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Abstract 
Surveillance of infections in blood donors and blood recipients can be 
useful for both transfusion medicine and public health. This thesis describes 
how an enhanced surveillance system for transfusion-transmissible infections 
has been established in England and Wales. 
Data from the surveillance system (1995 to 1999) have been used to 
monitor test performance and to describe the epidemiology of HBV, HCV and 
HIV in blood donors. The prevalence and incidence of HBV, HCV and HIV 
infections in blood donors have been monitored and were generally stable, and 
low compared to other countries and to other groups in the UK. HCV 
prevalence decreased throughout the 1990s. The exposure histories reported 
by infected donors indicate that donor selection largely succeeds in excluding 
high-risk groups, but also identify some failures in communication of, or 
compliance with, exclusion criteria. 
Diagnosed, reported, post-transfusion infections were rare and after 
investigation only 20% (21) were shown to have been transmitted by 
transfusion. The majority (52%) of reported transfusion-transmitted infections, 
and resulting deaths (3 of 4) were due to bacteria. The number of undiagnosed 
infections is not known but was estimated for HIV, HBV and HCV by 
calculations of the probability of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
due to true or false negatively to tests performed on donations prior to release. 
Various methods and assumptions have been used to investigate the 
robustness of these estimates and to develop an appropriate method for 
ongoing use in England and Wales. 
An enhanced surveillance system for transfusion-transmissible 
infections, that works in collaboration with national surveillance of infectious 
diseases and of non-infectious complications of transfusion, has been shown - 
despite some limitations - to provide data and analyses that have aided 
transfusion medicine and public health in England and Wales. This surveillance 
continues to develop and improve and further related work is planned. 
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1.1 Transfusion transmissible infections 
Transfusion of blood collected from one individual into another carries with 
it the possibility of transmitting blood-borne infectious agents. This is 
particularly important as patients receiving blood transfusions are often 
immunosuppressed or otherwise relatively vulnerable to infection. 
Transmission of syphilis (Treponema pallidum) was recognised in the early 
days of transfusion when blood was transferred directly from donor to recipient. 
Testing donations for treponemal antibodies and storage of blood between 
collection and transfusion has overcome this problem. Since then, three viral 
infections - HBV, HCV, and HIV - have been the predominant transfusion- 
transmitted agents to cause disease and to prompt changes in transfusion 
practice. Selective exclusion of individuals from giving blood based on 
increased risk associated with these blood-borne infections, and the testing of 
blood donations for serological markers of these infections have greatly reduced 
the risk of infectious donations entering the blood supply. Nevertheless, some 
risk will always remain because donor selection and serological testing of 
donations cannot identify and exclude every infectious donation. 
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At certain stages in their natural history many viral, bacterial, and protozoal 
infections can be blood-borne and may be transmitted by transfusion. 
Fortunately for transfusion medicine, many blood-borne organisms cause 
symptoms during the period of blood-borne infectivity that render their victims 
too unwell, or obviously unfit, to donate blood. Other agents are only present in 
the blood transiently and some agents do not survive the conditions of blood 
storage outside the human body. 
Variations in the length of time for which agents are present in the blood, 
and viable in stored blood, determine, to a large extent, variations in the risk of 
infectious donations being collected. Infections of most concern are those that 
have long periods of infectivity in the absence of any clinical signs or symptoms 
of infection and are stable in stored blood (for example, HBV, HIV and HCV). 
The length of time between infection and the development of detectable 
serological markers (the window period) also varies between agents (for 
example, 22 days for anti-HIV (Busch MP, 1995) and 66 days for anti-HCV 
(Barrera JM, 1995) using current assays). During the very start of this period - 
often referred to as the "eclipse" -infectious agent (nucleic acid) is absent from 
the blood or only found in very small numbers and blood is unlikely to be 
infectious if transfused. The infectious window period is therefore shorter than 
the total window period. The shorter the infectious window period, relative to 
the total asymptomatic sero-positive infective period, the better is the detection 
of infectious donations by serological testing. 
For infections with transient blood-borne infectivity (for example, HAV and 
parvovirus B19), the risk of infectious donations being collected depends upon 
the incidence of the infection in the donor population and the length of the 
infectious period. 
This general pattern of markers of infection can not be assumed for all 
infectious agents, as has been recently found for the infectious agents that 
cause spongiform encephalopathies (e. g. BSE, CJD). These agents do not 
conform in a number of ways, for example they do not contain nucleic acids. 
Viral infections 
Donor selection and donation testing prevent HBV, HCV and HIV 
infectious donations from entering the blood supply. However, these 
12 
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interventions are not 100% effective and transmissions of HBV (Elghouzzi M-H, 
1995), HCV (Kitchen AD, 1996; Vrielink H, 1995) and HIV (Conley LJ, 1992; 
Mak RP, 1993; Crawford RJ, 1987; CDR Weekly, 1997) by blood that tested 
negative for markers of infection have been documented in the UK and 
elsewhere. The expected risk of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
has also been estimated (Lackritz EM, 1995; Schreiber GB, 1996; Courouce 
AM, 1996). The potential of most other known blood borne viruses to be 
transmitted by transfusion and to cause morbidity or mortality in recipients is 
limited by relatively short periods of viraemia, and therefore low prevalence in 
donations, and by high immunity in recipients and low frequency of disease 
associated with infection. These factors, probably along with some 
transmissions resulting in mild, or non-specific symptomatology that is not 
precisely diagnosed, account for the rarity of clinically apparent HAV, parvo 
virus B19, CMV or EBV infection associated with transfusion. The case for 
intervention against transfusion transmission of HTLVI & II infections has 
become more compelling as reports of disease associated with these viruses, 
and particularly of disease in transfusion recipients (who are often 
immunosuppressed), have increased. (HTLV I is the etiological agent of adult T- 
cell leukaemia/lymphoma and of tropical spastic paraparesis or human T-cell 
lymphotropic virus type I-associated myelopathy (Ferreira OC, 1997). HTLV II is 
thought to cause a neurological syndrome similar to HTLV-I associated 
myelopathy and there is some evidence suggesting HTLV II predisposes to skin 
and soft tissue bacterial infections in injecting drug users (Murphy EL, 1996). ) 
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Box 1. Examples of viral infectious agents that have the potential for 
transmission by blood transfusion. 
from Barbara JAJ, 1994 
Hepatitis viruses 
Hepatitis A (HAV) - no carrier state (rarely transmitted) 
Hepatitis B (HBV) - carrier state 
Hepatitis D (HDV, or delta virus) - requires HBV 
Hepatitis C (HCV) - carrier state 
Human retroviruses 
Human immunodeficiency viruses, HIV-1 &2- latent state 
Human T-cell leukaemia, HTLV-I & II - latent state 
Herpes viruses 
Cytomegalovirus (CMV) - latent state 
Epstein-Barr virus (EBV) - latent state 
Non-viral infections 
Potentially, a large number and variety of non-viral agents may be 
transmitted by transfusion, both endogenous agents present in the donor at the 
time of donation and exogenous contamination occurring during collection and 
processing. The transmission of syphilis was a serious problem with early 
transfusions given directly from donor to patient. The storage of certain blood 
components (e. g. platelets) at 22°C rather than 4°C provides more favourable 
growth conditions for bacteria. Although rare, serious sequelae such as 
septicaemia and septic shock do occur (e. g. Boulton F, 1997) and approaches 
to identify and reduce the risks are under consideration. 
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Box 2. Examples of non-viral infectious agents that have the potential for 
transmission by blood transfusion. 
rom Kitchen AD, 1994 
Bacteria 
Endogenous bacteria 
Syphilis (Treponema pallidum) 
Lyme disease (Borrelia burgdorfen) 
Brucellosis (Brucella melitensis) 
Yersinia entercolitica (and others) 
Exogenous bacteria 
Environmental species, for example Staphylococcus epidermidis, 
Pseudomonas spp. and Serratia marcescens 
Rickettsiae 
Rocky mountain spotted fever (Rickettsia rickettsii) 
Q fever (Coxiella burnettii) 
Parasites 
Malaria (Plasmodium spp. ) 
Toxoplasmosis (Toxoplasma gondii) 
Trypanosomiasis (Chagas' disease and sleeping sickness) 
Whether prion disease can be transmitted by transfusion is currently 
uncertain (Ricketts MN, 1997). Unknown infections and infections with 
increasing potential to cause harm to recipients due to the changing 
epidemiology of the infection, or changing vulnerability of blood recipients to 
disease, may pose the greatest risks of infection to recipients. Avoidance of 
unnecessary transfusion and vigilance of blood-borne infectious diseases in the 
general population and in blood recipients are therefore important general 
components of transfusion medicine. Vigilance of infectious diseases in blood 
recipients - particularly in multiply transfused patients - can also contribute to 
early public health knowledge of emerging infections and to their control. 
Strategies to reduce risk 
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There are three main strategies for preventing infectious donations from 
entering the blood supply issued to hospitals. The first concerns the recruitment 
and selection of blood donors who do not have a known increased risk of 
infection. The second is the testing of donations for markers of infections. The 
third covers the control of cleanliness during component production. 
Selection of blood donors 
Donor recruitment and selection aims to select a group of individuals with 
a low risk of infection. To achieve this low risk both the prevalence of infection 
and the incidence of infection should be low. In practice incidence is often 
difficult to measure. The selection of a "low risk" group therefore often depends 
on identifying groups with low seroprevalence and without the characteristics or 
exposures associated with an increased risk of infection. There are some 
general guidelines for donor selection (which are well founded in experience). 
Voluntary donors are considered safer than paid donors, and repeat donors 
safer than new donors. However, selection of these individuals is not 
guaranteed to be effective - particularly for newly identified infections or for 
infections with changing epidemiology. 
New knowledge about exposures of increased risk for blood-borne 
infections is regularly considered so that guidelines for pre-donation donor 
selection in the UK can be revised as necessary. Unapparent infections and 
non-recognition or denial of risk factors in donors prevents the exclusion of all 
infected donations by pre-donation selection criteria. 
Donation testing 
A pre-transfusion test for syphilis has been performed routinely on each 
blood donation since the beginning of the transfusion service in England and 
Wales in 1946. It has been known since 1941 that spirochaetes survive poorly 
at low temperatures (Turner TB, 1941) and the storage of blood at 4-6°C has 
largely eliminated syphilis transmission by transfusion. There is no mandatory 
requirement for testing in Europe and the need for testing is now a matter for 
debate. The most persuasive arguments for continuing have been the 
increasing use of products such as platelets that are stored at 22°C and the 
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expectation that testing for syphilis may exclude some individuals who may be 
at increased risk of other sexually transmitted infections, e. g. HIV and HBV. 
Transfusion transmitted serum hepatitis has been recognised since the 
1940s, and was particularly common in recipients of blood products when large 
pools were used as the starting material. With no test for the infection, the 
measures taken to limit transmission were restricting plasma pools to 10 
donations and removing donors from the panel when a patient developed 
hepatitis following a transfusion of their blood. Identification of an antigen 
shown to be associated with hepatitis (called the Australia antigen) was 
followed by approval of donation testing in July 1971. By December 1972 all 
donations in the UK were being tested for hepatitis B surface antigen (Gunson 
HH, 1996). 
Accounts of AIDS in recipients of blood and blood products began to be 
reported in the literature in the early 1980s (MMWR, 1982; Amman AJ, 1983). 
With no test available, in September 1983 information was distributed to all 
donors, and potential donors, asking persons not to give blood if they thought 
they had the disease or were at risk of acquiring it (i. e. homosexual men with 
many partners, injecting drug users and sexual contacts of people with AIDS). 
A test for anti-HIV has been used for all donations since 14th October 1985. 
The criteria for excluding individuals with an increased risk of infection have 
been revised as more has been learnt about the epidemiology of HIV infection 
in the UK. As argued by others (Hewitt PE, 1994), and as shown later in this 
thesis, donor selection remains important as a means of reducing the number of 
anti-HIV positive donations entering the testing process and of reducing the risk 
of donations collected following infection but before antibody can be detected 
(Hewitt PE, 1994). 
Transfusion transmitted hepatitis continued, albeit at a much reduced 
frequency (Howell DR, 1995), after the introduction of donor screening for 
HBsAg. The majority of cases were due to an unknown agent, so called non-A, 
non-B hepatitis (NANBH). Some countries introduced surrogate tests for NANB 
hepatitis. These tests were assays for hepatitis B core antibody (anti-HBc) and 
tests for raised levels of liver enzymes (e. g. ALT). 
In the late 1980s a virus, to be named HCV, was identified by cloning 
nucleic acid from plasma of a chimp with NANBH (Choo Q-L, 1989). A 
diagnostic assay was first produced in 1990. Specificity of the tests was 
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improved by early 1991 and testing of all blood donations commenced in the UK 
on 1st September 1991. 
Over the years there has been a steady introduction of available measures to 
reduce risks that have been recognised. Table 1.1 shows the tests for markers 
of transfusion-transmissible infection that are currently performed on all blood 
donations in the UK. The introduction of each of these tests has led to a 
reduction in the number of transfusion-transmitted infections. During the first 
full year of anti-HIV (1986) and anti-HCV (1992) testing in England and Wales 
38 and 807 positive donors were identified respectively - thus preventing the 
donations from these donors entering the blood supply. As time passes 
following the introduction of a marker test, and the population of repeat blood 
donors passes through the testing process, the overall rate of infectious 
donations identified decreases. The number of positive donations excluded 
from the blood supply in England and Wales by donation testing during 1997 is 
shown in Table 1.1. Many of these HBsAg, anti-HIV or anti-HCV positive 
donations are expected to infect recipients if transfused. As donations'are now 
processed into several components, an infectious donation has the potential to 
expose several recipients to infection. 
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Table 1.1 Routine testing for markers of transfusion-transmissible infection in 
England & Wales and the effect of testing on the prevention of infections in 
blood transfusion recipients. 
Assay Data of Number of positive Reduction in transfusion-transmitted 
introduction to donations infections in England & Wales 
routine donation excluded by following introduction of routine 
testing testing during 1997 test 
Uncertain: it is difficult to ascribe 
Treponemal by 1950 100 reduction in transfusion-transmitted 
antibodies (1 in 21,703 syphilis to testing since storage at 4°C 
donations) leads to inactivation of T. pallidum. 
There was a marked fall in post- 
HBsAg early 1970's 123 transfusion acute HBV infections. E. g. 
(1 in 21,710 North London blood centre recorded 30 
donations) reports of cases in 1970,12 in 1972,6 
in 1974 and 3 in 1976 (Barbara JAJ, 
1981). 
There have been 69 HIV infections 
Anti-HIV 1 October 1985 29 diagnosed that were probably 
Anti-HIV 1&2 June 1990 (1 in 92,079 transmitted by transfusion in the UK 
donations) prior to 10/85#, and 3 that were 
transfused between 10/85 and the end 
of 1997. 
Transfusion prior to 9/91 has been 
Anti-HCV September 1991 236 associated with 128 (4.3%) of 
(1 in 11,315 laboratory reports of HCV infection with 
donations) risk factor information (1992-1996) 
(Ramsay ME, 1998). Between 1/10/95 
and 30/9/99 2 cases of HCV 
transmission by transfusion post 9/91 
have been reported+. 
Other factors, such as improved donor selection, will have contributed. 
# Source: PHLS AIDS Centre (data as of 1st September 1998). 
+ Source: SHOT Report, 98-99. 
Maximising the effectiveness of donation testing includes assuring good 
test performance. Strategies to achieve this include the evaluation of test kits, 
and test kit batches, for suitability and reliability in the blood centre setting, 
before their use by transfusion services. Monitoring performance once a test is 
in use is also important. 
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Testing blood donations improves the safety of the blood supply in two 
direct, and quantifiable, ways: 
1. Infectious donations found to be positive for markers of infection at the 
time of donation are removed. 
2. Infected donors are excluded from the donor population, and infected 
donations are therefore prevented from entering blood centres in the 
future. In practice this is only assured if infected donors do not conceal 
information about their previous donation, and the blood service's 
information system identifies them as infected donors if they attend to 
donate again. On rare occasions infected donors may re-attend for re- 
testing, either deliberately or in ignorance, and more than one infected 
donation from the same donor may enter the testing system. 
Testing also improves the safety of the blood supply in three indirect ways 
- more difficult to quantify and to distinguish the effects of each from each other 
and from other causes: 
1. Donors who are at increased risk of blood-borne infections are 
excluded from the donor population. As blood-borne infections 
often have common routes of transmission, donors with evidence of 
one infection may be at increased risk of having other blood-borne 
infections that are not detected by donation testing. 
2. Also, some individuals who have been in contact with infected 
donors (e. g. sexual contacts) may be at increased risk of infection 
and infected donations may be prevented from entering blood 
centres if these individuals are instructed not to donate blood. 
3. The diagnosis of infection in a donor, and the surveillance of 
infections and risk factors in donors can improve methods of donor 
selection, for example, the detection of HCV antibodies in blood 
donors revealed a large group of donors who had been exposed to 
blood-borne infections by injecting drugs (MacLennan S, 1994): 
donor selection has been revised in the light of this finding. 
Additional serological tests are performed in some countries. Some aim to 
detect infections missed by current testing, for example, HIV p24 antigen and 
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anti-HBc. Others detect transfusion-transmissible infections that are currently 
not tested for in the UK, for example, anti-HTLV. Others detect surrogate 
markers of infection, for example, ALT for hepatitis viruses, low pH 
hemagglutination for parvovirus B19, alpha-neopterin for detecting 
inflammation. The countries in which additional tests have been adopted have 
tended to have higher frequency of infections, and therefore of risk of 
transmissible infection, than in England and Wales. However, this is not always 
the case. Factors such as the expected risk of disease occurring in recipients, 
the amount of public concern about blood safety and the infection in question, 
and the availability of resources have also played a part in determining the 
differences in blood testing strategies in different countries. The availability of 
tests for nucleic acids provides an opportunity to detect infections that cannot 
be detected by serological tests. Donations collected during the window period 
of early infection are the main candidates. Nucleic acid testing (NAT) should 
detect infectious donations from seronegative donors and from any seropositive 
donors that routine serological testing fails to detect. Nucleic acid tests for HCV 
RNA were introduced during 1999 in the UK (with increasing implementation as 
a pre-release test for fresh components over the following 2 years), with testing 
of mini-pools of (96) plasma samples followed by further testing of smaller pools 
and individual samples of positive mini-pools. Initially the primary motivation to 
introduce this testing was compliance with requirements for manufacture of 
pooled plasma products (Flanagan P, 1998) but implementation was not halted 
when the UK stopped using UK sourced plasma for product manufacture. The 
potential additional benefit for a blood service of such procedures for specific 
agents will depend on the epidemiology of the agent in their population (see 
Chapter 5). 
Assessing the value of additional donation testing strategies must consider 
some or all of the following costs: 
" The cost of test kits and reagents and related laboratory costs including 
staff time 
" The costs of confirmatory testing on reactive donations 
" The costs of notifying, counselling, and referring donors who are 
positive to new tests, or who have persistent false reactivity to the new tests 
used 
21 
Chapter 1 
" The costs of replacing donors excluded because of positivity (or false 
persistent reactivity) to the tests used 
" The costs of any delay in the release of blood components while testing 
is performed 
" The costs of added data management and added complexity to the 
blood release procedure 
" The costs of look-backs - that is, of tracing and testing recipients who 
may have been exposed to infection by earlier donations from donors found to 
be positive. 
" Costs of litigation due to transmissions 
" Costs of lost confidence in transfusion (psychological costs) and in the 
political system responsible for transfusion. 
Control of production and administration 
Certain manufacturing processes and conditions can reduce the 
probability of transmitting an infection by blood transfusion. Strict control of 
cleanliness during component production limits the opportunities for bacterial 
contamination. Storage of whole blood and red cells at 4°C ± 2°C limits the 
growth of many bacteria that may be present in blood. 
Developments to testing systems, and controls on those systems, that 
ensure the release only of components that are negative for markers of infection 
have been a crucial factor in the improvement of safety gained by donation 
testing. Automation of testing, along with inclusion of controlled steps in 
commercial tests, has enabled strict standardisation and close monitoring of the 
testing process. One example of an important addition to the testing processes 
is sample addition monitors that change colour (measurable on a 
spectrophotometer) when serum or plasma is added. Another is process 
control automation. Use of appropriate quality control samples, as well as the 
manufacturer's controls, and "go-no-go" samples, adds a further check on test 
performance. The computerisation of test results and of component release 
has helped to increase safety in the face of increasing numbers of donations 
and the increasing volume of data generated during the testing of each 
donation. 
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Practices beyond the transfusion centre also contribute to the prevention 
of transfusion-transmitted disease. Strategies to avoid transfusion as a 
treatment unless absolutely necessary, and to inactivate viruses by heat or 
solvent detergent treatments of products, prevent exposures. Strategies to 
provide prophylactic treatment to recipients can also play a useful role. For 
example, HBV immunisation is currently recommended for haemophiliacs, 
those receiving regular blood transfusions or blood products, or those carers 
responsible for the administration of such products (Salisbury & Begg, 1996). 
Manufacturing processes that involve pooling donations or components, 
e. g. for treatment with solvent detergents, require careful consideration. 
Pooling (unless the infection is neutralised by antibodies also present in the 
pool) can lead to an infectious agent in one donation entering multiple products, 
and should be avoided for that reason. Pooling is particularly dangerous with 
regard to agents that are not excluded by current testing strategies, including 
agents that are as yet unknown. 
Maintenance of cold storage until used at the bedside, and administration 
with sterile equipment is also important. 
Consequences of transfusion-transmitted infections 
Infected recipients do not necessarily develop disease, and estimating the 
effect of infections requires knowledge about the natural history of infections. 
Transfusion-transmitted infections also bear a risk of onward transmission. 
The major risk factors for transmission of the persistent viral infections i. e. 
injecting drug use and sexual contact may be relatively rare amongst 
transfusion recipients because of their health and high average age. However, 
this is not always the case and other types of contact - especially those 
common in health care settings - pose a risk of secondary transmission. 
1.2 Estimation of the risks of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
Quantifying the risk of transfusion-transmission of infection can be 
attempted by several methods - each method having different limitations. 
Existing surveillance systems monitor diagnosed transfusion-transmitted 
infections. Several factors common to transfusion-transmitted infections, and to 
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transfusion recipients, are likely to contribute to a lack of clinically apparent 
symptoms and therefore to under-diagnosis of infections. Other therapies may 
negate or modify symptoms. For example, many transfusion recipients are 
receiving antibiotic drugs and are therefore less likely to suffer observable 
consequences from bacterial infections. Transfusion recipients are sick or 
injured, and often elderly, and have high mortality from other causes. The 
recipients who receive relatively large numbers of transfusions, and are 
therefore at the highest risk of transfusion-transmitted infections, have the 
highest mortality rates. Long pre-symptomatic periods are common for 
persistent blood-borne virus infections and occurrence of disease is therefore 
far removed in the future. This period may be reduced when infected by a 
larger viral dose, at an older age, and in already ill or immunocompromised 
individuals, but this is not always known. Even so, transfusion in the past may 
be overlooked as a possible route of infection when diagnosis is delayed for a 
period. 
For some infections (for example, HAV and B19), naturally acquired 
immunity may be quite high - especially in older age groups - meaning that 
transmission of infection may be considerably less frequent than infectious 
transfusions. Also, asymptomatic infection is more common amongst the 
younger age groups who have the lower levels of naturally acquired immunity; 
so infection transmissions may not result in any disease. Recognised and 
reported cases of transfusion-transmitted infections are likely to be those with 
the more apparent, and more severe, clinical consequences. 
There are therefore many handicaps to the recognition of transfusion- 
transmitted infections and these lead to ascertainment biases and limitations in 
data based on reports of diagnoses. Actively following up transfused recipients 
and testing them for evidence of transfusion-transmitted infections can 
overcome these. In the UK, transfusion-transmission of infection with observed 
clinical consequences is rare - both in absolute terms and relative to incidents of 
infection transmission by other routes. The number of recipients that need to be 
followed up in order to obtain a precise estimate of transmission rates is 
therefore very large and such studies have become prohibitively expensive. 
Table 1.2 shows some examples, using the rule of three to estimate binomial 
confidence intervals, (Armitage, 1998) of the number of subjects needed in 
cohort studies to produce a 95% Cl that excludes a given transmission rate in 
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studies that observe no cases (assuming no loss of power due to loss to follow- 
up or error in recipient tracing) i. e. the minimum size of cohorts needed to 
demonstrate that the true transmission rate is lower than the given rate. 
Table 1.2. Sample size calculations for transmission studies. 
Transmission rate (per Number needed in cohort 
number of units for 95% CI on transmission 
transfused) rate of zero (i. e. when no 
transmissions observed) to 
exclude given rate. 
1 in 10,000 30,000 
1 in 100,000 300,000 
1 in 3 million 9 million 
I in 10 million 30 million 
A recent study of over 22,000 units issued in London and the South East 
found no transfusion-transmitted HIV, HBV, HCV or HTLV I&II infections (Regan 
FAM, 2000). Another approach is to estimate the number of infectious 
donations that current donation testing is not expected to detect. To attempt 
such estimation, information is needed about infection rates in the population 
donating blood, about the development and persistence of the markers that are 
tested for and about the tests, and testing system, used. The probability of a 
donation being collected during the window period when the tests used cannot 
detect evidence of infection depends upon the incidence of the infection and the 
length of the window period. The probability of symptoms that may prevent 
donation occurring during this period may also need to be considered. 
Incidence is usually calculated using observations of seroconversions in repeat 
donors or observations of acute infections in donors. The predictive value of a 
negative test result depends upon the prevalence of the marker and the 
sensitivity of the test. The probability of a marker positive donation being 
released into the blood supply due to a failure, or error, in the testing system 
also depends upon the prevalence of the marker and upon the probability of a 
failure or error. 
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Table 1.3 shows some key items of information required to calculate 
theoretical estimates of the risk of a donation infectious for a given organism 
entering the blood supply. The range of values in which each of the variables in 
Table 1.3 might lie depends on the sample used to estimate the variable, the 
biological variability involved, and the assumptions made in obtaining the 
working value. 
Table 1.3 Key information for estimating the risk of donations infectious for 
known pathogens entering the blood supply despite donation testing. 
Component of risk Information needed and source of that information 
Derived from donation testing Other sources 
i. Risk of seronegative infectious " Incidence of infection in " Length of the infectious 
donation being collected during donors seronegative window period 
early infection following infection 
ii. Risk of seropositive donation " Prevalence of marker used " Sensitivity of tests for the 
entering the blood supply through to indicate infectivity in marker 
test failure or process error donations " Rate of errors that could 
lead to failure to identify or 
withdraw a positive donation 
iii. Risk of seronegative infectious " Frequency of seronegative, 
donation being collected from infectious individuals (other 
donors with established (not than those in the window 
early) infection period following infection) 
amongst blood donors 
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Table 1.4. Published risk estimation studies. 
Country Estimated risk of Window Length of False Test Estimate 
Year of data/ Infectious donations period infectious negative sensitivity for new 
estimates per million donations (WP) risk window period (FN) & (S) & error donor 
(Reference) (range) estimated used in days error risk rate (ER) donation 
(Range) estimated used included 
USA, 1986-87 HIV 26 Yes 56(28-98) Yes S: 99% Partially 
(Ward, 1988) No - WP=No FN=Yes 
USA, 1987 HIV 6.5 (3.33-11.33) Yes 56 No - Yes 
(Cumming, 1989) Yes ER: 0.1% 
USA, 1987 HIV 4.64 Yes 56 No - Yes 
(Brookmeyer, 1994) No - 
UK, 1986-87 HIV: 1986 3.2 Yes 56 Yes S: 98% Partially 
(Hickman, 1988) HIV: 1987 1.1 No - WP=No 
FN=Yes 
Australia, 1985-90 HIV: 1.08 Yes 28-42 Yes S: 99.69% Yes 
(Dax, 1992) No 
USA, 1991-93 HIV: 2.03 (0.36-4.95) Yes 22 (6-38) No - No 
(Schreiber, 1996) HTLV: 1.56 (0.50-3.90) 51(36-72) No - 
HCV: 9.70 (3.47-36.11) 82 (54-192) 
HBsAg: 6.65 (2.87-13.43) 59 (37-87) 
HBV: 15.83 6.82-31.97 
USA, 1992-93 HIV: 1.52-2.22 Yes Average of 25 No - Yes 
(Lackritz, 1995) Yes ER: 0.5% 
France. 1992-94 HIV: 1.75 (0.3-4.6) Yes 22 (6-38) No - No 
(Courouce, 1996) HTLV: 0.17 (0.0-1.6) 56(24-128) No - 
HCV: 4.48 (1.7-10.0) 66 (38-94) 
HBsAg: 3.13 (0.9-11.2) 51 (36-72) 
HBV: 8.45 2.8-25.2 
Germany & Austria, HIV (Austria): 1.9 (0.7- Yes 22 Yes S: 99% Yes 
1993 4.8) Yes ER: 0.1% 
(Schwartz, 1995) HIV (Germany): 1.1 (0.4- 
2.6 
Austria & Germany, HCV (Austria): 111 (61- Yes 74 Yes S: 98% Yes 
1994-5 161) Yes ER: 0.1% 
(Riggert, 1996) HCV (Germany): 208 (25- 
756 
Australia, 1994-95 HIV: 0.79 (0.22-1.37) Yes 22 (6-38) No - No 
(Whyte, 1997) HCV: 4.27 (2.82-10.01) 82 (54-192) No - 
HBsAg: 2.71 (1.70-4.00) 59(37-87) 
HBV: 6.45 4.05-9.52 
South Africa HIV: 22(11-39) Yes 34-98 Yes S: 99.9% Yes 
(Sitas, 1994) Yes ER: 0.1% 
Germany, 1996 HIV: 0.53(0.21-1.39) Yes 22 No - No 
(Gluck, 1998) HCV: 8.8(3.3-31) 82 No - 
HBV: 4.3(l. 6-7.5) 56 
Germany, 1990-95 HCV: 1995 5(0.7-10) Yes 74 Yes S: 98% 
(Koerner. 1998) repeat Yes ER: 0.1% 
HCV: 1995 50(36-67) 
new 
EPFA countries , HIV: 0.43(0.18-0.82) Yes HIV: 22(6-38) 
No - No 
1997 HCV: 1.61(0.93-2.29) HCV: 66(38-94) No - 
(Muller-Breitkreutz, HBV: 2.51(1.57-3.70) HBV: 59(37-87) 
1999) 
Thailand, 1990-93 HIV: 1990 380 (210-650) Yes 45 No - No 
(Kitayapom, 1996) HIV: 1991 190 (100-340) No - 
HIV: 1992 200 (110-360) 
HIV: 1993 190 50-670 
N. Thailand, 1989-94 HIV: 1,290 (880-1900) " Yes 45 No 
No 
(Sawanpanyalert, No - 
1996) 
Ivory Coast, 1991 HIV: 5,400-10,600 Yes 56 Yes S: 99.0% Yes 
Savant, 1992) No 
Central & South HIV/HBV/HCV or T. cruzi: Different approach: estimates based on prevalence of infections and % of 
America, 1993-94 Average = 3,226 donations tested. 
Schmunis, 1998 
' Various methods. 
2 Not-for profit blood services in Denmark, England, France, Finland, 
Germany, Scotland, Switzerland (NB data and estimates for Australia and 
American Red Cross are also included in paper). 
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Published estimates of the risk of viral transmission by transfusion for 
different blood services and different periods of time have varied in their 
methods and scope. Differences in the risk of infectious donations between the 
early days of HIV testing and more recent years (due largely to the reduced 
window period of more recent tests) and between countries of high infection 
prevalence and incidence and countries of low infection prevalence and 
incidence show clearly in the risk estimates produced for different years and 
countries. However, variations in the methods used to calculate risk estimates 
mean that relatively small differences in the estimates produced by countries 
using similar testing systems and with similar epidemiology are more difficult to 
interpret. 
Table 1.4 summarises some published studies that have provided 
theoretical estimates of the risk of transfusion-transmitted infections. All of 
these studies have included estimation of the risk of window period donations 
(i. e. i. in Table 1.3) associated with donations from repeat donors. Some 
studies have included estimation of the risk of false negative results and errors 
(i. e. ii. in Table 1.3). In all, the risk of persistent (or fluctuating) seronegativity 
during established infections (i. e. iii. in Table 1.3) in blood donors has not been 
included or has been assumed to be zero. 
In the USA the fall in the estimated risk of issuing HIV infectious donations 
between 1987 and the early 1990s was largely due to a reduction in the length 
of the window period used in the risk calculations (from 56 days to 22 days). 
The markedly higher estimated risk of HIV infectious donations in the Thai study 
is largely the result of the higher incidence of HIV infection in Thailand than in 
Europe and North America, although the longer window period used in this 
study also contributed to this higher estimated risk. The published studies have 
varied in whether they have estimated the risk from all donations, or just from 
donations from repeat donors. New (i. e. first time) donors differ from repeat 
donors in ways that affect the risk of an infectious donation entering the blood 
supply. Probably most important is that new donors have not been previously 
tested by the blood service for markers of infections used to exclude individuals 
from the donor panel. So, donations from new donors have a higher prevalence 
of infectious markers. Incidence of infection can be derived from donation 
testing in two ways; by testing donations for markers indicative of an early 
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infection (e. g. IgM class of antibody to hepatitis B core antigen, p24 HIV 
antigen, nucleic acids, or testing for low titre anti-HIV with recently proposed 
de-tuned antibody assays), or by using seroconversions in repeat donors that 
mark infections that have arisen since a previous donation. The former 
approach was not used in any of the studies listed in Table 1.4. All except one 
used the latter approach. Brookmeyer et al did not use donation testing data at 
all but utilised back-calculated estimates of the infection curve in the United 
States. Unfortunately seroconversions can only be observed in repeat donors: 
additional information and assumptions have to be used to obtain an estimate of 
incidence in new donors. Cumming et al used the prevalence observed in 
donations and assumptions about the time donors had been at risk of HIV 
infection to estimate incidence rates in donors tested for the first time. Lackritz 
et al used the prevalence observed in donations from new and from repeat 
donors during the first year of testing and assumptions about how the difference 
between these prevalences represented differences in incidence. Dax et a/ 
used the prevalence observed in donations and assumptions about the time 
course of HIV infection and about the probability of donating throughout that 
time. 
More recently the use of de-tuned HIV antibody tests has been used to 
detect recent infections and to derive incidence (Jansen RS, 1998 and 
McFarland W, 1999). This method applies a sensitive and a less-sensitive (de- 
tuned) assay to samples and classifies samples that are positive to the sensitive 
assay and negative to the less-sensitive assay as early infections. 
There has been no standard approach to the calculation of ranges around 
point estimates. Some studies have repeated the calculations using the "best" 
and "worst" values of some or all variables (e. g. window period length) to give 
the best and worst estimates. Some studies have used 95% confidence 
intervals around observed rates to allow for sampling variability in the data 
used. 
One group has produced two studies that both used data from two 
countries (Germany and Austria) to produce comparable estimates for two 
blood services (Schwartz 1995, Riggert 1996). Another produced comparable 
estimates for a larger collection of blood services - those blood services 
collaborating in the European Plasma Fractionation Association's viral marker 
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surveillance (Muller-Breitkruetz, 1999). The estimates for the 8 European 
collaborating blood services ranged from 0.05 infectious donations per million to 
1.4 per million for HIV 1+2, from 0.43 to 4.97 per million for HCV and from 0.9 to 
4.6 per million for HBV. As the same methods were used to generate the risk 
estimate for each blood service in this study, the differences in the risk 
estimates for the different blood services are - assuming the data submitted by 
each blood service were comparable - due only to statistical variability in the 
data used and to true differences in the risks dependent on the different 
epidemiology in the donors to the organisations. 
Perhaps the most notable, and compelling, observation from reviewing 
these estimates is the disparity between the level of viral risk experienced in the 
less developed countries (e. g. Thailand, Ivory Coast) and that experienced in 
more developed countries (e. g. those in Western Europe and North America). 
Studies frequently state that the risk of a donation being collected during 
the window period is the largest remaining risk of infection transmission (for 
infections that donations are tested for). This is often actually an assumption 
rather than a demonstrated fact. The relative importance of each component of 
the risk of accepting infectious donations varies between blood services 
depending on the specifications of donation testing, the proportion of donations 
collected from new donors and the rates of incidence and prevalence in the 
donating population. Figure 1.1 shows how the percentage of the total risk 
estimate due to the window period of early infection can vary with different 
prevalence and incidence. Many studies omit separate calculations for 
donations from new donors. However, donations from new donors consistently 
have higher prevalence and there are good reasons to expect they will also 
have higher incidence. The greater the proportion of donations collected from 
new donors the larger the contribution to the overall risk is that associated with 
donations from new donors (the Thai study reports that 76% of all donations 
were collected from new donors); and the greater the prevalence of infection the 
more important the risk of false negative tests and errors in the exclusion of 
seropositive donations. According to an analysis of data for England (Soldan K, 
Barbara J et a/ Unpublished work), 1993-1995, less than 10% of the total 
estimated risk of an HCV infectious donation entering the blood supply in 
England would be due to window period donations from repeat donors (if 
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window period for anti-HCV is 66 days (54-192), test sensitivity for anti-HCV is 
98%, error rate is 0.5%). Studies that omit some components of risk or only 
consider donations from repeat donors would usually (to an extent dependent 
on their epidemiology and selection and testing practices) underestimate the 
risk of an infected donation entering the blood supply. 
Figure 1.1 Variation in components of risk with varying prevalence and 
incidence 
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In most risk estimation studies estimates of incidence based on 
seroconversions have been a key element. The use of seroconversions to 
estimate incidence involves an assumption that donors are not more likely to 
self-defer, either temporarily or permanently, after they have seroconverted and 
that the probability of an individual donating blood does not vary over the course 
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of antibody development after infection. There are some observations, such as 
longer than average inter-donation intervals in donors who have seroconverted 
for antibodies to HCV (Soldan K, 1998), and fewer than expected HIV p24 
antigen positive, HIV antibody negative donations in the USA (Scheiber G, 
1997), that suggest that donors are more likely to self-defer during the window 
phase. This may be due to a perception of recent risk, symptomatic primary 
infection, or perhaps just a disrupted life less conducive with donation around 
the time of their exposure to infection. 
HBsAg negativity during established HBV infection can occur in healthy 
adults at the tail end of HBV carriage. Transmission from such donors has 
been observed (Soldan K, 1999) and this risk should be included in estimates of 
total risk where blood services use HBsAg alone as a marker of HBV infective 
donations. 
Several other scenarios that could lead to infectious donations entering 
the blood supply are seldom considered in risk estimates. The sensitivity of 
assays is typically estimated using a panel of samples considered 
representative of the population positive for the marker concerned. The 
potential of newly recognised subtypes and variants of viral infections to escape 
detection by assays is not addressed by most risk estimation studies. Since 
HIV antibody testing began, there has been an emphasis on improving the 
sensitivity of tests with regard to early seroconversions concentrating on the 
HIV sub-type that has been most common in Europe and the USA, sub-type B. 
Other subtypes of HIV-1 infection have become more globally distributed, and 
the importance of ensuring assays have high sensitivity to a comprehensive 
range of HIV sub-types, should not be overlooked (Gurtler L, 1998). Mutant 
HBV infections, not detected by HBsAg tests, have also been shown to pose a 
risk (Jongerius JM, 1998). 
Data that could verify or refute the results of risk estimation studies are 
rare. The introduction of nucleic acid technology (NAT) for testing donations 
should detect infectious donations missed by current serological tests and 
therefore provide some data to compare with the estimates. However, if the 
estimates from Europe and the USA are close to, or higher than, the true risk, 
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several years of data collection from NAT testing will be needed to test the 
accuracy of the estimates. 
Use of risk estimate 
The comparability of these estimates to other risks of morbidity is not 
straightforward. Infectious donations entering the blood supply do not directly 
translate to infected recipients and the actual risk of disease also depends upon 
the transmission rate, susceptibility of the recipient and the natural history of 
transfusion-transmitted infections in recipients. Information about natural 
history is often only available from case reports or from studies in other patient 
groups. The size of the infective dose, and the relatively poor health status of 
recipients, may make transmission, and rapid disease progression, more likely. 
On the other hand, some infectious agents may lose viability during their 
storage between collection and transfusion. 
The communication and use of risk estimates is often difficult (Caiman KC, 
1997). Misunderstanding of these risk estimates, or ignorance of their 
limitations can lead to a false sense of confidence, or a false sense of alarm, in 
the safety of transfusion. 
Only those components of risk that are known about are estimated and the 
accuracy of the estimates is only as good as the accuracy of the information 
used to derive them. While these estimates of the risk of infectious donations 
being accepted and entering the blood supply can be of value, they can give the 
misleading impression that the true and total infectious risk of transfusion is 
known. They should not be allowed to detract attention and resources away 
from un-estimated risks. The true infectious risks of blood transfusion involve 
both infections already known to be blood-borne (such as HBV, HIV and HCV), 
and those that have not yet been identified. The latter category may have 
considerable impact on blood services, for example the current concern and 
activity due to possibility of transmission of vCJD by transfusion (Barbara JAJ, 
1998), and represents a potential hazard of transfusion that has been 
repeatedly realised as blood-borne infections have been recognised. These as 
yet unidentified risks justify the use of generic measures to limit the exposure of 
recipients such as restricting donation pooling, the use of viral inactivation and 
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the avoidance of unnecessary transfusion therapy irrespective of how low the 
estimated risks for HBV, HCV and HIV become. 
1.3 Epidemiology of infections in blood donors and recipients: implications for 
public health 
The testing of blood donations for markers of infectious disease has not 
only reduced the rate of transfusion transmitted infections, but has also 
provided opportunities for the relatively early treatment of the infections 
detected in "healthy" individuals (Seymour CA, 1994) and for the prevention of 
further transmission by other routes. Regional or national collation of the results 
of testing blood donations has contributed to knowledge about the frequency of 
infections in the population (McGarrigle C, 1997; MacLennan S, 1994). 
Comparisons of different geographical areas or different time periods can reflect 
differences in the frequency of infection in the population from which the donors 
come, or differences in the donor recruitment and selection, or donation testing, 
procedures. Despite the biases introduced by donor recruitment and selection, 
international comparisons (WHO, 1996; Naplas B, 1996) have typically provided 
rankings of infection rates that have concurred with information about infection 
rates in the population from other sources. The follow up of infected donors has 
also provided useful information about unrecognised, or unapparent routes of 
infection (Power JP, 1995; Hewitt PE, 1994). The collation of the probable 
routes of HIV infection of blood donors has contributed to the relatively scarce 
information about the extent of HIV transmission by sex between men and 
women in the UK (Gunson HH, 1991). The identification of newly acquired 
infections in repeat donors (i. e. the observation of seroconversions between 
donations) has been of particular interest as it has provided the opportunity to 
study the serology and infectivity of recent infections (Petersen LR, 1994), and 
to observe the complete natural history of infections that are typically only 
detected when clinical symptoms appear many years after infection. 
Information about seroconverting donors has also been used to identify and 
describe current, rather than past, probable routes of infection transmission 
(Soldan K, 1998). 
In addition to the opportunistic use of data derived from donation testing 
and the follow up of donors found to be infected, the donor population has also 
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been used as a study base for special studies of the epidemiology and natural 
history of infections. The selection and recruitment of suitable controls for case- 
control studies is relatively easy and this study design has been used most 
recently to investigate risk factors for HCV infection (Goodrick MJ, 1994; Neal 
KR, 1994). 
When considering the infectivity of blood from donors, and the natural 
history of infections transmitted by transfusion, knowledge obtained from 
observing infections transmitted by other routes may not be reliable. In 
particular, the progression of disease due to some viral infections may be 
affected by the infective dose. An infected blood component typically exposes a 
recipient to a far higher viral dose than other routes of transmission. Never-the- 
less, recipients exposed to infected blood have often been used for studying the 
natural history of blood-borne infections, particularly of the development of 
markers of infection and of symptoms in the early stages of infection, and of the 
onset of disease associated with chronic viral infections. 
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Introduction 
2.1 A brief history of blood transfusion 
Records of transfusion of blood to human beings date back to one by 
Samuel Pepys over 300 years ago when Arthur Coga received a few ounces of 
sheep's blood before an audience with the Royal Society. James Blundell 
pioneered human transfusions during the 19th century, but it was the 
combination of the discovery of ABO blood groups by Landsteiner in 1900 and 
the impetus of the injuries of the two World wars and the Spanish Civil War that 
resulted in blood transfusion becoming an established medical therapy. History 
records the activities of several individuals as key to the development of blood 
transfusion therapy and of blood donors' organisations. Geoffrey Keyes 
became aware of the life-saving properties of blood transfusion whilst working 
as a medical officer during the First World War. He observed transfusion saving 
the lives of those who were in shock through loss of blood, and extending the 
possibilities of surgery. Returning to hospital work in London, Keyes was 
amazed at the lack of importance ascribed to transfusion and became an active 
promoter of transfusion among his colleagues. Resistance to consider the use 
of transfusion arose from the expense and awkwardness of direct transfusion as 
practised at that time. When his efforts to set up a donor panel at St 
Bartholomews were blocked he complained that "This prevailing uncertainty as 
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to how or where to obtain a blood donor often results in the postponement of 
the decision to transfuse until the patient has passed from the category of 
hopeful to hopeless" (said by Keyes, 1924). Meanwhile however, a layman 
was independently solving this problem. In 1921 a meeting of the Camberwell 
Division of the Red Cross was interrupted by a request for volunteers to give 
blood at nearby King's College Hospital. Percy Lane Oliver (1878-1944) was 
one of the members who went along to the hospital. Oliver's blood was not 
compatible with that of the patient but he was deeply impressed by the 
beneficial effect of the donation obtained from his fellow member - who rejoined 
them none the worse for her donation. So much so that he set about changing 
the situation he saw of patients who had neither relatives nor friends willing and 
able to donate blood being disadvantaged. Oliver put his public spirit and 
organisational skills to establishing a panel of volunteer donors to which 
hospitals had access strictly through his office. He arranged for hospitals that 
wished to use the service to blood group potential donors and he insisted on 
certain conditions and standards for the treatment of the donors at hospitals. 
His attention to the concerns and experience of the donors - whilst an 
annoyance to the hospitals - was crucial to maintaining the donor panel. For 
example, Oliver insisted on the use of sharp needles and the protection of 
donors from witnessing particularly distressing sights during the donating 
procedure (a common reason for donor resignation). 
The Spanish Civil War provided impetus for, and experience in banking 
blood. Storage techniques had been proposed in the UK but had not been 
favoured over the use of fresh blood. After initial resistance it was again the 
imminence of war, in 1939, that prompted plans for four blood-storage depots in 
London funded by the Cabinet. The Medical Research Council (MRC) 
administered the depots on behalf of the Ministry of Health along with the 
Emergency Medical Service. The hospital based (Red Cross) panels became 
less in demand as the use of blood from the depots became standard. The Red 
Cross remained involved, along with other charities, in the organisation of 
panels and care of donors. In 1940 the need for depots outside London led to a 
scheme to establish a regional transfusion service. Depots bled in excess of 
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local needs in order to produce plasma. The service expanded and the 
processes developed and became more sophisticated throughout the war. 
As the end of the Second World War approached it was recognised that 
although the depots were set up to meet the needs of air-raid casualties, the 
bulk of their work had actually been in connection with the civilian sick and it 
would now be impossible to return to hospital based donor services. The MRC, 
whilst maintaining a research interest, withdrew from taking on routine supply 
and organisation. In 1945 the Treasury accepted the solution that the Ministry 
of Health (MoH) should provide the National Blood Transfusion Service by 
continuing with the existing structure of 12 regional centres situated at 
Newcastle, Leeds, Sheffield, Cambridge, Oxford, Bristol, Cardiff, Birmingham, 
Liverpool and Manchester, and two centres, in Luton and Sutton, serving 
London and the South East. On 26 September 1946, the MoH took over full 
responsibility for transfusion services including training of staff and research into 
transfusion-related problems. The organisation of the service over the next 53 
years has involved shifts of managerial responsibility (to regional health 
authorities and back to a centrally managed service), and changes in 
geographical location of blood centres (fully described by Gunson and 
Dodsworth, 1996). It has maintained a voluntary donor panel. Understanding 
of the clinical action of the components of blood and the separation of donations 
into those components has greatly increased the expertise involved in both the 
processing of blood donations and in the prescription of transfusions. 
During the last 30 years, the transmission of infections by blood 
transfusion has had a great impact on the practice of transfusion medicine. 
One major consequence of the increased awareness of transfusion 
transmissible infections has been the development of microbiology and virology 
within the blood services to detect markers of infectious disease in donations. 
There has been an active relationship between transfusion microbiology and 
infectious disease epidemiology as knowledge gained by each has proved 
valuable to the other. The testing conducted on blood donations, and the 
observation of infections in recipients (when testing does not exclude infectious 
donations from the blood supply), has provided valuable sources of 
epidemiological information. 
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2.2 Current provision of blood transfusions in England and Wales 
In 1993, the Department of Health in England established the National 
Blood Authority (NBA) as a Special Health Authority. Since that time it has 
taken on the responsibility for the management of the Bioproducts Laboratory, 
the International Blood Group Reference Laboratory and for the national co- 
ordination of the Regional Transfusion Centres (now called blood centres) -a 
task previously performed, to a lesser extent, by the now dissolved Central 
Blood Laboratories Authority and National Directorate of the National Blood 
Transfusion Service. 
In July 1996, there were thirteen regional blood centres collecting, testing 
and storing blood in England, plus an Army blood supply depot. In July 1999, 
after reorganisation of the service, there were ten testing centres (see Figure 
2.1). The Army Blood Supply Depot ceased collecting and testing blood from 
donors in July 1996. Blood centres remain in Cambridge (East Anglia), 
Liverpool (Mersey & North Wales) and Oxford but they no longer have full 
testing and processing capacity. 
Figure 2.1 The Blood Centres of England 
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The Welsh Blood Transfusion Service (WBTS) is the responsibility of the 
Welsh Assembly and has one blood centre in Cardiff. The WBTS supplies 
plasma to BPL (when BPL are accepting UK sourced plasma) and functions 
similarly to the NBA on most operational matters. Donors in North Wales are 
recruited and managed by the blood centre at Liverpool (donations are tested 
by Manchester centre). 
The English and Welsh blood transfusion services collect approximately 
2.5 million donations each year. Donors can donate more than once each year 
and it can be estimated that 1.8 million donors are tested each year. 
One component of the NBA's national co-ordination is donation testing 
and the collation of data arising from donation testing and from the investigation 
of post-transfusion infections. 
The methods and processes of the blood transfusion services in the 
United Kingdom (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) are 
standardised by the "Guidelines for the Blood Transfusion Service", more 
commonly known as "The Red Book" which is regularly revised by the Red 
Book Committee and its various specialist sub-groups. 
Donor selection 
Blood donations are collected from a selected sub-group of the population. 
Selection is both incidental and deliberate. 
Blood donation is an "opt in" activity that requires individuals to receive, 
understand, and respond to information about the need for blood donations and 
how they can become blood donors. 
Individuals who are healthy and aged between 17 and 60 years of age are 
targeted for recruitment to the donor panel. The age limits were revised in May 
1998 when the lower age was reduced from 18 to 17 years - adding up to 
600,000 potential new donors. The upper age for regular donors was increased 
at the same time from 65 to 70. The upper age limit for new donors remained at 
60 years. Further selection criteria applied prior to blood donation try to ensure 
that individuals who may suffer any harm from donating blood, and individuals 
whose blood may cause harm to recipients are not accepted as blood donors. 
These criteria are collated in an appendix to the UKBTS/NIBSC Guidelines for 
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the Blood Transfusion Service as an A-Z of Guidelines for the Medical 
Assessment of Donors (as a controlled document). 
Many of these selection criteria aim to lower the frequency of infectious 
diseases in the population who are accepted to donate blood. Individuals with 
any clinical signs or symptoms of a recent, or chronic, infection are not 
accepted. Individuals who have any behavioural, or lifestyle, characteristics 
that are associated with an increased risk of blood-borne infections are also not 
accepted. 
Guidelines for donor selection also include some procedural instructions 
that may affect the effectiveness of the criteria themselves. All donors are 
asked to confirm that they have consented to their donations being tested for 
the presence of infections that might be passed on to patients, and told that 
they will be informed of the result. It is also emphasised to the donor that ill 
health within 14 days post-donation may indicate their donation would be 
unsuitable for use. In these circumstances they must inform the blood centre. 
Donation venues must have the following literature available: 
1) Declaration to be signed by donors including the wording "I understand 
that I must read the literature explaining about HIV infection and AIDS. I agree 
that my blood donation can be tested for HIV (the virus associated with AIDS) 
and other infections that may be passed on by my blood. If my donation gives a 
positive result for any of these tests, I will be contacted for further tests and 
appropriate advice. I will inform the blood centre of ill health within 14 days 
post-donation as this may indicate that my donation would be unsuitable for 
use. " 
2) "Safety of Blood" leaflets. The most important exclusion criteria with 
respect to keeping the blood supply free from blood-borne infections are 
summarised on a leaflet. (Appendix 1). 
3) Posters. Displaying information in 2). 
Since 1999, every new donor has an individual interview that asks directly 
about their health, and their risks for infectious diseases including travel abroad, 
and a check that the donor has understood the Safety of Blood leaflet. 
European legislation requires all blood donors to give informed consent to 
the procedure at each session. Since November 1998, a 'tick-box' health check 
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questionnaire has been printed on the back of the session slips (Appendix 2). 
All new donors and those who have not given blood for some time have a one 
to one interview with the session nurse or doctor, and all known donors 
complete the medical questionnaire while they are awaiting or when they 
register to donate at a session. This gives donors who are in high risk 
categories for infections the information and opportunity needed to exclude 
themselves before donating; it also gives the blood service documented 
evidence of donors' answers to the health questions. 
The signature of the person completing the medical assessment must be 
recorded. 
In addition to the routine medical assessment, apheresis donors have a 
full blood count and their serum albumin and total serum protein levels 
measured at the initial visit and then at least every 6th visit or annually, 
whichever is the shorter interval. A medical officer in the light of these results 
then assesses the donor's fitness for apheresis. Volunteers with a platelet 
count below 150 x 109/1 should not undergo platelet apheresis. 
Bacterial contamination can be introduced into the blood donation during 
the collection process. This risk can be reduced by techniques for cleansing the 
site on the donor's arm from which the donation is taken. The cleansing 
technique of all staff that carries out donation procedures is checked once a 
month (with swabs taken for bacteriology), to assess the effectiveness of arm 
cleansing in practice. 
Component production and issue 
Most blood collected from donors is processed into blood components and 
blood products. Blood components, such as red cell and platelet concentrates, 
fresh frozen plasma (FFP) and cryoprecipitate, are prepared from a single 
donation of blood by simple separation methods such as centrifugation and 
transfused without further processing. Complex processes, using the plasma 
from many donors as the starting material, are used to prepare blood products 
such as coagulation factor concentrates, albumin and immunoglobulin solutions. 
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This thesis is primarily concerned with blood components, and only concerns 
blood products to the extent that issues concerning donors overlap and 
because these two parallel uses of blood donations influence each other. Since 
May 1998 no UK-sourced plasma has been used for blood product manufacture 
in the UK. After a thorough cleansing and re-fitting scheme, plasma sourced 
from countries with no reported vCJD cases (the US) entered the product 
manufacture at the Bio Product Laboratory (BPL) in England and products 
derived from US plasma have been on release since November 1998. The 
epidemiology of infections in UK blood donors is therefore not relevant to blood 
products produced in the UK since 1998. 
In most circumstances it is preferable to transfuse only the blood 
component or product required by the patient rather than using whole blood. 
This so-called `component therapy' is the most effective way of using donor 
blood which is a scarce resource, and also reduces the risk of complications 
from transfusion of unnecessary components of the blood. 
The average volume of whole blood collected is 450ml, taken into 63ml of 
anticoagulant. Up to three donations can be collected from a single donor 
during a year. Blood stored at 4°C has a'shelf-life' of 5 weeks when at least 
70% of the transfused red cells should survive normally. Alternatively, donors 
can give up to 15 litres of plasma per year by plasma apheresis: each donation 
providing 500-600ml of plasma. Platelets and leucocytes can also be collected 
by cytapheresis up to 24 times per year. 
The processing of blood into components of varying constituents and 
varying therapeutic properties is an increasingly detailed subject. Only some 
aspects of component therapy are relevant to this thesis. Storage conditions of 
different components affect the risk of bacterial multiplication and the viability of 
some other agents. Red cells and whole blood are stored between 2 and 6°C 
for up to 35 days. Platelet concentrates (from the pooling of platelets 
'recovered' from (usually four) whole blood donors and from apheresis from 
single donors) are stored at 20-24°C on a special agitator rack for up to 5 days. 
Fresh frozen plasma and cryoprecipitate is stored at -30°C for up to one year 
(and used within 4 hours of thawing). The cellular content of components 
affects the transmission of cell associated infectious agents. CMV, HTLV I&II, 
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and parvo B19 are associated with leucocytes and transmission of these 
viruses is less likely from acellular, or leucocyte depleted components 
Donors who provide plasma and/or platelets and leucocytes by apheresis 
differ in their donation frequency and selection. Apheresis donors are selected 
from whole blood donors and have therefore already been through the donor 
selection and testing process at least once. The logistics of making apheresis 
donations requires the donor to commit more time to donating as well as to 
attend more frequently. Apheresis donation may therefore be inconvenient for 
individuals with a relatively busy job or life. While the additional donor selection 
probably acts to reduce the risk of blood borne infections the frequent donation 
pattern of apheresis donors means that should a donor acquire a new infection 
it is more likely that one or more donations will be collected during the infectious 
period. 
Certain components, for example platelets, are often prescribed for 
conditions associated with immunosuppression. Immunosuppression may 
make a recipient less likely to mount a detectable immune response, and more 
vulnerable to disease, if transfused with an infectious component. 
Since a recommendation in July 1998 an additional stage of component 
production that may affect infection transmission has been introduced in the UK 
- routine leucodepletion. Prior to this recommendation 9% of red cell units and 
23% of platelet components underwent leucodepletion of some kind. This 
action followed reports from the Government's Spongiform Encephalopathy 
Advisory Committee (SEAC), that there was a theoretical risk of the 
transmission by leucocytes of the infectious agent in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob 
disease (vCJD). Monitoring of leucodepletion uses the guidelines produced by 
the Biomedical excellence and safety in transfusion group of the International 
Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) - with initial validation of the process 
followed by statistical process monitoring using a sample of components. 
Monitoring requires a standard of the reduction of the leucocyte count to less 
then 5x1 06 leucocytes per unit transfused in at least 99% of components filtered 
with at least 95% confidence. By February 1999 all platelet products were 
being leucodepleted and progress towards supplying leucodepleted red cell 
components was ongoing. The process of leucodepletion may affect the 
transmission of infectious agents other than vCJD. Some cell-associated 
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viruses may be removed from components during leucodepletion. The effect of 
leucodepletion on bacterial contamination is uncertain: depending on the pre- 
filtration storage time and conditions, any bacteria contained in a blood donation 
may be ingested by leucocytes and so removed by leucodepletion or may 
remain free and unaffected by the phagocytic action of leucocytes. 
During 1999, the English blood service provided over 2,893,627 
components to 329 hospitals. These included 2,212,385 units of adult red cells, 
50,383 units of paediatric red cells for newborn babies, 190 units of red cells for 
'intra-uterine' transfusion, 219,556 adult doses of platelets, 8,887 units of 
paediatric platelets, 385,425 units of fresh frozen plasma, and 1,882 units of 
white cells (Figure 2.2) (NBA, 1999). 
Figure 2.2 Components issued in England, 1999 
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Blood centres of England and Wales 
The location of blood centres in England and Wales is shown in Figure 
2.1. Donors registered with each centre live in the surrounding area, although 
donors may give blood elsewhere, for example, when on holiday. The donor's 
post-codes, and the site of the donation session (e. g. village hall, workplace, 
university campus) are linked to each donation record. Centres tend to 
predominantly supply their local hospitals, although blood components may be 
moved around the country to supply fluctuating demands. 
Donors are recruited by advertisements in the press, on radio (usually 
designed and organised at local level), and occasionally by television advert 
campaigns (organised centrally). Existing donors are invited to encourage 
family and friends to consider becoming donors. 
2.3 Surveillance of infectious diseases in England and Wales 
The Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS) Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre (CDSC) was established in 1977 to undertake national 
surveillance of communicable disease and to provide epidemiological 
assistance and co-ordination in the investigation and control of infection in 
England and Wales. 
Data are collected at CDSC about the testing performed, and infections 
diagnosed, at Public Health Laboratories around England and Wales. Forty-nine 
public health and two-hundred and fifty National Health Service laboratories 
report a minimum dataset (age, sex of patient, method of identification, date of 
onset, first specimen, details of laboratory) on all clinically significant infections 
diagnosed at these laboratories. 
Data are also collated from other sources including statutory notifications 
of infectious diseases, antenatal testing, seroprevalence surveys and vaccine 
administrators. Other datasets that are used for investigating particular aspects 
of some infectious diseases include death registrations, hospital episodes and 
sentinel General Practitioner reporting. 
51 
Chapter 2 
Surveillance of viral hepatitis 
Acute HBV infections confirmed by laboratories in England and Wales are 
reported to the PHLS CDSC. Laboratory confirmation of acute HBV infection 
includes a positive result of a test for HBV anti-core IgM (anti-HBc IgM), or a 
positive result of a test for HBV surface antigen (HBsAg) together with 
symptoms compatible with acute HBV and, if available, a negative result of a 
test for IgM antibodies to hepatitis A virus (HAV). Additional cases ascertained 
by contact tracing or other investigations, for example, during outbreaks or 
lookback at previous donations of a donor found to have HBV infection, are 
included in the surveillance if they have evidence of recent infection (anti-HBc 
IgM positive or seroconversion to anti-HBc IgG) even in the absence of clinical 
illness. Children infected by perinatal transmission and identified during the 
follow up of known high-risk mothers are also included. Surveillance reports 
include clinical and demographic details and information about risk exposure(s) 
in the previous 6 months. These details are based on information passed to 
laboratory staff by the clinician requesting the test and supplied with the results 
(Balogun MA, 1999). An audit of reporting has estimated 82% of laboratory 
confirmed acute HBV infections are reported (Ramsay M, 1998). Acute HBV 
infection may be asymptomatic or cause non-specific symptoms; about one- 
third of infections in adults are expected to be symptomatic and this surveillance 
cannot ascertain all acute HBV infections. Acute infection surveillance has 
been shown to give reasonable estimates of the incidence of symptomatic 
infection (Polakof S, 1984), and as the proportion of asymptomatic infections in 
adults is expected to be fairly constant over time surveillance of acute 
symptomatic cases can also be used to monitor trends in the incidence of acute 
HBV. 
The PHLS CDSC has carried out surveillance of HCV in England and 
Wales since 1990. The aim of this surveillance is to monitor trends in incidence 
and prevalence, to determine the major risk factors associated with infection in 
England and Wales and to inform health care planning, prevention and control 
strategies (Ramsay ME, 1998). Surveillance information is derived from reports 
of confirmed HCV infections from laboratories in England and Wales. The low 
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proportion of acute HCV infections that are symptomatic (Locarnini S, 1996), 
the long but variable interval between acquisition and chronic disease (Alter H, 
1996) and the lack of serological markers of acute infection (Clemens JM, 1992; 
Zaaijer HL, 1993) mean that these reports cannot be used to estimate current or 
past HCV incidence. Risk factor information is routinely reported from 
laboratories as part of the surveillance but the quality of this information is 
variable and the distribution of reported risk factors reflects the prevalence of 
testing in different risk groups. Some reporting laboratories have participated in 
enhanced surveillance involving the collection of more detailed clinical and 
epidemiological information about individuals with prevalent HCV infections and 
submission of serum for genotyping. Ad hoc surveys of testing and 
seroprevalence surveys have been used to further enhance the routine 
surveillance. Seroprevalence studies have involved archive samples from 
unlinked anonymous surveys of GUM clinic attenders, antenatal women and 
adults attending hospitals. 
Further information about the epidemiology and natural history of viral 
hepatitis infections is obtained by surveillance of chronic liver disease due to 
viral hepatitis, notifications of acute clinical hepatitis, reports of deaths from viral 
hepatitis, hospital admission for viral hepatitis, surveillance of paediatric HCV, 
surveillance of occupational exposure to sources positive for blood borne 
viruses, surveillance of infections in prisons and a register of HCV infections 
with a known date of acquisition that can be followed-up for clinical outcomes. 
Surveillance of HIV infection 
Reports of newly identified HIV antibody positive individuals and AIDS 
cases are sent by microbiologists and clinicians to the PHLS CDSC AIDS & 
STD Centre. Reports include clinical and demographic details and information 
about risk exposure(s). Whenever possible enough information is gathered 
from the initial report or through subsequent follow-up to allow consistent 
allocation of individuals to defined risk categories. Where there has been 
exposure to HIV infection by more than one route, allocation to the most 
probable route for purposes of summary statistics is based on a hierarchy of 
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risk associated with different possible routes of infection. All reports indicating 
heterosexual exposure to HIV infection, but with insufficient information for 
further sub-classification by risk and country of exposure, and all cases reported 
as having acquired infection through heterosexual exposure in the UK with no 
evidence of "high risk" partners, are systematically followed up to clarify their 
exposure category (Evans BG, 1992). 
Many HIV infections amongst groups of the population remain 
undiagnosed and therefore undetectable though surveillance systems based on 
routine laboratory and clinical diagnosis. To provide a more complete and 
accurate picture of the epidemiology of HIV infection in the community data 
from the HIV and AIDS reporting surveillance are augmented by several other 
sources of data. These include an annual survey of people currently receiving 
care for their HIV infection (Survey of Prevalent HIV infections Diagnosed - 
SOPHID (Molesworth AM, 1998)), behavioural surveys (Johnson AM, 1994), 
reports from genitourinary medicine clinics (Hughes G, 1998), mortality reports 
(Nylen G, 1999) and the surveys in the Unlinked Anonymous HIV 
Seroprevalence Monitoring Programme (DOH, 1999). 
Surveillance of other infections 
Reports of other confirmed infections - besides viral hepatitis and HIV 
infection - that can be transmitted by transfusion are also received at CDSC. 
Many of these come either on paper or electronically into the main database of 
laboratory reports - LABBASE. For example, CMV and parvo B19 infections 
are monitored. Microbiologists report a minimum dataset on all clinically 
significant infections based on information provided by the clinician requesting 
the test and receiving the result. The data reported includes age, sex of patient, 
method of identification, date of onset of illness, date of first specimen and 
details of reporting laboratory. Some risk factor information is reported for 
certain infections, but is very variable in quality. 
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Data collected by, or via, the NBA and the PHLS CDSC are the basis for 
the studies of the epidemiology of infection in blood donors and the assessment 
of the risk of transfusion transmitted infection included in this thesis. 
2.4 Background to this study 
Rational 
The study of the distribution and determinants of infections in the donors 
of blood donations that are tested for markers of infectious diseases can inform 
transfusion practices and contribute to knowledge about infection in the general 
population. 
Blood donation testing detects infections that are typically persistent but 
asymptomatic. As donors are selected to be individuals with no recognised 
increased risk of infection, unusual routes of infection transmission may be 
detected in this group. The serial testing of repeat donors enables the detection 
of incident infections. Some demographic information is available for the total 
population of donors tested and non-infected donors are available to provide 
more detailed comparative "control" information if needed. 
Careful pre-donation selection of blood donors who are believed to be at 
low risk of blood borne infections, and the introduction of routine testing of all 
blood donations for markers of T. pallidum (1950), hepatitis B surface antigen 
(HBsAg) (1970), antibodies to the human immunodeficiency virus (anti-HIV) 
(1985, anti-HIV2 1990) and antibodies to hepatitis C virus (anti-HCV) (1991), 
has greatly decreased the risk of transfusion transmissible infections. However, 
the demand for transfusions is increasing and the infectious hazards of 
transfusing blood components continue to cause concern. As transfusion 
transmitted infections have become more rare the efficiency of prospective 
studies to determine actual transmission rates has been reduced and 
alternative methods of estimating transmission rates based on observed 
incidents in recipients and on infection rates in donors have become more 
important. 
Additional interventions against transfusion-transmitted infections are 
available, for example, testing donations for HBV core antibody, HIV p24 
antigen and human T cell leukaemia virus type I (HTLV-I) and use of virus- 
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inactivation procedures on components and the use of alternative therapies. 
Predicting the benefits of these proposed interventions, and evaluating their 
effect once introduced, requires accurate information about the risks and 
consequences of transfusion transmitted infections. 
In order to assess the risks and consequences of transfusion-transmitted 
infections the characteristics of blood-borne infections, of donations, and of 
blood recipients need to be considered. Over the years, knowledge about new 
agents and about potential failures in the strategies to exclude known agents 
has increased. Consequently the range of possible strategies to exclude 
infections from the blood supply has also increased and debate about the risks 
of infection transmission by blood transfusion has become more complex. 
Appreciation of the value of surveillance of infections in blood donors and 
recipients, along with falling infection rates, led to a proposal to establish 
enhanced surveillance of transfusion-transmissible infections. This was 
facilitated by changes in the blood service to make it more of a National 
organisation with standardised methods and services. 
The study population 
All blood centres in the British Isles and Republic of Ireland (except the 
five blood centres of the Scottish Blood Transfusion Service), opted to 
collaborate in an infection surveillance system, jointly run by the NBA and the 
PHLS-CDSC, by providing data about testing performed and about infections 
detected. 
Clinicians and laboratories in England and Wales report blood borne 
infections - including those in blood transfusion recipients - to the PHLS-CDSC. 
Aims 
The overall aim of this work is to monitor and study the epidemiology of 
transfusion transmissible infections in England and Wales and to develop and 
apply methods for estimating the risk of infection transmission by transfusion in 
order to inform and evaluate donor selection and donation testing strategies, 
56 
Chapter 2 
and to contribute to knowledge of the epidemiology of blood-borne infections in 
England and Wales. 
The following specific aims are addressed: - 
1 Establish enhanced surveillance of transfusion transmissible infections 
1.1 To develop methodologies for the national surveillance of infections in 
blood donors and of suspected and confirmed cases of transfusion 
transmitted infections in recipients of blood and non-fractionated blood 
components in England and Wales. This surveillance system will provide 
data that will be used for the following aims. 
2 Descriptive epidemiology of infections in blood donors 
2.1 To describe and monitor the prevalence and incidence of infections 
with HBV, HCV and HIV in blood donors and examine these data for 
evidence of temporal trends in the total sample and in sub-samples of 
donations from new donors, repeat donors and donors of specific sex and 
age groups. 
2.2 To analyse the demographic characteristics (age, sex, ethnicity, 
region of donation) of blood donors infected with HBV, HCV and HIV. 
2.3 To describe the probable routes of infection for HBV, HCV and HIV 
infected blood donors. 
3 Descriptive epidemiology of post-transfusion infections in blood recipients 
3.1 To describe the characteristics, frequency and outcome of post- 
transfusion infections diagnosed in blood recipients. 
3.2 To identify any preventable factors contributing to the transmission of 
infections from donors to recipients in diagnosed post-transfusion 
infections. 
4 To conduct related epidemiological studies using data from the surveillance 
system. 
5 Calculation of estimates of the risk of transfusion transmitted infections 
5.1 To use data from the surveillance system, together with data and 
assumptions from other sources to estimate the risk of transmission of 
HBV, HCV and HIV infection by transfusion. 
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5.2 To conduct sensitivity analyses of the data and parameters in the 
assumptions used to estimate risks. 
5.3 To compare the estimated expected rate of transfusion transmitted 
infections with observed rates of transfusion-transmitted infections detected 
by the surveillance system. 
Aims 1 to 3 are addressed in Chapter 3. Aims 4 and 5 are addressed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
Chapter 2 references 
Alter H. Natural history and clinical aspects of hepatitis C virus infection. Antiviral 
Ther 1996 1 (Suppl. 3) 15-20. 
Balogun MA, Ramsay ME, Fairley CK, Collins M, Heptonstall J. Acute hepatitis B 
infection in England and Wales: 1985-96. EpidemioL Infect. 1999 122; 125-131. 
Clemens JM, Tasker S, Chau K, et al. IgM antibody response in acute hepatitis C 
viral infection. Blood 1992 79: 169-172. 
Department of Health Unlinked Anonymous HIV Steering Group. Prevalence of HIV 
in the United Kingdom, Data to end 1998. London. Department of Health, Public 
Health Laboratory Service, Institute of Child Health (London), Scottish Centre for 
Infection and Environmental Health. 1999. 
Evans BG, Noone A, Mortimer JY, Gilbart VL, Gill ON, Nicoll A, Waight PA. 
Heterosexually acquired HIV-1 infection: cases reported in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, 1985 to 1991 CDR Rev 1992; 2(5): R49-55. 
Gunson HH, Dodsworth H. Fifty Years of Blood Transfusion. 1996 Transfusion 
Medicine 6; Sup. 1 
Hughes G, Catchpole M. Surveillance of sexually transmitted infections in England 
and Wales. Eurosurveillance 1998; 61-5. 
Johnson AM, Wadsworth J, Wellings K, et al. Sexual attitudes and lifestyles. Oxford: 
Blackwell Scientific Publications; 1994. 
58 
Chapter 2 
Locarnini S, McAnulty J. Hepatitis C surveillance. 1996 Commun Dis lntell 20; 388- 
389. 
Molesworth AM. Results of a survey of diagnosed HIV infections prevalent in 1996 in 
England and Wales. Commun Dis Pub Health 1998; 1(4): 271-5. 
National Blood Authority Annual Report 1999. 
Nylen G, Mortimer J, Evans B, Gill ON. Mortality in young adults in England and 
Wales: the impact of the HIV epidemic. AIDS 1999; 13: 1535-41. 
Polakof S, Tillet H. Routine laboratory reports of patients with acute hepatitis B as 
indicators of incidence of the disease. J Infect 1984; 8: 44-8. 
Ramsay M, Gay N, Balogun K, Collins M. Control of hepatitis B in the UK. Vaccine 
1998; I6: S52-5. 
Ramsay ME, Balogun MA, Collins M, Balraj V. Laboratory surveillance of hepatitis C 
virus infection in England and Wales: 1992 to 1996. Communicable Disease and 
Public Health 1998 1; 89-94. 
Zaaijer HL, Mimms LT, Cuypers HT, et al. Variability of IgM response in hepatitis C 
infection J Med Viro! 1993 40; 184-187. 
59 
Chapter 3 
CHAPTER 3. SURVEILLANCE OF INFECTIONS IN BLOOD DONORS AND 
BLOOD RECIPIENTS ...................................................................................... 60 
3.1 METHODS 
................................................................................................................................ 
60 
3.1.1 Review of information available at blood centres ................................. . 60 3.1.2 Review of current surveillance systems and data ................................ . 64 3.1.3 Establishing NBA/PHLS-CDSC joint surveillance system .................... . 67 i) Organisation and collaboration .................................................................. . 
67 
ii) Objectives and requirements ..................................................................... . 
68 
iii) Surveillance of infections: the system/general approach .......................... . 69 iv) Donation testing surveillance .................................................................... 
72 
v) Infected donor surveillance ........................................................................ 77 
vi) Post-transfusion infection surveillance ...................................................... 
79 
vii) Piloting, and revisions, of the surveillance systems .................................. 
84 
viii) Co-ordination with laboratory reports to PHLS-CDSC ............................. 
87 
ix) Routine reports of collated data from the surveillance centre .................... 
91 
3.2 RESULTS ............................................................................................................................... ... 
91 
Donation testing ............................................................................................. 91 Infected donors ............................................................................................ 108 Transfusion-transmitted infections ............................................................... 120 3.3 DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................................... . 136 
Donation testing ........................................................................................... 136 
................ Infected donors 138 ............................................................................ Transfusion-transmitted infections ............................................................... 144 3.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................ . 147 
REFERENCES 
.............................................................................................................................. . 149 
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Review of information available at blood centres 
During the first half of 1995, each blood centre in England (14 centres) 
and Wales (1 centre) was visited (see Chapter 2: Blood centres of England and 
Wales). The methods of managing infected donors and post-transfusion 
infection cases, and the information about infections in donors and recipients 
that was available at blood centres were surveyed. This information was 
collected by the researcher (KS) during visits to each centre. Key members of 
staff including medical staff and laboratory staff were interviewed using a semi- 
structured questionnaire to ensure the same issues were covered at each 
centre. 
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Donation testing 
The microbiology departments of the 15 blood centres were visited. 
Microbiology departments at blood centres used various automated and semi- 
automated systems for screening donations for markers of infection. Typically, 
microbiology departments had their own computerised systems for managing 
donation testing. These systems had often been locally developed, and had 
different specifications in different blood centres. Microbiology systems linked 
into the blood centres' mainframe computers to draw on information about 
donations for testing and to input information about donations to be withdrawn, 
and about donations to be released for issue. Microbiology computer systems 
did not routinely hold information about the sex, age or the donation status of 
donors: staff had access to the mainframe computer to obtain such details for 
donors who were found to be repeatedly reactive. Donations found to be 
repeatedly reactive by manufacturer's criteria were withdrawn and a sample 
referred for confirmatory testing according to algorithms agreed locally with the 
confirmatory laboratory. 
Management of reactive donations varied between blood centres in the 
following ways: - 
" Management of donors who were persistently repeatedly reactive to 
a test and had been repeatedly shown by confirmatory testing to be negative 
for the infection varied between centres, and within centres for different 
infections: in some cases, after two, or three, repeatedly reactive donations 
with negative confirmatory tests, donors were deferred from donation until 
such time as the test kit in use was changed, in other cases donors were 
repeatedly bled and their reactivity and confirmatory test results monitored, 
and in other cases, donations from donors who had been shown to be 
reactive to a specific test kit, but repeatedly negative to confirmatory tests, 
were tested by alternative test kits and, if negative to the alternative test kit, 
these donations were released into the blood supply. 
." 
Repeat testing, and referral for confirmatory testing, of donations 
which were not reactive by manufacturer's criteria but which had abnormal 
results when compared to the bulk of non-reactive donations (i. e. donations 
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with results in the "grey zone") was standard at some blood centres, 
discretionary at others, and not done at others. 
" Blood centres microbiology departments used various methods for 
managing information about donors whose donations had been repeatedly 
reactive to a screening test, including card indexes, log books and computer 
databases. 
" Archive samples from positive donations were kept in various 
volumes (0.25,0.5ml) for varying lengths of time (mostly 2 years). 
Infected donors 
Microbiology departments informed blood centre medical staff of donors 
with confirmed markers of infection. Medical staff responsible for the care of 
infected donors at the 15 blood centres were visited. Management of infected 
donors varied in the following ways: - 
" Donors were informed of their positive test results by letter, by 
blood centre staff during a personal appointment (or occasionally a 
telephone conversation), or by their general practitioner (GP) depending on 
blood centre practice, the marker of infection and the geographical distance 
and travel restraints of the donor. (If seen again by the NBS, a blood 
sample was usually taken to re-confirm the infection. ) 
" If seen by blood centre staff, each blood centre performed 
discussion of histories of exposure to blood borne infection, and recording of 
this information, differently. 
" If referred to GPs for follow up, some blood centres sought to obtain 
exposure history information (for some, or all infections) from the GP and 
some requested no further information after referral to GPs. 
" Some blood centres periodically requested further information from 
the clinical centres managing their donors' long term care, and a few offered 
donors further testing over a number of years, and so obtained information 
about donors' disease progression. 
" The infection status of each donor, including infected donors, was 
stored on blood centre mainframe donor computers (including range of 4 
branded systems and several in-house systems). Further information about 
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infected donors was kept in paper files and sometimes also on computer 
databases. 
" Blood centres did not consistently report donors with HBsAg to the 
PHLS-CDSC national surveillance. Reporting to PHLS CDSC and to local 
public health systems (Consultants in Communicable Disease Control 
(CsCDC)) was - at least in some cases - performed by the laboratory that 
performed the confirmatory testing; however it was uncertain how systematic 
and complete this reporting was. 
Post-transfusion infections 
Verbal or written reports about 15 blood centres' PTI investigation 
practices were obtained. News of cases of PTI reached the blood centres by 
various routes (e. g. hospital doctors, GPs, recipients, news reports, other blood 
centres). Information was usually directed to medical staff, but was 
occasionally received by Quality Assurance departments or microbiology 
laboratories and passed on to medical staff for management and investigation if 
necessary. Practices for investigating PTIs varied. One third (five) of blood 
centres did not have a standard operating procedure (SOP) for investigating 
PTIs in place. The practices detailed within SOPs and described by centres 
with no SOP in place varied in the following respects: - 
" Criteria for initiating an investigation 
" Information given to implicated donors and policies on recalling, or 
awaiting the next visit, of implicated donors 
" The size of archived donation samples available and the use of 
these samples in testing implicated donors 
9 The extent of look-back at previous donations from an implicated 
donor 
and 
" The dissemination of findings (one centre reported its post- 
transfusion hepatitis infections to PHLS-CDSC national hepatitis 
surveillance, others left reporting to PHLS CDSC to reference laboratories 
(usually PHLs) performing the testing of samples. Again, the extent and 
nature of local communication about these infections with CsCDC was not 
clear or systematic. ). 
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The following estimates and conclusions were made from the information 
obtained from blood centres about PTI investigations conducted between 1991 
and early 1995: - 
" approximately 50 investigations had been conducted each year 
" three-quarters of these had involved HBV or HCV infections 
"1 in 5 of the post-transfusion hepatitis investigations had concluded 
that a transfusion was the probable source of the recipient's infection. 
" Nearly half of the post-transfusion hepatitis investigations had been 
in the South and North West Thames Regions. How much this 
predominance was directly due to higher rates of post-transfusion hepatitis, 
and how much due to more frequent communication between hospitals and 
the blood centres about such cases was not clear. 
" Other PTI cases investigated included infections with HAV, HIV, 
CMV, bacteria and parasites. 
" While individual cases were well documented at most blood 
centres, potentially useful information about these PTIs had not been 
consistently reported to any national surveillance centre. 
3.1.2 Review of current surveillance systems and data 
Three surveillance systems for infections in blood donors were in place in 
1994. 
The surveillance system for HIV antibody testing of blood donations had 
been initiated when HIV antibody testing began in October 1985. All UK blood 
centres sent a monthly report form to a central collating centre (1985-1994 
Manchester Blood Centre and from 1994 onwards The National Blood 
Authority). The form requested details about i) the test kits used during the 
previous month, ii) the total number of donations tested and the number of 
donations from new donors tested, iii) the number of donations (total and from 
new donors) which were initially reactive to the HIV antibody test, iv) the 
number of donations (total and from new donors) which were repeatedly 
reactive to the HIV antibody test, v) the number of donations (total and from 
new donors) which were referred for confirmatory testing and vi) the sex, vii) 
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date of birth, viii) number of previous donations and ix) the probable route of 
infection, if known, for each confirmed HIV infection detected. The form also 
asked for the results of testing of quality control specimens distributed by the 
Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS). 
In principle blood centres should also have been reporting all HIV positive 
donors to CDSC and their details entered into the national database of first 
confirmed HIV-1 antibody positive tests. In practice HIV positive donors were 
so rare that in most centres such reporting to CDSC had not become routine 
and reporting was not assumed to be complete. Each year, therefore, the NBS 
surveillance centre sent CDSC a list of the HIV positive donors identified so that 
centres could be prompted to complete reports for individuals not already 
reported to CDSC. Exposure history information was reported by blood centres 
to the NBS surveillance as free-text and was often unknown at the time of the 
surveillance report of the HIV infection: the probable route of infection was 
therefore often (90% of reports in 1994) not known by the NBS surveillance 
system. 
A similar UK wide surveillance system for HCV antibody testing of blood 
donations had been initiated in September 1992 - one year after HCV antibody 
testing began in September 1991. Two forms were used for reporting HCV 
antibody testing information each month. One form requested numbers of 
donations tested, initially reactive, repeatedly reactive and sent for 
supplementary testing with a break down for donations from new donors and 
donations from previously reactive donors. A second form requested the RIBA 
and PCR results for donations receiving supplementary testing with a 
breakdown for donations from males and from females, and from new donors 
and from previously reactive donors. To allow time for supplementary testing to 
be completed, the second form was typically sent to the, collation centre one 
month in arrears of the first form. No information about age or probable route of 
infection had been collected. 
The data from both these NBS surveillance systems were collated and 
stored in DATAEASE databases. A set of standard summary tables was issued 
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each month to the reporting centres and to others with an interest in donation 
testing. 
The completing of the surveillance forms was discussed in detail with the 
Head of Microbiology or the other staff member(s) designated to complete these 
forms at each blood centre. A number of variations in blood centre practices, in 
interpretation of the surveillance forms and in preparation of data for these 
forms were resulting in non-standardised information being collated by the 
surveillance centre. 
For example, the eligibility of donations from previously reactive donors to 
be included in the monthly surveillance data about HIV and HCV testing had 
been understood differently by different centres, despite an attempt to separate 
these donations on the HCV antibody testing surveillance forms. Variation in 
the rates of reactivity to tests, as observed in the surveillance data, were 
therefore partially due to variation in the practices for managing, and for 
reporting, previously reactive donors. 
In 1987 North London Blood Centre established a register of HBsAg 
positive donors (Howell D, 1991; Howell D, 1993). Centres were asked to make 
an initial report of all HBsAg positive donors previously identified, as far back as 
records would allow. Since that date, some centres had reported HBsAg 
positive donors as they were identified, and all centres had been asked annually 
to report each (unreported) HBsAg positive donor identified during the past 
year. Some data about donations dating back to 1972 were collected. The 
registry report requested donor identifiers, sex, date of birth, ethnicity or country 
of birth, history of any relevant exposures or symptoms and history of previous 
donation. For some years no reports had been received from some centres and 
some centres had not responded to each end of year check for cases not 
reported during the year. Absence of any reports from some centres, and quite 
marked fluctuations in the numbers of cases reported each year from other 
centres suggested underreporting to varying, unknown extents. 
No national collation of the results of testing donations for Treponemal 
antibodies had occurred. 
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3.1.3 Establishing NBA/PHLS-CDSC joint surveillance system 
i) Organisation and collaboration 
A Steering Group was convened to advise and oversee the development 
of the surveillance system and of related studies of transfusion transmissible 
infections. Table 3.1 shows the members of this group and the time committed 
by each to the project. The group met at ad hoc times through out the study 
period. 
Table 3.1 NBA/PHLS-CDSC steering group members 
Steering group member Time commitment to project 
Scientist, PHLS-CDSC Immunisation Full-time 
Division 
Consultant Microbiologist, PHLS-CDSC Project supervisor: Involvement in 
Immunisation Division ongoing work. (until October 1996) 
Consultant Epidemiologist, PHLS-CDSC Steering group meetings (chair) & 
Immunisation Division advice as requested up till October 
1996. From October 1996 - 
Project supervisor. 
Head of Microbiology, NBS-North Co-supervisor: Involvement in 
London Centre, & Consultant in ongoing work. 
Microbiology to the NBA 
Principal Scientist, PHLS-CDSC AIDS Periodic collaboration on HIV 
Centre surveillance data. 
Steering group meetings & advice 
as requested. 
National Quality Assurance Manager, Steering group meetings & advice 
NBA as requested. 
Director, Sexually transmitted and Steering group meetings & advice 
blood-borne virus laboratory as requested. 
Deputy Director, PHLS-Laboratory of Steering group meetings & advice 
Hospital Infection as requested. 
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A group of blood centre and hospital specialists was convened during 
1995 to develop a surveillance system for all serious hazards of transfusion 
(SHOT). The surveillance of PTIs developed in collaboration with this group so 
that it functioned in parallel with a system for surveillance of non-infectious 
complications of transfusion. (The scientist (KS) sat on the SHOT working group 
and the Consultant Epidemiologist (MR) sat on the SHOT Steering Group. ) In 
order to improve the ascertainment and reporting of cases, the SHOT group 
took a number of steps to increase the awareness of the hazards (both 
infectious and non-infectious) of transfusion and to publicise the surveillance 
systems when the non-infectious complication reporting system was launched 
in November 1996. These included an editorial in the British Medical Journal, 
notices in various other journals and mailings to all hospital haematologists. 
ii) Objectives and requirements 
The objectives of the surveillance of infection in blood donors were: - 
" To measure and monitor the initial and repeat reactivity rates to all 
test kit batches in use for testing blood donations at blood centres 
" To measure and monitor the prevalence of markers for blood borne 
infections in first time (tested) blood donors 
" To measure and monitor the incidence of markers for blood borne 
infections in repeat (tested) donors 
" To describe the demographic (age, sex, ethnicity and geographical 
region) characteristics, clinical signs and histories of exposure to blood 
borne infections of infected blood donors 
The requirements of the surveillance of infection in blood donors were: - 
"A standardised surveillance system, covering all mandatory testing 
of blood donations, and all infected donors. 
" Clear definitions of the information requested on surveillance forms. 
"A format of data that would allow transfer of data electronically from 
blood centres to the collation centre when the IT system allowed. 
" Staff at each centre trained to report, and responsible for co- 
ordinating reporting and for distributing results from the surveillance system 
within centres as appropriate 
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The objectives of the surveillance of infection in blood recipients were: - 
" To monitor the number of post-transfusion infections which blood 
centres are informed about, and the probable source of these infections 
" To collate and describe the failures of current blood centre practices 
to exclude HBV, HCV and HIV infections from the blood supply 
" To collate and describe reasons for the occurrence of bacterial, 
parasitic and other viral (for which donations are not tested) infections in the 
blood supply 
" To collate and describe the characteristics of transfusion 
transmitted infections in blood recipients 
The requirements of the surveillance of infection in blood recipients were: - 
9A standardised surveillance system, covering all post-transfusion, 
infections in blood recipients about which blood centres are informed 
" Clear definitions of the information requested on surveillance forms. 
" Routine receipt of reports of suspected transfusion transmitted 
infections which are reported to PHLS-CDSC national infection surveillance 
systems 
9 Staff at each centre trained to report, and responsible for co- 
ordinating reporting and for distributing results from the surveillance system 
within their centres as appropriate 
iii) Surveillance of infections: the system/general approach 
In order to meet the objectives listed above, and with consideration of the 
availability of information at blood centres, a new surveillance system was 
developed. 
The surveillance system was divided into three, linked systems- each 
collecting a different section of data: - 
1. Data about donations tested, initial and repeat reactivity to test kit 
batches and confirmed markers of infection detected. (Donation testing 
surveillance - DTS) 
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2. Data about donors with a confirmed marker(s) of infection. (Infected 
donor surveillance - IDS) 
3. Data about infections in transfusion recipients about which blood 
centres are informed, and investigations conducted into implicated 
donations. (Post-transfusion infection surveillance - PTIS) 
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the NBA/PHLS-CDSC surveillance 
system. Figure 3.2 outlines the communications involved in generating the 
surveillance data relating to infections in blood donors. 
Figure 3.1 NBA/PHLS-CDSC surveillance of transfusion transmissible 
infections 
Donations tested 
No marker of infection Marker(s) of infection 
Donation issued Donation withdrawn 
1&2 
Blood service 3 NBA/CDSC 2 Donor counselled 
informed of surveillance & exposure history 
infected recipient obtained 
2&3 
CDSC infection specific surveillance 
Surveillance data 
1. = Donation testing surveillance 
2. = Infected donor surveillance 
3. = Post-transfusion infection surveillance 
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Figure 3.2 Communication of information and surveillance reports 
Blood centres NBA/CDSC 
surveillance 
Microbiology Testing: Testing and results 
computer and Monthly database 
paper records U 
Mainframe donor Infected donor 
database database 
U Donor care 0 - HBV 
Test results Medical Officer's Infected donors: -HCV 
records Case by case -HIV 
-T. pallidum 
00 
Infected donor 
follow-up 
Confirmatory test 0 
results Test results 
- other 
databases 
A set of surveillance forms was developed for each of the three 
surveillance systems. The format of these forms was determined by the data 
requirements and by the need for different pieces of information to be obtained 
from different staff within a blood centre, and at different times. 
All the surveillance forms were printed on no-carbon-required double, or 
triple, A4 and A3 paper so a copy of each form sent to the surveillance centre 
could be kept at the blood centre. All surveillance forms were sent, in 
confidence, to the Medical Director of the National Blood Authority. 
The three infection surveillance systems (DTS, IDS and PTIS) were 
introduced to blood centres in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Republic of 
Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man on 1st October 1995. The 
Scottish Blood Transfusion Service (SNBTS) established a similar system for 
surveillance of donation testing in April 1995, and provided collated data, in a 
format comparable to the NBA/PHLS-CDSC surveillance data, to the 
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surveillance centre monthly. (The Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) 
surveillance system was introduced to UK hospitals on 1st November 1996. ) 
Each system is described in detail below. 
iv) Donation testing surveillance 
Standardised information was required about the following parameters for 
each of the infections with mandatory marker testing: - 
" Test kit batch specific numbers of donations tested. 
" Test kit batch specific numbers of donations initially reactive. 
" Test kit batch specific numbers of donations repeatedly reactive. 
" Test kit batch specific numbers of donations sent for confirmatory 
testing. 
" Test kit batch specific numbers of donations shown by confirmatory 
testing to be positive, negative and undetermined for markers of each 
mandatory tested infection. 
" Donor type (i. e. first-time, "new" donor, or repeat "old" donor) 
specific numbers of donations tested. 
" Donor type specific numbers of donations repeatedly reactive. 
9 Donor type specific numbers of donations sent for confirmatory 
testing. 
" Donor type specific numbers of donations shown by confirmatory 
testing to be positive, negative and undetermined for markers of each 
infection for which testing is universal. 
The donation testing surveillance monthly form pack (Appendix 3) 
consisted of six forms. 
The first form (DTS Section 1) recorded the number of donations tested 
during the calendar month. The minimum requirement was the number of 
donations from new donors and the number of donations from repeat donors. 
Information about the number of donations tested by sex and by age group (<25 
years, 25-34 years, 35-44 years and 45 years and over) was requested, but not 
required. The form asked for counts of donations from new donors to exclude, 
if possible, the following categories of donors: 
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i. Potential donors who attend a session, but do not provide a 
specimen for microbiological testing. 
ii. Donors who have donated to other transfusion centres in the UK. 
iii. Repeat donors who attend a session un-called/without their 
donor certificate. 
iv. Lapsed donors i. e. donors who have not donated for a certain 
number of years or more (e. g. usually 2 or 5- specified on the form). 
However, as blood centre computer systems could not always promise to 
exclude such donors from the new donation count, the form also recorded 
whether each of the four categories may have been included in the reported 
data, so that a correction could be applied to the data if necessary. 
The second form (DTS Section 2) recorded the number of initially reactive 
donations during the calendar month. One line of data was required for each 
test kit batch used during the month: test kit name, batch number, number of 
donations tested by the batch and the number of donations which were initially 
reactive to the batch. 
The other four forms in this monthly pack (DTS Section 3 a, b, c, &d) 
recorded information (test kit batch, donation number, donation date, donation 
type, initial and repeat test results, and whether sent for confirmatory testing) 
about each donation tested (with a donation date within the calendar month) 
and found to be repeatedly reactive to the test used. In addition, the same 
information was recorded about all other donations sent for further testing in 
order to confirm a suspected infection. A separate form was used for each 
marker of infection (HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti-HIV and T. pallidum antibodies). The 
confirmatory laboratory conclusions were also recorded on these forms. 
Screening results were defined as: 
Initially reactive (IR) -a donation found to be reactive at or above the 
manufacturer's defined cut-off in the first test using whichever validated 
screening assay is used for donation release. These donations (unless 
within 6 months from a previously repeatedly reactive, confirmed negative, 
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donor being monitored) were withheld for repeat testing with the screening 
assay. 
Repeatedly reactive (RR) -a donation found to be consistently (at least 
in duplicate) reactive at or above the manufacturer's defined cut-off in 
whichever validated screening assay is used for donation release. These 
donations (unless within 6 months from a previously repeatedly reactive, 
confirmed negative, donor being monitored) are sent to a reference 
laboratory for investigation. 
Donation types for DTS Section 3 forms were defined as: 
New - donations from donors who, according to blood centre records 
and donor self-report, have never been tested by a blood centre for this 
marker of infection i. e. from donors for whom available NBS records and self- 
reported information from the donor do not specify any donation to a UK 
blood centre before, and from donors who have not donated since the 
introduction of testing for the marker for which their test results are reported. 
This latter type of new donor in DTS Section 3 would be classified as a 
repeat donor in DTS Section 1. For such donations, blood centres were 
asked to label the record as ONT (old, not tested) on the DTS Section 3. 
Previously reactive PR) - donations from donors whose blood is not 
permitted to enter the blood supply because of one, or more, repeatedly 
reactive donation(s) within the last six months, or at the last, or last-but-one 
donation (i. e. so-called flagged donors or X-filed donors). In practice this 
may include donations from donors who were previously reactive to the 
current test or to another test for the marker used in the past. 
Not previously reactive NPR) - repeat donors whose blood is eligible 
(pending donation testing) for the blood supply. These donations are from 
donors, who have been tested for the infection marker before, but have either 
never been repeatedly reactive, or who have not been repeatedly reactive at 
the last, and last-but-one donation or during the last six months. 
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Confirmatory laboratory conclusions for DTS Section 3 were defined as: 
Positive - found by the confirmatory laboratories tests and interpretation 
to be positive for the marker of infection. 
Negative - found by the confirmatory laboratories tests and 
interpretation to be negative for the marker of infection. 
Undetermined - found by the confirmatory laboratories tests and 
interpretation to be neither positive nor negative for the marker of infection, 
but concluded to be of undetermined marker status at this time. 
Blood centres were asked to exclude the following samples from the 
reported data on each form: 
I. Samples taken to re-confirm an infection in a donor i. e. 
"diagnostic" samples. 
ii. Non-blood donor samples, e. g. antenatal samples, organ/tissue 
bank samples. 
iii. Autologous donations i. e. donations collected from an individual 
for transfusion to the same individual at a later date. 
and to also exclude from the Section 3 forms, 
iv. Donation samples referred for antibody quantification for 
immunoglobulin preparation. 
Donation testing surveillance forms were sent to the surveillance centre as 
soon after the end of each calendar month as possible, and by the 15th of the 
following month at the latest; complete confirmatory laboratory conclusions 
were not always available. Second copies of the DTS Section 3 forms, with 
completed confirmatory laboratory conclusions, were sent with the following 
months data if updated information was then available. If no report had been 
received by the surveillance centre for the last month, or if any confirmatory 
laboratory conclusions remained outstanding for the last but one month, the 
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blood centre was contacted by the surveillance centre and asked for the 
missing data. 
Data were generally summarised and analysed as frequency of reactivity 
and positive donations per 100 and per 100,000 donations tested respectively. 
During 1999, two routine analyses of the monthly donation testing data 
were developed - 
Analysis of Monthly donation testing data 
The aim of this analysis was to identify overall repeatedly reactive rates 
and infected donor rates for the most recent month that were outside the 95% 
prediction intervals based on the previous 36 months observed data (i. e. to alert 
to major changes in repeat reactivity and infection rates in blood donations 
collected by all reporting centres, possibly indicating a change in testing 
performance, donor selection or national infection rates in the donor 
population). 
Programmes were written in GLIM (by Nick Andrews) to model the 
observed data (numbers tested, found repeatedly reactive and found confirmed 
positive) for the previous 36 months in order to predict an expected range, at a 
set level of confidence, for rates during the current month. Each month the data 
files were up-dated and the analyses re-run. The model gave out-lying 
observations during the thirty-six month period a lower weighting in the 
prediction of expected rates so that previous unusual observations did not make 
the model insensitive to changes in the observed data that might be of 
importance. The output gave the raw data for the month, the observed rates, 
the expected rates, the low and high limits of the ranges of expected rates (at a 
set confidence level) and a score of how much each observed rate differed from 
the expected rate. This score, called the exceedance score, reached 1 when 
the observed rate was equal to the high limit of the expected rate and -1 when 
the observed rate was equal to the low limit of the expected rate. Exceedance 
scores of less then -1 or greater than 1 where therefore flagged as "unusual" 
observations. 
Exceedance score = (observed rate - expected rate) (high limit of expected rate - expected rate). 
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The model was run twice each month - once at the 95% confidence level 
and once at the 80% confidence level. 
Analysis of centre distribution of infected donors 
The aim of this analysis was to identify centre specific proportions of all 
infections, during the current year, that were outside the 95% probable range of 
expected values based on the previous 3 years' data (i. e. to alert to a relative 
change in infection rates at any one centre, possibly indicating a localised 
increase (or decrease) in infections in the donor population). The smaller 
testing centres were excluded: data from 14 centres in British Isles entered this 
analysis each month. 
Chi-squared analyses were performed by EXCEL to compare the 
distribution of infections between centres during the most recent six months with 
the distribution of infections between centres during the previous twelve 
months. Each month the "data" spreadsheet was refreshed with an update from 
the donation testing database and the outputs on the "results" spreadsheet 
were automatically re-calculated. 
Chi-squared values indicating an observed rate for any centre outside the 
95% confidence interval on the rate observed during the previous 3 years were 
flagged as "unusual" observations. Unusual observations were summarised 
each month in a table showing the number of consecutive months for which this 
result had been flagged as unusual. 
v) Infected donor surveillance 
The infected donor surveillance form pack (Appendix 4) consisted of two 
forms. 
The first form (IDS Section 1) recorded demographic (sex, date of birth, 
post-code) and previous donation details (when, where and test results for the 
most recent previous donation) about the donor of each donation with a 
confirmed marker of infection (HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti-HIV or Treponemal 
antibodies) and the details of all confirmatory tests performed on the donation. 
This form was designed for completion from blood centre records when the 
confirmatory laboratory conclusion was received. 
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In order to match the infected donor surveillance reports to donation 
testing surveillance reports of donations with confirmed markers of infection, the 
donation number was required on both the DTS and the IDS surveillance forms. 
In order to identify each infected donor, and to match infected donor 
surveillance reports to surveillance reports from other sources to the PHLS- 
CDSC, the soundex code of each donor's surname, and their first initial and 
date of birth were also required on the IDS forms. (Soundex codes are not 
unique for a single surname. Mainly because soundex codes ignore vowels, all 
soundex codes can relate to several names, for example, H300 is the code for 
Hutt, Heite, Hyde and Hoade, among many possibilities. However, if the 
soundex code is used in combination with the first initial, date of birth and sex, 
matching reports, and duplicate reports, can be identified and reports for an 
individual can be updated if additional information becomes available. ) The 
extent of erroneous matching due to identical soundex and date of birth for 
different individuals has not been estimated. The probability of an infected 
donor record with identical soundex and date of birth and within the same 
region and the same period of diagnosis as another infection record is expected 
to be very small and erroneous matching is unlikely to cause error in the 
information collected. Instructions for the manual coding of surnames into 
soundex codes and a programme for the computer generation of soundex 
codes were sent to blood centres when the revised surveillance system was 
introduced. 
The second form (IDS Section 2) recorded the donor details that only 
became available when a blood centre clinician, or other carer, subsequently 
communicated with the donor about the infection that had been detected. 
These details were: the donor's history of exposure to blood borne infections, 
the ethnic group of the donor (ethnic group is sometimes available from blood 
centre records, and reported on IDS Section 1), the donor's country of birth and 
whether the donor had any clinical signs of the infection. Ethnic group 
information was requested to be based on donor self-report i. e. asked as "To 
which ethnic group does the donor consider himself/herself to belong? " The 
first version of this form also recorded how this information was obtained: from 
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personal interview, from blood centre records, or from some other source e. g. 
GP or clinician to whom donor referred for further care. 
If a IDS Section 1 was not received at the surveillance centre for a 
donation reported as positive by the DTS Section 3, a reminder was sent to the 
blood centre, initially during the quarter following the donation date and again 
each quarter as necessary (changing to by six-month periods from Jan 1997). 
Besides increasing reporting, this also functioned as a check that all positive 
donations reported to the donation testing surveillance were unique positive 
blood donors (i. e. resulted in detection of duplicate test reports for the same 
individual, or reports of samples other than blood donations). If an IDS Section 
2 was not received, a periodic reminder was also sent, until the surveillance 
centre was informed that follow up of this donor had been closed without IDS 
Section 2 information being made available. 
Follow-up of selected Infected Donor reports was conducted during the 
study period for various purposes e. g. to identify seroconverters, to investigate 
sources of infection that were unusual or possibly of public health interest e. g. 
infections reported to have been acquired in hospitals or in schools. 
vi) Post-transfusion infection surveillance 
The post transfusion infection surveillance pack (Appendix 5) initially 
consisted of three forms. 
These forms were for reporting to the surveillance centre all infections 
(including HAV, HBV, HCV, HIV, bacterial and parasitic infections) in 
transfusion recipients about which blood centres were informed, and to 
subsequently report a summary of any investigations of the implicated 
components. 
Information about the recipient, the recipient's infection and the 
transfusion(s) implicated as the possible source of infection formed the basis of 
the initial report. Subsequently, after appropriate investigations had been 
completed, details about the findings of the investigation were reported on the 
other two forms. 
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The first form (PTIS Section 1) recorded each post-transfusion infection 
which blood centres were informed about. A post-transfusion infection (PTI) 
was defined by the following criteria: 
" The receipt of transfusion had been confirmed. 
and 
" Infection in the recipient had been confirmed (by detection of antibody, 
antigen, RNA/DNA, or culture of an organism). 
and 
" There was no evidence that the recipient was infected prior to the 
transfusion. 
or, 
" The receipt of transfusion had been confirmed. 
and 
" The recipient had had a diagnosis of acute clinical hepatitis of no known 
cause (i. e. including no evidence of acute HAV, HBV, HCV, EBV, or CMV 
infection in post-transfusion samples to date). 
This second definition was necessary to include cases of post-transfusion 
hepatitis of unknown type, and cases of post-transfusion HCV where serological 
markers of infection were not yet detectable. 
One category of post-transfusion infections was exempt from reporting. 
The exception was for HCV or HIV infected recipients whose implicated 
transfusion(s) were not tested for anti-HCV or anti-HIV (i. e. transfusion under 
investigation occurred prior to the introduction of testing). These cases were 
exempt from reporting as they were frequent, often inconclusively investigated, 
and not informative about current blood safety. 
If other possible sources of infection were known for a post-transfusion 
infection, an initial report was still requested. 
This form recorded details about the recipient (soundex code, first initial, 
sex, date of birth, significant test results on pre- and post-transfusion samples, 
infection, date of onset of symptoms, date of diagnosis and history of other risk 
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factors for infection) and about the transfusion (reason for transfusion, place of 
transfusion, date, type and number of components transfused). PTIS Section 1 
also recorded whether, based on available information about the recipient and 
the implicated donations, an investigation of the implicated donations had been 
initiated. 
The second (PTIS Section 2), and third (PTIS Section 3), forms recorded 
the outcome of any investigation of implicated components. PTIS Section 2 
recorded the testing performed on samples from the implicated donations and 
donors. PTSI Section 3 recorded the conclusions of the PTI-case investigation. 
If one or more component(s) implicated in the PTI case had been produced by 
blood centre(s) other than the one which was informed of the PTI, copies of 
PTIS Sections 2 and 3 could be sent to the relevant blood centre(s) for 
completion and return to the case-initiating blood centre. 
A probably transfusion-transmitted infection (TTI) was defined by the 
following general criteria: - 
For viral infections: - 
9 Re-testing of the archived sample of an implicated donation found 
the donation to have markers of infectivity. 
or 
" Testing of subsequent samples obtained from the donor of an 
implicated donation found the donor to have markers of infection consistent 
with the donor having been infectious at the time of the implicated donation. 
For bacteraemias: - 
" Testing of the implicated donation found evidence of an organism 
also found in the recipient, or, in the absence of an organism identified in the 
recipient, of an organism expected to cause the symptoms observed in the 
recipient. 
and 
9 No evidence that contamination of the implicated donation occurred 
after the transfusion was stopped. 
Specific criteria applicable to the majority of cases are shown in table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Specific criteria for classification of post-transfusion infections as 
transfusion- transmitted infections. 
Infection Donation Donor Recipient' 
archive 
HBV HBsAg positive & No tests performed after implicated & Evidence of HBV 
or HBV PCR donation, or Evidence of HBV infection infection (of same 
positive at some time after implicated donation sub-type if known) 
or, No testing or & Markers of acute HBV infection found & Evidence of HBV 
Negative for all <6 months after implicated donation, or infection (of same 
serology tests Symptoms of acute hepatitis during 6 sub-type if known) 
for HBV (with months after implicated donation and 
or without markers of HBV infection found 
DNA) subsequently, or Markers of resolved 
infection or HBV carriage found >6 
months after implicated donation 
(without known date of infection after 
the implicated donation). 
or, HBsAg & No tests performed after implicated & Evidence of HBV 
negative, anti- donation, or Same as archive, with or infection (of same 
HBc positive, without a history of hepatitis. sub-type if known) 
anti-HBs 
negative/wk 
Infection Donation Donor Recipient 
archive 
HCV Anti-HCV & No tests performed after implicated & Evidence of HCV 
positive or HCV donation, or Evidence of HCV infection infection (of same 
antigen positive at some time after implicated donation. sub-type if known) 
or HCV PCR 
positive 
or, No testing or & Markers of HCV infection found after & Evidence of HCV 
Negative for all implicated donation (without known date infection (of same 
tests for HCV of infection after the implicated sub-type if known) 
donation) or Symptoms of acute 
hepatitis during 3 months after 
implicated donation and markers of 
HCV infection found subsequently. 
Infection Donation Donor Recipient 
archive 
HIV Anti-HIV & No tests performed after implicated & Evidence of HIV 
positive or HIV donation, or Evidence of HIV infection infection (of same 
p24 Ag positive at some time after implicated donation. sub-type if known) 
or HIV PCR 
positive 
or, No testing or & Markers of HIV infection found after & Evidence of HIV 
Negative for all implicated donation (without known date infection (of same 
tests for HIV of infection after the implicated sub-type if known) 
donation), or Symptoms of 
seroconversion illness during 3 months 
after implicated donation and markers 
of HIV infection found subsequently. 
Infection Donation Donor Recipient 
archive 
/componene 
Bacteria Markers of & No tests performed after implicated & Evidence of specific 
specific donation, or Evidence of specific blood bacterial infection of 
bacterial borne bacteria, or of specific bacteria same species and 
infection or colonising venepuncture site, at some type as far as known, 
Cultures time after implicated donation. or Symptoms typical 
specific of specific bacterial 
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bacteria infection. 
or, No testing & Evidence of specific blood borne & Evidence of specific 
or Negative for bacteria, or of specific bacteria bacterial infection of 
all tests for colonising venepuncture site, at or after same species and 
bacteria time of implicated donation. type as far as known, 
or and no other 
Symptoms of specific bacterial illness identified source of 
during month before or after implicated infection. 
donation and any permanent markers of 
specific bacterial infection found 
subsequently. 
Infection Donation Donor Recipient 
archive/ 
component 
HAV No testing or & Acute HAV infection diagnosed during & anti-HAV positive 
anti-HAV post-transfusion period 
positive 
or, as above & anti-HAV positive & Acute HAV infection 
post-transfusion 
Malaria No testing or & Positive for malarial antibodies & Malaria diagnosed 
positive for within x weeks of 
plasmodium or transfusion. 
malarial 
antibodies 
1. All without other proven source of infection, and without evidence of 
infection prior to transfusion, and with disease (or markers of infection) within 
limits of possible incubation periods. 
2. If index component used then absence of evidence of contamination 
having occurred after the transfusion is also required. 
All cases meeting these criteria, and any cases that were undetermined by 
these criteria, were reviewed by the consultant in microbiology for the National 
Blood Authority (Dr John Barbara) who used his own expertise, and consulted 
with other specialists, to confirm the classification or to determine whether 
"infectivity", "evidence of an organism" and "no evidence of contamination" were 
observed in undetermined cases. 
Lists of post-transfusion infection reports received were sent six monthly to 
the reporters. These individuals were asked to check that all infections about 
which their blood centre had been informed were included on the list, and if not, 
to report them without further delay. 
Additional information about certain cases that were of interest for a 
specific purpose, or specific period of time e. g. quality assurance data relating 
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to leucodepletion of components shown to have transmitted bacterial or cell 
associated infections, was collected from reporters as required 
vii) Piloting, and revisions, of the surveillance systems 
Pilot 
Donation testing surveillance 
The provisional surveillance forms were reviewed by the Steering group, 
the NBS Batch pre-acceptance group (BPAT) and by the microbiology 
departments at all blood centres, and the forms were revised in the light of the 
comments received. 
The donation testing surveillance system was piloted in five blood centres 
for the month of August 1995. The five blood centres chosen for the pilot 
(Brentwood, North London, Leeds, Southampton and Bristol) represented the 
three geographical and organisational zones of the NBS and also represented 
the major computer systems in use in blood centres. Minor revisions to the 
formatting of the forms were made following this pilot month in order to aid 
completion of the information requested. 
Infected donor surveillance and post transfusion infection surveillance 
The provisional surveillance forms were reviewed by the Steering group, 
and by the medical consultants at all blood centres. Completion of the donor 
surveillance forms from information stored in HCV infected donor files at North 
London blood centre, and of the post-transfusion infection surveillance forms 
from information stored in PTI case files at South Thames blood centre was 
trialed. The forms were revised in the light of the comments received and the 
experience of their trial use. The forms were introduced for use at blood 
centres from Ist October for an initial pilot period of six months. Use of the 
forms continued after the pilot six months without revision. 
Revisions 
Revisions to Donation testing surveillance during the study period 
Electronic reporting 
During 1999 and early 2000, reporting on paper forms posted to the 
surveillance centre was replaced at all English and Welsh centres with 
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electronic reporting using Microsoft ACCESS and electronic mail. A standard 
database was designed to receive and manage data at centres and to export 
data each month to the surveillance centre. Data-entry screens mimicked the 
paper forms, and reports printed paper copies of the data (again formatted like 
the paper forms) to be in paper files if necessary. This standard database was 
customised for each reporting centre to fit their style of data collection (e. g. for 
daily data-entry or batch data-entry once or twice a month) and to perform local 
functions (e. g. lists of positive donations for medical follow-up, repeat reactivity 
rates by week for local test monitoring) in addition to the reporting function. 
Each centre's database contained all the data reported to date by that centre 
only. A second much smaller, "transfer" database was also installed at each 
centre. The data in this database was overwritten by an automatic data export 
process each month, and this transfer database was copied each month by 
electronic mail (email) to the NBA. Staff were trained to use the database, run 
the export and email the transfer database. Any problems or queries after 
instillation and training were dealt with by telephone by the surveillance co- 
ordinator who also held a copy of the design of each customised database. 
Electronic reporting greatly reduced manual transcription of numbers and 
test results and reduced data-entry workload - both at the centres where data- 
entry shortcuts and bar-code readers speeded data-entry, and at the NBA 
where the bulk of the data was imported directly. The advantages of electronic 
reporting were greatest for the centres testing largest numbers of donations. 
The smaller participating centres of the Eire, Northern Ireland, the Channel 
Isles, and the Isle of Man continued using the paper reporting system. 
One revision to the donation testing dataset was introduced into the 
electronic reporting system. During 1998, nucleic acid testing (NAT) for HCV 
RNA by PCR was introduced into the testing performed by the blood service. 
From 1st September 1999, frozen components were released as confirmed 
HCV RNA negative by pooled PCR testing. At the end of 1999, it was agreed 
that the donation testing surveillance system should monitor the NAT result for 
all anti-HCV positive donations. 
NAT results 
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Nucleic acid testing (NAT) results for anti-HCV positive donations were 
added to the data reported each month at the beginning of 2000. These test 
results were initially collected retrospectively back to Ist September 1999, to 
cover the period for which all FFP had been issued as NAT negative. 
Subsequently data were collected back to 1st April 1999, when NAT testing 
moved from anonymous pilot testing to testing that resolved results to identified 
donations. The donation testing databases were modified so that the entry of 
the result of HCV PCR testing was requested on entry of an anti-HCV positive 
donation. 
Revisions to Infected donor and post-transfusion infection surveillance 
during the study period 
During 1999, following a meeting of all reporters to discuss the 
surveillance and the use of the data generated by the surveillance systems, the 
infected donor surveillance forms and the post-transfusion infection surveillance 
forms were revised (Appendices 6& 7). 
The revisions to the infected donor surveillance forms were: i) prompting 
for reporting the results of pooled and singleton PCR testing for HCV, ii) a 
question asking for information about exposures to be summarised as either a. ) 
Donor has no identified risk despite satisfactory follow-up information available, 
b. ) Risk for the donor not identified, possibly because of incomplete follow-up 
information, or c. ) One or more probable risk factor identified, with the details of 
each risk factor only completed for those in group c), iii) revision of the risk 
factor grid to separate donors exposures from donor's heterosexual partner's 
exposures, and iv) a question asking (of group c. ) donors) why the donor did not 
disclose the existing risk factor at the time of donating blood, instead of the 
question asking for the method by which the information on the report had been 
obtained. 
The revisions to the post-transfusion infection surveillance forms were i) 
provision to specify that the report referred to a post-transfusion reaction 
suspected to be due to bacteria (rather than a confirmed bacteraemia), ii) 
alternative versions of the section 2 and 3 forms specific for post-transfusion 
bacteraemias and post-transfusion reactions suspected to be due to bacteria. 
These alternative forms (PTI(bac)) included questions on the age of the 
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component, the method of platelet collection, the method of any leucodepletion 
performed on the component and allowed more space for free text to describe 
the source of the samples available for culture and the investigations conducted 
on these samples. 
viii) Co-ordination with laboratory reports to PHLS-CDSC 
Co-ordination of reports to other specific infection surveillance systems 
Blood centres were advised that with the introduction of the NBA/PHLS- 
CDSC surveillance system they were no longer requested to complete separate 
HIV antibody positive report forms, or HBsAg positive report forms, for the 
PHLS-CDSC. From the I st October 1995 these reports for the PHLS-CDSC 
infection specific surveillance systems were generated from the NBS/PHLS- 
CDSC system using the information reported on the IDS and the PTIS forms. 
The PHLS-CDSC HIV/AIDS surveillance centre sometimes receives 
further information about an HIV infected blood donor, when the individual 
attends for care at another centre (usually a genitourinary medicine clinic), or 
when the individual is diagnosed with AIDS, or dies. This information is 
provided in confidence by voluntary reporters. The PHLS-CDSC HIV/AIDS 
centre also conducts follow up of individuals, including blood donors, who have 
no identified risk for HIV infection, or report only heterosexual contact in the UK 
with partners who have no known high-risk exposure. The PHLS-CDSC 
HIV/AIDS centre therefore may hold information about blood donors that is not 
known to the blood centres were the donors were tested. Periodically 
(quarterly from October 1995-December 1996 and six-monthly from January 
1997), the NBA/PHLS-CDSC surveillance system cross checked reported 
information for HIV positive donors with the PHLS-CDSC HIV/AIDS centre, and 
the most up to date information was obtained. Information obtained from PHLS- 
CDSC HIV/AIDS centre was held separately to information reported by blood 
centres and was not communicated to blood centres except without any means 
of donor identification in summary tables. 
The PHLS-CDSC HIV/AIDS centre informed the NBA/PHLS-CDSC 
surveillance system of any newly reported HIV positive individuals with 
transfusion in the UK reported as the suspected route of infection. 
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The PHLS-CDSC Hepatitis section informed the NBA/PHLS-CDSC 
surveillance system of any individuals reported with acute HBV infection with 
transfusion in the UK as a suspected route of infection, and of any anti-HCV 
positive report with transfusion in the UK since September 1991 (i. e. the start of 
anti-HCV testing of all blood donations) as the most probable route of infection. 
In 1995, when many individuals who received transfusions prior to the 
introduction of anti-HCV testing of blood donations were requesting anti-HCV 
testing to investigate their infection status, the PHLS-CDSC Hepatitis section 
conducted a survey of the numbers of anti-HCV tests performed at PHLs and 
the reasons for testing and test results. Reports of infected recipients with a 
history of transfusion in England prior to testing were passed to the National 
Blood Service. These infections, probably acquired from untested anti-HCV 
positive transfusions, were excluded from the surveillance of post-transfusion 
infections and have been collated elsewhere (National Lookback Collaborators, 
2001). 
PHLS colleagues working on surveillance of specific organisms that may 
be transfusion transmissible were made aware of the NBA/PHLS-CDSC 
transfusion transmissible infection surveillance project and asked to pass on 
any relevant infection reports. 
Interrogation of LABBASE 
Public Health Service laboratories (PHLs), National Health Service 
laboratories and some private laboratories routinely report all detected 
infections to PHLS-CDSC Lab-Base. 
Transfusion was not, during this time, included as a coded feature for any 
infections reported by laboratories to PHLS-CDSC Lab-Base. Infections that 
were, or might have been, associated with transfusion could therefore be 
identified only by searching a free-text field ("comments") for any mention of 
transfusion. Due to variation in both the completeness of infection reporting and 
the amount of information included on reports from different laboratories, 
analysis of clinical or epidemiological data provided with routine reports to 
CDSC Lab-base must be considered with caution. 
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Two investigations of reports to Lab-Base were conducted. Firstly, in July 
1995, two selections were made from reports received by CDSC between the 
beginning of 1994 and week 27 of 1995. The first selection was of reports of 
bacteraemias with comments mentioning transfusion. Examination of the 
comments showed that for 40% (19) of these selected reports, there was no 
indication of infection associated with blood transfusion. For 3 isolates from 2 
patients, comments indicated that the bacteraemia was definitely associated 
with transfusion. Both these cases had been investigated by the NBS. The 
remaining 29 isolates were concluded to represent possible cases of 
transfusion associated bacteraemia. The second selection was of a subset of 
organisms reported to Lab-Base. Organisms that were likely to be isolated from 
blood cultures relatively infrequently (<500 reports per year) and which might be 
transfusion transmissible were selected. 83 selected organisms (including 
Yersinia enterocolitica (23), Pseudomonas fluorescens (53), Pseudomonas 
putida (18), Pseudomonas cepacia (43), Serratia marcescens (269) and 
Serratia liquifaciens (96)) yielded 2,966 reports. Review of the contents of the 
free text fields suggested that, when the underlying clinical condition reported 
was one for which transfusion would almost certainly have been required, a 
history of transfusion had rarely been reported. 
This pilot examination of Lab-Base led to a request for history of 
transfusion (yes/no) to be included as a standard prompted feature for selected 
organisms in future developments of the Lab-Base system so that selection of 
infections which may be associated with transfusion may be performed more 
accurately. Subsequent changes to the Lab Base system and methods of 
reporting have decreased the free text information reported and further use of 
this system has not been developed. 
A second attempt to interrogate Lab-Base for information about 
transfusion-transmitted infections was made in 2000 when information was 
needed about CMV transmission by transfusion - particularly to neonates. All 
laboratory reports of CMV infection to CDSC (LABBASE) were queried for 
relevant information. As for bacterial infections, information about recent 
transfusion is not routinely requested for CMV infection reports: a free text field 
is available for reporters to note comments of possible relevance. 
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Of 2,925 CMV infections reported to LABBASE from 1/1/97 to date, 101 
(3.5%) were in patients known to be less than 3 weeks of age. Fifty of these 
babies had comments associated with their CMV report - no comments 
mentioned transfusion. Of all 2,925 reports, 1,269 had comments and 5 of 
these mentioned transfusion: - 
1. (Wk: 9717) 3-5 month old male baby, comment: preterm/jaundice/blood 
transfusion (N. B. Not the same case as the one reported to a blood centre 
during 1997. ). 
2. (Wk: 9836) 29 yr old female transplant recipient, comment: blood 
transfusion 
3. (Wk: 9832) 54 yr old male, comment: H/O transfusion 
4. (Wk: 9701) 57 yr old female, comment: thought to be from blood 
transfusion in Egypt 
5. (Wk: 9813) 73 yr old male, comment: post transfusion 
The three LABBASE reports during 1998 (9836,9832,9813) that mention 
transfusion were, according to information from blood centres, not reported to 
the blood services for investigation. This may be due to identification of another 
source of infection or under-reporting to the blood service. 
Lab reports of infections in babies had comments more frequently than 
reports of infections in older aged patients. 
No evidence was found of transfusion associated CMV cases during 
1998/99. Four of 2,925 (0.14%) laboratory reports of CMV infection (1997 to 
date) mentioned a history of transfusion not known to have been abroad, but 
these do not seem to have been investigated by blood services. 
As blood centres may not be informed of suspected post-transfusion CMV 
infections, and laboratory reports to CDSC do not routinely contain information 
about whether or not the patient has had a recent transfusion, the available data 
could not demonstrate there had been no such cases. Further follow up of 
selected LABBASE reports may be worthwhile if further work on this issue is 
required. As transfusion associated CMV cases in babies are of most 
importance, and reports for this group were also more detailed, a routine search 
of LABBASE for CMV cases in babies that mention transfusion in the 
comments, with follow up of any cases via the reporter, was considered, but has 
not been carried out. 
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ix) Routine reports of collated data from the surveillance centre 
Donation testing surveillance data were collated monthly and a tabular 
report of the reactivity rates for the past month, and the confirmed infection 
rates for the last-but-one month, was sent to all blood centres and other 
interested centres by the 25th of the next month. The output from the monthly 
analysis of donation testing data where circulated to key staff overseeing 
donation testing and quality assurance. (Appendix 6 contains the report for 
September 1999 with centre and manufacturer names removed. ) 
Up until December 1996, data from the infected donor surveillance and 
post-transfusion infection surveillance systems were collated by calendar 
quarter and a tabular and graphical report (NBA/PHLS CDSC Infection 
Surveillance report) was sent to all blood centres and other interested centres at 
the end of the following calendar quarter. From January 1997, the frequency of 
infection surveillance reports was changed to be six monthly (Appendix 7 
contains Report 10, with data to end June 1999). 
The content and analyses included in these routine reports is described 
below. 
3.2 Results 
Donation testing 
Between 1/10/95 and 30/09/99,11,442,706 blood donations were tested 
by the blood services of England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Isles 
and Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland and the results of testing these 
donations for HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti-HIV and Treponemal antibodies were 
reported to the surveillance system. 
Appendix 6 shows the monthly report for September 1999. This report 
presents data on donations tested during September 1999, and cumulatively 
since October 1995. Tables 2a, 2b and 1c from the October 1999 report are 
also included in appendix 6: these tables show the confirmed positives during 
September 1999 and cumulatively from October 1995 to September 1999. 
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(Note: Manufacturers' and products' names and centre names have been 
blanked-out of the tables included in this thesis, as some of these data are 
confidential. ) 
Table 3.3 and Figure 3.3 summaries the specificity of the assays used 
over this period - according to the data reported. 
Table 3.3 Summary reactivity to screening tests for HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti- 
HIV and T. pallidum antibodies: batches in use September 1999 
All donations reported to NBA/PHLS CDSC Donation testing surveillance, 01/10/95 
to 30/09/99 (4 years) 
Test Kit Number Number Number Falsely 
(3 with highest usage, tested repeatedly confirmed repeatedly 
and others) reactive % positive reactive 
HBsAg 
Test 1 (i. e. most used) 518,381 439 0.085% 11 0.083% 
Test 2 262,443 30 0.011% 10 0.008% 
Test 3 130,996 205 0.156% 4 0.153% 
Others 29,218 19 0.065% 0 0.065% 
All test kits 941,038 693 0.074% 25 0.071% 
Anti-HCV 
Test 1 259,004 235 0.091% 15 0.085% 
Test 2 151,846 55 0.036% 4 0.034% 
Test 3 66,602 39 0.059% 10 0.044% 
Others 22,629 18 0.080% 0 0.080% 
All test kits 500,081 347 0.069% 29 0.064% 
Anti-HIV 
Test 1 344,895 168 0.049% 2 0.048% 
Test 2 251,820 203 0.081% 4 0.079% 
Test 3 144,762 68 0.047% 1 0.046% 
Others 8,564 5 0.058% 0 0.058% 
All test kits 750,041 444 0.059% 7 0.058% 
T. pallidum 
Test 1 547,887 154 0.028% 12 0.026% 
Test 2 68,502 33 0.048% 1 0.047% 
Test 3 52,521 15 0.029% 1 0.027% 
Others 43,706 53 0.121% 0 0.121% 
All test kits 712,616 255 0.036% 14 0.034% 
All test kits, all markers 0.227% 
Test 1, all markers 58% 0.242% 
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Figure 3.3 False reactivity: most commonly used kits, others, and all tests 
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Figure 3.4 show the rates of repeat-reactivity and of confirmed markers of 
infection over the four-year period 01/01/96 to 30/09/99, for donations from new 
donors, donations from repeat donors and for all donations. 
Figure 3.4 Frequency per 10,000 donations of reactivity and confirmed 
positivity for HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti-HIV and Treponemal antibodies for 
donations from new donors, donations from repeat donors and all donations, 
1996-1999. 
(See graphs on next twelve pages. ) 
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New donor repeat reactors for HBsAg 
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All donor repeat reactors for HBsAg 
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Since September 1999 a statistical analysis has been run each month, 
using the reported data, to identify any unusual data that may indicate an 
important change in test performance, or in donor infection rates. 
Analysis of Monthly donation testing data 
During the first 12 months (September 1999 to August 2000), out of 288 
observed repeatedly reactive rates and infected donor monthly rates this 
analysis identified (at the 5% significance level) 22 that were outside the 95% 
prediction intervals based on the previous 36 months observed data i. e. with an 
exceedance score greater or less than 1. These unexpected observed rates 
are shown in Table 3.4, with the exceedance score for the observed rate and 
the number of donations repeatedly reactive, or positive, that generated the 
observed rate. 
Table 3.4 Unexpected repeatedly reactive (RR) rates and confirmed infection 
rates (at 5% significance level) observed in donation testing data for July 1999 - 
June 2000. 
Month Unexpected 
RR rate 
Donor 
type 
Exceedance 
score 
Number 
RR 
0100 HBsAg New 1.40 55 
0100 T. pall. New 1.62 30 
0200 anti-HCV New 1.26 84 
0200 anti-HIV Repeat -1.51 180 
0200 anti-HIV ALL -1.26 230 
0200 T. pall. New 2.12 33 
0200 T. pall. ALL 1.08 190 
0300 T. pall. New 3.68 61 
0500 T. pall. New 1.83 42 
0500 T. pall. Repeat 1.43 246 
0500 T. pall. ALL 1.44 288 
0899 T. pall. ALL -1.01 107 
0999 T. pall. Repeat -1.08 80 
0999 T. pall. ALL -1.02 98 
1199 HBsAg New 1.36 50 
1299 HBsAg New -1.21 22 
1299 anti-HCV New -1.19 61 
1299 T. pall. New -1.21 13 
18 
Unexpected 
infection rate 
Donor type Exceedance 
score 
Number 
infected 
HBsAg Repeat 1.40 3 
anti-HCV Repeat -1.24 1 
anti-HIV New 1.02 2 
anti-HCV ALL 1.12 24 
4 
The majority (82%) of unexpected observations were repeatedly reactive 
rates: 61 % of these (11) concerned repeat reactivity to test for Treponemal 
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antibodies. The repeatedly reactive rate for Treponemal antibodies in new 
donors was high for 4 months, and low for 1 month during this year. 44% of 
unexpected repeatedly reactive rates were unexpectedly low. Only 4 
unexpected infection rates were observed at the 5% significance level, one was 
an unexpectedly low rate. Only one of the unexpectedly high infection rates 
was based on more than 5 infections. None of the unexpectedly high infection 
rates persisted for more than one month. 
Analysis of monthly centre distribution of infected donors 
One hundred and forty-one of 1,344 (10%) observed centre and donor 
type specific infection rates (i. e. proportion of donations tested found to be 
positive) during the first year (July 1999 to June 2000) were flagged as falling 
outside the probable range at the 5% significance level based on the previous 3 
years' data. There was an average of twelve flagged centre and donor type 
specific infection rates per month (range 7 to 17 flagged values). An average of 
6.8 flags each month (range 1 to 13) referred to rates based on more than two 
infections. 
The average number of flags per month (and range) with various 
restrictions in place are shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Number (range) of flagged results per month meeting criteria, N= 
number of positive donations generating the rate, X2 = value of chi-squared for 
the observed rate. 
Possible criteria for 
further attention 
HBsAg Anti-HCV Anti-HIV T. pall. 
All flagged rates 2.3 (0-3) 2.3 (1-4) 1.5 (0-3) 5.7 (0-11) 
Flagged: N>1 2.0 (1-3) 2.0 (1-3) 0.8 (0-2) 5.4 (0-10) 
Flagged: N>2 0.9 (0-1) 1.8 (0-3) 0 4.1 (0-9) 
Flagged: N>5 0.3 (0-1) 1.3 (0-3) 0 0.8 (0-4) 
Flagged: X2> 5 2.3 (1-3) 2.3 (1-4) 1.5 (0-3) 5.7 (0-11) 
Flagged: X2> 10 0.9 (0-2) 1.2 (0-2) 0 4.4 (0-8) 
Flagged: N>1 and X2 >5 2.0 (1-3) 2 (1-3) 0.8 (0-2) 5.4 (0-10) 
Flagged: N>3 and X2 > 10 - - - 1.4(0-5) 
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85 flags passed criteria of N >1 and X2 >5 for HBsAg, anti-HCV and anti- 
HIV and N>3 and X2 > 10 for T. pallidum: 9 of these flags appeared for one 
month only: the remainder appeared for at least 2 consecutive months. Twenty- 
five (29%) were on new donor infection rates and 60 (71 %) were on repeat 
donor infection rates. 
Infected donors 
During the period of study, a total of 1,829 donations (16.83 per 100,000 
donations) collected by the English and Welsh Blood services had markers of 
infectious HBV, HCV or HIV infection. Of these infected donations, 903 (49%) 
had anti-HCV, 463 (25%) had HBsAg, 94 (5%) had anti-HIV and 369 (20%) had 
Treponemal antibodies. New donors contributed 12% of all blood donations, 
but 70% of infected donations. Table 3.6 summarises the rate of infectious 
marker detection in donations from new donors, donations from repeat donors 
and in all donations, collected by the English and Welsh Blood Service during 
the period 01/10/95 to 30/09/99. The completeness of reporting to the infected 
donors surveillance was monitored by matching of reports for infected donors to 
confirmed positive donations reported to the donation testing surveillance. The 
completeness of reporting patient details, and of reporting follow-up clinical and 
risk factor details, is shown in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.5. 
The distribution of infections by age group and by sex of donors is shown 
in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 and Figures 3.6 and 3.7 for newly tested donors and 
previously tested donors respectively. 
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Table 3.6 Infections detected in blood donors and the completeness of 
reporting: Donations collected in England and Wales from 01/10/1995 to 
30/09/1999 
Surveillance reports' 
Infections In blood donors 
Total 
01 /10/1995-30/09/1999 
HBV HCV HIV T. pallidum 
(HBsAg) (anti-HCV) (anti-HIV) (Treponemal 
antibodies) 
a. Donations with confirmed marker of infection 463 903 94 369 
per 100,000 donations tested 4.26 8.31 0.86 3.39 
-1 in x donations 23,477 12,037 115,635 29,457 
donations from new donors (1,207,079) 391 656 56 177 
per 100,000 donations tested 32.39 54.35 4.64 14.66 
-. ` Wx donations 3,087 1,840 21.555. 6,820 
donations from repeat donors2 (9,662,571) 72 247 38 191 
per 100,000 donations tested 0.75 2.56 0.39 1.98 
-1 in x donations -' 134,202 39,120 254,278 50,589 
b. Infected donors reported 463 873 94 358 
-% of infections reported3 100% 97% 100% 97% 
c. Exposure histories reported 358 702 78 252 
-% of infections with exposure history reported3 77% 78% 83% 68% 
Source: a. Donation Testing Surveillance monthly reports, b. Infected Donor 
Surveillance Section 1 reports, c. Infected Donor Surveillance Section 2 reports. 
2 May include repeat donors newly tested for markers of infection. 
3 i. e. percentage of a. 
49 donors had markers of more than 1 infection: 5 donors had HBsAg(carriage) and HCV, 
1 donor had HBsAg(carriage) and HIV and 3 donors had HCV and Treponemal antibodies. 
Figure 3.5. Infections detected in blood donors and completeness of 
reporting: Donations collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999 
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Figure 3.6 Age and sex of infected blood donors: newly tested donors. 
Donations collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
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' Rates adjusted for underreporting by multiplying the denominator estimate for 
each age and sex group by the proportion of all detected infections reported, 
e. g frequency of anti-HCV in males under 25 = (number anti-HCV positive 
males < 25 yrs /(number of donations, males < 25 yrs x 0.97[from table 3.6])). 
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Figure 3.7 Age and sex of infected blood donors: previously tested donors. 
Donations collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
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Rates adjusted for underreporting by multiplying the denominator 
estimate for each age and sex group by the proportion of all detected infections 
reported. 
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HBsAg and anti-HCV were 2.3 times and 2.2 times respectively more 
common in newly tested male donors than newly tested female donors. (chi- 
squared test p<0.001 for both markers). The mean age of newly tested donors 
who had HBsAg was 34.5 years (95% confidence interval 33.4 to 35.6), for anti- 
HCV it was 37.1 years (95% confidence interval 36.4-37.7), and for anti-HIV it 
was 30.4 years (95% confidence interval 28.6-32.3). (Table 3.9 and Figure 3.8) 
The probable routes of infection for donors found to be positive for HBsAg, 
ant-HCV and anti-HIV are shown in Tables 3.11,3.12 and 3.13 and Figure 3.10, 
3.11 and 3.12 respectively. 
Table 3.9 Mean age (and 95% confidence intervals) of newly tested infected 
donors by infection marker and sex: Donations collected 01/10/1995 to 
30/09/1999. 
Treponemal Any of these 
HBsAq anti-HCV anti-HIV antibodies markers 
Females 34.6 37.2 29.9 42.9 37 
(32.5-36.7) (36.1-38.3) (26.5-33.3) (40.6-45.2) (36.0-38.0) 
Males 34.5 37.0 30.8 43.3 36.7 
(33.2-35.8) (36.2-37.8) (28.6-32.9) (41.2-45.3) (36.0-37.4) 
Total 34.5 37.1 30.4 43.1 36.8 
(33.4-35.6) (36.4-37.7) (28.6-32.3) (41.6-44.6) (36.2-37.3) 
Figure 3.8 Mean age (and 95% confidence intervals) of newly tested infected 
donors by infection marker and sex: Donations collected 01/10/1995 to 
30/01999. 
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The ethnic group of all donors was not available. The ethnic group of infected 
donors is shown in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.9. 
Table 3.10 Ethnic group of infected blood donors. Donations collected from 
01 /10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
Ethnic group 
HBV 
(HBsAg) 
No. % 
HCV 
No. % 
HIV 
No. % 
T. pallidum 
(Treponemal antibodies) 
No. % 
Infections reported 463 100% 873 100% 94 1 00% 358 100% 
White 188 41% 671 77% 66 70% 169 47% 
Black-Caribbean 12 3% 7 1% 8 9% 26 7% 
Black-African 40 9% 4 0.5% 5 5% 14 4% 
Black-Other 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 1% 
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi 38 8% 15 2% 0 0% 10 3% 
Chinese 34 7% 3 0.3% 0 0% 1 0.3% 
Other Asian 40 9% 6 1% 0 0% 3 1% 
Mixed and other 2 0.4% 2 0.2% 0 0% 0 0% 
Not available 109 24% 165 19% 15 16% 132 37% 
Figure 3.9 Ethnic group of infected blood donors. Donations collected from 
01 / 10/ 1995 to 30/09/1999. 
a) HBsAg Infections (N-463 b) HCV Infections (N=873) 
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Table 3.11 Exposure categories of HBsAg positive blood donors. Donations 
collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
How infection was probably acquired I Newly tested Previously tested I All donors 
4 5 1% Injecting drug use 
Sexual intercourse 
between men 
between men and women 
exposure to 'high risk' Aartner(s)2 
exposure abroad3 
exposure in the UK4 
incomplete information 
Blood factor treatment 
Blood/tissue transfer 
Mother to infant 
Blood contact - documented 
Blood contact - possible 
Family/household contact 
5 
' Newly tested by the blood transfusion services included in this surveillance: may have had donations 
tested in other countries. 
2 Partner(s) exposed through sexual intercourse with men, IDU, blood factor treatment or blood/tissue transfer. 
3 Individuals from abroad, and individuals from the UK who have lived or visited abroad, for whom 
there is no evidence of "high risk" partner(s). 
No known 'high risk' partner(s). 
s Of these previously tested donors 28 report a previous negative result, 11 report an HBsAg positive 
previous donation (10 previously confirmed positive, 1 found to be positive on re-testing of archive) and 
for 8 the previous test results are not reported. 
Figure 3.10 Exposure categories of HBsAg positive blood donors. Donation 
collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
3 0I3 1% 
4 1 5 1% 
12 5 17 5% 
8 1 9 3% 
9 3 12 3% 
0 0 0 0% 
11 1 12 3% 
54 2 56 16% 
4 3 7 2% 
39 7 46 13% 
10 1 11 3% 
Q Injecting drug use 
  Sexual intercourse between men 
® Sexual intercourse between men and women 
  Blood/tissue transfer 
  Mother to infant 
  Blood contact - documented 
  Blood contact - possible 
  Family/household contact 
Q No identified exposure 
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Table 3.12 Exposure categories of anti-HCV positive blood donors. 
Donations collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
How infection was probably acquired Newly tested Previously tested I' 
'^" 
All donors 
Injecting drug use 209 9 218 31% 
Sexual intercourse 
between men 0 1 1 0% 
between men and women 
exposure to 'high nsk' partner(s) 2 49 3 52 7% 
exposure abroad 3 6 0 6 1% 
exposure in the UK4 2 1 3 0% 
incomplete information 1 1 2 0% 
Blood factor treatment 1 0 1 0% 
Blood/tissue transfer 95 11 106 15% 
Blood contact - documented 13 1 14 2% 
Blood contact - possible5 120 17 137 20% 
Family/household contact 2 1 3 0% 
No identified exposure 132 27 159 23% 
Total 630 72 6 702 100% 
1 Newly tested by the blood transfusion services included in this surveillance: may have had donations 
tested in other countries. 
2 Partner(s) exposed through IDU, blood factor treatment or blood/tissue transfer (pre Sept 91). 
3 Individuals from abroad, and individuals from the UK who have lived or visited abroad, for whom 
there is no evidence of "high risk" partner(s). 
` No known "high risk" partner(s). 
5 Includes tattoos, acupuncture, possible occupational exposure to blood. 
6 Of these previously tested donors 35 report previous negative donations, 16 report previous reactivity 
not confirmed positive, 10 report previous positivity (8 previously confirmed positive, 2 found to be 
positive on re-testing of archive) and for 11 the results of the previous donation are not reported. 
Figure 3.11 Exposure categories of anti-HCV positive blood donors. 
01njecting drug use 
 Sexual intercourse between men 
® Sexual intercourse between men and women 
  Blood factor treatment 
  Blood/tissue transfer 
  Blood contact - documented 
  Blood contact - possible 
  Family/household contact 
ONO identified exposure 
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Table 3.13 Exposure categories of anti-HIV positive blood donors. Donations 
collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
How infection was probably acquired I Newly tested Previously tested I All donors 
Injecting drug use 
Sexual intercourse 
between men 
between men and women 
exposure to 'high risk' partner(s)2 
exposure abroad3 
exposure in the UK4 
incomplete information 
Blood factor treatment 
Blood/tissue transfer 
Other 
10I1 1% 
13 16 29 31% 
6 1 7 7% 
8 7 15 16% 
11 11 22 23% 
5 1 6 6% 
0 0 0 0% 
0 0 0 0% 
0 0 0 0% 
39 6 
1 Newly tested by the blood transfusion services included in this surveillance: may have had donation 
tested in other countries. 
2 Partner(s) exposed through sexual intercourse between men, IDU, blood factor treatment or 
blood/tissue transfer. 
3 Individuals from abroad, and individuals from the UK who have lived or visited abroad, for whom 
there is no evidence of 'high risk' partner(s). 
4 No known 'high risk' partner(s). 
5 Investigation continuing. 
6 All 39 positive previously tested donors had a previous anti-HIV tested donation in the UK 
recorded: all are reported to have been anti-HIV negative. 
Figure 3.12 Exposure categories of anti-HIV positive blood donors. 
Donations collected from 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
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Exposure history information was reported for 67% of donors with 
confirmed reactivity for Treponemal antibodies: 27% of Treponemal antibody 
positive donors with exposure history information available had a history of 
Syphilis reported and 5% had a history of Yaws. 
The second version of the infected donor surveillance form asked for 
reasons for non-disclosure prior to donation of probable routes of infection. 60 
of 129 exposure histories reported on these new forms (to 30/06/1999) included 
a response to this question. The reasons donor selection criteria did not exclude 
these donors are shown in Table 3.14; amongst the remaining 59, only 2 
reported an identified probable route of infection. For 30 of the 60, the probable 
route of infection was not a reason for pre-donation exclusion. For 11, the 
probable route of infection occurred outside the period of time for which the 
donor selection criteria apply. For 19 (13 HCV, 3 HIV and 3 TP) a risk factor 
was disclosed during post-diagnoses counselling that should have resulted in 
exclusion from donation: the reported reasons these risk factors were not 
disclosed prior to donation are shown in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.14 Classification of applicability of donor selection criteria to infected 
donors with reasons why probable route of infection was not disclosed prior to 
donation reported (up to 30/06/1999). 
HBV HCV HIV T. pallidum Total 
No exclusion criteria applied 14 93% 14 38% 1 1 30 50% 
Exclusion criteria expired 1 7% 10 27% 0 0 11 18% 
Exclusion criteria did apply 0 0% 13 35% 3 3 19 32% 
Total 15 100% 37 100% 4 4 60 100% 
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Table 3.15 Reasons for non-disclosure prior to donation of risk factors for 
which exclusion criteria applied. 
How infection was infection Reason stated for non-disclosure prior to donation 
probably acquired 
Injecting drug use HCVSingle IDU only, therefore did not think it applied. 
" Thought blood would be tested. Needed to know blood group for work. 
" Told S. O. past history of hepatitis but informed by a hospital last year that no 
longer has it. Did not tick IDU because linked it with the hepatitis which had 
discussed with the S. O. 
" Was only trying to help, and thought all was tested anyway. 
" Did not think it relevant -a long time ago and did not share needles/syringes, 
although did share other injecting equipment' 
" Did not think it was relevant as it was along time ago. 
Thought it was too long ago to matter. 
" Knows others In the same situation who are long-term donors. 
" Did not fully understand the safety of blood leaflet. 
" Asked for advice prior to session, and was assured that if had been cleared of 
hepatitis B and it was more than 12 months ago, it was OK. 
" Didn't adequately read safety of blood leaflet. Also tries to forget one episode o 
IDU. 
Sexual intercourse HIV Says that discussed with GP who told him it was OK to donate, and thinks 
etween men "Blood Service has a prejudice against gays"2 
" Did not see risk as had not had anal sex, and rated oral sex as messing around 
only. 
" Regular donor - hard to self-exclude now. 
T. pallidum Assumed infection fully eradicated therefore OK. 
Sexual intercourse HCV Thought was In the clear as partner said had never shared a needle - only 
between men and spoons (heroin addict) and was tested and negative in the past. 
Women Did not understand that spouse's histöry excluded donor, as spouse in no longer 
using drugs. 
T. pallidum Has had blood tests before but no positive results. 
" Not aware of risk. 
Notes: 1,2,3&4 were repeat donors. 1= not previously tested. 2,3 = previously negative. 4= previously 
reactive. 
Transfusion-transmitted infections 
Infectious complications following transfusion differ from non-infectious 
complications in several ways that may affect the ascertainment and 
investigation of incidents. The onset of symptoms related to a transfusion- 
transmitted viral infection may occur from several weeks to years after the date 
of the transfusion. Reports of infections transmitted by transfusion in any 
particular year, or period of years, can therefore accrue over the subsequent 
year(s). The number of cases ascertained by the end of any period is therefore 
expected to be an incomplete picture of the infections transmitted during that 
period. Acute infections, such as bacteraemias, that tend to be clinically 
apparent and diagnosed within days after receipt of the infectious transfusion, 
may be relatively complete but chronic viral infections will be underrepresented. 
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In addition, the occurrence of disease, or the observation of serological 
markers of infection, in individuals who have donated blood can lead to the 
ascertainment of transfusion-transmitted infections by tracing and testing of 
recipients exposed to components collected from donors during potentially 
infectious periods. Recipients may be asymptomatic at this time and only 
identified by this investigation. 
Post-transfusion infections (PTI) may be due to an infected (or 
contaminated) transfusion or infection may have been acquired from another 
source. Investigation of markers of infection in an implicated donation, or in 
subsequent samples from the donors of implicated donations, can confirm 
transfusion as the probable cause of infection, or identify the need to investigate 
other possible sources. The blood service must therefore be informed about 
implicated transfusions so that investigations can be conducted to confirm or 
refute the suspicion that the implicated transfusion(s) may have been infectious. 
This is essential to prevent further transmission(s) by other components and/or 
by chronically infected donors, and to reveal any systematic errors or 
deficiencies in the blood service testing. Such investigations may involve 
microbiological testing of many donors and may take several months to 
complete. 
One category of post-transfusion infections is not included in these data. 
In January 1999, a meeting of reporters agreed that HCV and HIV infections 
diagnosed in recipients who had received transfusions in the UK that were not 
tested for anti-HCV (i. e. pre September 1991) or anti-HIV (i. e. pre October 
1985) respectively should be excluded from reporting. The blood service is 
rarely able to conduct follow-up investigation of donors implicated in these 
cases and these cases do not contribute to knowledge of the current infection 
transmission risks of blood transfusions. Numbers and details of such 
infections were therefore not included in data for the surveillance system after 
January 1999, and 4 previous reports have been excluded retrospectively. 
Data received by 31/12/99 about incidents of transfusion-transmitted 
infections initially reported by blood centres during the four years from 1/10/95 
to 30/9/99 are included in this thesis. 
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Unless the investigation was closed due to the identification of a probable 
source of infection other than transfusion, investigations that were closed 
without being able to conclusively investigate the source of the post-transfusion 
infections were classified as post-transfusion infections with inconclusive 
investigation. Table PTI 1 and Figure PTI 1 show the number of reports by their 
status by report year. 
Table PTI I Status of post-transfusion infections reported 01/10/1995 to 
30/09/1999 by report year. 
Report year Outcome of donor investigation/comment 
Probable Investigation Inconclusive Full Total 
transfusion concluded not investigation investigation 
transmitted transfusion- pending 
infection transmitted 
1.01/10/95-30/09/96 3 8 1 0 12 
2.01/10/96-30/09/97 8 12 4 3 27 
3.01/10/97-30/09/98 3 20 8 2 33 
4.01/10/98-30/09/99 7 17 3 8 35 
Total 21 (19%) 58 (54%) 16 (15%) 13 (12%) 108 
1 An additional 23 post-tranfusion reactions suspected to be due to bacteria 
were reported. 
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Figure TTI 1. Post-transfusion infection (PTI) reports by report year. 
Q Post-transfusion reactions (? bacteria) 
  All other post-transfusion infections (not shown to be transfusion transmitted infections) 
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Table PTI 2 shows the number of reports by their status and by infection. 
Figure PTI 2 shows the status of reports up to the end of September 1999 at 
31/12/99. 
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Table PTI 2 Status of post-transfusion infections reported 01/10/1995 to 
30/09/1999 by infection. 
Infection Outcome of donor investigation/comment 
Probable Investigation Inconclusive Full Total 
transfusion concluded not investigation investigation 
transmitted transfusion- pending 
infection transmitted 
HAV 1 1 - - 2 
HBV2 5 26 3 6 40 
HCV2 2 25 7 6 40 
HIV3 1 3 1 - 5 
Bacteria 11 3 5 1 20 
Malaria 1 - - - 1 
Total 21 (19%) 58(5451o) 16(1591o) 13 (12%) 10 
An additional 23 post-transfusion reactions suspected to be due to 
bacteria were reported. 
2 Including one dual HBV and HCV post-transfusion infection concluded 
not transfusion transmitted. 
3 One additional investigation failed to confirm or refute transfusion 
transmission of HIV infection during the early 1990s. As the patient had 
received multiple transfusions, and had no other risk factors for infection, 
transfusion with HIV infectious blood was concluded to be the probable, 
although unproven, source of infection. 
Figure PTI 2 Post-transfusion infections reported 01/10/1995 to 30/09/1999. 
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Table PTI 3 shows the cumulative number of transfusion-transmitted 
infections reported by the end of September 1999 by infection and year of 
transfusion. 
Table PTI 3 Cumulative total transfusion-transmitted infections: reported 
between 1/10/95-30/9/99 by date of transfusion. 
The number of incidents is shown with the total number of identified 
infected recipients in brackets. 
Year of 
transfusion 
pre- 
1995 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(to end 
Sept) 
Total Deaths 
Infection 
HAV - - 1(1) - - - 1(1) HBV 1(1)b 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)- 5(5) 
HCV - - 1(1) 1(1) - 2(2) 
HIVc - - 1(3) - - - 1(3) 
Bacteria - 1(1) 1(1) 3(3) 3(3) 3(3)8 11(11) 3 
Malaria - - - 11a - - 11 1 
Total 1(1)b 2(2) 5(7) 6(6)a 4(4)ax2 3(3)a 21(23) 4 
Notes: ° Intection was implicated in the death of a recipient. 
b One household member who was caring for the recipient has been 
diagnosed with acute HBV. 
One additional investigation, initially reported during 97-98 and 
concluded during 98-99, failed to confirm or refute transfusion transmission of 
HIV infection during the early 1990s. As the patient had received multiple 
transfusions, and had no other risk factors for infection, transfusion with HIV 
infectious blood was concluded to be the probable, although unproven, source 
of infection. 
During the first four years of reporting (i. e. 01/10/95 to 30/09/99) to the 
surveillance system for post-transfusion infections, 107 post-transfusion 
infections were reported (including 1 dual infection). Twenty-one were 
classified, after investigation, as transfusion transmitted infections (see Table 
PTI 3). Sixteen (15%) post-transfusion infections were classified as post- 
transfusion infections of undetermined source due to incomplete investigation of 
the transfusion(s) implicated as the source of the infection. For 58 (54%) post- 
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transfusion infection reports, investigation into the case was completed and no 
evidence was found to implicate transfusion as the source of infection. At least 
one other risk factor for infection other than transfusion was identified for 31 
(53%) of these infections. 
During the years 1996-1999 an additional 23 reports were received about 
post-transfusion reactions that were suspected to be due to bacteria but for 
which no evidence of bacterial infection (or endotoxin) that could have caused 
the reaction was sought and found in the recipient or implicated component (i. e. 
did not satisfy the criteria for a post-transfusion infection as stated above, but 
may have been reactions of bacterial origin). These reports started during the 
second report year when a parallel system for reporting non-infectious hazards 
of transfusion was established and hospitals were encouraged to report all post- 
transfusion complications. A new category was added to the report form for 
these cases as they were clinically important post-transfusion complications. 
The absence of confirmation of infection in the recipient was likely - at least in 
some cases - to be due to absence of the appropriate sample for testing, rather 
than absence of any infection. The cause and source of these cases cannot be 
resolved as certainly as the other cases, and they are presented separately 
throughout. 
Reports were received from 15 of the 21 blood centres (between 1-16 
cases each) participating in the surveillance system. The six centres that did 
not report any cases included 3 small centres that tested less than five 
thousand donations per year. These six centres collect approximately 5.4% of 
the donations tested by blood centres participating in the surveillance system. 
Seven hospital clinicians reported more than one infection: 23 hospitals 
transfused more than one of the investigated recipients (20 x2 reports, 2x3 
reports, 1x4 reports). 
Post-transfusion reactions: 
None of the 23 post-transfusion reactions suspected to be due to bacteria 
were clearly shown to be due to transfusion-transmitted bacteria. Six of these 
recipients died: for one the transfusion reaction was implicated in the death of 
the recipient. Brief details of these cases are shown in table PTI 4. 
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Table PTI 4 Cases of post-transfusion reactions suspected to be due to 
bacteria. 
Report 
year 
PTR organism PTR symptoms PTR organism in 
unit 
PTR 
organism 
in 
reci ient 
PTR 
other 
source 
2 Febrile, back pain No No 
2 Unspecified reaction No No 
2 Staph. warners Pyrexia, breathless, hypertension Yes 
(contamination? ) 
No 
2 Febrile, hypertension No No 
2 Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa 
Cardiovascular collapse, respiratory arrest Yes 
(contamination? ) 
No 
2 Hypertension No No 
3 Pseudomonas 
vesicularis 
Febrile Yes 
(contamination? ) 
No 
3 Hypotension, trachycardia No No 
3 Mixed Hypotension, breathless, died(cardiac arrest) Yes 
(contamination? ) 
No 
3 Serratia 
li uifacians 
Febrile, rigors Yes No 
3 E. coli Hypotension, faint, cyanosis Yes No 
3 Staph. epidermidis Unspecified reaction Yes 
(contamination? ) 
No 
4 Allergic reaction, wheezing, hypoxia, uticarial 
rash 
No No ? HLA 
4 Rigors, (died-aortic aneurysm) No No 
4 Died(cardiac arrest) No No 
4 Unspecified reaction No No 
4 Febrile, rash No No 
4 Unspecified reaction, died(other causes) No No 
4 Hypertension, pulmonary oedema No No 
4 Hypotension, rash, pulmonary oedema No No ? Trali 
4 Unspecified reaction No No 
4 Septicaemia reaction No No 
4 Unspecified reaction, died(other causes) No No 
Details of transfusion transmitted infections 
A. Infections for which donation testing is mandatory 
Hepatitis B virus 
Five transfusion transmitted HBV infections were reported. 
HBV1. One recipient (29 year old female) had clinical acute HBV infection 
four months after transfusion of 2 red cell units. One donor was found to have a 
history of HBV infection 5 years prior to the implicated donation and to be anti- 
HBc positive and anti-HBs negative (HBV DNA negative). An HBV infectious, 
HBsAg negative, donation collected from a donor during the tail end of carriage 
of HBV infection was concluded to be the probable source of the recipient's 
HBV infection. 
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HBV2. One recipient (26 year old male) had acute clinical HBV infection 
five months after transfusion of a red cell unit (one of 14 red cell units given 
over a year) that was found, by testing of the archived sample of the donation to 
be anti-HBc negative but HBV DNA positive. At the time of the investigation, 
the donor recalled having viral symptoms and abdominal pains 5 months post- 
donation and was found to be anti-HBs positive. The probable source of the 
recipient's HBV infection was concluded to be an HBV infectious though HBsAg 
negative and anti-HBc negative donation collected from a repeat donor during 
early acute infection. 
HBV3. One recipient (67 year old female) had acute HBV infection five 
months after transfusion of three red cell units. One of the donors was found to 
have markers of resolved HBV infection eleven months after donating the 
implicated donation. An HBV infectious, HBsAg negative, donation collected 
from a donor during acute (asymptomatic) infection was concluded to be the 
probable source of the recipients HBV infection. 
HBV4. One recipient (59 year old male) was found to be an HBsAg and 
HBeAg positive HBV carrier 6 years after transfusion with 8 red cell units. One 
of the donors was found to have markers of resolved HBV infection and it was 
also discovered that this donor had developed acute HBV (confirmed by the 
local laboratory) 3 months after donating the implicated donation. No archived 
sample of the donation was available for further testing. The probable source of 
the recipient's HBV infection was concluded to be an HBV infectious but HBsAg 
negative donation collected from a new donor during acute infection. 
Secondary transmission seems to have occurred as a household member who 
was caring for the infected recipient was diagnosed with acute HBV at the same 
time as the recipient's diagnosis. 
HBV5. One recipient (73 year old female) was found to have markers of 
acute HBV infection four months after transfusion of a red cell unit (one of three 
units received during a month) collected from a donor who developed acute 
HBV infection between one and two months after donating blood. The recipient 
was traced after the donor's General Practitioner informed the blood service of 
the donor's infection status. The archive of the implicated donation was 
confirmed to be HBsAg negative on re-testing but was found to be HBV DNA 
positive by nested PCR. (DNA was not detectable by PCR on aI in 96 
dilution. ) The recipient died three months after her HBV diagnosis from the 
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underlying reason for transfusion: HBV infection was not implicated in the 
recipient's death. The probable source of the recipient's HBV infection was 
concluded to be an HBV infectious, though HBsAg negative, donation collected 
from a repeat donor during early acute infection. The blood donor did not report 
any risk factor for HBV infection that is currently included as criteria for the 
exclusion of individuals from donating blood. 
Both of the donations implicated in cases HBV3 and HBV4 above were 
collected from donors who subsequently disclosed risk factors for HBV infection 
that should, according to donor selection criteria in place at the time, have been 
recognised as making them ineligible for blood donation. Further investigation 
is needed to identify the reasons why these donors were not recognised as 
ineligible for donation. 
Hepatitis C virus 
Two transfusion transmitted HCV infections were reported. 
HCV1. One recipient (79 year old female) was traced and tested for HCV 
infection, seven months after transfusion with a single red cell unit, when a 
repeat donor was shown to have seroconverted for anti-HCV between 
donations. The pre-seroconversion donation was subsequently shown by 
testing of the archived sample to be HCV RNA positive. An HCV infectious, 
anti-HCV negative, donation collected from a repeat donor during acute 
(asymptomatic) infection was concluded to be the probable source of HCV 
infection for the recipient. 
HCV2. A repeat donor was found to be anti-HCV positive and HCV RNA 
positive. The archived sample of the previous (first) donation from this donor 
was re-tested and was also anti-HCV and HCV RNA positive. The recipient (a 
64 year old male) of this red cell unit was traced and tested fourteen months 
after transfusion and was found to be anti-HCV positive and HCV RNA positive. 
Investigation by the blood service found an error had occurred during the re- 
testing of the donation that was initially reactive to the anti-HCV test. The 
duplicate repeat tests were read as negative because the samples were 
unintentionally dispensed into blank wells that are used to fill out part plates so 
they can be handled by automated machinery. It had been common practice to 
blank these out with a black marker pen so that in the event they were 
accidentally used for samples they would return a fail-safe positive reaction. 
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However new machinery had been introduced which read these as negative. 
Once the problem was identified corrective and preventative action was put in 
place to ensure that a different mechanism is used to ensure that blank wells 
will, if accidentally used, return a positive result and "fail safe". The probable 
source of the recipient's HCV infection was concluded to be an HCV infectious, 
anti-HCV positive, donation from a new donor. The donation was not excluded 
from the blood supply because of a laboratory error during the testing process. 
The donations implicated in cases HCV1 and HCV2 were collected from 
donors who did not report any risk factor for HCV infection that are currently 
included as criteria for the exclusion of individuals from donating blood. 
HIV 
One transfusion transmitted HIV infection was reported. 
HIV1. A recipient (47 year old female) was tested for HIV infection when 
she developed signs of HIV infection, after transfusion therapy involving over 
100 units of red cells and platelets over a seven-month period. The archived 
sample of one donation (giving rise to a platelet unit transfused to the patient), 
from a repeat donor who had not been shown to be anti-HIV negative on a 
subsequent donation, was found to be HIV DNA positive. The donor was 
subsequently found to be anti-HIV positive. An HIV infectious, anti-HIV 
negative, donation collected from a repeat donor during acute (asymptomatic) 
infection was concluded to be the probable source of the recipients HIV 
infection. The recipients of the red cells and the fresh frozen plasma produced 
from the infectious donation were subsequently shown to have also been 
infected with HIV by transfusion (one recipient had died of non-HIV-related 
causes). 
The donation implicated in case HIV1 was collected from a donor who 
subsequently disclosed risk factors for HIV infection that, according to donor 
selection criteria in place at the time, made the donor ineligible to donate blood. 
B. Infections for which donation testing is not mandatory 
Bacteria 
Eleven transfusion-transmitted bacteraemias were reported. 
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BAC1. One recipient (male, age not reported) suffered septic shock after 
transfusion with 2 platelet units. The same serotype of group B streptococcus 
was isolated from the patient, the implicated unit and from a throat swab from 
the donor. 
BAC2. One recipient (21 year old female) developed rigors, nausea, and 
peripheral vasoconstriction soon after transfusion with a pooled platelet unit 
began. B. cereus serovar H18 was isolated from the platelet pool and from the 
arm of one of the donors who contributed to the pool. 
BAC3. One recipient (21 year old female) entered endotoxic shock after 
transfusion with a red cell unit. The red cell unit was subsequently found to be 
haemolysed and was shown to contain Serratia liqufaciens. No evidence of 
infection was found in the donor by arm swabbing and by testing blood for 
antibodies. The source of the contamination was not identified. 
BAC4. One recipient (4 year old male) suffered a bacteraemia after 
transfusion with a platelet unit. Escherichia coli was cultured from the pack and 
from the patient. No damage to the pack or source of the contamination was 
identified. 
BAC5. One recipient (61 year old female) suffered a bacteraemia after 
transfusion with a (leucodepleted) pooled platelet unit. The pack and an arm 
swab from one of the four donors were both shown to contain Bacillus cereus, 
serotype H29. 
BAC6. One recipient (32 year old female) developed a bacteraemia after 
transfusion with red cells and platelets and died two days after the transfusion. 
Staphylococcus aureus was isolated from the recipient and from skin and nasal 
swabs from one of the implicated donors. 
BAC7. One recipient (27 year old male) developed bacteraemia after 
transfusion with two leucodepleted, 4-day-old apheresis platelet units from the 
same donor. The recipient recovered and was asymptomatic one week after 
the transfusion. Staphylococcus epidermidis was isolated from the platelet 
packs and from the recipient (and these two isolates had identical banding 
patterns). Staph. epidermidis (with a different DNA fingerprint) was 
subsequently cultured from swabs of the donor's arms. Staph. epidermidis was 
not grown from swabs taken after standard skin preparation. No failure in the 
donor arm cleansing procedure at the time of donating the implicated donation 
had been noted. The probable source of the recipient's bacteraemia was 
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concluded to be transfusion with platelets contaminated with skin flora from the 
donor's arm. 
BAC8. One recipient (52 year old male) suffered a severe febrile reaction 
during transfusion of a leucodepleted, 3 day old apheresis platelet unit, and died 
later the same afternoon. On inspection the next day the remainder of the 
platelet pack had some signs of bacterial contamination (unusual orange 
colouration and small specks visible when held up to the light). Escherichia coli 
was cultured from the recipient's blood and from the platelet pack (and these 
two isolates had identical biochemical profiles). No leaks or defects were 
identified in the platelet pack. An interview with the donor confirmed absence of 
symptoms of infection at and around the time of donation and swabs of the 
donor's arm skin were negative on culture. The probable source of the 
recipient's reaction, and cause of death, was concluded to be transfusion with 
platelets contaminated with E. coli. No source of the contamination was 
identified. 
BAC9. One recipient (78 year old female) suffered symptoms including 
feeling hot, sweaty and dyspnoeic during transfusion of a pooled, 
leucodepleted, 4-day-old platelet unit. The recipient subsequently recovered 
and was completely asymptomatic two weeks after the transfusion. Blood 
cultures were not taken from the recipient. Staphylococcus epidermidis was 
cultured from the platelet pack and from the red cell unit made from the same 
donation. An interview with the donor confirmed absence of symptoms of 
infection at and around the time of donation and swabs from the skin of the 
donor's arm were negative on culture. The probable source of the recipient's 
transient reaction was concluded to be transfusion with platelets contaminated 
with Staph. epidermidis. No source of the contamination was identified. 
BACIO. One recipient (63 year old female) developed urticaria, rigors and 
pyrexia during transfusion of a pooled, leucodepleted, 4-day-old platelet unit. 
The recipient was pyrexial for three days after transfusion and was treated with 
broad-spectrum antibiotics. Bacillus cereus was cultured from the recipient's 
blood and from the platelet pack (and these two isolates were both of type 29). 
B cereus (type 29) was also cultured from swabs from the skin of the donor's 
arm (both pre- and post- arm cleansing). The probable source of the recipient's 
reaction was concluded to be transfusion with platelets contaminated with B. 
cereus from the donor's arm. 
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BAC11. One recipient (58 year old female) suffered a respiratory and 
cardiac arrest during transfusion of a second unit of red cells (33 day old, not 
leucodepleted) and died the same day. Yersinia entercolitica (serotype 09, 
biotype 3) was isolated from the patient's blood, the implicated red cell pack, 
and the archive of the implicated donation and a fresh sample of blood taken 
from the donor 5 months after the donation. On follow-up the donor reported a 
history of diarrhoea a few weeks prior to the donation. The probable source of 
the recipient's reaction, and cause of death, was concluded to be transfusion 
with red cells contaminated with Yersinia entercolitica from the donor's blood. 
The four cases BAC7-10 were associated with leucocyte-depleted 
platelets since all platelets issued in the UK were leucocyte depleted. The 
numbers of cases before and after universal leucodepletion were too small to 
detect any effect of leucodepletion on bacterial contamination of components. 
Other 
HAV1. One transfusion transmitted HAV infection was reported. The 
recipient was traced and tested for HAV infection, one month after transfusion 
with three red cell units, after a donor reported HAV infection that developed ten 
days after donation. An HAV infectious donation collected from a donor during 
acute (asymptomatic) infection was concluded to be the probable source of 
HAV infection for one recipient2. The recipient of the platelets from the 
implicated donation was found to be non-immune and not infected. 
MALARIA1. One transfusion transmitted malaria (Plasmodium falciparum) 
infection was reported. The recipient developed cerebral malaria two weeks 
after transfusion with two red cell units and died within two weeks of diagnosis. 
One new donor was found to have malarial antibodies when a subsequent 
sample was tested. 
Morbidity and mortality of recipients with transfusion transmitted 
infections 
The majority of recipients with transfusion transmitted infections suffered 
serious morbidity as a result of their infection. Table PTI 5 shows the 
breakdown of cases by morbidity and by infection. Major morbidity was defined 
as acute symptomatic confirmed infection or persistent viral infection. Minor 
133 
Chapter 3 
morbidity was defined as asymptomatic resolving viral infection. As such 
"minor" infections would only be diagnosed incidentally, it is not that surprising 
no reports - predominately originating because of clinical disease - fall into this 
category. 
Table PTI 5 Morbidity by infection for transfusion-transmitted infections, 
1995-1999. 
TTIs 
HAV HBV HCV HIV Bacteria Malaria Total Mean 
age(SD) 
[range] 
All 
N 
PTIs 
Mean 
age(SD) 
[range] 
Death 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 55(19) 10 57(27) 
attributed to [32-78] [0-85] 
infection 
Death due to 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 [20,72] 4 51(25) 
underlying [20-72] 
condition 
Major morbidity 1 4 2 1 7 0 15 50(24) 81 47(22) 
due to infection [4-80] [0-84] 
Minor morbidity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - 
due to infection 
Patient 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 12 53(19) 
outcome not [4-75] 
known 
Total 1 5 2 1 11 1 21 51(23) 107 49(22) 
[4-80] [0-85] 
Mean age(SD) 80 51(22) [61, 46 42(24) 78 
[range] [26-72] 79] [4-77] 
The average age of these recipients was 51 years (St dev of mean: 23, 
95% confidence interval: 41-61, median: 58, range 4-80 years) and was similar 
to the age of all recipients reported with post-transfusion infections (mean: 49, 
St dev of mean: 22,95% confidence interval: 45-53, median: 50, range 0 to 85 
years). 
Details of post-transfusion infections not found to be transfusion 
transmitted infections 
Sixteen (15%) post-transfusion infections (5 Bacteraemia, 3 HBV infection, 
7 HCV infections and 1 HIV infection) were classified as post-transfusion 
infections of undetermined source due to incomplete investigation of the 
transfusion(s) implicated as the source of infection. For 58 (54%) post- 
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transfusion infection reports (26 HBV infections, 25 HCV infections, 3 bacterias, 
3 HIV infections and 1 HAV infection), investigation was completed and no 
evidence was found to implicate transfusion as the source of infection. A 
probable source of infection other than transfusion was identified for 31 of these 
infections. 
Reporting delay 
For the 11 transfusion-transmitted bacterial infections, symptoms occurred 
on the same day as the transfusion. Blood centres were informed of the 
bacteraemias suspected to be associated with transfusion on the same day (n = 
7), the next day (n = 2), 2 days (n = 1) and 7 days (n = 1) after transfusion. The 
median interval between the initial information being reported to the blood 
centre and the completion of the initial surveillance report form by the blood 
centre was 32 days (mean 57, St dev 65, range 3-228). 
Four of the transfusion-transmitted viral infections (1 HAV, 1 HBV and 2 
HCV) were diagnosed with sub-clinical infections (45 days, 130 days, 224 and 
440 days after transfusion respectively) during the follow up of suspected 
infectious donations. The other five transfusion-transmitted HBV infections and 
the malaria transmission were diagnosed with infection 86,98,141,455,2303 
(HBV) and 42 (malaria) days after transfusion. The median interval between 
the initial information being reported to the blood centre and the completion of 
the initial surveillance report by the blood centre form was 64 days (mean 73, St 
dev 45, range 16-127). Some of this period of time - at least in some cases - 
was whilst confirmation of the recipient's infection details was awaited. 
Underreporting 
The cases ascertained by this surveillance system were diagnosed, 
suspected to be attributable to transfusion, communicated to the blood service, 
and reported by a blood centre to the surveillance centre. At any one of these 
steps, other post-transfusion infections may have been missed and the extent of 
underreporting of post-transfusion infections is therefore unknown. The 
proportion of post-transfusion infections that are reported each year may vary 
as other factors such as testing performed on transfusion recipients, awareness 
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of transfusion as a possible source of infection, reporting of information to blood 
centres and reporting of information from blood centres to the surveillance 
centre vary. 
3.3 Discussion 
Donation testing 
A system for collecting standardised data about routine donation testing 
for four serological markers of infection has been established. Data about 
reactivity rates and infection rates are available. The identity of every positive 
donation is collected to enable matching with infected donor reports and 
monitoring of infected donor reporting rates. 
Testing specificity 
The specificity of donation testing was high - less than 0.3% (1 in 333) of 
donations were referred for confirmatory testing due to false reactivity to the full 
suite of screening tests. There was an increase in repeat reactivity to HBsAg 
tests amongst repeat donors that was associated with a poorly performing batch 
of test kits from a single manufacturer. 
Removing tests performed on donors who were being monitored because 
of past reactivity to tests from the data removed the dependence of repeat 
reactivity rates in repeat donor donations on variations in the policy on bleeding 
these donors. 
Some misclassification of donor type is expected to occur in the donation 
testing data. Some misclassifications are identified when infected donor reports 
are matched to donation testing data and contain information that allows re- 
classification of donor type. However, as the small changes in the numbers of 
donations tested in each donor category have little effect on rates, this 
misclassification is not expected to cause any important errors in the data. 
Infection rates in blood donations 
The overall rates of infected donations in England and Wales were low 
and rates were much lower in donations from repeat donors than in new donors. 
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Most donations of blood (89%) came from repeat donors. HIV antibodies were 
detected in 0.86 per 100,000 donations tested in England and Wales. 
Comparative data from other European countries shows rates per 100,000 
donations of 2.41 in France (1995), 1.49 in Germany (1993), and 0.28 in 
Finland (1995) (WHO, 1996). HCV antibodies were detected in 0.05% of 
donations from new donors in England and Wales, compared with 0.28% in 
France (1994), 0.16% in Germany (1995), 0.05% in Finland (1995) and 0.04% 
in Denmark (1995) (Naplas, 1996). Difference in the recruitment and selection 
of donors, as well as differences in the prevalence and incidence of infections in 
the general population, affect the rates of infection in donations of blood. The 
tests that are used also affect these rates: for example, in the UK, blood 
donations are tested for HBsAg whereas in Denmark and France, blood 
donations are tested for HBsAg and antibody to hepatitis B core antigen. 
There was a significant trend (at 5% significance level) to increasing anti- 
HCV prevalence in donations from new donors at the very end of the study 
period, and a significant decrease in anti-H IV prevalence in donations from new 
donors (Figure 3.4). However, although a trend was identifiable (at the 95% 
confidence level) neither of these trends were strong. Annual data for HCV 
prevalence in new donors from 1995 to 2000 show a significant (p<0.01) 
downward trend. 
Monthly analysis of donation testing data 
Monitoring of donation testing data and of all observed centre and donor 
type specific infection rates identified by analyses as outside the probable range 
(at the 5% significance level) based on the previous 3 years' data allows 
deviations in the data to be noticed. Many of the unusual results identified by 
the monthly analyses were relatively minor fluctuations that required no follow- 
up. Deviations that meet certain criteria can be highlighted for further attention. 
The first year of analyses has allowed criteria for further attention to be set at a 
workable level. 
None of the unusual results identified during this first year of running these 
analyses, have identified a problem with donation testing or been connected 
with an outbreak in the general population. Two documented outbreaks of 
syphilis infection occurred in England during this time period (CDR, 1998; CDR, 
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1999). Both these outbreaks predominately affected individuals in high-risk 
groups: none of the individuals linked to these outbreaks were identified though 
blood donation testing. The performance of the analyses in the event of an 
outbreak that does involve blood donors was not observed (upto August 2000). 
The analyses supplement the usual vigilance of unusual infections. The 
analyses would not identify outbreaks that do not result in significant changes in 
rates of infection. The occurrence of a single acute HBV infection in a blood 
donor would be unlikely to significantly change the rate of HBsAg positivity in 
blood donations but can warrant an outbreak investigation - for example if the 
individual who is infected has an identified risk that may have also affected 
other individuals (e. g. a recent invasive medical procedure), or if others are 
likely to have been exposed to the infected individual (e. g. a health care worker 
performing exposure prone procedures). These analyses would be unlikely to 
identify small but important changes in the number, or proportion, of infections 
that were acquired recently or between donations i. e. acute infections and 
seroconversions. 
These routine analyses have the potential to identify changes in test 
performance and changes in the frequency of infected blood donors that may 
be important. Further investigation of changes in test performance may lead to 
identifying bad test batches or operational problems. Further investigation of 
changes in infection frequency may lead to identifying an outbreak of infection 
or a failure in donor selection at a local or national level. 
Criteria for defining results that warrant further attention may be changed 
in the light of further experience. 
These analyses continue to be run each month. Reporters and other 
relevant staff within the blood service and the Public Health Laboratory Service 
will be informed of any results that meet the criteria for further attention. 
Infected donors 
A system for collecting standardised data about blood donors found to 
have HBV, HCV, HIV or Treponemal infections on donations testing has been 
established. Data about demographic characteristics, previous donations, and 
risk factors for infection are available. Anonymous identifiers enable matching 
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with other sources of data about these infections, such as laboratory reports, 
and AIDS case reports to PHLS CDSC. 
Anti-HCV was the most prevalent marker of infection in blood donors in 
England and Wales (1995-1999), followed by HBsAg, treponemal antibodies 
and, least frequently, anti-HIV (Table 3.6). 
There was a decrease in the prevalence of anti-HCV in donations from 
new donors, and in donations from repeat donors during the years 1995-1999. 
Almost two-thirds of anti-HCV positive donations from repeat donors during this 
period of time (starting four years after the introduction of anti-HCV testing) 
were from donors who were being tested for anti-HCV by the blood service for 
the first time (compare numbers of "new" and "repeat" positives in Tables 3.6 
with "newly tested" and "previously tested" respectively in Table 3.12). The 
decline in the prevalence amongst donations from repeat donors is largely due 
to the removal of these positive individuals from the donor panel. The decrease 
in prevalence amongst donations from new donors may be due to a decreasing 
prevalence in the population or due to improved donor selection. The process 
of donor selection has been changed and expanded during this period (see 
Chapter 2) - and this was in fact partly motivated by the finding at the start of 
anti-HCV testing of a large number of anti-HCV positive donors reporting a 
history of injecting drug use. It is therefore likely that improvements in donor 
selection are responsible for a decrease in anti-HCV prevalence in new donors. 
As documented in Chapter 4, the recent incidence of anti-HCV in repeat blood 
donors is extremely low. If incidence was greater in the past, there may also be 
a truly decreasing prevalence in the population of new donors - typically 
younger individuals than repeat donors - who present to give blood each year. 
The biggest difference in the epidemiology of infection in blood donors and 
in the general population is the frequency of infection - shown by both the 
relatively low prevalence and relatively low incidence. For example the 
prevalence of anti-HIV infection in antenatal women outside London during 
1999 was 0.02%, (UASSG, 2000), 4.7-fold that observed in new donors in 
England and Wales (i. e. including London). The prevalence of HBsAg in 
samples from hospital patients (15-44 years old, excluding those requesting 
HBV testing) collected in 1996 from 16 microbiology laboratories in England and 
Wales was 0.37% (Gay NJ, 1999), over 11-fold that observed in new donors. 
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Also, the characteristics of infected blood donors differ from the 
characteristics of many other groups of diagnosed individuals due to the pre- 
selection of individuals to give blood - particularly the selection of healthy 
individuals and the selection of individuals who are not at known high risk of 
infection. For example, the relatively low proportion of HIV infections acquired 
by injecting drug use (11% (n=1) compared to 9% (n=3,608) amongst all reported 
anti-HIV positive diagnoses reported to PHLS CDSC (up to June 2000) 
(CDR, 2000). The distribution of probable routes of infection reported for 
infected donors differed quite markedly from that observed amongst all reports 
of newly diagnosed infections. The most common risk factors for HIV, HBV and 
HCV were present amongst infected donors, however they accounted for a 
much smaller proportions of infections than in other tested groups. For many of 
these risk factors (e. g. sex between men, injection drug use) donor selection 
aims to specifically exclude donors with these risk factors. The relative 
infrequency of these risk factors in infected donors suggests that this is 
successful, however, there may also be an information bias in the reported risk 
factors - with donors more likely to withhold information about exposure 
histories that should have excluded them from donating blood. Follow-up by the 
PHLS CDSC HIV/AIDS Centre did identify a probably route of infection that 
should have led to permanent exclusion from donating blood for 7.5% (N=7) of 
anti-HIV positive donors who did not report this route to the blood service. 
The selection of low risk individuals to be blood donors, and the resulting 
distribution of probable routes of infection acquisition in blood donors biased 
towards low risk exposures and no known route of infection, can be useful for 
pubic health work. Low risks for infection, and unusual routes of infection, are 
relatively more likely to be observed amongst donors, who therefore can act as 
a sentinel group for infections in groups with exposures believed to be of low 
risk, for example sex between men and women in the UK with partners with no 
identified increased risk for HIV infection. Donors with no identified risk of 
infection, or with reported exposure histories that are of uncertain risk, for 
example sexual exposure as a reported source of HCV infection, may also be 
good subjects for studies to identify unrecognised risk factors and evaluate 
exposure histories of uncertain risk. For 46% of HBsAg positive donors 
(detected between 1/10/95 and 30/6/96) no exposure associated with an 
increased risk of HBV infection was identified. During the same time period, 
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there was no exposure associated with an increased risk of HCV infection 
identified for 14% of anti-HCV positive donors, and, for a further 28% of anti- 
HCV positive donors, a possible exposure, of unknown risk, was identified. 
These possible risk factors included sexual contact with a partner with no 
known HCV infection or known increased risk of HCV infection, possible contact 
with blood during acupuncture, body piercing, invasive medical/dental 
procedures, and possible occupational contact with blood: these are common 
exposures that may be coincidental with, rather than associated with, infection. 
Whether these possible exposures represent true risks for infection could be 
determined by analytical epidemiological studies, for example case-control 
studies, providing enough such cases (and suitable controls) are available for 
study. 
Some strong features of the epidemiology of these blood-borne infections 
show clearly amongst blood donors despite the selection biases in this 
population. The predominance of individuals with non-white ethnicity amongst 
HBsAg positive individuals (Table 3.10) and the high proportion of HCV 
infections acquired by injecting drug use (Table 3.12) have been frequently 
observed in other groups and are well known features of the epidemiology of 
these viruses. The excess of males amongst all infections has also been 
observed in other surveys, for example amongst hospital patients the 
prevalence of HBsAg carriage was 0.63% in males, 0.15% in females (Gay NJ, 
1999). Available denominator data show that approximately half of all 
donations (45% of donations from new donors and 52% of donations from 
repeat donors) are collected from male donors. Should this change, to collect a 
larger (or smaller) proportion of donations from male donors, we would expect 
to see an increase (or decrease) in the prevalence of infection in donations. 
The sex ratio amongst donors is clearly important when comparing the 
prevalence of infection found in different surveys. The higher prevalence of 
blood-borne infections observed in some other European blood services might 
be at least partially accounted for by a higher proportion of donations from male 
donors. 
The age and sex distribution of HBsAg, anti-HCV, anti-HIV and 
Treponemal antibodies differ (Table 3.7 and Figure 3.6). HBsAg positives 
include donors with acute HBV infection and donors with chronic HBV 
(carriage), however as acute infection is relatively uncommon the pattern of this 
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age-distribution is predominantly that of HBV carriage. A study of the 
prevalence of anti-HBc (i. e. a marker of having been infected with HBV) 
amongst a large sample of donations collected at two blood centres in 1995 
found anti-HBc prevalence increased steadily with increasing age, and again 
was significantly higher in males (Soldan K, 2000). If this peak is due to a 
cohort of donors infected with HCV in the past that are now passing through the 
donor population, and incidence of infection is now much lower, we would 
expect to see (all other things being constant) a continuing decrease in the 
prevalence of anti-HCV in donations from new donors. 
HIV infected donors had both a lower peak age group, and a significantly 
lower average age (Table 3.9) than the donors with other infections. Donors 
found positive for treponemal antibodies were the oldest group of infected 
donors, and the only group to show a steady increase with increasing age 
across the whole age span. As the majority of these donors have persistent 
markers of past infection this pattern is to be expected as both the time at risk of 
exposure increases with age, and syphilis infection was more common in the 
past. As for HBV, there are some cases of acute syphilis amongst these data. 
Cases of recent infection are the most important for both the blood service and 
for providing public health information, but are relatively few in number 
compared to past infections and so not well described by the data presented 
here. Further work is needed to ensure that infected donor reports specify 
when the donor has acute syphilis, and to monitor this sub-group of donors 
separately so that any small but important changes in their frequency, or 
characteristics, are not overlooked. 
Interpretation of the ethnic groups of infected donors is very limited by the 
lack of data about the denominators of donations tested from donors in each 
ethnic group. The proportion of donations collected from ethnic minorities is 
known to be relatively small compared to the proportion of the total population in 
these groups, but exact data were not available. In an attempt to obtain some 
information about the proportion of donors who are of Asian ethnicity, a 
computer programme (NAMPECHAN) that was developed by Bradford County 
Council to identify names of Indian sub-continent origin (and their religion and 
language) has been applied to a cohort of 40,000 new donors (work not 
included in this thesis). This was also applied to HBsAg positive donors and the 
results indicated the prevalence of HBsAg in donors with a South Asian name 
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was 7.5 times higher than in the rest of the donor population. This supports the 
picture of HBsAg association with non-white ethnicity seen in Figure 3.9 a) 
when compared to the other infections (i. e. in Figure 3.9 b), c) and d)). HIV 
infection and treponemal antibodies appear (in the absence of denominator 
information to confirm this) to have an association with black ethnic groups. 
The association of HIV infection in England and Wales with having lived in sub- 
Saharan Africa is well documented. Between 5 and 10% of donors with 
positivity for treponemal antibodies report a past history of Yaws, a tropical 
ulcerative disease caused by a treponemal infection, and probably responsible 
for at least some of the association of this test result with African ethnicity. 
The data in Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show that most infectious donations are 
from individuals who do not report exposure histories that should have led to 
their exclusion from donating blood. The collection of infectious donations from 
donors with a risk factor that occurred over twelve months ago could be avoided 
by lifetime deferral of these donors from blood donation. However, as the risk 
factors in the "12-month exclusion" category tend to be relatively common in the 
potential donor population life-long deferral may mean the loss of an 
unacceptable number of donations - the vast majority of which are expected to 
be from un-infected donors. The collection of infectious donations from donors 
with risk factors that should have excluded them from donating blood indicates 
failures either in the communication, understanding, or compliance with, donor 
selection criteria. In some cases, the donor may be unaware of their risk at the 
time, for example if the donor was unaware of a sexual partner's infection or risk 
of infection. These donations are extremely difficult to prevent. In other cases, 
donors are both aware of their risk and of the selection criteria but do not 
comply with the blood service's request to not give blood. A small sample of 
reasons for this is given in Table 3.15 and collection of these data continues. 
As the blood service has to rely on donors to comply with selection criteria, this 
is a vulnerable point in the process of providing a safe blood supply and 
deserves ongoing monitoring. Donors' perception of the blood service, and 
their trust in its staff and systems may affect their compliance with donor 
selection as well as their response to donor recruitment. These data may be 
used to monitor the compliance of various risk groups with donor selection, and 
to identify risk groups who are not aware of, or not minded to comply with, 
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donor selection criteria so that communication can be targeted at the groups in 
which donor selection is most often failing. 
Transfusion-transmitted infections 
A system for collecting standardised data about all post-transfusion 
infections that blood centres are informed about has been established. Data 
about demographic characteristics, the transfusion episode, clinical 
consequences of infection and other risk factors for infection are available. 
Anonymous identifiers enable matching with other sources of data, (e. g. 
laboratory reports) about these infections. 
Reports have been received from most centres. Many hospitals have not 
reported any cases, however reports have originated in hospitals all over the 
country and most reporting hospitals (and reporting hospital clinicians) have 
reported just one case. There were no large clusters of cases associated with 
any one reporting individual or hospital. This distribution of reports suggests 
that the mechanisms for hospitals to notify blood centres are in place all over 
the country, and that there are no serious biases in reporting. 
Reported transfusion-transmitted infections are rare: only 21 confirmed 
cases were recognised during this 4-year period of reporting. Investigations of 
a further 87 cases of post-transfusion infection were reported. Half (54%) of the 
PTI reports have been shown not to be caused by transfusion. For 15% of the 
reports the investigation was inconclusive and for the remainder investigation 
continues. Exclusion of transfusion as the source of infection and dissemination 
of this information can have useful infection control implications as other 
sources of infection - perhaps assumed to be unlikely at first - may then be 
further investigated and, if identified, become the subject for infection 
prevention. This has been the case in some hospital-acquired hepatitis 
infections eventually associated with infected health care staff. 
Twenty-three cases of post-transfusion reactions suspected (but not 
confirmed) to be due to bacteria were also reported. Conclusive investigation of 
a suspected bacteraemia in a transfusion recipient relies heavily on the 
collection and handling of relevant samples at the hospital where the 
transfusion was performed. This means that absence of evidence of an 
144 
Chapter 3 
infection (or toxin), in donations given to recipients who had post-transfusion 
reactions that were suspected (on clinical presentation) to be due to bacteria 
does not equate with evidence of absence of a transfusion-transmitted infection 
(or toxin). 
The intervals between transfusion and diagnosis of transfusion-transmitted 
infections were long - many weeks, months or years. Infections transmitted by 
transfusion between 1/10/95 and 30/9/99 will continue to be ascertained by the 
surveillance system as diagnoses are made in the future. 
The delay in reporting (1 to 2 months) suggests that the data are not timely 
enough to act as early warning of outbreaks of transfusion-transmitted 
infections e. g. as a result of a batch of contaminated blood packs. (Parallel 
reporting of incidents that indicate a break down in quality assurance acts as a 
mechanism to quickly detect such problems. ) 
Four transfusion-transmitted viral infections (1 HAV, 1 HBV and 2 HCV 
infections) were detected by follow-up of recipients after the detection of 
infections in blood donors. In one case of HAV the donor reported an HAV 
diagnosis shortly after donating blood. In two cases of HCV infection the 
donor's infection was diagnosed by the blood service by the testing of a 
subsequent donation. In one case of HBV the donor's GP informed the blood 
service of the donor's infection. None of these transfusion-transmitted infections 
had caused symptomatic, diagnosed disease in the recipients. Two of these 
transfusion-transmitted infections (1 HBV and 1 HCV) were due to a donation 
collected from a donor during the marker negative "window period" early in a 
recent infection. One (HCV) was due to a laboratory error resulting in a false 
negative test result. One (HAV) was due to an infection for which no routine 
microbiology testing is performed. 
Eleven transfusion-transmitted bacterial infections were due to collection 
of a donation from a donor with an infection for which no routine microbiology 
testing is performed. 
Four transfusion-transmitted infections reported during this period resulted 
in the death of the recipient (3 bacteria, 1 malaria). 
Several reports have been received of components that were observed to 
have visual signs of bacterial contamination before use, were not transfused, 
were sent for bacteriological investigation and were found to contain bacteria 
expected to cause disease in a recipient if transfused. Inspection of 
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components (especially platelets) detected contamination and prevented 
morbidity in these incidents. Such inspection is encouraged. These reports 
indicate "near-miss" bacterial transmissions. The investigation of the source of 
the contamination in these cases can be as informative as the investigation of 
transmissions, and the possibility of requesting and collating some information 
about these cases in the future is being considered. 
An unknown, but probably relatively large, proportion of transfusion 
transmitted infections are expected to be clinically unimportant, and 
undiagnosed - at least for many years and the extent of under-diagnoses of 
clinically important transfusion transmitted infection, and of underreporting of 
diagnosed infections to blood centres and to CDSC is not known. 
Based on the cases reported the following recommendations have been 
made: - 
" National collation of data arising from these cases needs to continue over 
several years before a picture of the extent and nature of the infectious 
complications of transfusion can emerge. 
" Clinicians should report all post-transfusion infections diagnosed in their 
patients to the blood service (via their regional blood centre) for appropriate 
investigation. Blood centres should, in turn, complete an initial report form as 
soon as possible. 
" The quality of investigation of transfusion reactions suspected to be due to 
bacteria is variable. Hospitals should consult guidelines and the blood 
service about the investigation of such cases, including the sampling and 
storage of implicated units. National guidelines (from the NBS) on the 
investigation of these cases are currently being revised following comments 
from users. 
" Donors' clinicians (and donors themselves) can aid the detection of 
transfusion-transmitted infections, and hence their appropriate care, by 
communicating with the blood service about any relevant history of blood 
donation on diagnoses with blood borne infections. 
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3.4 Summary and Conclusions 
Surveillance of infections in blood donors and in blood recipients has 
benefits for transfusion medicine and for general infectious disease control and 
epidemiology. The surveillance system established in England and Wales built 
on the existing systems in the National Blood Service for monitoring donation 
testing and on the existing systems in the PHLS for disease specific infection 
surveillance, to enhance the surveillance of transfusion transmissible infections. 
Data about donation testing, frequency of infections, characteristics of infected 
donors, frequency of recognised transfusion-transmitted infections and 
characteristics of transfusion-transmitted infections are collated, analysed and 
disseminated regularly. 
These data have demonstrated that the prevalence and incidence of HBV, 
HCV and HIV in blood donors in England and Wales during 1996-1999 were 
low and fairly stable. Over the total time period (1995-1999) there were 
significant trends towards decreasing anti-HCV prevalence in donations from 
new donors, and decreasing anti-HIV prevalence in donations from new donors, 
however the strength of these trends was no greater than have been observed 
for other similar length periods that are not significant when longer time periods 
are analysed. 
No outbreaks of infection or crises in test performance were detected by 
the surveillance over the period of time described here, but analyses were 
designed and implemented that have the potential to identify these through 
irregularities in donation testing results. 
Detailed reports were received for 98% of infected donations detected in 
England and Wales. Risk factor information was available from the NBS for 
76% of all infections, and was obtained via the PHLS CDSC for 65% (20/31) of 
the anti-HIV positive donors who did not provide information to the NBS. 
Collection of data about each infected donor allowed identification of donors 
who had seroconverted for HBsAg, anti-HCV or anti-HIV between donations 
and therefore enabled estimates of incidence to be made. Further work will 
investigate factors associated with seroconversion. 
Information about the probable route of infection has been collected in a 
standard format for every reported infected donor and enabled comparison of 
the risk factors for the different infections. 
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Only 20% of post-transfusion infections were concluded after full 
appropriate investigations to be transfusion-transmitted infections. Just over 
half of the cases concluded to be caused by transfusion (11/21) were due to 
bacterial contamination of transfusions. HBV was the most common 
transfusion-transmitted viral infection reported. Transfusion-transmitted HBV, 
HCV and HIV infections occurred due to the following occurrences: donation in 
the early stages of infection (without the marker of infection used in testing), 
donation in the tail-end stage of carriage of HBV infection, false negative test 
results due to error in the laboratory. Two non-bacterial infections for which 
blood is not tested also occurred (HAV, malaria). The frequency of recognised, 
reported transfusion-transmitted infections was shown to be very low, and to be 
low relative to the number of reports of non-infectious complications of 
transfusion. However, the extent of underreporting of transfusion-transmitted 
infections is not known and may be greater for many infections than it is for non- 
infectious complications that are fast and acute in onset after transfusion. 
The surveillance system for transfusion-transmissible infections in England 
and Wales is an ongoing, systematic, collation of data that are analysed and 
disseminated to those in charge of control and prevention of transfusion- 
transmitted infection, and infections in the general population. The data held in 
the surveillance databases provides a baseline for future monitoring of the 
epidemiology of transfusion-transmissible infections and holds potential for both 
descriptive and analytical epidemiological studies. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Studies that provide specific analyses and estimates have been conducted 
using data from the surveillance system, and additional information specially 
collected for the purpose of the further study. Two of these studies are 
described below. The first collected further information about donors who 
appeared - from the surveillance reports - to have seroconverted for anti-HCV 
and determined the incidence of HCV infection amongst repeat donors in 
England during 1993 to 1995. The second collected further information from 
blood centres about all acute HBV infection reported to PHLS between 1991 
and 1997 as associated with transfusion and described the frequency of 
confirmed transfusion-transmitted cases and the reasons for HBV infectious 
blood entering the blood supply. 
4.2 Survey of HCV seroconversions in blood donors: England, 1993-95. 
Introduction 
In September 1991, UK Blood Transfusion Services began routinely 
testing all blood donations for antibody to hepatitis C virus (anti-HCV). Since 
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then, approximately 2 million healthy adults have been tested for anti-HCV 
annually by the English National Blood Service (NBS). National collation of test 
results, and of characteristics of anti-HCV positive donors, provides valuable 
information about the donor panel, and about a selected sample of the adult 
population of England. 
The majority of acute HCV infections are asymptomatic, and most 
probably pass undetected. An anti-HCV positive donation, preceded by an anti- 
HCV negative donation, suggests recent infection. The testing of donations 
from repeat donors therefore provides a rare opportunity to identify incident 
HCV infections. Information about incident HCV infections is of interest to blood 
transfusion services and to public health workers as it relates to current, rather 
than past, HCV transmission. Pre-donation selection of blood donors aims to 
exclude donors who have recognised risks for contracting blood borne 
infections. Incident infections in blood donors usually indicate one of three 
scenarios: a failure in the definition or application of pre-donation selection 
criteria; an unrecognised exposure to blood borne infection, or infection through 
an exposure that is not included in pre-donation selection criteria because it is a 
frequent exposure of blood donors and thought to be associated with a 
relatively small risk of infection. There remains a small risk of transmission of 
HCV by transfusion due to anti-HCV negative, infectious donations and due to 
failures in the testing and exclusion of seropositive donations. The number of 
donors who seroconvert for anti-HCV between donations is one piece of 
information needed to estimate the risk of collecting a donation from a recently 
infected donor who has not yet developed detectable anti-HCV, and hence the 
risk of transmitting HCV infection by transfusion. 
A survey of seroconversions for anti-HCV detected by English blood 
centres from September 1991 to December 1995 was conducted during 
1994/95 and the results of this survey have been used, along with data from the 
infection surveillance system of the National Blood Authority and Public Health 
Laboratory Service Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (NBA/PHLS 
CDSC), to estimate the rate of seroconversion for anti-HCV in repeat donors in 
England during 1993-1995. 
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Subjects and methods 
Sample 
Blood donations in England are obtained from voluntary unpaid donors. 
Pre-donation selection excludes individuals who are outside the age-range 18- 
65 years, have had known high risk exposures for contracting blood borne 
infections, or have any medical condition which contraindicates either the loss 
of 450ml of blood, or the giving of their blood to patients. The number of repeat 
donors in 1994 constituted approximately 4% of the 18-65 year old population of 
England in the middle of 1994. 
During the study period all donations were tested for anti-HCV using 
enzyme-linked immunosorbant assays (ELISAs). Initially-reactive donations 
were re-tested by ELISA. Donations that were reactive on repeat testing were 
not issued and supplementary tests (additional ELISAs and recombinant 
immunoblot assays (RIBAs), and, in some cases, polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) for HCV DNA)) were performed to clarify the infection status of donors. 
Donors with evidence of HCV infection were contacted by the blood 
centres and were offered additional testing and counselling by the blood centre 
followed by referral to a relevant medical specialist, or were referred to their 
general practitioner for further management (Ryan KE, 1994). Risk factors for 
HCV infection were discussed with donors during their follow up and any 
acknowledged by the donor were recorded. 
Case definition 
A standardised algorithm for confirmatory testing of blood donations was 
not used during the study period and variation in the tests used had to be 
accommodated. In order to include all true biological seroconversions but 
exclude any spurious "seroconversion" caused by changes in test format and 
performance over time, or due to false reactivity in the tests, a comprehensive 
case definition was developed and agreed. (Box 3) 
152 
Chapter 4 
Box. 3 Criteria for determining seroconversion for anti-HCV. 
Pre-seroconversion 
donation 
RIBA 3.0 non-reactive 
ELISA non-reactive & RIBA 
2.0 non-reactive 
ELISA 3.0 non-reactive 
Post-seroconversion donation 
and RIBA 3.0 positive 
or 
and ELISA (of same manufacturer and 
generation as pre-seroconversion 
test) positive & RIBA 2.0 positive 
or 
and ELISA 3.0 positive & RIBA positive 
not PCR 
negative 
if < 12 months 
and after pre- 
seroconversion 
donation 
Methods 
In July 1994 all English blood centres were asked to return information 
about the tests performed and results obtained on the first anti-HCV positive 
donation (i. e. post-seroconversion donation) and the last anti-HCV negative 
donation (i. e. pre-seroconversion donation) for each donor considered to have 
seroconverted for HCV between donations since anti-HCV testing began in 
1991. Seroconversions identified after July 1994 were also reported and 
included in the survey. Information was also requested about possible 
exposures to HCV infection. In October 1995 the national system for the 
surveillance of donation testing was revised and seroconversions were then 
identified from routine surveillance reports. 
Test results were examined to see if they met the case definition. If they 
did not, the reporting blood centre was contacted and asked for any additional 
test results or to perform additional tests on archived samples - most commonly 
they were asked to perform parallel RIBA tests on samples from pre- and post- 
seroconversion donations. Follow-up of missing returns, and requests for 
additional information continued during 1995. 
During 1991 (September-December) and 1992 the majority of repeat 
donors tested for anti-HCV were being tested by the NBS for the first time. As a 
previous negative anti-HCV test is a pre-requisite for HCV seroconversion, rates 
for 1991 and 1992 were not calculated. 
The rate of post-seroconversion donations in all donations from repeat 
donors was calculated by dividing the number of seroconversions by the 
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number of donations from repeat donors. The numbers of donations from 
repeat donors tested for anti-HCV during 1993,1994 and 1995 was obtained 
from the national system for the surveillance of donation testing. The incidence 
of HCV seroconversion was calculated by dividing the number of 
seroconversions by the number of person years (PYs) at risk. The number of 
PYs was estimated by dividing the number of donations from repeat donors by 
the average annual number of donations per repeat donor. The average 
number of donations per repeat donor at one blood centre (that tests 5% of the 
repeat donor donations in England) was 1.71 over a one-year period, and 3.49 
over a three-year period (1993-95). The average annual number of donations 
during the three-year period 1993-95 was therefore taken as 3.49/3 = 1.16: this 
is equivalent to an average interval between donations of 0.86 years. 
Table 4.1 Seroconversions for anti-HCV amongst repeat donors in England 
1993-1995. 
Number of donations from donors 
who have seroconverted for HCV 
since a previous donation 
Number of donations from repeat 
donors tested for HCV antibody 
Frequency of donations from 
donors who have seroconverted 
for HCV since a previous 
donation 
Rate of seroconversion per 
100,000 PYs 
(95% confidence interval) 
1993 1994 
53 
2,140,712 2,116,178 
1995 1993-1995 
6 14 
2,105,038 6,361,928 
1 in 428,142 1 in 705,393 1 in 350,840 1 in 454,423 
0.40 0.24 0.49 0.26 
(0.17-0.96) (0.08-0.75) (0.22-1.08) (0.15-0.43) 
Results 
Twenty-three reports of putative HCV seroconversion in repeat donors 
tested between September 1991 and the end of 1995 were received. The test 
results available for 7 of these did not satisfy the case definition. As centres 
were asked to report only those donors for whom full testing information was 
available, these 7 reports do not represent all the possible additional cases of 
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recent HCV infection in repeat donors where the data is insufficient to satisfy 
our case definition. Two of the donors that fulfilled the study case definition for 
anti-HCV seroconversion were diagnosed during 1991 or 1992 and 14 of the 
cases were diagnosed during the study years, 1993-1995 (Table 4.1). The 
difference in the rates for 1993,1994 and 1995 was not significant (p=0.59). 
PCR tests results were available for 10 of these 14: 9 were PCR positive, and 
one donor, whose first seropositive donation was taken two years after the last 
seronegative donation, was PCR negative. Five blood centres reported no HCV 
seroconversions. Three centres reported more than one HCV seroconversion: 
one centre in the Thames regions' reported 4 cases and had the highest rate of 
seroconversion; two centres, outside the Thames regions, reported 2 cases 
each. There was no significant heterogeneity between the rates by centre 
(deviance = 15.9,13 degrees of freedom, p=0.25). 
The average interval between donation of the pre-seroconversion and 
post-seroconversion donation for the fourteen cases was 1.29 years (median 
1.38 months, range 0.42-2.33 years). This interval was 1.5 times the average 
inter-donation interval (1993-95) for all repeat donors. 
The reported probable exposures to infection of the seroconverters are 
shown in Table 4.2, along with their sex and average age (information about 
ethnic group was not gathered). The approximate average age of all repeat 
donors was 40 years. 
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Table 4.2 Acknowledged probable exposures in donors who had 
seroconverted for anti-HCV. 
Probable exposures to HCV infection Donor selection Number (%)of seroconverting 
criteria (1995) donors 
instruct 
exclusion 
Total Males Females 
Injecting drug use Yes 2 (14%) 2 
Sex between men and women 5 (36%) 14 
- known HCV infected partner Yes' 110 
- IDU partner2 Yes 202 
- partner with tattoos No 101 
- partner from high HCV prevalence No 101 
country 
Blood contact with person with risk factors No 1 (7%) 10 
None identified No 4 (29%) 22 
No information - 2(14%) 20 
Total 5 (36%) Yes 14 86 
9 (64%) No (100%) 
Mean age (years) 30.5 31.4 29.3 
(95% confidence interval) (26.6-34.4) (26.1- (21.1- 
36.7 37.5) 
1 At the time of donation this selection criterion was not in use (Kitchen 
AD, 1996). 
2 For I the partner was tested for anti-HCV, and found to be positive, after 
the donor's diagnosis, for the other the anti-HCV status of the partner is not 
known. 
Discussion 
English blood centres identified 412 anti-HCV positive repeat donors 
during 1993-1995. Very few (14) of these can be shown to represent incident 
HCV infections. This survey provides an estimate of the minimum rate of HCV 
seroconversion in repeat donors in England during 1993-95. The case 
definition for HCV seroconversion used in this study was chosen to exclude 
spurious seroconversion due to changes in test format and performance. The 
sensitivity and specificity of ELISAs and RIBAs used for anti-HCV testing 
changed between 1991 and 1995 with the introduction of third generation tests 
during 1993. By the time of this survey many of the archived samples from the 
pre-seroconversion donations under investigation had been used for repeat and 
supplementary tests, or discarded, according to each blood centre's protocols: 
repeat and supplementary testing of pre-seroconversion donations was 
therefore limited. By requiring evidence of comparably confirmed negativity for 
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the last seronegative donation, some cases of true seroconversion may have 
been excluded. Previous reports of HCV seroconversions with less strictly 
applied case definitions (Shopnick RI, 1995) have been quite justifiably 
challenged (Kessler C, 1995) and we chose to identify clear-cut, rather than 
probable, cases. Also, the survey was conducted retrospectively, and relied on 
retrieval of blood centres' records of tests performed on donations up to four 
years previously. For these reasons, this study may underestimate the number 
of seroconverting donors, and therefore the rate of seroconversion among 
repeat donors in England. Donations from repeat donors who were being 
tested for anti-HCV by the NBS for the first time during 1993-95 could not be 
excluded from the denominators that we used. A study conducted on donations 
during 1993 by one blood centre found 1.8% of donations from repeat donors to 
be from donors not previously tested for anti-HCV by the blood centre (Atrah, 
1996). This inaccuracy in our denominator is likely to result in a further, 
although very slight, depression of the seroconversion rates as estimated from 
these data. 
One blood centre has published reports about 3 donors diagnosed during 
1993 (Atrah HI, 1995), and a further 4 donors diagnosed during 1994 and 1995 
(Atrah HI, 1996) who were thought to have seroconverted for HCV. The blood 
centre obtained denominators of previously negative donors tested for anti-HCV 
during 1993 and estimated the seroconversion rate during 1993 to be 2.78 per 
100,000 (1 in 35,937) previously negative, repeat donors (Atrah HI, 1996): more 
than ten-fold the estimate from our national study. However, the case definition 
used by this centre may have been flawed (Allain J-P, 1997 and Hewitt PE, 
1997); only one of the cases described satisfied the case definition that we 
used. We consider the estimate of the HCV seroconversion rate in repeat blood 
donors derived by this single centre to be erroneously high. 
Pre-donation selection criteria aim to select a sample of the population 
who do not report a recognised risk for blood borne infections prior to donation 
(Guidelines for the Blood Transfusion Services in the United Kingdom Section 
1.1.5 Medical Assessment of Donors, 1997). Since the early 1980's potential 
donors have been given explanatory literature and since 1999, direct 
questioning about risk factors has been introduced for all new donors, and for 
donors who have not attended for two years or more. One centre has 
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additionally used a donor-completed questionnaire. The procedure for eliciting 
information about exposures to risks for HCV infection from infected donors has 
varied though out the UK. A standard questionnaire for interviewing donors is 
soon to be introduced. Information obtained post-donation from infected donors 
may be affected by both interviewer-related, and donor-related, biases. The 
majority of HCV infected blood donors have reported a history of injecting drug 
use (MacLennan S, 1994, Crawford RJ, 1994, Goodrick MJ, 1994, Neal KR, 
1994, Gesinde MO, 1992 and Atrah HI, 1994), typically many years prior to 
donating blood. Almost one third of the HCV seroconverters in this study had 
no risk for HCV infection identified by the blood service. Testing the sexual 
partners of seroconverting donors may help to establish the true extent of 
heterosexual transmission in the donor population. Uncommon routes of 
transmission, and possible exposures that are not thought to be associated with 
risk of HCV infection, should also be investigated. 
Seroconversion for HCV amongst repeat blood donors in England is very 
rare. This implies that the incidence of HCV in the population represented by 
repeat blood donors is now very low, and/or that pre-donation selection criteria 
effectively exclude most repeat donors with current exposure to HCV. During 
1993-95,14 donations (less than 1 in 450,000 donations), were obtained from 
donors who had seroconverted for HCV since a previous antibody negative 
donation. During the same period, 15 donations were obtained from donors 
who had developed detectable anti-HIV since their previous donation. The 
number of repeat donors who become infected with HCV, or other blood borne 
infections, but do not return to donate after their seroconversion cannot be 
ascertained by donation testing. In the future, tests for nucleic acids may 
enable detection of antibody negative, infectious donations. 
The HCV status of the recipients of the seronegative, pre-seroconversion 
donations was not determined in this survey. Blood centres conduct tracing 
recipients of potentially infectious donations and one of the 14 pre- 
seroconversion donations has been shown to have transmitted HCV infection 
(Kitchen AD, 1996). 
Donations from new donors contributed 12% of the total number of 
donations collected in England in 1993-1995. Seroconversion rates in new 
donors cannot be directly measured and there are reasons to expect that recent 
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infections in new donors may be more frequent than in repeat donors; repeat 
donors have been subjected to the post-donation selection criteria of negativity 
for tests for HCV, HBV, HIV and T. pallidum infection markers, and new donors 
may be more likely to donate blood in order to obtain testing following an 
exposure to infection. 
Surveillance of donation testing and of donors who seroconvert for HCV 
between donations continues to be an important component of monitoring the 
safety of the blood supply. Study of possible exposures to infection that are 
associated with seroconversion for HCV, and of the course of HCV infection in 
seroconverting blood donors, who have a relatively precisely known date of 
HCV infection, should further contribute to our understanding of the 
epidemiology and natural history of HCV infection. 
4.3 Review of acute HBV infection laboratory reports: Reports of acute 
HBV infection associated with blood transfusion in England and Wales, 
1991-1997. 
Introduction 
Blood donations in England and Wales are collected from healthy donors 
who do not acknowledge factors associated with an increased risk of blood 
borne infections. All donations issued for transfusion (since early 1970's) have 
been found negative for hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) as a marker of 
transmissible hepatitis B virus (HBV). These measures have resulted in low 
rates of HBV transmission by transfusion, but have not eliminated all infectious 
donations from the blood supply. HBV infections in recipients are investigated 
by National Blood Services (NBS) to identify if they were transmitted by 
transfusion, and prevent other transmissions, or to identify the need to explore 
sources other than transfusion. An implicated donation is concluded as having 
been probably infectious for HBV if it was: - i) collected from an HBsAg negative 
donor for whom there is evidence of acute infection at that time, or ii) collected 
from an HBsAg negative donor for whom there is evidence of infectious HBV 
carriage (i. e. antibody to hepatitis B core antigen (anti-1-113c) present but 
antibody to HBsAg not, or weakly, present (I Izuka H, 1992)), or iii) HBsAg 
positive (as shown by review of test results or re-testing of archived serum) and 
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erroneously released into the blood supply. Mutant HBV infections, not 
detected by routine HBsAg tests, also pose a risk of infectious donations being 
transfused (Jongerius JM, 1998). 
Laboratories in England and Wales to PHLS CDSC report acute HBV 
infections, and the probable route of infection, voluntarily. 
Methods and results 
Acute HBV reports to CDSC were reviewed and information was sought 
from the NBS about reports associated with transfusion between 1991 and 
1997 (Table 4.3). Between 1991 and 1997 24 of 4,185 (0.6%) acute HBV 
reports were associated with transfusion in England and Wales. For 10 reports, 
investigation by the NBS was either not feasible (e. g. donation identifiers not 
available) or inconclusive (e. g. one of more donor not traced for re-testing), or 
NBS information was not available retrospectively. Fourteen probably infectious 
donations identified by the NBS fell into two categories: 3 (21 %) were collected 
from HBsAg negative donors during acute HBV infection and 11 (79%) were 
collected from HBsAg negative donors during late HBV carriage. No reports of 
erroneous release of HBsAg positive blood were identified. 
Table 4.3 Acute HBV reports associated with transfusion, England and 
Wales, 1991-1997. 
Year Total Transfusion in UK as NBS identified NBS investigation 
reports' the most probable HBsAg negative outcome not 
route of infection probably infectious available, or 
donor with inconclusive 
acute HBV 
HBV carriage 
1991 572 5 02 3 
1992 531 3 11 1 
1993 629 5 14 0 
1994 631 3 02 1 
1995 613 5 01 4 
1996 581 2 11 0 
1997 628 1 00 1 
1991-1997 4,1852 24 (0.57%) 3 11 10 
1- Data at 31/3/98. 
I- For 21 (0.50%) of these reports (1991-1997) the most probable route of 
infection was transfusion abroad (not known to have been confirmed by 
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investigation of the implicated donations), and for 3 reports no information about 
the place of transfusion was provided. 
Discussion and conclusions 
The NBS of England and Wales issue over 2.5 million donations annually. 
The cases presented here underestimate the number of transfusion-transmitted 
HBV infections: HBV is often asymptomatic and not all acute HBV infections are 
diagnosed and reported to CDSC. 
Surveillance of acute HBV infections shows that transfusion transmission 
of HBV in England and Wales does occur, but is rare. The contribution of this 
route of transmission to the total burden of acute symptomatic HBV is small and 
acute infections in donors cause the minority of transfusion-associated cases. 
A similar breakdown of causes of transfusion-transmitted HBV was observed by 
North London blood centre during 1985-1993 (John Barbara - personal 
communication). 
Donor selection criteria aim to exclude individuals with recent risk factors 
for the acquisition of blood-borne infection. Persistent HBV infections often 
follow perinatal or childhood infection and therefore are less likely to be 
excluded by donor selection. 
Testing donations for anti-HBc, as is routine in some other countries, 
would have detected most of the HBsAg negative infectious donations 
identified. Since anti-HBc testing would also detect non-infectious donations 
from donors with naturally acquired immunity to HBV: further tests would be 
needed to avoid unnecessary loss of donations. 
The post-transfusion infection surveillance that is described in Chapter 4, 
and that forms the infectious part of the Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) 
scheme (Williamson LM, 1996), will continue to monitor post-transfusion HBV 
infections. Policies to vaccinate multiply transfused individuals (Salisburg & 
Begg, 1996) remain justified. Testing of donations for anti-HBc has been 
considered but not adopted to date in the UK. The findings of this survey 
suggest that this now warrants further consideration of the costs and benefits, 
as anti-HBc testing could prevent the majority of transmissions from donors at 
the HBsAg negative tail end of HBV carriage. One caveat to this is that HBsAg 
tests have improved in sensitivity during the last 5 years, and the HBsAg 
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negative period at the tail end of carriage may now be much shorter than in the 
earlier years included in this survey. Of the five reports of transfusion- 
transmitted HBV infection to the PTI surveillance (1995-1999, see Chapter 3), 
only one was concluded to be due to a donor in the tail end of carriage. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Knowledge of the risks of transfusion transmitted viral infections is helpful 
in monitoring the safety of the blood supply and to evaluate the likely benefits of 
new strategies to improve transfusion safety. The current very low risk of 
transfusion-transmitted infections in the UK makes prospective study of 
transfusion recipients a prohibitively long and costly method to obtain accurate 
transmission rates (Table 1.2). Also, the results from direct observation are 
soon out of date as either the epidemiology of the infections considered, or 
transfusion service practices, change. 
The advantages of estimating transmission risk using routinely available 
data and evidence-based assumptions include the speed and low cost, and the 
ease of revision in the light of new data or changing circumstances. 
Generating estimates of the risk of transfusion-transmitted infections 
requires firstly identifying the circumstances that could allow an infectious 
donation to enter the blood supply, and secondly, assessing the likelihood of 
each, and then any, of the circumstances occurring. 
In the UK, during the entire period of this study, all blood donations were 
tested for hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg), human immunodeficiency virus 
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antibody (anti-HIV) and hepatitis C antibody (anti-HCV) (and for Treponemal 
antibodies as a marker of syphilis infection). Donations with any of these 
markers detected by the testing performed were excluded from the blood 
supply. Even in the presence of such testing, several circumstances could lead 
to HBV, HCV or HIV infectious donations entering the blood supply: 
1. Sero-negative infectious donations. A period of sero-negativity - the 
`window period' - prior to detectable levels of antibody or antigen, follows 
infection with HBV, HIV or HCV. During acute, resolving, HBV infection there is 
a second HBsAg negative, infectious window, following the transient presence 
of detectable HBsAg in the blood. During the tail end of HBV carriage HBsAg 
may fall below detectable levels for a considerable period of time before HBV 
infectivity is lost (Hoofnagle, 1986). HBsAg testing cannot therefore be 
assumed to detect all established HBV infections and the risk of HBV infectious 
donations collected from sero-negative infectious donors during the tail end of 
HBV carriage should be included to give an overall risk estimate. 
Although some patients have been described with HIV infection, and some 
with HCV infection, who have no antibodies to these infections, such cases are, 
so far, restricted to immunosuppressed individuals (e. g. Durand F, 2000). For 
this analysis, it has been assumed that HIV and HCV infections, once 
established in immunocompetent individuals, result in persistent antibody 
presence and therefore can always be detected by antibody testing, and that 
individuals who are known to be immunosuppressed, or have characteristics 
that suggest they are likely to be immunosuppressed, are excluded from 
donating blood. 
2. False negative test results. Tests for HBsAg, anti-HIV and anti-HCV are 
never 100% sensitive and some positive samples will give false negative 
results. The high sensitivity of the tests chosen for blood donation testing, and 
the low prevalence of these markers in UK donations, result in a very high 
positive predictive value for a negative test result. As large numbers of 
donations are tested however, the low risk of a false negative should not be 
assumed to be negligible. The sensitivity of tests to infections in donors may 
alter if sub-types, or mutant strains, of infections that were not included during 
the tests' evaluations become more prevalent in the donor population. Sub- 
types and mutants do occur and can result in alarms about transfusion safety. 
The relative contribution of different test sensitivities to the overall risk of 
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infectious donations entering the blood supply is therefore of interest and should 
be monitored. 
3. Laboratory error. Laboratory errors can result in a positive sample being 
credited with a negative result - either due to an error in sampling or conducting 
the test, or due to an error in recording test results. Controls on every part of 
the testing process and the information technology involved in recording results 
aim to prevent such errors occurring and going unnoticed. However, these may 
not always work, or may not prevent an unforeseen circumstance leading to the 
release of a positive donation, and the risk resulting from errors should be 
considered. 
In this chapter, data from infection surveillance databases and from 
special surveys are used, along with estimates of the sensitivity and window 
periods of current tests, and the estimated rate of error in the testing process, to 
estimate the risk of HBV, HIV and HCV infectious blood donations entering the 
blood supply issued to hospitals from English blood centres between 1993 and 
1998. 
5.2 Methods 
Study population 
Information about all donations tested during six years, 1993 to 1998, at all 
blood centres in England (15 at the beginning of the period, reducing to 10 by 
the end of the period) was included in the study. 
Donations were sub-classified into donations from new donors and 
donations from repeat donors. A repeat donor was a donor who had a recorded 
attendance as a donor previously. A new donor was a donor who had not 
attended previously according to that blood centre's current records, although, 
in some cases, such donors may have attended many years ago, or at another 
blood centre previously. A positive donation from a repeat donor did not always 
represent a seroconversion since the last attendance for three reasons. Firstly, 
not all repeat donors who have attended a donor session previously had given a 
donation (for example, if they failed haemoglobin tests) and been tested for all 
infections previously. Secondly, repeat donors who have had a marker of 
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infection detected by the blood service in the past, and been asked not to 
donate again, do occasionally re-donate (7% of positive donations from 
previously tested donors between 1/10/95 and 31/12/98 were from previously 
confirmed positive donors). Thirdly, as new tests are introduced into donation 
testing and the sensitivity of tests improve, donors who have not been tested 
previously or who were negative to previous test kits may be found to be 
positive (32% of positive donations from previously tested donors between 
1/10/95 and 31/12/98 were from donors who had not been previously tested for 
the infection detected). Details about the testing of previous donations from 
positive donors were therefore sought so that they could be accurately 
classified as first-time tested donors and previously tested donors. Previously 
tested donors were sub-classified as donors who had seroconverted and 
donors who were, or may have been, seropositive at the time of the previous 
test and could not be shown to have seroconverted. It was not possible to 
similarly classify the total numbers of all donations tested from repeat donors 
into those from first time tested donors and those from previously tested donors. 
A portion of the denominator used in the incidence estimates may therefore not 
have been previously tested for anti-HCV and this may dilute the HCV incidence 
estimate a little. However a study at one blood centre of donations tested 
during 1993 found that only 1.8% of all donations from repeat donors had not 
been previously tested for HCV (Atrah, 1996): the effect on the results of such a 
small, and diminishing, amount of misclassification in the denominator is 
negligible and no adjustment to compensate for this was made. 
Collection of data needed to estimate the risk of infectious donations 
entering the blood supply 
Prevalence of HBsAg, anti-HCV and anti-HIV in new and repeat 
donors 
The numbers of HBsAg, anti-HIV and anti-HCV seropositive donations 
from new and repeat donors and the numbers of donations tested from new and 
repeat donors during each year were obtained from surveillance databases and 
special surveys of HBsAg positive donations and anti-HCV positive donations 
and used to calculate the prevalence of each infection within donations from 
new and from repeat donors. 
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Incidence of HBsAg, anti-HCV and anti-HIV in new and repeat donors 
Incidence rates in repeat donors were derived from observed 
seroconversions. Repeat donors who had seroconverted for anti-HIV were 
identified from surveillance reports to the NBS and to the Public Health 
Laboratory Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (PHLS-CDSC) 
AIDS/HIV Centre. Repeat donors who had seroconverted for anti-HCV were 
identified by a retrospective survey of blood centre records (Soldan, 1998) prior 
to October 1995 and from the NBA/PHLS CDSC surveillance system from 
October 1995 to the end of 1998. The results of screening and confirmatory 
tests performed on the last negative, and the first positive, donation were 
reviewed for all cases of putative anti-HCV seroconversion. Cases with 
possible but not proven seroconversion, e. g. due to test batch variation, or 
unsupported interpretations of indeterminate test results were classified as 
probable false seroconversions, and were not included as seroconverters. The 
results of HBsAg tests on any previous donations from the donors of HBsAg 
positive donations were also collected either directly from blood centres or from 
reports to the infected donor surveillance and repeat donors who had 
seroconverted for HBsAg were identified. The criteria used to identify a 
seroconverter from their test results are shown in Table 5.1. A seroconverter 
was defined as a donor who had made a seropositive donation during the study 
period (1993-98) and had made a seronegative donation within the ten years 
prior to the positive donation. Some other similar studies conducted in other 
countries have classified as seroconverters only those donors whose positive 
donation and previous negative donation fell within the study period. This 
method of defining seroconverters within a study reduces the number of 
seroconverters, but, as the inter-donation interval for the excluded 
seroconverters is very long, the contribution these make to the risk of a window 
period donation may be negligible. To investigate the effect of only including 
seroconverters whose negative donation was within the study period, this 
approach was also tried and the resulting incidence rate estimates, and risk 
estimates, were compared. Incidence rates in repeat donors were calculated as 
the number of seroconverting donors divided by the total number of person 
years at risk. The number of person years at risk was calculated as the number 
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of donations made by repeat donors multiplied by an estimate of the average 
interval (in years) between donations from repeat donors (see below). 
Table 5.1 Criteria for defining seroconverters from donation testing results. 
Pre-seroconversion Post-seroconversion donation 
donation 
---------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ ----------------------- 
------- 
HCV 
---------------- 
1. RIBA 3.0 non-reactive and RIBA 3.0 positive } 
or 
} 
} not PCR 
2. ELISA non-reactive & and ELISA (of same } negative 
RIBA 2.0 non-reactive manufacturer and } if < 12 months 
generation as pre- } and after pre- 
seroconversion test) } seroconversion 
positive & RIBA 2.0 } donation 
positive 
or } 
3. ELISA 3.0 non-reactive ELISA 3.0 positive &} 
and RIBA positive } 
HBV 
1. Negative for HBsAg by and Positive for HBsAg by and No evidence of 
EIA, or RIA EIA or by RIA, false negative 
confirmed by positivity results pre- 
for other HBV seroconversion 
marker(s). 
HIV 
1. Negative for anti-HIV and Positive for anti-HIV No evidence of 
by EIA by EIA confirmed by false negative 
alternative EIAs and results pre- 
positivity to Western seroconversion 
Blot or PCR. 
Incidence was estimated using seroconversions after a negative donation 
within the previous ten years and for the more recent three-year study period, 
after a negative donation within that three-year study period. 
Because donors who seroconvert may have shorter or longer inter- 
donation intervals between their pre-seroconversion donation and their post- 
seroconversion donation than the majority of donors, the probability of a window 
period donation may actually be greater or less than the average probability that 
is calculated by the method described below (see "Probability of bleeding an 
infectious window period donation", page 178). For example, if infected donors 
169 
Chapter 5 
had inter-donation intervals 3 times the length of ordinary inter-donation 
intervals, the chance of the final day of their inter-donation interval being during 
a randomly falling window period of X days during their inter-donation interval 
would be 1/3 the chance of the final day of a non-seroconverting donor's inter- 
donation interval being during a randomly falling period of X days during their 
inter-donation interval. The probability of a window period donation as 
calculated above was therefore multiplied by an adjustment factor S. 
S= inter-donation interval for non-seroconverting donors 
inter-donation interval for seroconverting donors 
S was calculated for each infection using the mean inter-donation interval 
for non-seroconverting donors and the median inter-donation interval observed 
for seroconverters detected during the years 1996-98. 
SHIV = 315/514 = 0.61 (NB. mean interval for seroconverters =709, St dev =704) 
SHCV = 315/419 = 0.75 (NB. mean interval for seroconverters =577, St dev =407) 
This adjustment was not applied to the calculations for HBV risk because, 
as explained on page 171, the inter-donation intervals of detected HBsAg 
seroconverters were biased towards shorter intervals due to the transient nature 
of HBsAg. 
SHBSAg (not used)= 315/154 = 2.05 (NB. mean interval for seroconverters =175, 
St dev = 72) 
If it is assumed that the detected HBsAg seroconverters are the lower 
ranking of all the (inferred) HBV incident donors with respect to inter-donation 
intervals, they occupy the bottom 37 % of inter-donation intervals. The mean 
inter-donation interval of the bottom ranking 37% of the anti-HIV and anti-HCV 
seroconverters (ranked by inter-donation interval) was 227 days. This artificially 
biased inter-donation interval for the HIV and HCV infected donors is much 
closer (1.3 times) to that observed for the biased sample of HBV infected 
donors, than the average for all HIV and HCV seroconverters (662 days - giving 
an interval 3.8 times the HBV sample). The assumption was therefore made 
that the total (63% unobserved) group of HBV infected repeat donors had a 
similar distribution of inter-donation intervals to HIV and HCV infected repeat 
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donors and that the value of S most appropriate for the HBV estimates was 
therefore calculated using the average for all anti-HIV and anti-HCV 
seroconverters. 
SHBV = 315/478 = 0.66 (NB. mean interval = 662, St dev = 613) 
For the years for which seroconversions were identified from Infected 
Donor reports, and there was some underreporting, the numbers of 
seroconversions for each infection and for each year were adjusted for 
underreporting by multiplying the identified numbers by 1/the proportion of all 
infections in repeat donors that were reported during that year. 
HBsAg adjustment 
HBsAg is generally transient in individuals infected with HBV as adults and 
the HBsAg test will have reverted to being negative in many HBV infected 
donors by the time of their next donation. All the long term HBsAg testing of 
donations will identify carriers and only some of the donors with transient 
antigenaemia. The probability of detection of an incident infection by 
subsequent HBsAg testing therefore had to be calculated. 
Other workers, including Korelitz et at (1997), have published estimates of 
HBV incidence using a method that takes transient antigenaemia into account 
by calculating the weighted probability that donation testing would detect 
seroconversion. Korelitz et at assumed that 70% of infected donors would have 
transient antigenaemia lasting an average of 63 days (the mid point of two 
published estimates, (Hoofnagle, 1978; Mimms, 1993)), that 25% of infected 
donors would have no antigenaemia and that 5% would have persistent 
antigenaemia. 
In this study it was similarly assumed that 5% of donors would have 
persistent antigenaemia. For the remaining 95% of infections it was assumed 
that 85% would have typical transient antigenaemia lasting an average of 63 
days and that 10% would have a heightened and more rapid clearance of 
antigen lasting just 30 days (Hoofnagle, 1986). 
The chance that an incident HBV-infected donor would be detected by 
HBsAg testing was therefore: 
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Probability of detection as HBsAg seroconverter = (5%xl)+(85%xT, )+(10%xT2) 
where, 
T, = probability that a donor with typical transient antigenaemia is HBsAg 
positive at time of donation, and 
T2 = probability that a donor with rapid transient antigenaemia is HBsAg positive 
at time of donation 
With, 
T= duration of antigenaemia 
Inter-donation interval 
The average inter-donation interval for the 20 HBsAg seroconverting 
donors detected during 1996-1998 was 175 days (St dev 72). So, 
T1 = 63/175 = 0.36 
T2=30/175=0.17 
and 
Probability of detection as HBsAg seroconverter = (5% x 1) + (85% x 0.36) 
+ (10% x 0.17) 
= 0.373, or 37% 
The observed HBsAg incidence rate was therefore multiplied by 1/0.373 = 
2.68 to give an estimate of the total HBV incidence rate. 
New donor risk factor estimation 
The incidence of HIV and HCV in new donors cannot be measured directly 
from current routine test results (specialised testing such as anti-HCV avidity 
testing and de-tuned anti-HIV testing offer potential for direct identification of 
recent infections). An adjustment figure (Z) was calculated to represent the 
difference in incidence between new donors and old donors. This was applied 
to the incidence rates in repeat donors to produce an estimate of the incidence 
rates in new donors i. e. incidence in new donors = incidence in repeat donors x 
Z. Several methods were used to estimate Z. 
New donor incidence multiplier method 1: The ratio of the frequency of 
acute HBV in donations from new donors to the frequency of acute HBV in 
donations from repeat donors was used to derive Z. 
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Z, = Acute HBV donations per 100,000 donations from new donors 
Acute HBV donations per 100,000 donations from repeat donors 
Using data from North London Blood Centre, 1993-1998 where 7 acute 
HBV donations were collected amongst 215,366 donations from new donors 
and 9 acute HBV donations were collected amongst 1,251,411 donations from 
repeat donors, Z was estimated as shown below. 
Z, = 7/2.15366 = 3.25 = 4.51 
9/12.51411 0.72 
New donor incidence multiplier method 2: A method used in a study by 
Lackritz at al (1995) was used. This method is based on the understanding that 
at the start of testing, when no repeat donors have been excluded because of a 
positive test result, the seroprevalance of a persistent marker of infection is 
equivalent to the cumulative incidence of the infection. If the time at risk of 
infection has been the same for new donors and repeat donors, the ratio of the 
seroprevalence in new donors and repeat donors during the first period of 
testing can be used as an estimate of Z. The period of time used should not 
contain any repeat tests on the same individual. Lackritz et al took the first year 
of testing. As donors can donate up to 3 times each year (every 16 weeks), and 
some repeat donors do donate more than once a year, the ratio for each 
calendar quarter during the first 15 months of testing was calculated to check 
the period of testing used for calculating Z did not include any quarter that 
showed a ratio that may have been inflated by inclusion of negative repeat 
donors in the denominator for the repeat donor prevalence (see table 5.2). The 
prevalence of anti-HIV amongst new donors during the first year of testing (Oct- 
85-Sep-86) was 5.15 times that amongst repeat donors. During the first six 
months and second six months of testing the prevalence in new donors was 
3.67 times that amongst repeat donors, and 6.08 times that amongst repeat 
donors respectively. The prevalence in new donors in 1997 was 6.73 times the 
prevalence in repeat donors, and has remained at around this level since (ratio 
for 1987 to 1997 = 8.43). Z2 was therefore taken as the ratio for the first six 
months as by the second six month period the ratio had increased towards the 
ratio observed once repeat donors with prevalent infections had been excluded 
from the donor panel. It was assumed that when HIV testing was introduced all 
donors had been at risk of HIV infection for 6 years, since 1980. 
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Z2(HIv) = Anti-H IV prevalence in new donors during 1 st 6 months of testing 
Anti-HIV prevalence in repeat donors during 1st six months of testing 
Z2(HIV) = 3.67 
Table 5.2 HIV prevalence during first 15 months of anti-HIV testing of blood 
donations. 
Time period Total 
tested 
donations 
New 
donations 
Donations 
from 
repeat 
donors 
Total HIV 
positives 
New 
donor 
HIV 
positives 
Repeat 
donor 
HIV 
positives 
Prevalence 
per 10,000 
repeat 
donor 
donations 
Prevalence 
per 10,000 
new donor 
donations 
Ratio of 
new donr 
to repeat) 
donor 
prevalence 
Q1 (Oct-Dec'85) 527969 63356 464613 8 3 5 0.11 0.47 4.40 
Q2 (Jan-Mar86) 565299 67836 497463 10 3 7 0.14 0.44 3.14 
Q3 (Apr-Jun'86) 560966 73914 487052 12 6 6 0.12 0.81 6.59 
Q4 (Jul-Sep'86) 558289 67856 490433 20 9 11 0.22 1.33 5.91 
Q5 (Oct-Dec'86) 561962 77642 484320 27 11 16 0.33 1.42 4.29 
Q1-Q2 1093268 131192 962076 18 6 12 0.12 0.46 3.67 
03-04 1119255 141770 977485 32 15 17 0.17 1.06 6.08 
Q1ß4 2212523 272962 1939561 50 21 29 0.15 0.77 5.15 
Q2-Q5 (86) 2246516 287248 1959268 69 29 40 0.20 1.01 4.95 
Q1-Q5 2774485 350604 2423881 77 32 45 0.19 0.91 4.92 
1987 2223713 287553 1936160 12 6 6 0.03 0.21 6.73 
1987-1997 27022326 3380026 23642300 236 129 107 0.05 0.38 8.43 
Data about anti-HCV positive donations per month were not available for 
the first year of anti-HCV testing (September 1991 to August 1992). The 
prevalence of anti-HCV amongst new donors during the first full year of testing 
(1992) was 4.05 times that amongst repeat donors. Adjusting this ratio by the 
increase observed in the anti-HIV data between the first six month's ratio and 
the first year's ratio resulted in an estimate of the ratio for the first six months, for 
anti-HCV of 2.88 (=4.05 x (3.67/5.15)). 
It was assumed that when HCV testing was introduced all donors had 
been at risk of HCV infection since the age of 15 years. Repeat donors have an 
average age of approximately 42 years and new donors have an average age 
of approximately 33 years. The new donor incidence multiplier for anti-HCV 
was therefore estimated as the estimated prevalence ratio for the first six 
months of 1992 multiplied by the difference in the time at risk for new donors 
and repeat donors. 
Z2(Hc=(Prev new dons 1992)x(Ratio for HIV 1st 6mo)x(Repeat dons yrs at risk) 
(Prey repeat dons 1992) (Ratio for HIV 1st 12 mo) (New dons yrs at risk) 
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Z2(HCV) = 4.05 x 0.71 x 1.5 = 4.32 
New donor incidence multiplier method 3: A third method was adapted 
from Cumming et al. Cumming et al estimated incidence by using the time at 
risk to convert prevalence rates (the results of cumulative incidence) to annual 
incidence rates. Half the total time since the beginning of HIV infection spread 
and the present time was used as a measure of time at risk for new (and 
previously untested) donors. Cummings et al (1989) proposed using half the 
total time in order to compensate for the increasing, and non-linear, risk of HIV 
infection over this time. We applied this method to 1993-1998 prevalence data 
for repeat donors and new donors in England, assuming HIV infection spread 
began in England in 1980, that new donors had been at risk of HCV infection 
since the age of 15, and that new donors had been at risk of HBV infection 
since birth. Z3 was then estimated by dividing the annual incidence rate for new 
donors by the annual incidence rate for repeat donors. For HCV - an infection 
with a relatively high prevalence in repeat donors - the comparable "annual 
incidence" for repeat donors was the sum of the incidence calculated from 
seroconversions and annual incidence calculated from prevalence as for new 
donors. 
Z3HIV = annual incidence new donors = 1.82 
annual incidence repeat donors (as in Table 5.5) 
where, 
Annual incidence new donors = prevalence during 1993-1998 
average annual time at risk 
= 0.69/100,000pys 
with, 
Average annual time at risk = (Sum of (each year in study-1980)/6) 
2 
= 7.8yrs 
and 
Z3HCV= annual incidence new donors = 7.68 
annual incidence repeat donors 
where, 
Annual incidence new donors = prevalence during 1993-1998 
average annual time at risk 
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= 3.92/100,000pys 
with, 
Average annual time at risk = (average age - age first at risk) 
= (33-15) = 18yrs 
and , 
Incidence repeat donors = 
Incidence of seroconversion + prevalence during 1993-1998 
average annual time at risk 
= 0.26 [from Table 5.5] + 0.25 = 0.51/100,000pys 
and 
Z3HBV = annual incidence new donors 
annual incidence repeat donors (as in Table 5.5) 
= 2.70 
where, 
Annual incidence new donors = prevalence during 1993-1998 
average annual time at risk 
= 1.1 /100,000pys 
with, 
Average annual time at risk = (average age - age first at risk) 
= (33-0) = 33 
New donor incidence multiplier method 4: A fourth method of estimating Z 
was adapted from Dax et al (1992). This method used prevalence data and 
probability of donating during the seronegative window period stage of infection 
(i. e the seronegative window period as a proportion of the total time course of 
infection for new donors, and the seronegative window period as a proportion of 
the inter-donation interval for repeat donors). Dax et al assumed that the 
number of first-time donors who donate whilst in the window period is the 
product of the proportion of the time course of infection during which the tested 
marker is not present and the prevalence of the marker in new donors, and that 
the number of repeat donors who donate whilst in the window period is the 
product of the proportion of the inter-donation interval during which the tested 
marker is not present and the prevalence of the marker in repeat tested donors. 
Z4 was estimated as the ratio of these numbers. Again, because of the high 
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prevalence in repeat donors (due to accumulated past incidence), the 
comparable calculation for repeat donors included incidence derived from 
prevalence. 
Z4 = window period donations new donors 
window period donations repeat donors 
with, for HIV 
Window period donations new donors = (22/(10 x 365)) x (89/1,662,238) = 
0.032/100,000 
WP donations repeat donors = (22/(45 x 7)) x (42/12,939,000) 
= 0.023/100,000 
Z4HIV = 1.39 
with, for HCV 
WP donations new donors = (66/(25 x 365)) x (1,172/1,662,238) 
= 0.51/100,000 
WP donations repeat donors = ((66/(45 x 7)) x (29/12,939,000)) + ((66/(25 
x 365)) x (570/12,938,971)) = 0.047 + 0.032 = 0.079/100,000 
Z4HCV = 6.46 
with, for HBV 
WP donations new donors = (110/(25 x 365)) x (607/1,662,238) 
= 0.44/100,000 
WP donations repeat donors = (110/(45 x 7)) x (46/12,939,000) 
= 0.12/100,000 
Z4HBV = 3.67 
Table 5.3 summarises the estimates of Z obtained from applying these 
methods to English data. The value of Z used for our "standard" estimates was 
the mean value for each infection. 
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Table 5.3 Values of new donor window period risk multiplier (Z) 
HBV HCV HIV 
Method 1: Direct observation of acute infections 4.51 NA NA 
Method 2: Cumulative incidence at start of testing NA 4.32 3.67 
Method 3: Incidence from prevalence and time at risk. 2.70 7.68 1.82 
Method 4: Prevalence and WP as proportion of total 
infection course 
3.67 6.46 1.39 
Mean (all available methods) 3.63 6.15 2.29 
The overall incidence rate of an infection was calculated as the weighted 
average of the incidence rates in new and repeat donors. 
Inter-donation intervals 
The average inter-donation interval estimates was derived from data 
provided from one blood centre for the three-year period 1993-1995.606,193 
donations were collected from 173,777 repeat donors, giving 3.49 donations per 
donor over 3 years, or 3.39/3 = 1.16 donation per year. The average inter- 
donation interval was estimated as 365/1.16 = 314 days or 45 weeks (0.86 
years). 
The inter-donation interval for the seroconverters was calculated directly 
from the dates of the last negative and first positive donation. 
Estimation of risk of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
Probability of bleeding an infectious window period donation 
The probability of a seronegative donation being made during the window 
period was calculated firstly (WP method 1) as equal to the incidence of 
infection in donors, multiplied by estimates of the infectious window periods 
during acute infection. 
WP risk, = incidence x window period 
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Tests used during the study period detect anti-HIV and anti-HCV 22 days 
(Busch, 1995) and 66 days (Barrera, 1995) after HIV and HCV infection 
respectively. The upper and lower values of these window periods were 6 days 
and 38 days for anti-HIV and 54 days and 192 days for anti-HCV. 
The patterns of infectivity and serological markers for HBV are slightly 
more complex. Figure 5.1 shows the patterns of serological markers during 
acute, resolving infection. Three windows during which infectious blood could 
be collected were considered: the "early acute window" after exposure and prior 
to any serological markers, the "late acute window" of resolving infection when 
HBsAg is below detectable levels but anti-HBs is not present and some 
infectivity remains, and the "tail-end window" at the end of HBsAg carriage 
when HBsAg falls below detectable levels in advance of total loss of infectivity. 
Current tests detect HBsAg a median of 59 days after HBV infection, with 
upper and lower values of 37 days and 87 days respectively (Mimms, 1993). 
Figure 5.1 Serological and clinical patterns observed during acute HBV 
infection. 
(From Manual of Clinical Microbiology, Lennete, Balows, Hausler and 
Shadomy) 
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The period between loss of HBsAg and loss of infectivity during resolving 
acute infections - the late acute window - was estimated to be another 30 days 
(range 10 to 50). The average effective total window period during acute 
infection was calculated as the early acute window for all infections plus the 
late-acute window for 95% of infections expected to resolve and therefore to 
pass through this late acute window. 
Total HBV acute window = 59 + (0.95 x 30) = 87.5 days 
With lower and upper values of 46.5 days (37 + (0.95 x 10) and 134.5 
days ((87 + (0.95 x 50). 
Donations bled immediately after a donor has been infected are unlikely to 
contain enough viruses to be infectious. This period immediately after infection 
when nucleic acids cannot be recovered from the blood is often called the 
"eclipse" period, and results in the infectious window period being shorter then 
the total window period from infection to positive serological markers. It is 
thought likely that this eclipse period is proportional in length to the total window 
period, however, for simplicity and in the absence of specific data a 7-day non- 
infectious period immediately after infection was taken for each virus. The 
antibody/antigen window period estimates, and the lower value for these 
estimates, were therefore decreased by seven days to give an infectious 
window period. 
Upper and lower limits to the risk estimates were calculated using the 
extremities of the ranges of the incidence rate estimates, and of the ranges of 
the window periods. 95% credibility intervals for the risk estimates were 
calculated by simulation to reflect the sampling variability of the incidence and 
prevalence estimates and uncertainty about the infectious window period. This 
was done by using Poisson distributions with observed rates for the number of 
seroconversions and the prevalence numerators, and a triangular distribution 
for the infectious window period. The inter-donation interval, proportion of 
donations from new donors, time at risk adjustment factor and number of 
donors tested during the first year of testing were kept constant. 
An alternative approach to estimating the risk of a window period (WP 
method 2) was also used. This approach did not work from incidence, but by 
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summing the probability of previous donations from seroconverting donors 
having been made during the window period. 
WP risk2 = number of SC x (WP/median pre-SC donation interval) 
number of repeat donor donations 
This method has been used by Gluck, 1998 and Muller-Breitzeutz, 2000. 
This method has the advantage of directly accommodating the effect of longer 
inter-donation intervals in donors who seroconvert than in other donors. 
Probability of test failure or error 
The risk of a seropositive donation not being identified by testing was 
equal to the probability of false negative test result estimated using the 
sensitivity of the test and the prevalence of the marker. 
FN risk = (prevalence) x (1-sensitivity) 
sensitivity 
Upper and lower limits on the risk were calculated using the upper and 
lower 95% confidence intervals for the prevalence rate. The sensitivity of anti- 
HCV tests was 99% (PHLS, 1995) and the sensitivity of anti-HIV tests was 
99.5%. The sensitivity of HBsAg tests was assumed to be 1. 
Process error was defined as any technical or human error in the testing, 
recording, or discarding of infectious donations. The error rate was estimated to 
be 0.5%, based on data from USA (Linden, 1994 a&b). No published rates of 
technical or human errors in the testing, recording, or discarding of donations in 
the UK were available. There is evidence that errors do still occur in England: 
one case of transfusion transmitted HCV by an anti-HCV positive donation 
released by an error in the testing process has been documented (see Chapter 
3) and two incidents of HCV testing failures allowing donations from HCV 
infected donors to be released (neither resulting in infection of a recipient) have 
been reported. The risk of a Process Error involving an infectious donation was 
equal to the estimated probability of a Process Error (0.5%) multiplied by the 
probability of a donation being seropositive. 
PE risk = prevalence x error rate 
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Probability of HBsAg negative donations during tail-end carriage 
The frequency and duration of HBsAg negative, infectious, periods at the 
tail end of HBV carriage in blood donors was not known. The relative frequency 
of observed transfusion transmitted HBV by these two causes was used to 
scale-up the estimates of risk due to donations from acute donors to the overall 
risk due to donations from acute donors and donations from tail-end carriers. A 
review of all cases of reported acute HBV infection associated with transfusion 
in England and Wales between 1991 and 1997 (Soldan, 1999) found 11 of 14 
(79%) cases were due to donations from donors with HBV carriage and 3 were 
due to donations from donors with acute HBV infection (none were due to 
errors) (see Chapter 4). A similar observation has been made by North London 
blood centre where 10 of 13 (77%) cases between 1985 and 1993 were due to 
donations from donor bled during the infectious, but HBsAg negative, period at 
the tail-end of HBsAg carriage (Barbara, personal communication). The risk of 
infectious donations from tail-end carriers was therefore estimated by 
multiplying the risk of window period donations by 11/3 = 3.67. The upper and 
lower limits for this estimate were calculated using the upper and lower limits of 
the window period risk and the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence 
interval of the proportion of observed transmission due to carriers. 
Sensitivity analysis 
The effect of uncertainty in the data and assumptions used in the 
estimations was investigated by varying the parameters used and recording the 
absolute and percentage change in the resulting estimates. Two groups of 
variations were considered. 
Firstly, variations were made in the parameters (usually derived from other 
data and assumptions) that were used for which there was little supporting 
evidence, and therefore may have been incorrect. Several parameters in this 
category were varied. The accuracy with which incidence can be derived from 
observations of reported seroconversions in repeat donors can be questioned 
(as discussed in chapter 4). In order for a new infection to be detected the 
donor has to donate once before infection and once after infection. Further 
more, the criteria used to define a seroconversion were designed to exclude the 
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relatively large numbers of "apparent" seroconversions, and the requirement for 
documented proof of a change from negative to positive, comparable, serology, 
may have excluded some true seroconversions as well as many "apparent" 
seroconversions. The number of seroconversions is therefore likely to be an 
underestimate of the true number of new infections in the person years 
observed. A 50% and a 100% increase in the numbers of new infections 
entering the incidence calculations was used in the sensitivity analyses to 
investigate the effect on the resulting risk estimates of a higher incidence rate. 
Another source of possible error in the incidence estimates was the derivation - 
rather than observation - of the person years at risk. The mean inter-donation 
interval was used, but the estimate of the mean may have been wrong, and the 
use of the mean rather than the median may also have resulted in error in the 
incidence rate denominator. A 20% increase and decrease in the person years 
at risk entered into the incidence calculations was used in the sensitivity 
analyses to investigate the effect on the resulting risk estimates of a varied true 
number of person years at risk. The new donor multiplier was a very uncertain 
parameter. The upper and lower estimates of the new donor multiplier obtained 
from the various methods described earlier was used in the sensitivity analyses 
to investigate the effect on the resulting risk estimates of the uncertainty in this 
parameter. The rate of errors in blood centres that would allow the release of 
positive donations is not well known. Errors are known to have occurred and 
the rate used in the best estimates was in line with published rates and 
observations within the blood service. However, this is contentious and the rate 
could be higher of lower. A 100% increase (i. e. 1 error every 100 donations 
tested) and decrease (i. e. no errors) in the error rate was used in the sensitivity 
analyses to investigate the effect on the resulting risk estimates of different error 
rates. 
Secondly, variations were made in parameters that were relatively well 
known (usually observed), but that may change over time. Several parameters 
in this category were varied. The prevalence and incidence of infection markers 
in blood donations may change over time. During the period considered, the 
prevalence of anti-HCV in blood donations collected in England and Wales was 
declining (from 17.9 to 6.8 positives per 100,000), the prevalence of anti-HIV 
was not changing, but did fluctuate from year to year with minimum of 0.7 to a 
maximum of 1.1, and the prevalence of HBsAg was falling slightly from 5.0 to 
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4.5 positives per 100,000 donations. The overall incidence of each infection in 
repeat donors was not obviously changing over this period, but may change in 
the future depending on the epidemiology of these infections in the donor 
population and on donor recruitment and selection practices. A 50% rise and 
fall in prevalence (in all donations) and incidence (in repeat donors) of infection 
in blood donations was used in the sensitivity analyses to investigate the effect 
on the resulting risk estimates of changing frequency of infection in the donor 
population. Eleven percent of donations were collected from new donors over 
the period studied: this was consistent each year. The proportion of donations 
collected from new donors may change in the future as donor recruitment and 
selection practices change to meet the demands for blood. A 50% rise and fall 
in the proportion of donations collected from new donors (i. e. from 5.5% to 16.5) 
was used in the sensitivity analyses to investigate the effect on the resulting risk 
estimates of changing proportions of donations collected from new donors. 
Serological tests are, in general, expected to continue improving in sensitivity 
and in the detection of early window period infections. A 20% and 50% 
reduction in window period, and a 20% and 50% improvement in sensitivity 
were used in the sensitivity analyses to investigate the effect on the resulting 
risk estimates of improvements in test performance. 
Estimates for the variations described above in each parameter, and for 
the range of all parameters in each category, and for all parameters in both 
categories together, were produced. 
5.3 Results 
Prevalence of infection 
During the six-year period 1993-1998, English blood centres tested 
14,601,238 donations: 12,939,000 (89%) of these donations were from repeat 
donors and 1,662,238 (11 %) were from new donors. A total of 2,621 (0.02%) 
donations were found to have confirmed markers of HIV (145,0.99 per 
100,000), HCV (1,771,12.1 per 100,000) or HBV (705,4.83 per 100,000) 
infection. 
Table 5.4 shows the prevalence rates of markers of HBV, HCV and HIV 
infection in blood donations in England, 1993-1998. 
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Table 5.4 Prevalence of HBsAg, anti-HCV and anti-HIV in blood donations in 
England 1993-98. 
Donation type 
1993-1995 
Tested Pos prey. 
(1,000s) per 
100,000 
Tested 
(1,000s) 
1996-1998 
Pos prey. per 
100,000 
1993-1998 
Tested Pos prey. 
(1,000s) per 
100,000 
BsAg 
From repeat 6,361.9 41 0.64 6,577.1 57 0.87 12,939.0 98 0.76 
donors 
From new donors 870.2 322 37.0 792.0 285 35.98 1,662.2 607 36.52 
All donations 7,232.1 363 5.02 7,369.1 342 4.64 14,601.2 705 4.83 
nti-HCV 
From repeat 6,361.9 414 6.51 6,577.1 185 2.81 12,939.0 599 4.63 
onors 
From new donors 870.2 727 83.54 792.0 445 56.18 1,662.2 1,172 70.51 
1 donations 7,232.1 1,141 15.78 7,369.1 630 8.55 14,601.2 1,771 12.13 
Anti-HIV 
From repeat 6,361.9 30 0.4 6,577.1 26 0.40 12,939.0 56 0.43 
donors 
From new donors 870.2 49 5.63 792.0 40 5.05 1,662.2 89 5.3 
II donations 7,232.1 79 1.09 7,369.1 66 0.90 14,601.2 145 0.99 
Incidence of infection 
Based on data from one blood centre about the number of donors tested 
during 1993-1995, the average inter-donation interval for repeat donors over 
that three-year period was estimated to be 45 weeks (average number of 
donations per year per repeat donor = 1.16). 
The new donor incidence adjustments (Z) used were 3.63 for HBV, 6.15 
for HCV and 2.29 for HIV. 
Table 5.5 shows the incidence rates of seroconversion for HBsAg, anti- 
HCV and anti-HIV in repeat blood donors in England, 1993-1998. 
Table 5.6 shows the estimated incidence in new donors, and the weighted 
incidence in all donors in England, for the 2 three year periods and the total 
study period 1993-1998. 
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Estimates of risk of donations from infected donors entering the blood 
supply 
Tables 5.7a), b) and c) show estimates of the frequency of donation from 
a) new donors, b) repeat donors and c) all donors with HIV, HBV or HCV 
infections entering the blood supply for the periods 1993-95,1996-98 and 1993- 
98. 
Upper and lower limits of the ranges were calculated using the 95% 
confidence interval for the incidence rates, the range of the length of the window 
periods during acute infection, the upper and lower limits of the 95% confidence 
interval for the prevalence rates. Upper and lower limits of the range on the 
total (combined) risks were calculated using the upper and lower limits of the 
component risks. 
Figure 5.2 shows the proportion of the total calculated risk that was due to 
each component of risk. 
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Table 5.5 Incidence of seroconversion for HBsAg, anti-HCV and anti-HIV in 
repeat donors in England, 1993-98. 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 
Person No. of Person No. of Person No. of 
years sero's incidence years sero's incidence years sero's incidence 
per per per 
100,000p 100,000p 100,000p 
s s s 
HBsAg 5,505,515 25 0.4628 5,691,697 20 0.3591 11,197,212 46 0.4101 
nti-HC 5,505,515 14 0.2543 5,691,697 15 0.2691 11,197,212 29 0.2618 
nti-HIV 5,505,515 15 0.272 5,691,697 27 0.4744 11,197,212 42 0.3751 
Table 5.6 Estimated incidence in new donors, and weighted incidence in all 
donors. 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 
incidence in incidence in incidence in incidence in incidence in incidence in 
new donors all donors new donors all donors new donors all donors 
HBsAg 1.2407 1.6333 0.9627 1.2349 0.8590 1.4286 
Anti-HC 1.5639 0.4119 1.6550 0.4181 0.8590 0.4153 
nti-HIV 0.6239 0.3147 1.0863 0.5401 0.8590 0.4302 
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Table 5.7a) Estimates of the frequency of donations from NEW donors with 
HIV, HBV or HCV infections entering the blood supply (1993-1998). 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 
) HBV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.655 0.508 0.581 
95% credibility interval 0.413 - 1.050 0.300 - 0.836 0.421 - 0.892 
due to test error 0.000 0.000 0.000 
due to process error 0.185 0.180 0.183 
Range 0.165 - 0.205 0.159 - 0.201 0.168 - 0.19 
total 0.840 0.688 0.763 
Range 0.578 - 1.255 0.459 - 1.037 0.589 - 1.08 
estimated number of HBV infected donations 7 5 13 
Range 5-11 4-8 10-18 
) HCV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.189 0.201 0.19 
95% credibility interval 0.131 - 0.658 0.137 - 0.677 0.159 - 0.62 
due to test error 0.844 0.568 0.712 
Range 0.783 - 0.905 0.515 - 0.620 0.672 - 0.75 
due to process error 0.418 0.281 0.353 
Range 0.388 - 0.448 0.255 - 0.307 0.333 - 0.37 
total 1.451 1.049 1.26 
Range 1.301 - 2.011 0.907 -1.604 1.163 -1.748 
estimated number of HCV infected donations 13 8 21 
Range 11-18 7-13 19-29 
c) HIV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.016 0.027 0.022 
95% credibility interval 0.0073 - 0.0419 0.0141 - 0.0686 0.0117 - 0.052 
due to test error 0.028 0.025 0.02 
Range 0.020 - 0.036 0.018 - 0.033 0.021 - 0.03 
due to process error 0.028 0.025 0.027 
Range 0.020 - 0.036 0.018 - 0.033 0.021 - 
0,032 
total 0.072 0.078 0.075 
Range 0.048 - 0.114 0.049 - 0.119 0.0542 - 
0.11 
estimated number of HIV infected donations 1 1 1 
Range 0.4-1.0 0.4-0.9 0.9-2. 
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Table 5.7b) Estimates of the frequency of donations from REPEAT donors 
with HIV, HBV or HCV infections entering the blood supply (1993-1998). 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 
) HBV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.180 0.140 0.160 
95% credibility interval 0.114 - 0.289 0.083 - 0.230 0.116 - 0.24 
due to test error 0.000 0.000 0.000 
due to process error 0.003 0.004 0.00 
range 0.002 - 0.004 0.003 - 0.006 0.003 - 0.00 
total 0.184 0.144 0.164 
range 0.116 - 0.293 0.086 - 0.236 0.119 - 0.251 
estimated number of donations 12 9 21 
range 7-19 6-15 15-32 
HCV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.031 0.033 0.032 
95% credibility interval 0.021 - 0.107 0.022 - 0.110 0.026 - 0.101 
due to test error 0.066 0.028 0.04 
range 0.059 - 0.072 0.024 - 0.033 0.043 - 0.051 
due to process error 0.033 0.014 0.02 
range 0.029 - 0.036 0.012 - 0.016 0.021 - 0.02 
total 0.129 0.075 0.102 
range 0.110 - 0.215 0.058 - 0.159 0.090 - 0.17 
estimated number of donations 8 5 13 
range 7-14 4-10 12-2 
c) HIV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.007 0.012 0.009 
95% credibility interval 0.0032 - 0.0183 0.0061 - 0.0299 0.0051- 0.023 
due to test error 0.002 0.002 0.002 
range 0.0015 - 0.0032 0.0012 - 0.0028 0.0016 - 0.002 
due to process error 0.002 0.002 0.002 
range 0.0015 - 0.0032 0.0012 - 0.0028 0.0016 - 
0.002 
total 0.012 0.016 0.014 
range 0.006 - 0.025 0.009 - 0.036 0.008 - 
0.02 
estimated number of donations 1 1 2 
range 0.4-1.6 0.6-2.3 1.1-3. 
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Table 5.7c) Estimates of the frequency of donations from ALL donors with 
HIV, HBV or HCV infections entering the blood supply (1993-1998). 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 
) HBV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.235 0.182 0.208 
95% credibility interval 0.150 - 0.380 0.109 - 0.303 0.153 - 0.323 
due to test error 0.000 0.000 0.000 
due to process error 0.024 0.024 0.024 
range 0.023 - 0.028 0.021 - 0.026 0.022 - 0.026 
due to tail end carriers 0.860 0.667 0.762 
range 0.581 - 7.547 0.160 - 2.079 0.208 - 2.701 
total 1.118 0.874 0.994 
range 0.753 - 7.954 0.290 - 2.408 0.383 - 3.05 
equivalent to 1 in x donations 89,424 114,480 100,616 
range 12,572 - 132,801 4 1,534 - 345,161 32,784 - 260,96 
estimated number of donations 81 64 145 
range 54 - 575 21 -177 56 - 44 
) HCV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.049 0.052 0.050 
95% credibility interval 0.034 - 0.173 0.036 - 0.178 0.042 - 0.164 
due to test error 0.154 0.090 0.123 
range 0.151 - 0.169 0.080 - 0.093 0.117 - 0.128 
due to process error 0.076 0.044 0.061 
range 0.075 - 0.084 0.039 - 0.046 0.058 - 0.064 
total 0.280 0.186 0.233 
range 0.259 - 0.425 0.155 - 0.317 0.217 - 0.35 
equivalent to I in x donations 357,688 537,791 428,305 
range 235,183-386,100 315,259-645,161 281,057-480,40 
estimated number of donations 20 14 34 
range 19-31 11 -23 32-52 
c) HIV 
Risk of donation from infected donor per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection 0.008 0.014 0.011 
95% credibility interval 0.004 - 0.021 0.007 - 0.035 0.006 - 
0.027 
due to test error 0.005 0.005 0.005 
range 0.004 - 0.007 0.003 - 0.006 0.004 - 0.00 
due to process error 0.005 0.005 0.005 
range 0.004 - 0.007 0.003 - 0.006 0.004 - 0.00 
total 0.018 0.023 0.021 
range 0.012 - 0.035 0.014 - 0.046 0.014 - 0.038 
equivalent to 1 in x donations 5,422,019 4,365,928 4,823,425 
range (millions) 2.90-8.13 2.18-7.19 2.62-6.99 
estimated number of donations 1 2 3 
ran e 0.9-2.5 1.0-3.4 2.1-5.6, 
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Figure 5.2 Components of the risk of donations from infected donors 
entering the blood supply. 
Process HCV 
error WP 
(0.5%) (66 
ays) 
Process HIV 
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The results of the alternative window period method (method 2) for the risk 
of window period donations from repeat donors, along with the comparable 
results from window period method 1 are shown in table 5.8. The results of the 
incidence method without adjustment (S), were - as expected - higher than the 
results of the alternative method. The amount by which they were higher 
reflected the extent to which the inter-donation intervals of seroconverters were 
greater than of other donors. After adjustment for this difference, the incidence 
method estimates were the same as the alternative method's results. It is worth 
noting that if the mean rather than the median inter-donation intervals for 
seroconverting donors were used to calculate the adjustment factor S, the 
results of the incidence method were lower (73%) than the results of the 
alternative method. 
Test errc 
(S=99.5% 
Process 
error 
(0.5%) 
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Table 5.8 Results of window period risk estimates method 2. 
Window period risk in repeat donors 
per 100,000 donations 
1993-1995 1996-1998 1993-1998 % of 
method 
2 
a) HBV 
Method 2 0.0674 0.0523 0.0597 
Method 1- before adjustment (S) 0.1020 0.0791 0.0904 151% 
Method 1- after adjustment (S) 0.0673 0.0522 0.0596 100% 
b)HCV 
Method 2 0.0310 0.0328 0.0319 
Method I- before adjustment (S) 0.0411 0.0435 0.0423 133% 
Method I- after adjustment (S) 0.0308 0.0326 0.0317 99% 
c) HIV 
Method 2 0.0069 0.0120 0.0095 
Method 1- before adjustment (S) 0.0112 0.0195 0.0154 163% 
Method 1- after adjustment (S) 0.0068 0.0119 0.0094 99% 
HB V risk due to tail-end of carriage 
Based on the ratio of the causes of observed transfusion transmitted HBV 
infections (due to donations from acute donors and donations from tail-end 
carriers), the risk of donations from tail end carriers was estimated to be 0.76 
per 100,000 donations (range with 95% confidence limits of proportion acute 
amongst observed, 0.21 to 2.7 per 100,000). 
Sensitivity analysis 
1. Weakly supported parameters 
Identification of seroconverters for incidence estimates 
If seroconverters were identified - as in some studies - as positive repeat 
donors with a previous negative donation during the study period rather than 
within the past 10 years (as above), the numbers of seroconverters and the 
length of the inter-donation intervals for seroconverters were reduced. Table 
5.9 shows the number of seroconverters, the values for S (adjustment to allow 
for different inter-donation intervals for seroconverters) and the resulting window 
period risk estimates and overall risk estimates for the 1996-98 period with the 
seroconverters identified as positive repeat donors with a negative donation 
within the study period. For HCV the number of seroconverters was reduced 
and the median inter-donation interval (and therefore S) changed little: the risk 
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estimate therefore reduced. For HIV the number of seroconverters reduced by 
a greater amount and the inter-donation interval also decreased greatly (and S 
increased) so the resulting risk estimates were reduced more markedly. 
Estimates for HBV were not re-calculated in this way as detected 
seroconverters for HBsAg were of short inter-donation intervals (seroconverter 
detection only affected by 2%, by fall from 4 to 1 for the first year of the period) 
due to the transient nature of HBsAg and this revision was not applicable. 
Table 5.9 Changed criteria (3 year period) for identifying seroconversions for 
incidence. 
a) HBV b) HCV c) HIV 
%of %of %of 
"best" "best" "best" 
Number of seroconverters 1996-98 17 83% 9 59% 9 33% 
Seroconversion inter-donation interval(days) -- 371 89% 168 33% 
S (seroconverter IDI/average IDI) -- 0.78 104% 1.09 179% 
Risk of infected donation per 100,000 donations: 
due to window periods of acute infection --0.035 67% 0.008 57% 
total --0.169 91% 0.017 74% 
The effect of changes in the numbers of seroconversions, and in other 
factors that effect incidence rates, was also shown by the sensitivity analyses. 
Table 5.10 shows the effects of variations in the parameters used in the risk 
model for all donations, 1993-98. H= value giving higher risk estimate, L= 
value giving lower risk estimate. 
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Table 5.10 Sensitivity analyses results (excluding component of HBV risk 
due to tail-end carriers). 
HBV HCV HIV 
'Best" model: 0.21 0.02 0.23 100% 0.43M 0.05 0.18 0.23 100% 0.43M 0.011 0.010 0.021 100% 4.8 
Changes to parameters relatively poorly known: 
WP ER TOT % of 1 in x WP ER TOT % of 1 in x WP ER TOT % of 1 in x 
New best" best" best' 
Infections 
H: x1.5 0.31 0.02 0.34 145% 0.30M 0.08 0.18 0.26 111% 0.39M 0.016 0.010 0.026 126% 3.8M 
HH: x2 0.42 0.02 0.44 190% 0.23M 0.10 0.18 0.28 122% 0.35M 0.022 0.010 0.032 152% 3.2M 
Pys 
L: x1.2 0.17 0.02 0.20 85% 0.51M 0.04 0.18 0.23 96% 0.44M 0.009 0.010 0.019 91% 5.3M 
(13,436,654) 
H: x0.8 0.26 0.02 0.28 122% 0.35M 0.06 0.18 0.25 105% 0.41M 0.013 0.010 0.023 113% 4.3M 
(8,957,770) 
New donor 
multiplier 
H: upper value 0.22 0.02 0.25 107% 0.40M 0.06 0.18 0.24 102% 0.42M 0.012 0.010 0.022 107% 4.5M 
of range 
L: lower value 0.19 0.02 0.22 93% 0.47M 0.04 0.18 0.23 97% 0.44M 0.010 0.010 0.020 95% 5.1 M 
of range 
Error rate 
H: 100% up 0.21 0.05 0.26 110% 0.39M 0.05 0.24 0.29 126% 0.34M 0.011 0.015 0.026 124% 3.9M 
(0.01) 
L: 100% down 0.21 0.00 0.21 90% 0.48M 0.05 0.12 0.17 74% 0.58M 0.011 0.005 0.016 76% 6.3M 
(0) 
All the above 
All HIGH 0.56 0.05 0.61 262% 0.16M 0.14 0.24 0.38 164% 0.26M 0.031 0.015 0.046 220% 2.2M 
values 
All LOW values 0.16 0.00 0.16 69% 0.63M 0.04 0.12 0.16 68% 0.63M 0.008 0.005 0.013 64% 7.6M 
Changes to par ameters liable to change over time: 
Prevalence 
H: x1.5 0.21 0.04 0.24 105% 0.41 M 0.05 0.27 0.33 139% 0.31M 0.011 0.015 0.026 124% 3.9M 
L: x0.5 0.21 0.01 0.22 95% 0.45M 0.05 0.09 0.14 61% 0.70M 0.011 0.005 0.016 76% 6.3M 
Incidence In 
RDs 
H: x1.5 0.31 0.02 0.34 145% 0.30M 0.08 0.18 0.26 111% 0.39M 0.016 0.010 0.026 126% 3.8M 
L: x0.5 0.10 0.02 0.13 55% 0.78M 0.03 0.18 0.21 89% 0.48M 0.005 0.010 0.015 74% 6.5M 
New donor 
proportion 
H: x1.5 0.23 0.03 0.26 113% 0.38M 0.06 0.23 0.29 125% 0.34M 0.011 0.012 0.024 115% 4.2M 
(16.5%) 
L: x0.5 (5.5%) 0.18 0.01 0.20 85% 0.51 M 0.04 0.13 0.17 71% 0.60M 0.010 0.007 0.017 83% 5.8M 
Test 
sensitivity 
L: 1-sensitivity NA: sensitivity 100% in best" 0.05 0.12 0.17 74% 0.58M 0.011 0.007 0.018 88% 5.5M 
halved 
LL- sensitivity 0.05 0.06 0.11 48% 0.90M 0.011 0.005 0.016 76% 6.4M 
100% 
Window 
period for test 
20% down 0.18 0.02 0.20 87% 0.50M 0.04 0.18 0.22 96% 0.45M 0.009 0.010 0.019 90% 5.4M 
50% down 0.13 0.02 0.16 67% 0.64M 0.03 0.18 0.21 89% 0.48M 0.005 0.010 0.015 74% 6.5M 
All the above 
All HIGH 0.34 0.05 0.39 170% 0.25M 0.09 0.35 0.44 188% 0.23M 0.017 0.019 0.036 173% 2.8M 
values 
All LOW values 0.06 0.01 0.06 28% 1.5 M 0.01 0.02 0.03 13% 3.2 M 0.003 0.002 0.004 21% 23.4M 
All parameters (except "new Infections') 
All HIGH 0.47 0.10 0.57 247% 0.17M 0.13 0.47 0.59 254% 0.17M 0.025 0.028 0.054 258% 1.9M 
values 
All LOW values 0.05 0.00 0.05 20% 2.2 M 0.01 0.00 0.01 3% 12.8 M 0.002 0.000 0.002 10% 50. OM 
Variation 12-fold 76-fold 27-fold 
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HBV 
The estimates for risk of HBV infected donations entering the blood supply were 
most affected by changes in the rate of incidence of HBV, or any parameters 
that affected the estimated incidence rate. Reasonable variation in the 
"uncertain" parameters resulted in highest and lowest risk models with total 
estimates that were 3.8-fold different, from 1 in 625,000 donations to I in 
125,000 donations. Reasonable variation in the "changeable" parameters 
resulted in highest and lowest risk models with total estimates that were 6.1-fold 
different, from 1 in 1.5 million to 1 in 254,000 donations. When reasonable 
variations in all the parameters used in the sensitivity analyses were combined 
(excluding variation in "new infections" so as to not duplicate the effect of error 
in the incidence rate), the highest and lowest risk models gave total estimates 
that were 12-fold different, from I in 2.2 million to 1 in 0.17 million donations. 
These are the very outside expected limits of the risk estimates. 
HCV 
The estimates for risk of HCV infected donations entering the blood supply were 
most effected by changes in the prevalence of anti-HCV, and in parameters 
such as test sensitivity that were combined in the model to estimate the number 
of anti-HCV positive donations released due to test or process error. 
Reasonable variation in the "uncertain" parameters resulted in highest and 
lowest risk models with total estimates that were 2.4-fold different, from I in 
629,000 donations to 1 in 261,000 donations. Reasonable variation in the 
"changeable" parameters resulted in highest and lowest risk models with total 
estimates that were 14-fold different, from 1 in 3.2 million to I in 228,000 
donations. When reasonable variations in all the parameters used in the 
sensitivity analyses were combined (excluding variation in "new infections" so 
as to not duplicate the effect of error in the incidence rate), the highest and 
lowest risk models gave total estimates that were 76-fold different, from 1 in 
12.8 million to 1 in 0.17 million donations. These are the very outside expected 
limits of the estimates. 
HIV 
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The estimates for risk of HIV infected donations entering the blood supply were 
most affected by changes in the rate of incidence of HIV, or any parameters that 
affected the estimated incidence rate. Reasonable variation in the "uncertain" 
parameters resulted in highest and lowest case models with total estimates that 
were 3.5-fold different, from 1 in 7.6 million donations to 1 in 2.2 million 
donations. Reasonable variation in the "changeable" parameters resulted in 
highest and lowest case models with total estimates that were 8.4-fold different, 
from 1 in 2.8 million to 1 in 23 million donations. When reasonable variations in 
all the parameters used in the sensitivity analyses were combined (excluding 
variation in "new infections" so as to not duplicate the effect of error in the 
incidence rate), the highest and lowest case models gave total estimates that 
were 27-fold different, from 1 in 50 million to 1 in 1.9 million donations. These 
are the very outside expected limits of the estimates. 
5.4 Discussion 
Sensitivity analyses 
Reasonable variation in "uncertain" parameters affected the estimates by 2 
to 4 fold. This is not a significant amount of variation. However, variation in the 
"changeable" parameters resulted in a much greater range of estimates - with 
up to more than 70-fold variations. The particularly wide range of estimates 
produced for HCV resulted from the sensitivity of the HCV model to the 
prevalence of infection. It is not unrealistic to include a 50% reduction in anti- 
HCV prevalence, as the prevalence of anti-HCV did fall by over 50% during the 
period studied. These results suggest that lowering the prevalence of HCV in 
blood donations, or improving the detection of anti-HCV positives (by improved 
test sensitivity, reduction of lab error rate) is the most fruitful avenue for 
reducing the total risk of donations from HCV infected donors entering the blood 
supply. One qualifying point about this risk is that not all of these donations - 
and more so for HCV than for HBV and HIV - will be infectious. Seventy-five 
percent of anti-HCV positive donors are HCV RNA positive by PCR, and it is 
probable that only RNA positive donations will transmit infection to recipients. 
The HCV risk estimates could therefore by reasonably reduced by multiplying 
the "error" component by 0.75. This would give a "best" overall estimate of 0.19 
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per 100,000 (1 in 533,000) and a highest risk of 0.48 per 100,000 (1 in 
210,000). (As the lowest risk model sets sensitivity to 1 and error to 0, no error 
component exists). 
In contrast, for HBV and HIV the incidence of infection and parameters 
that affect the risk of window period donations had the greatest effect on the risk 
estimates. This suggests that for these infections - with very low prevalence 
already achieved in the donor population - the most fruitful avenues to reduce 
the risk further are strategies to reduce the number of seroconversion in donors, 
and reductions in the window period of tests. 
The use of the incidence method without adjustment for longer periods 
between donations for seroconverters can result in considerable overestimation 
of the risk of window period donations. This may partially explain observations 
of lower risk than predicted - for example after the introduction of p24 ag testing 
in the US. 
The prevalence and incidence rates of blood-borne viruses in English 
blood donors during 1993-1995 were very low. Seroconversion rates for HIV 
and HCV were less than one tenth the rates reported for 1991-1993 at five USA 
blood centres (Schreiber, 1996), and less than one sixth the rates reported for 
1992-1994 in France (Courouce, 1996). Low prevalence of these infections in 
the UK, and current donor education and selection appears to be effective in 
securing relatively small numbers of seroprevalent donors and, as far as we can 
identify, seroconverting donors to the English National Blood Service. Current 
tests for anti-HIV, anti-HCV and HBsAg have high sensitivity and are performed 
by automated processes with stringent quality and process control procedures 
and computerised information transfer. Overall, therefore, the risk of infectious 
donations entering the blood supply is extremely small. Testing sero-negative 
donations, or components, for viral nucleic acids may have the potential to 
provide a direct measurement of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
(see below). Prospective assessment of recipients is one way to directly 
measure rates of viral transmission from blood components. However, as the 
low risks of infection transmission now make the required size of such studies to 
accurately estimate risk prohibitive, a theoretical approach has been taken to 
estimating the number of infectious donations that may enter the blood supply 
from English blood centres. There are several potential sources of error in the 
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data, and in the assumptions, used in this study. These errors may have led to 
over- or under-estimation of the true risk. 
The estimates of risk associated with window period donations are highly 
dependent on accurate and complete identification of seroconversion in blood 
donors. The definition of a seroconversion in a repeat donor required detailed 
information about the first sero-positive donation and the last sero-negative 
donation. If this information was absent, a true seroconversion may have been 
excluded from this study. Our seroconversion rates, and therefore risks, may 
be underestimates. The sensitivity analysis showed that exclusion of "possible" 
seroconversions could - if all possible seroconversions were true 
seroconversions - have led to underestimation of the window period risk. 
Blood components that are produced from repeat donor donations are 
associated with lower risks than similar components from new donors. The 
methods used to estimate the incidence of infections in new donors made 
various assumptions - for example, that the incidence rate of HIV and HCV was 
constant over different age groups, and that the ratio of incidence amongst new 
and repeat donors had been constant since 1986 for HIV and since 1992 for 
HCV. These assumptions are unlikely to be valid, and considerable uncertainty 
therefore surrounds the estimates of the risks of window period donations from 
new donors. The use of several different methods to generate an estimate of 
the new donor risk multiplier gives some security against the errors of any one 
method, but does not necessarily improve the accuracy of the resulting 
measure of increased risk. Although new donors contribute only 11 % of all 
donations, they contribute a larger proportion to the total risk estimates. The 
sensitivity analysis showed that the use of different new donor incidence 
multipliers caused the window period risk estimates to vary by plus or minus 
approximately 15%. 
The inter-donation interval between seroconversion is longer than the 
average inter-donation interval; the average inter-donation interval for the 13 
HCV seroconversions detected during 1993-95 was 63 weeks. This will tend to 
lead to overestimation of window period risk by the incidence method unless an 
appropriate adjustment is made. The adjustment used produced the same 
window period risk estimates as an alternative method of estimating the window 
period risk. Studies that have used the incidence methods without similar 
adjustment, and have included seroconversion with inter-donation intervals that 
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differ from the rest of the donor population will have over, or under, estimated 
the risk. Even with this adjustment made, the estimates are still sensitive to the 
inter-donation interval. 
The transient nature of HBsAg causes several complications to estimating 
the risk of window period donations from HBV infected donors. Other studies 
that have assumed that the observed inter-donation interval for donors who 
seroconvert for HBsAg is also characteristic of donors who acquire HBV 
infection but never donate during their HBsAg positive period of infection may 
have over estimated the risk of window period donations from donors with HBV 
infection. 
Donors who donate during an infectious window period, but do not re- 
attend to give a post-seroconversion sero-positive donation may contribute 
infectious donations to the blood supply that would not have been included in 
these estimates. Indeed, there are plausible reasons why donors may be more 
likely to donate only, or for the last time, during an infectious window period. 
Despite alternative testing options and donor education, people who have a 
self-perceived exposure risk may attend donation sessions in order to obtain 
infection tests, and these donation attendances may occur in the sero-negative 
window period. Also, in the course of a donation attendance a donor may 
become aware that he/she is not eligible to donate due to a recent exposure 
risk. One English blood centre has a confidential donation exclusion option to 
allow donors to declare exposure risks in confidence and withdraw their 
donation from the blood supply without taking any non-routine action (Brennan, 
1995). If this option is not utilised, and at sessions where it is not available, a 
donor with an exposure risk may find it easier to proceed with his/her current 
donation attendance and self-defer from further donation. 
A process error rate of 0.5% was used. Donation testing and release is 
largely automated and computerised in English blood centres and the 
probability of an error may well be considerably lower than 0.5%. The error risk 
contributes 24%, 26% and 2% to the overall risk for HIV, HCV and HBV 
infectious donations respectively. Sensitivity of tests used during the study 
period was taken as 99% for HCV tests and 99.5% for anti-H IV tests. Test 
failure consequently accounted for 24% and 52% of the total HIV and HCV risks 
respectively. 
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Since the introduction of anti-HCV testing in 1992, the prevalence of anti- 
HCV in donations from repeat donors has declined steeply as seroprevalent 
donors have been removed from the donor panel. The majority of anti-HCV 
positive repeat donors detected during 1993-1995 were first-time tested donors. 
The prevalence of anti-HCV in donations from repeat donors is expected to 
continue to decline until all repeat donors have been tested for anti-HCV. The 
estimated risk due to sero-positive donations from repeat donors is therefore 
also expected to decrease. This was shown in the comparison between the first 
and second three-year period of study. While the risk of window period 
donations dependent on seroconversions remained constant, the risk of errors 
and test failures dependent on the prevalence of infection fell. 
There is an additional theoretical risk of HIV and HCV infection, not 
included in our estimates, from sero-negative infectious donations from donors 
with no detectable antibody to these infections. 
In contrast to HCV and HIV, the estimated risk for HBV infectious 
donations is relatively high when compared to published risks from the USA. 
This may be largely due to a difference in donation testing strategy. Testing for 
hepatitis B core antibody is routine in the USA, and some other European blood 
services. This additional test was introduced, before a specific test for HCV 
infection was available, as a surrogate marker for a risk of HCV infection. 
However, where implemented, it also served to remove the risk of HBV 
infectious donations entering the blood supply due to HBsAg sero-negative 
donations from donors with anti-HBc and evidence of HBV infectivity. The 
detection of tail-end carriers by HBsAg tests is expected to have improved in 
recent years as the sensitivity of HBsAg tests has increased; the ratio of 
observed tail end to acute transmitters that was used may therefore be out-of- 
date and resulting in overestimation of the risk of infectious, HBsAg negative 
donations from tail end carriers. 
The additional safety that may be gained by strategic policy changes such 
as more stringent donor selection, donation testing or by performing viral 
inactivation procedures on tested components may be estimated by appropriate 
alteration to the data and assumptions used in the calculations described. The 
low level of the current risk estimates and the considerable uncertainty 
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surrounding them, implies that predicting the benefits of additional safety 
measures will be difficult to do with certainty, and that observing any future 
improvement in the viral safety of blood components from English blood centres 
will be even more difficult. Variations in estimates are easily obtained by 
changing methods and assumptions and the estimates are more sensitive to 
changes in some of these factors than to changes in observed prevalence and 
incidence rates. 
Findings of different results from the different methods to estimate the new 
donor multiplier, and from different methods to estimate the window period risk 
using English data may not be experienced when these methods are applied to 
other data. In general, the methods used would be more robust in countries 
with higher prevalence and incidence. The estimates for England are relatively 
fragile and vulnerable to errors in assumptions and to errors in generalisations. 
It is now accepted that prospective studies cannot accurately measure the risk 
of transfusion-transmitted infection in the UK. It may also be the case that 
calculations described above also lack the precision to accurately detect the 
true risks in the UK - at least not with accuracy good enough to, for example, 
evaluate the relative expected benefit from two alternative approaches to 
improving blood safety. 
Donations from new donors were associated with a higher risk of 
prevalent, and of incident, infection than donations from repeat donors. 
Donations from new donors constituted only 11 % of tested blood donations 
during the study period, but made a significant contribution to the total risk. 
New donors accounted for 33%, 62% and 38% of the estimated number of 
donations entering the blood supply each year from donors with HIV, HCV and 
HBV infections. Studies that do not consider the risk from new donors are likely 
to underestimate the total risk. 
Comparison with observed, reported transmissions 
Several additional factors need to be considered in order to estimate the 
number of recipients infected as a result of these donations from infected 
donors. These factors include the infectivity of the donations, the number of 
components made from each donation, the percentage of untransfused 
components, the number of components to which each recipient is exposed, the 
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prevalence of immunity in recipients and the rate of infection from transfused 
components. Recognition of transfusion transmitted HIV, HCV and HBV is 
impaired because of the occurrence of sub-clinical infections, long lag periods 
between infection and disease onset and is also obscured by high mortality 
from other causes. Furthermore, transfusion may not be suspected as the 
cause of even clinically apparent post-transfusion infections, and suspected 
transfusion transmitted infections may not come to the attention of the blood 
transfusion service. Furthermore, donors are encouraged to notify the blood 
centre if they are ill in the weeks following donation. Reported symptoms of 
acute hepatitis or HIV seroconversion illness may therefore lead to withdrawal 
from the blood supply of infectious donations from seroconverting blood donors, 
and a consequent reduction in the risk to recipients. The effect of such 
prompted withdrawals of potentially infected components has not been 
quantified. 
Since HIV antibody testing of blood donations began in the UK, one HIV 
infectious donation to the Scottish National Blood Service has been detected by 
the observation of seroconversion in a donor, with subsequent identification of 
infection in a recipient in the UK (Crawford, 1987) and one HIV infectious 
donation to the English National Blood Service has been detected by the 
observation of infection in a recipient and subsequent identification of a 
seroconversion in a donor (Martlew, 2000). Three cases of transfusion 
transmitted HCV infection by HCV antibody tested blood donations have been 
reported. 
Table 5.11 shows the risk estimates alongside observed rates of clinically 
recognised cases and the results of a recent prospective study of the recipients 
or almost 22,000 blood components (Regan, 2000). 
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Table 5.11 Sources of quantitative data and estimates in the UK about how 
many transfusion-transmitted infections occur (or are reported) 
Infection Surveillance of Prospective study of Estimated infectious 
apparent cases, 1995- transfusion recipients, donations released into the 
1999 approx. 22,000 blood supply per year, 
( see PTI surveillance - donations 1993-98 
chapter 4) (Regan, 2000) [ranges] 
[95% Cl] 
HAV 1 (Hewitt, 1997) NA NA 
HIV 1 (3 recipients 0 [0 - 423] 0.5 [0.3 - 0.9] 
infected) 
HCV 2 0 [0 - 423] 6 [5 - 9] 
HBV 5 0 [0 - 423] 24 [9 - 74] 
HTLVI&II 0 0 [0 - 423] NA 
Bacteria 11 NA NA 
NA = Not available. 
The estimates derived from calculations predict more transmission by 
transfusion than are clinically recognised. This discrepancy can be explained 
by poor ascertainment of cases for a number of reasons. It was estimated in 
1987 by Mortimer et al, that 50% of blood components were transfused to 
patients who were dead within one year. High mortality in the post-transfusion 
period has been observed more recently in the cohort of patient traced in the 
course of the HCV Lookback programme (Robinson, 2001) in which - amongst 
those reported to have died - 47% died within one year of their transfusion. 
Patients who die shortly after their transfusion are unlikely to receive diagnoses 
of a transfusion-transmitted infection during this time. Severe disease - due to 
the underlying reason for transfusion, and, or, symptoms caused by treatments 
may obscure the clinical presentation of transfusion-transmitted infections and 
make their diagnosis - even if symptomatic - less likely. Many transfusion- 
transmitted infections are likely to be asymptomatic for many years. Some 
infections may occur in patients who have other more probable risk factors for 
infection and so transfusion is never investigated as the source. 
Both of the HCV infections and one of the HBV infections that have been 
clinically recognised, and reported between October 1995 and September 1999 
(see Chapter 4) were detected by the blood service identifying an infected 
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donor, not by diagnoses in the recipients, who until contacted and offered 
testing, were unaware of their infection. 
The estimates suggested that 85% of donations entering the blood supply 
from donors with HBV, HCV or HIV infection were donations from donors with 
HBV. 63% (five of eight) of reported transfusion-transmitted HBV, HCV and HIV 
infections were HBV. 
The estimates suggested that 6% of donations entering the blood supply 
from donors with HBV, HCV or HIV infection were due to process error: 1 of 8 
(12.5%) reported transfusion-transmitted HBV, HCV and HIV infections were 
due to process error. 
5.5 Post-script re recent developments in donation testing 
Continuing concern about the safety of blood, and continuing advances 
in testing assays and technologies, has led to new, additional tests being 
proposed for all blood donations, and to one new assay - for HCV nucleic acid 
- being introduced in England and Wales. The methods of estimation 
described above have recently been used to predict the yield of nucleic acid 
testing for HCV and to evaluate the expected benefits of other new testing 
strategies. This post-script includes some of this work, and demonstrates the 
use of the risk estimation methods that have been described in this thesis to 
inform discussions about strategies for testing blood donations. 
Combined HIV antibody and antigen tests 
Combined tests for anti-HIV and HIV p24 antigen are now available and 
have been approved for use for donation testing in England. These tests have 
been shown to shorten the time from infection to test positivity by around 4 
days. These tests will be expected to reduce the risk of window period 
donations from HIV infected donors by 27% (see sensitivity analysis above) 
HCV NAT testing 
Nucleic acid testing (NAT) of pools of 96 donation samples began in 
England in early 1999. The system used combines the Qiagen (Hilden, 
Germany) extraction system, using the Qiagen robotic processor (Bio Robot 
9604, Qiagen), with the Roche Amplicor HCV version 2.0 assay using the 
automated COBAS system. Results of sensitivity testing using Roche Amplicor 
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2.0 assay, following the probit analysis approach recommended by the Paul 
Ehrlich Institute, identifies that when a pool of 96 donations is used, the 95% 
detection limit will be 2,000 IU/mL in the donation (Harrison, unpublished data). 
(NB. The relationship between Genome Equivalents (geq) and International 
Units (lUs) is approximately 1 IU to 4 geq for the National Institute for Biological 
Standardisation and Control working standard. ) 
NAT of 2 million donations during 1999 yielded 1 anti-HCV negative, HCV 
NAT positive donation 
NAT testing might be expected to detect a proportion of the risk estimated 
above due to the window period of early infection - by using NAT window rather 
than serology window i. e. only 20 rather than 59 days, 66% of HCV serology 
window period detected. NAT testing is also expected to detect the proportion 
of the false negative component of the risk estimates above that are viraemic as 
well as serologically positive. This can be estimated by multiplying the false 
negative risk estimate by the proportion of prevalent infections that are 
expected to be viraemic i. e. 75% for HCV, 100% for HIV. NAT would also 
detect any truly sero-negative, viraemic infections - assumed to be negligible in 
the estimates above. 
The expected findings of NAT testing (plus truly sero-negative, viraemic 
infections) in England are shown in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 Expectations for findings of HCV and HIV NAT. 
Component of risk Estimates 1996-98 
HIV HCV 
NATposWP 7d NATposWP: 39d 
%viraemic" 1n(1°%, %, viraemic" 75% 
i. window period risk 0.0079: 1 in 13M 0.0229: 1 in 4.4M 
(26% of total) (19% of total) 
ii. false negative risk 
test failure 0.0177: 1 in 5.6M 0.0671: 1 in 1.5M 
process error 0.0043: 1 in 23M 0.0332: 1 in 3. OM 
Total 0.0299: 1 in 3.3M 0.1232: 1 in 0.8M 
The 90% confidence intervals on an observation of 1 in 2 million is 1 in 40 
million to 1 in 0.4 million, i. e. the observed rate during 1999 was consistent 
(statistically, at the 10% significance level) with a true rate of 0.05 to 4.75 per 2 
million. Table 5.13 shows the probabilities of observing 1 or fewer positives in a 
sample size of 2 million for different "true" rates. 
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Table 5.13 Poisson probabilities. 
"True" rate Sample tested p of observing up to 1 
1 per 0.5 million 2 million p=0.091 
i. e. 4 in 2 million 
1.0 per million 2 million p=0.406 
i. e. 2 in 2 million 
0.5 per million 2 million p=0.735 
i. e. 1 in 2 million 
The estimates were therefore not significantly different from the 
observation during 1999. However, the observed rate would have had to be 
many times higher than expected for a difference to be apparent. Some 
possible reasons for estimates of HCV infectious donations being overestimates 
are shown in Table 5.14. The most likely reason for underestimation of risk by 
the method used was underestimation of HCV incidence in repeat donors based 
on seroconversions (i. e. if all seroconversions were not detected). Other 
possible reasons for underestimation of HCV risk include occurrence of anti- 
HCV negative, PCR positive donors during chronic infection, and the opposite 
of all the reasons shown in Table 5.14. 
Table 5.14 Reasons why the assumptions/data used in estimates of the 
frequency of infectious donations entering blood supply in England could 
overestimate the observed frequency of NAT positive donations. 
Reason Evidence 
" NAT negative "eclipse" period " Some evidence of this from US 
during anti-HCV negative window studies. 
period, i. e. infectious window shorter. 
" Test sensitivity better than 99% "? thought probable by test experts. 
and error rates less than 0.5%. 
" Prevalence of anti-HCV in " Observed in UK - fall of 25% 
donations has fallen. between 1993-95 and 1995-97. 
" Seroconverting donors have a " Observed in UK data (1.4 times 
longer inter-donation interval longer) and in EPFA survey data 
(between sero-negative and sero- (personal communication Konstanze 
positive donation) than average Muller-Breitkreutz). 
donors do. The model may not fully 
adjust for this. 
" New donor risk multiplier " None available, however, evidence 
overestimated. for estimated multiplier was weak. 
" Some anti-HCV positive donations " Only 75% of anti-HCV positive 
are not infectious i. e. are NAT donors with PCR test results are PCR 
negative. positive. 
" Rate of seroconversion in donors " None. 
has fallen. 
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NAT is expected to prevent (and measure) a proportion of estimated risk 
of donations from infected donors not detected by serology. This proportion is 
estimated as approximately 74% for HCV and 80% for HIV. The probability of 
the observed findings of HCV NAT (1 in 2 million), if estimates (revised, 1996- 
98) are correct, is 0.1 - 0.4. The observed findings suggest true risk may be 
lower than estimated - one possible reason for this - worth further investigation - 
is incorrect assumption about donation patterns following infections (this has 
been observed in other voluntary donor populations). Alternatively, the error 
and false negative component of the models could be too high. 
In order to estimate the impact of a range of new tests/strategies on the 
release of infectious donations into the blood supply, these models were 
extended with some extra parameters regarding the performance of proposed 
additional tests, to estimate the infectious donations that could be prevented 
from entering the blood supply by the use of additional tests. The assumptions 
made (in addition to those described earlier in this chapter), and the results are 
given below. 
For each yield the "best" estimates - generated from calculations using 
the "most likely" parameter values - and the results of "high" and "low" 
calculations (or models, or scenarios) giving the best and worst yields that can 
be expected, were calculated. For some parameters there was very little 
evidence for the correct values to use. This is partially reflected in the ranges of 
values used in the "high" and "low" models (or scenarios). 
Different scales were needed on the graphs to express the risks and yields 
for each infection. To ease comparison of the yield estimates, all the yield 
graphs are plotted on the same scale in the final figure. This still leaves 
differences in the severity of the infections averted, and differences in the costs 
of the interventions for the reader - and for further work - to consider. 
New models were constructed, using only the parameters shown below, 
for HTLV and bacteria. Ranges were also calculated using parameter values 
that applied for different donation (i. e. from new or repeat donors), or 
component (e. g. platelets, or red cells), types where applicable. 
Although the aim of this work was the evaluation of testing strategies, 
donor selection is an important alternative strategy to reduce infectious risk, and 
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an indication of the effect it can have on the risks calculated was included as 
follows. 
Infected donors who report (after donation and diagnosis of their 
infection) a history that should have led to exclusion from blood donations 
accounted for approximately 20% of all infected (HBsAg, anti-HCV or anti-HIV) 
donations collected during 1996-98. Table 5.15 below shows the potential 
reduction in prevalence and incidence of HBsAg, anti-HIV and anti-HCV that 
would be obtained if these donors were successfully excluded from donating 
blood. 
Table 5.15 Reduction that could be achieved by excluding PRE-donation all 
donors who report (POST-donation) a history of sex between men or a history 
of injecting drug use, and all donors who have had a previous positive donation 
(based on infected donors reported in England and Wales, 1996-98). 
HBsAg Anti- 
HCV 
Anti- 
HIV 
Reduction in prevalence 4% 27% 23% 
Reduction in incidence 5% 7% 26% 
This is an underestimate of the reduction in risk that could be achieved 
by better compliance with existing donor selection criteria because i) only the 
permanent exclusion criteria were considered, ii) there is likely to be some 
underreporting of these risk factors post-donation. 
The risks of HBV, HCV and HIV infectious donations were re-calculated 
after reducing the prevalence and incidence data by these amounts - to show 
the minimum reduction in risk that could be achieved by improved donor 
selection. The point estimates of these risks ("Risk: with improved donor 
selection") are shown on the graphs. 
Another alternative strategy - inactivation - has not been considered. 
This could be added to the models in the future, or considered as a potential 
strategy to prevent the remaining risk. 
HIV 
The following additional tests were considered: - 
a) anti-HIV/HIV p24 antigen combined tests 
b) HIV NAT for DNA on single samples 
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c) HIV NAT for RNA on pooled (48) samples 
d) HIV NAT for RNA on single samples 
The extra assumptions used (those with * are varied below) in the "best" model 
were: - 
II. All false anti-HIV negative donations and antibody positive 
donations released in error are negative for HIV antigen, positive for 
HIV PCR (both RNA and DNA, in single and pooled samples). 
III. * Combined anti-HIV/HIV Ag assays will detect new infections 4 
days before current anti-HIV tests (3ýd gen ELISAs) (i. e. giving total 
WP of 18 days, infectious WP of 11 days). 
IV. * HIV NAT for DNA on single samples will detect new infections 6 
days before. 
V. current anti-HIV tests (i. e. giving total WP of 16 days, infectious 
WP of 9 days). 
VI. * HIV NAT for RNA on pooled samples will detect new infections 
10 days before current anti-HIV tests (i. e. giving total WP of 12 days, 
infectious WP of 5 days). 
VII. * HIV NAT for RNA on single samples will detect new infections 12 
days before current anti-HIV tests (i. e. giving total WP of 10 days, 
infectious WP of 3 days). 
The "high" model estimated the highest yield consistent with the probable limits 
of the assumptions used, and the "low" model estimated the lowest yield 
consistent with the probable limits of the assumptions used. The assumptions 
used and varied are shown below. 
Assum tion 
Anti-HIV/HIV Ag 
benefit 
Hi h model 
5 days 
Best model 
4 days 
Low model 
3 days 
HIV DNA single 
benefit 
7 days 6 days 5 days 
HIV RNA pooled 
benefit 
12 days 10 days 8 days 
HIV RNA single 
benefit 
14 days 12 days 10 days 
Prevalence anti-HIV 10% increase Observed 1996-98 10% decrease 
Incidence HIV 10% increase Observed 1996-98 10% decrease 
Hi h model #2 Low model #2 
Donations tested New donors All/averse Re eat donors 
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HCV 
The following additional tests were considered: - 
a) HCV Ag tests (in addition to anti-HCV) 
b) HCV NAT for RNA on pooled (48) samples 
c) HCV NAT for RNA on single samples 
The extra assumptions used (those with * are varied below) in the "best" model 
were: - 
II. All false anti-HCV negative donations and antibody positive 
donations released in error are negative for HCV antigen, and 75% 
are positive for HCV PCR (both single and pooled samples). 
III. * HCV Ag assays will detect new infections 53 days before current 
anti-HCV tests (3rd gen ELISAs) (i. e. giving total WP of 13 days, 
infectious WP of 6 days). 
IV. * HCV NAT for RNA on pooled samples (48) will detect new 
infections 55 days before current anti-HCV tests (i. e. giving total WP 
of 11 days, infectious WP of 4 days). 
V. * HCV NAT for RNA on single samples will detect new infections 
57 days before current anti-HCV tests (i. e. giving total WP of 9 days, 
infectious WP of 2 days). 
The "high" model estimated the highest yield consistent with the probable limits 
of the assumptions used, and the "low" model estimated the lowest yield 
consistent with the probable limits of the assumptions used. The assumptions 
varied are shown below. 
Assumption High model Best model Low model 
HCV Ag benefit 58 days 53 days 48 da s 
HCV RNA pooled 
benefit 
56 days 55 days 54 days 
HCV RNA single 
benefit 
58 days 57 days 56 days 
Prevalence anti-HCV 10% increase Observed 1996- 
98 
10% decrease 
Incidence HCV 10% increase Observed 1996- 
98 
10% decrease 
Hi h model #2 Low model #2 
Donations tested New donors All/average Repeat donors 
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HBV 
The following additional tests were considered: - 
a) anti-HBV core tests 
b) HBV NAT pooled (48) samples 
c) HBV NAT on single samples 
The extra assumptions used (those with * are varied below) in the "best" model 
were: 
II. * All donations collected during the HBsAg negative, infectious, 
window of late acute infection are anti-HBV core positive. 
Ill. All donations collected during the HBsAg negative, infectious, 
period at the tail-end of HBV carriage are anti-HBV core positive. 
IV. All HBsAg positive donations released in error are anti-HBV core 
positive and are HBV NAT positive (both single and pooled samples). 
V. * HBV NAT on pooled samples (48) will detect new infections 6 
days before current HBsAg tests (i. e. giving total WP of 53 days, 
infectious WP of 47 days). 
VI. * HBV NAT on single samples will detect new infections 15 days 
before current HBsAg tests (i. e. giving total WP of 44 days, infectious 
WP of 37 days). 
VII. * The risk of infectious donations from tail-end carriers is in ratio to 
the risk from acute infections as observed amongst reported 
transfusion-transmitted HBV cases in England and Wales during 
1991-97 when 11 of 14 cases were due to tail-end carriers. The 
detection of tail-end carriers by HBsAg tests is expected to have 
improved in recent years as the sensitivity of HBsAg tests has 
increased, this ratio may therefore be out of date - making the "low" 
model closer to today's reality. 
The "high" model estimated the highest yield consistent with the probable limits 
of the assumptions used, and the "low" model estimated the lowest yield 
consistent with the probable limits of the assumptions used. The assumptions 
varied are shown below. 
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Assumption High model Best model Low model 
Late acute window 
period 
50 days 30 days 10 days 
HBV NAT pooled 
benefit 
9 days 6 days 3 days 
HBV NAT single 
benefit 
18 days 15 days 12 days 
Prevalence HBsAg 10% increase Observed 1996- 
98 
10% decrease 
Incidence HBV 10% increase Observed 1996- 
98 
10% decrease 
Tail-end: acute ratio 15: 3 11: 3 3: 3 
High model #2 Low model #2 
Donations tested New donors All/average Repeat donors 
Bacteria 
A new model was constructed to estimate the number of contaminated 
donations expected to be detected/prevented by the following strategies if 
applied in England and Wales: 
a) revised donor arm cleansing 
b) diversion of first mis 
c) testing of platelets 
The assumptions used (those with * are varied below) in the "best" model were: 
II. *1 in 1700 red cell units and 1 in 200 platelet units are 
contaminated with bacteria 
III. * Revised donor arm cleansing would prevent 50% of 
contaminations of all units. 
IV. * Diversion would prevent 50% of contaminations of all units. 
V. * Testing all platelets pre-release would prevent 80% of 
contaminated platelets. 
The "high" model estimated the highest yield consistent with the probable limits 
of the assumptions used, and the "low" model estimated the lowest yield 
consistent with the probable limits of the assumptions used. The assumptions 
varied are shown below. 
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Assumption High model Best model Low model 
Contamination 10% increase I in 1,700 10% decrease 
frequency in red cell 
units 
Contamination 10% increase 1 in 200 10% decrease 
frequency in 
platelets 
Prevented by arm 65% 50% 35% 
cleansing 
Prevented by 65% 50% 35% 
cleansing and 
diversion 
Detection by testin 99% 80% 50% 
MO model #2 Low model #2 
Units Platelets All Red cells 
Please note: Not all contaminations are of equal importance/severity, but 
all are treated as equal in the model above. This model could be refined to 
consider endogenous bacteria and skin contaminants separately. As 
endogenous bacteria are more often associated with serious complications in 
recipients, and are not prevented by arm cleansing or diversion, this may clarify 
comparison of the yield of platelet testing vs cleansing and diversion. 
HTLV 
A new model was constructed to estimate the yield of the following strategies 
for testing for HTLV infection if applied in England and Wales: 
a) anti-HTLV testing pooled samples 
b) anti-HTLV testing single samples 
The assumptions used (those with * are varied below) in the "best" model were: 
II. * The prevalence of HLTV infection in blood donations is 2 per 
50,000 donations. 
III. * Leucodepletion reduces the prevalence of infectious donations 
by two-thirds. 
IV. * The sensitivity of anti-HTLV tests is 98% in single samples, 92% 
in pooled samples (48). 
The key assumptions and ranges are shown in the table. 
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Assumption High model Best model Low model 
HTLV prevalence in 1 in 20,000 1 in 50,000 1 in 100,000 (Scotland) 
donors (LSE) 
Reduction by 50% 67% 95% 
leucodepletion 
Sensitivity of anti-HTLV 
tests 99.5% 98% 95% 
1. single samples 95% 92% 88% 
II. pooled samples 
Reduction in infectivity 50% 66% 95% 
due to leucodepletion 
This simple model could be expanded to consider the incidence of HTLV 
infection in blood donors and then used to additionally estimate the yield of 
proposed applications of the test such as: - 
I. Anti-HTLV testing all donors once only 
II. Anti-HTLV testing all donors once, and then repeating testing at 
specified time intervals 
RESULTS 
The results are shown in the tables below - expressed first as number of 
donations tested to prevent one infectious donation, and then as the number of 
infections prevented per million donations tested. 
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Table 5.16 Donations tested (millions) to prevent 1 HIV infectious donation. 
ddltlonal test added 
Yield: above current 
anti-HIV tests 
Marginal yield: 
above previous 
Leaving a risk of 1 
in x million 
ombined anti-HIV/HIV Ag 27.5 27.5 5.2 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 20.0 To 40.8 20.0 To 40.8 5.0 To 5.5 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 13.8 To 31.6 13.8 To 31.6 1.4 To 7.9 
IV DNA NAT - single samples 6.8 9.0 12.2 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 5.8 To 8.0 8.2 To 10.0 12.5 To 12.2 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 1.6 To 11.5 1.8 To 18.0 6.1 To 14.0 
IV RNA NAT - pooled (48) samples 5.4 27.5 22.0 
lange: high & low yield assumptions 4.5 To 6.7 20.0 To 40.8 33.4 To 17.5 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 1.5 To 8.4 13.8 To 31.6 11.0 To 25.2 
IV RNA NAT - single samples 5.0 55.0 36.7 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 4.1 To 6.1 50.0 To 61.1 100.1 To 24.5 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 1.4 To 7.4 27.6 To 63.1 18.4 To 42.1 
Table 5.17 HIV infectious donations prevented per million donations tested. 
dditional test added Yield: above current 
anti-HIV tests 
Marginal yield: 
above previous 
Leaving a risk of x 
per million 
ombined anti-HIV/HIV Ag 0.04 0.04 0.19 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 0.05 to 0.02 0.05 To 0.02 0.20 to 0.18 
: tange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.07 to 0.03 0.07 To 0.03 0.71 to 0.13 
IV DNA NAT - single samples 0.15 0.11 0.08 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 0.17 to 0.12 0.12 To 0.10 0.08 to 0.08 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.62 to 0.09 0.54 To 0.06 0.16 to 0.07 
IV RNA NAT - pooled (48) samples 0.18 0.04 0.05 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.22 to 0.15 0.05 To 0.02 0.03 to 0.06 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.69 to 0.12 0.07 To 0.03 0.09 to 0.04 
IV RNA NAT - single samples 0.20 0.02 0.03 
lange: high & low yield assumptions 0.24 to 0.17 0.02 To 0.02 0.01 to 0.04 
nge#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.72 to 0.13 0.04 To 0.02 0.05 To 0.02 
Figure 5.3 HIV - estimated yield (best model) infectious donations per 
million. 
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Table 5.18 Donations tested (millions) to prevent 1 HCV infectious donation. 
Additional test added Yield: above 
current anti- 
HCV tests 
Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of 1 In 
x million 
CV Antigen 2.15 2.15 0.72 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 1.79 to 2.64 1.79 to 2.64 0.67 to 0.77 
Range#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.56 to 3.41 0.56 to 3.41 0.12 to 2.18 
CV RNA NAT - pooled (48) samples 0.67 
1 0.97 2.71 
Range: high & low yield assumptions 0.61 to 0.75 0.92 to 1.05 2.52 to 2.94 
Range#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.12 to 1.61 0.16 to 3.03 0.45 to 7.83 
-IlCV RNA NAT - single samples 0.66 57.04 2.85 
Range: high & low yield assumptions 0.60 to 0.74 51.86 to 63.38 2.65 to 3.08 
Range#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.12 to 1.58 14.71 to 90.48 0.46 to 8.57 
Table 5.19 HCV infectious donations prevented per million donations tested. 
dditlonal test added Yield: above 
current anti- 
HCV tests 
Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of x 
per million 
CV Antigen 0.46 0.46 1.39 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.56 to 0.38 0.56 to 0.38 1.49 to 1.29 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 1.80 to 0.29 1.80 to 0.29 8.69 to 0.46 
CV RNA NAT - pooled (48) samples 1.49 1.03 0.37 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 1.65 to 1.33 1.09 to 0.95 0.40 to 0.34 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 8.24 to 0.62 6.44 to 0.33 2.25 to 0.13 
CV RNA NAT - single samples 1.51 0.02 0.35 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 1.67 to 1.35 0.02 to 0.02 0.38 to 0.32 
anges2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 8.31 to 0.63 0.07 to 0.01 2.18 to 0.12 
Figure 5.4 HCV - estimated yield (best model) infectious donations per 
million. 
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Table 5.20 Donations tested (millions) to prevent 1 HBV infectious donation. 
Additional test added Yield: above current 
HBsAg tests 
Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of 1 in 
x million 
IBV core antibody 0.13 0.13 0.85 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 0.06 to 0.34 0.06 to 0.34 0.77 to 0.95 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.04 to 0.18 0.04 to 0.18 0.30 to 1.11 
BV NAT - pooled (48) samples 0.13 7.37 0.96 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.06 to 0.34 4.47 to 16.38 0.94 to 1.00 
: tange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.04 to 0.17 2.64 to 9.58 0.34 to 1.25 
BV NAT - single samples 0.13 4.92 1.20 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 0.06 to 0.33 4.47 to 24.58 1.18 to 1.05 
: tange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 0.04 to 0.17 1.76 to 6.39 0.43 to 1.55 
Table 5.21 HBV infectious donations prevented per million donations tested. 
Additional test added Yield: above current 
HBsAg tests 
Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of x 
per million 
BV core antibody 7.56 7.56 1.18 
nge: high & low yield assumptions 16.29 to 2.91 16.29 to 2.91 1.29 to 1.06 
ange#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 22.24 to 5.67 22.24 to 5.67 3.28 to 0.90 
BV NAT - pooled (48) samples 7.70 0.14 1.04 
ge: high & low yield assumptions 16.52 to 2.98 0.22 to 0.06 1.07 to 1.00 
nge#2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 22.62 to 5.78 0.38 to 0.10 2.90 to 0.80 
BV NAT - single samples 7.90 0.20 0.84 
anger high & low yield assumptions 16.74 to 3.02 0.22 to 0.04 0.85 to 0.96 
2: new & repeat donors (best model assumptions) 23.19 to 5.93 0.57 to 0.16 2.34 to 0.64 
Figure 5.5 HBV - estimated yield (best model) infectious donations per 
million. 
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Table 5.22 Donations tested (100,000s) to prevent 1 bacterially 
contaminated unit. 
Additional test added Yield: above current Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of 1 in x 
100,000s 
evised arm cleansing 0.022 0.022 0.022 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.015 to 0.035 0.015 to 0.035 0.029 to 0.019 
ange#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 0.004 to 0.034 0.004 to 0.034 0.004 to 0.034 
Diversion 0.022 0.044 0.022 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.015 to 0.035 0.082 to 0.029 0.029 to 0.019 
ange#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 0.004 to 0.034 0.008 to 0.068 0.004 to 0.034 
esting of all platelets 0.035 0.069 0.016 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 0.031 to 0.038 0.090 to 0.059 0.015 to 0.018 
ange#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 0.003 to 0.000 0.005 to 0.000 0.010 to 0.017 
leansing, diversion & platelet 0.013 0.065 
esting 
a4 nge: high & low yield assumptions 0.012 to 0.018 - - 0.059 to 0.036 
an e#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 0.002 to 0.023 0.040 to 0.068 
Table 5.23 Bacterially contaminated units prevented per million donations. 
dditional test added Yield: above current Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leaving a risk of x per 
100,000 
Revised arm cleansing 45 45 45 
enge: high & low yield assumptions 65 to 29 65 to 29 35 to 53 
angea2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 250 to 29 250 to 29 250 to 29 
iversion 45 23 45 
lange: high & low yield assumptions 65 to 29 12 to 35 35 to 53 
nge#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) to to to 
resting of all platelets 29 14 62 
lange: high & low yield assumptions 32 to 26 11 to 17 68 to 56 
nge#2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 400 to 0 200 to 0 100 to 59 
leansing, diversion & platelet 75 _ 15 
esting 
nge: high & low yield assumptions 83 to 54 - to - 17 to 28 
an 2: platelets & RBCs (best model) 475 to 44 - to - 25 to 15 
Figure 5.6 Bacteria - estimated yield (best model) contaminated units per 
100,000. 
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NB. The yeild shown here does not distinguish between contaminations from 
donors' venepuncture, and contaminations due to endogenous bacteria. Only 
platelet testing prevents the release of units contaminated with endogenous 
bacteria, or during processing. 
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Table 5.24 Donations tested (millions) to prevent 1 HTLV infectious donation. 
Additional test added Yield: above current Marginal yield: above 
previous 
Leavings risk of 1i 
x million 
Anti-HTLV test donations in pools (48) 0.16 0.16 1.88 
Range: high & low yield assumptions 0.18 to 0.15 0.18 to 0.15 0.80 to 16.67 
nti-HTLV test each donation 0.15 2.50 7.50 
Range: high & low yield assumptions 0.15 to 0.15 0.89 to 28.57 0.80 to 16.67 
Table 5.25 HTLV infectious donations prevented per million donations tested. 
Additional test added Yield: above current Marginal yield: above Leaving a risk of x 
previous per million 
nti-HTLV test donations in pools (48) 6.13 6.13 0.53 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 5.42 to 6.61 5.42 to 6.61 1.25 to 0.06 
nti-HTLV test each donation 6.53 0.40 0.13 
ange: high & low yield assumptions 6.54 to 6.64 1.13 to 0.04 1.25 to 0.06 
Note: Preliminary work in Scotland suggests that the loss of sensitivity resulting 
from pooling can be reduced, without incurring specificity problems, by 
adjustment of the cut-off (to below manufactuerers criteria). If so, the yield for 
pools would approach that calculated for single samples. 
Figure 5.7 HTLV - estimated yield (best model) infectious donations per 
million. 
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Figure 5.8 Re-production of graphs with same scale (except Bacteria) 
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From these estimates, is appears that strategies to prevent bacterial 
contamination, testing for anti-HBV and testing for anti-HTLV would have 
greater positive effects on the safety of the blood supply than expanding nucleic 
acid testing. Differences in the susceptibility to, and severity of the infections 
prevented, and differences in the costs of the interventions, have not been 
evaluated. These three strategies are however probably amongst the cheapest 
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considered. Bacteria have caused more reported transfusion-associated 
deaths in recipients than all other infectious risks in recent years (chapter 4). 
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Chapter 6. Discussion & Conclusion 
Discussion 
By way of summary and conclusion, I will review the TTI surveillance 
and related studies described in this thesis and discuss further work that could 
contribute to blood safety and public health knowledge. 
Adequacy and limitations of the surveillance system established 
The work described has established ongoing and systematic collection, 
analysis and interpretation of data relevant to blood safety and the 
epidemiology of HBV, HCV and HIV in blood donors. Timely data from this 
system are disseminated regularly to a wide range of colleagues and 
organisations responsible for the control and prevention of these infections. 
This work therefore meets the criteria for surveillance (e. g. Last JM, 1988). 
Some aspects of this surveillance system are atypical. In particular, the 
aims of the post-transfusion infection surveillance require a high degree of 
completeness and accuracy in the data collected for each reported case, and 
do not include the detection of changes in trend or distribution. In these 
respects it is more akin to a collation of case histories than a classical 
surveillance system. The time lag between the occurrence of an incident and 
the availability of complete information reported to the post-transfusion 
infection surveillance system mean that this surveillance is not expected to 
prompt timely control measures for any individual case. The contribution to 
control measures is via provision of information for more general priority 
setting and the evaluation of practices. These features are characteristic of 
enhanced surveillance systems of rare conditions, where fewer, more 
accurate, data are needed. Also, the ongoing, standardised, nature of the 
data collection and the regular dissemination of data can be used to justify its 
description as surveillance. 
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The two most obvious limitations of the post-transfusion infection 
surveillance are the unknown extent of under-reporting, and the poor 
likelihood of detecting transfusion-transmitted infections that cause either 
delayed-onset conditions or conditions that are not yet associated with blood- 
borne infectious agents. The former is a common problem for infectious 
disease surveillance. As discussed in chapter 1, prospective studies to inform 
this are not currently feasible in England and Wales except to estimate a 
maximum transmission rate, and therefore a maximum underreporting rate. 
The most recent study found no HBV, HCV or HIV transmissions amongst 
22,000 donations, giving an upper estimate of transmission of 1 in about 500 
units transfused. Observed transfusion-transmitted infections are very rare. 
The discrepancy between expected infectious donations released and 
observed infections although large, is not more than can be explained by a 
combination of under-diagnosis and under-reporting. How this partitions 
between under-diagnoses and under-reporting is not known. One source of 
information about underreporting of post-transfusion infections has been the 
HCV lookback. In the course of tracing and testing recipients, several HCV 
infected recipients were identified who had had post-transfusion hepatitis that 
had never been reported to the blood service. This pre-dated the surveillance 
system described and may or may not be similar today. Increased awareness 
of post-transfusion infections due to both the HCV/lookback experience and to 
the publicity of the SHOT system mean, hopefully, this is less likely to still 
occur. The risk estimations described in this thesis are another avenue to 
estimate under-diagnosis and under-reporting. 
Much of the published literature about the estimation of the remaining 
risk of HBV, HCV and HIV from transfusion does not consider three aspects of 
the risk of infectious donations entering the blood supply that this thesis show 
to be important. Firstly is the omission to consider donations from new 
donors. In England and Wales, and elsewhere, there is evidence that new 
donors have a higher risk of both prevalent and incident infections. Although 
new donors only contribute 12% of donations in England and Wales, their 
donations contribute between one-third and two-thirds of the risk of HBV, HCV 
or HIV infectious donations entering the blood supply. Secondly, many 
studies have not considered the risk of false negative donations entering the 
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blood supply due to test sensitivity less than 100% or due to errors. The risk 
of window period donations is likely to dominate in situations of relatively low 
prevalence and high incidence. However, in situations as described in 
England and Wales, a significant proportion of the risk may be due to false 
negative test results. Thirdly, the most commonly used method does not 
adjust the risk estimation if seroconverting donors tend to leave a longer, or 
shorter, interval between donations than non-seroconverting donors. Again, 
the data analyses in this thesis show that this will result in overestimation, or 
underestimation of the risk respectively. 
Rapid data from Donation Testing Surveillance does not benefit from 
detailed data of confirmatory test results and standardised classification of 
test results that follows. This has meant that the infection status of some 
donations has been incorrectly classified in the rapidly disseminated donation 
testing data. While this is not likely to have caused any significant errors in 
the summary data that are monitored, it has meant some inconsistencies - all 
be them minor - between early and subsequent data. It is planned that this 
will be avoided in future by obtaining confirmatory test results directly, and 
more rapidly, from a single laboratory that conducts all the confirmatory 
testing. 
The exposure history information reported to the Infected Donor 
surveillance may be incorrect, or biased, for several reasons. Firstly, the 
information is usually self-reported by the infected donors. These donors may 
forget to mention exposures that are relevant, even when asked, or may 
choose to with-hold relevant information if they prefer either the member of 
staff they talk to, or the blood service to not know. In particular, this might be 
expected if the donor has an exposure history that was specified by the blood 
service as a reason to not donate blood. For example, 7% of HIV infected 
donors (1995-1999) who were reported by the blood service as having no 
identified risk factor, or with heterosexual sex as their probable route of 
infection where found by further investigations conducted by CDSC to have 
probably acquired their infections from sex between men. Secondly, each 
member of staff who records this information on the infected donor report form 
may have tendencies towards identifying, or recording, some risk factors more 
than others. 
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The monitoring of transfusion itself (who, why, how often etc) - could be 
seen as a component of the surveillance of blood safety. This is not routinely 
done in the UK but the data such monitoring would provide is increasingly 
sought after and would inform the blood service about changes in transfusion 
practices and requirements for components. 
Opportunities for associated work 
During the period of study described, several related areas of work have 
developed in collaboration with, if not directly dependent on, the surveillance 
system. In 1997, a register of individuals with a known date of HCV infection 
was established to study the natural history of HCV (Harris HE, 2000). This 
register initially consisted of HCV infected patients identified to be recipients 
of blood from donors subsequently found to be HCV infected, and presumed 
HCV infectious at the time of their donation to the infected recipient. Donors 
who seroconvert for anti-HCV between donations (within 3 years) are now 
also invited to enter this register to extend its observations to "known" date 
infections acquired by other routes. 
Tissue donations collected by the English NBS centres have been 
increasing in both importance and numbers. In 1999, four centres started 
participating in a pilot system for the surveillance of infections in tissue donors 
that was established to run in parallel, and collect comparable data, to the 
blood donor surveillance. This is due to be expanded and extended in 2001. 
Blood centre microbiology departments are equipped and skilled for the 
efficient running of tests on large numbers of samples. Several centres in the 
English NBS have taken on the testing of antenatal samples. Surveillance of 
antenatal HBsAg and anti-HIV testing is being established. These data are of 
use to public health work concerned with the control of sexually and vertically 
transmitted infections. They can also be used to inform the blood service of 
the prevalence of infections in the populations from which donors are drawn, 
and hence inform donor selection, and the success of donor selection in 
obtaining donations with a lowered prevalence of infection when compared to 
antenatal women. 
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Further work 
The surveillance of Donation Testing will be improved by direct capture 
of data from the confirmatory laboratory and by feedback from the detailed 
reports for infected donors into a version of the donation testing database. 
This would allow the exclusion of certain groups of positive donations that do 
not actually represent an infection (e. g. donations from donors with HBsAg 
positivity due to recent immunisation, positive donations later shown to be due 
to contamination of the sample) from the testing data and so be more correct 
for true infection rates. The DT database would remain the most accurate for 
test specificity data, and the timeliest for infection rate data. 
The surveillance of Infected Donors will be improved by follow-up of 
possible seroconverters and possible acute HBV or syphilis infections to 
enable routine, accurate, identification of donors with recent infections. 
A programme of risk factor research with tested methods for follow-up of risk 
factors in donors with no identified risk, and evaluation of the risk associated 
with possible exposures reported by cases, would be a worthwhile extension 
of the information available from the surveillance. A case-control study 
protocol has been developed to investigate risk factors for HCV and HBsAg 
infection in donors with no identified risks reported. One hundred cases and 
two controls for each case would be needed to be expected to detect, with 5% 
significance and 80% power, relative risks for HCV infection of around 3-4, 
and relative risks for HBV infection of around 2-3, for exposures common to 
between 10% and 70% of controls. The methods of this study are currently 
being piloted on cases of seroconversion for anti-HCV or HBsAg with no 
identified risk reported. These cases are perhaps the most informative as 
they provide information about current risk factors, and information about the 
risk factors for donors who are most likely to donate during the window period 
of early infection. 
Possible methods for investigating risk factors for positivity to tests for 
pre-symptomatic vCJD are being considered, with the aim being to design a 
study to investigate risk factors for positivity to tests for vCJD and conduct 
appropriate preparatory work so that such a study can go ahead without delay 
once a test becomes available. No test is currently available for vCJD, and in 
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the absence of a test, and of precisely identified risk factors within the UK 
population, there is no way to differentiate individuals who are more likely to 
be incubating infection from those less likely to be incubating infection. As 
soon as a test is available that identifies infection, or is even a rough 
surrogate for infection, this will change. The blood service is likely to use any 
available tests to try to exclude possibly infectious donations from the blood 
supply. There will be urgent interest in the use of the test to identify 
individuals, and numbers of individuals, in the population that may be at risk of 
disease/infectivity. There will also be urgent interest in the use of the test to 
investigate risk factors for infection (or possible infection) by comparison of 
test-positives with test-negatives. Unlike most blood-borne infections that 
have been major problems for blood transfusion, vCJD is unlikely to be 
associated with the same "high risk" groups that are now asked to not give 
blood. Blood donors have been an important population for initial 
investigation of risk factors for other infections e. g. HCV, but the selective 
nature of donors has meant these studies have been biased away from the 
more common risk factors in the population and have therefore been limited in 
their ability to inform public health. Blood donors are expected to be more 
representative of the general population with regard to their diet than with 
regard to their exposures to other blood borne infections. This makes the 
donor population a more suitable population for the investigation of risk 
factors for vCJD present in the general population than has been the case for 
other infections, for example, HCV and HIV. Also, in contrast to HCV and 
HIV, risk factors for vCJD seem to be less easy to identify by the 
epidemiology of the clinically diagnosed cases than has been true for HIV and 
HCV (to be expected if the risk factor is a relatively common dietary factor, 
and/or long past). It may therefore be the case that a test becomes available 
before good risk factor information is available for donor selection - and the 
test will be the tool (via epidemiological studies) for obtaining this information. 
The blood service may therefore be able to contribute to public health, and to 
blood safety through donor selection, by conducting a prompt study of risk 
factors associated with positivity to the first (and subsequent) tests for vCJD. 
Work on the design and methods of such possible studies could be done now, 
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to allow preliminary peer-review and preparation in advance of the time they 
are needed. 
In order to improve the availability of safer blood, and prepare for any 
sudden drop in eligible donors (e. g. in case of poor specificity vCJD testing) 
and a need to recruit more donors and, or, relax some selection criteria in 
order to meet demands for blood, donor recruitment policy and donor 
selection criteria need to be evaluated. This requires combining knowledge 
about the response to recruitment drives and about the frequency of donor 
characteristics in potential donors, with knowledge of the risk (i. e. the 
prevalence and incidence) of blood-borne infections in sections of the 
population that are targeted for recruitment and in potential donors with 
characteristics leading to exclusion. This work is beginning. Factors used by 
the NBS to monitor the success of recruitment (and so determine recruitment 
policy) are being added to the variables used to describe infection rates so 
that recruitment can consider infection rates as well as donation yields when 
targeting advertising and incentives to donate. 
PTI surveillance describes instances of recognised TTI and identifies the 
circumstances under which they occur. Whilst the SHOT system has the 
potential to observe any novel symptom or syndrome occurring post- 
transfusion, its power to detect late-onset, chronic, or atypical symptoms of 
infections transmitted by transfusion is likely to be weak. For example, a rare 
malignancy associated with a viral agent not yet recognised to be an 
etiological factor for the malignancy. Studies of recipient mortality, and if 
possible morbidity, - ideally linked to stored samples from donations - could 
be used not only to test hypothesis about disease caused by transfusion 
transmissible agents, but also be used to data-dredge for any indication of 
unrecognised hazards of transfusion, and then for any infectious cause. 
Blood components that are not transfused because they are visibly 
contaminated with bacteria should be returned to the blood service for 
investigation of the source, and any further spread, of the contamination. 
These events are not eligible for reporting to the PTI surveillance as there is 
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no transfusion and so no post-transfusion infection. However, these events 
can be just as informative about the source of contamination of blood 
components as a case of transmission and should be monitored. Surveillance 
of contaminated components (not transfused) could be seen as comparable - 
with regard to informing blood safety - to the surveillance of infections in 
donors, or the exercise performed by the SHOT system that has monitored 
unear-miss" events such as the transfusion of the "wrong" blood group that 
does not happen to cause a reaction. 
Reconciliation of data in the TTI system and other CDSC information 
sources could be strengthened. For example, health care associated 
infections, and hospital-acquired bacteraemias are often reported as 
suspected transfusion associated infections. Different investigations 
concerning the same infection can currently be monitored by different 
departments of CDSC without awareness and exchange of information. 
Matching of records from different sources (e. g. laboratory reports, and 
infected donor reports) may become more difficult if personal identifiers 
collected by surveillance systems are further restricted. The ability to match 
reports should be retained so that information can be completed and updated 
from different sources and duplicate reports for a single infection can be 
identified. 
The risk estimation methods are now being used to contribute to the 
evaluation of some transfusion service practices. Initial work on the 
evaluation of proposed new tests has been described (chapter 5). Further 
work will include the use of these methods in the evaluation of donor selection 
criteria. For example, the effect of accepting men who have had sex with men 
as blood donors on the risk of HIV and HBV entering the blood supply can be 
estimated using data and assumptions about the prevalence and incidence of 
HIV and HBV in this currently excluded group. 
Overview of elements of a comprehensive (ideal) TTI surveillance 
system/programme for England and Wales and conclusion 
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The surveillance system for transfusion-transmissible infections in 
England and Wales is now relatively comprehensive. However, limitations 
and omissions can be identified when working with the data provided, or 
comparing the system with that in other countries. 
The following components are proposed for a full and comprehensive 
TTI surveillance system for England and Wales. This is based on the system 
now in place. Other strategies could be combined to construct equivalent, 
alternative, total systems. For example, in France, where the current strategy 
is to actively follow-up every transfusion recipient, the benefits of a long-term 
recipient study would be far less and other supplementary strategies may be 
envisaged. 
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Components of comprehensive TTI 
surveillance and epidemiology 
1. Surveillance of infections in the population 
- including vigilance for mutant/variants of 
known infectious agents and for new 
infectious agents. 
2. Surveillance of behaviours associated with 
infections in the population 
3. Surveillance of donation testing, infected 
donors and of (diagnosed, reported) post- 
transfusion infections. 
4. Surveillance of non-infectious 
complications of transfusion 
5. Infected recipient natural history studies. 
6. Infected donor risk factor 
investigations/studies 
7. Regular studies or routine monitoring of the 
frequency of characteristics proposed as 
donor selection criteria amongst potential 
and actual donors. 
8. Regular studies or routine monitoring of 
recipient characteristics and transfusion 
practices and outcomes. 
9. Regular studies or routine monitoring of the 
morbidity and mortality of transfusion 
recipients. 
10. An archive of donation samples and linked 
recipient samples for the testing of 
hypothesis regarding the prevalence of 
new/emerging infections in blood donations 
and their transmission by transfusion. 
Ideally, this would be linked to 8 and 9 so 
that hypotheses about morbidity and 
mortality could also be tested. 
In England & Wales 
Currently conducted by PHLS & 
CDSC 
Currently conducted by 
CDSC/ONS/special surveys 
e. g. the sexual lifestyles survey 
Currently conducted by 
NBS/PHLS CDSC - as 
described in this thesis. 
Currently conducted by SHOT. 
Currently conducted for HCV 
infected recipients by PHLS 
CDSC. 
Routine investigations 
conducted by PHLS CDSC for 
HIV infected donors. Pilot study 
underway for HBsAg and anti- 
HCV seroconverting donors. 
No routine. Several ad hoc 
surveys have been conducted 
by the NBS. 
No routine. Development of one 
study now in progress in NBS. 
No routine. 
Development of one study of 
mortality now in progress in 
NBS. 
No routine. 
The surveillance of transfusion-transmissible infections forms a relatively 
small component of the surveillance of blood-borne infections, just as blood 
donation testing forms a relatively small component of the control of the 
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transmission of these infections in the population. Targeted HBV 
immunisation, needle-exchange schemes and safer sex practices do far more 
to reduce the transmission of HIV, HBV and HCV by addressing the more 
common routes of transmission of these viruses. Data from the surveillance 
of blood donors in England and Wales has not identified new high priorities for 
national public health work: it has informed public health about the frequency 
of infections in low risk, healthy adults (and in transfusion recipients) and 
thereby clarified the elevation of risks experienced by some other groups in 
the population and perhaps indirectly contributed to the setting of priorities for 
infection prevention. 
The documentation of, and publicly available information about, 
transfusion-transmitted infections may actually adversely affect the perception 
of blood safety amongst at least some of the public. The identification and 
description of risks can lead to public worry, without the expected reassurance 
from the quantification of the risk. Further work is needed on risk 
communication and understanding how risks are perceived. 
Infectious risks are no longer the major cause of preventable, serious, 
complications, however this remains a key area. This may be partly because 
the potential for damage to recipients is there, as has been revealed by HIV 
and HCV in the past two decades, and this danger - of known infections and 
of new and, or, unknown ones - is perhaps better perceived and more 
dreaded than the known risks of non-infectious complications. Several 
attempts have been, and continue to be, made to examine transfusion risks in 
a broader context and to improve communication of the risks of transfusion to 
the general public. 
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Appendix 2 
NBS 2757624 NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 
Surname: Group: 
Forenames: 
Title: D. O. B. Sex: Donor No: 
Address: 
Tel No: 
Occupation: 
Tel No. (day): 
TOTAL 
AWARD 
Attendance Outcome 
Outcome of Attendance Donation No. 
01 BLED (>50mi) 
02 LOW Hb 
03 OTHER SAMPLES ONLY 
04 NOT BLED - NO NUMBERS 
CODE 
05 NOT BLED - NUMBERS ISSUED 
06 NOT BLED - PACK LABELLED (<50m1) 
Dale 
Panel 
Sub Panel 
Message for P: 
session slip: T: 
MALARIA RISK INFORMATION APHERESIS - TYPE OF DONATION 
Area Visited Date of return Platelets only Plasma for fractionation 
Visitor f Resident Lj Platelets & Plasma Therapeutic 
Malaria [l Febrile illness O Date of recovery I Plasma for FFP Other 
OTHER SESSION COMMENTS PACK HOLD CODE PACK WEIGHT STATUS 
Normal 
Underweight 
Signature Overweight L! 
APHERESIS - Machine set-up by 
Withdraw / Suspend until // 
(Delete as appropnete) 
For the Attention of Centre Medical Staff 
Additional Letter Attached 
SET MEDICAL BAR 
REGISTRATION 
HEALTH CHECK 
Hb SCREEN PASS _J LOW 
SESSION Hb RESULTS 
VENEPUNCTURIST 
Local anaesthetic YES (W_ NO ` 
BEDSIDE CARE 
FINAL PACKSAMPLE CHECK 
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PLEASE PH, N r YOUR FULL NAME AND ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS 
FIRST TIME DONORS AND DONORS YES NO T WHO HAVE NOT GIVEN FOR 2 YEARS USE 
t Have you eýer had d senuus illness 
including hepatitis or jaundice? 
2 Have you ever had an operation? 
3 Before 1985 did you have any 
injections of human pituitary extracts 
such as growth hormones? 
4 Before August 1992 did you have 
any brain surgery or an operation for a 
tumour or cyst on the spine? 
ALL DONORS TO COMPLETE QUESTION IS 5.27 
5 Are you fit and well? 
6 Are you currently Seeing or waiting to 
see a doctor/dentist/nurse or other 
health care professional? 
7 Are you taking any regular medication? 
8 Have you taken any other medication, 
including over the counter remedies 
such as aspirin, in the last 5 days? 
9 Have you been told that you should 
never give blood? 
10 Have you over injected 
yourself with anything, including 
body building drugs? 
11 In the Iasi 2 years have you had 
jaundice or hepatitis? 
12 Has anyone in your family had CJD 
(Creutzieldt-Jakob Disease) 
13 Have you ever had malaria? 
14 Were you born or did you live in 
another country before you were 
5 years old? 
15 Have you been to places other than 
Western Europe. Australia, New Zealand 
or North America in the last 12 months? 
16 Have you ever had any unexplained 
fever while abroad, or shortly after 
your return to the UK? 
17 Have you ever lived in or visited 
Centrab'South America? 
18 Have you ever felt unwell after giving 
blood? 
NBS 2757624 
IN THE LAST YEAR, OR SINCE YES NO ST fu" YOUR LAST DONATION USE:. 
19 Have you received blood yourself? 
20 Have you had acupuncture, ear, nose, 
body piercing, a tattoo or 
semi-permanent makeup? 
21 Have you had any injury which could 
have put you at risk of hepatitis or HIV? 
22 Have you had an operation or 
serious ilkiess° 
IN THE LAST 4 WEEKS: 
23 Have you, to the best of your knowledge, 
been in contact with any infectious disease? 
24 Have you had any vaccinations or 
immunisations? 
You should never give blood if: 
" you or your partner are HIV positive 
" you carry the hepatitis B or C virus 
" you are a man who has had sex with another man, even 
'safe sex' using a condom 
" you have ever worked as a prostitute 
" you have ever Injected yourself, even once, with drugs 
(including body building drugs) 
" you think you need an HIV or hepatitis test 
25 IS IT POSSIBLE THAT ANY OF THE 
ABOVE MIGHT APPLY TO YOU? 
You should not give blood for a year after sex with: 
"a man who has had sex with another man (if you are a 
woman) 
"a prostitute 
" anyone who has injected themselves with drugs 
" anyone with haemophilia or related blood clotting disorder, 
who has received clotting factor concentrates 
" anyone of any race who has been sexually active In Africa 
in the past year (apart from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt) 
" someone you think might be HIV or hepatitis positive 
26 IS IT POSSIBLE THAT ANY OF THE 
ABOVE MIGHT APPLY TO YOU? 
27 00 YOU WISH TO SPEAK IN 
CONFIDENCE TO A DOCTOR OR NURSE 
IT you become unwell within 2 weeks of your donation, please ring the donor helpline on 0345 711711 as soon as possible. 
rnti, osm,, uweb 
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jJ s e 
is o 
AII-I 
FRv1 Month Year 
NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 
INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
DONATION TESTING SURVEILLANCE 
i 
i i 
i 
This folder is for recording and reporting of testing performed on blood and plasma donations taken during a 
calendar month. 
Section I is for recording the number of donations tested during the calendar month. 
Section 2 is for recording the number of initially reactive (by manufacturers criteria) donations for HBV, 
HCV, HIV and T. pallidum screening tests during the calendar month. 
Section 3 is for recording the details of each donation tested (with donation date within the calendar month) 
and found to be repeatedly reactive to the screen (by manufacturers criteria), and, in addition, all other 
donations (except those specified below) sent for further testing in order to confirm an infection with HBV, 
HCV, HIV or T. pallidum. Please classify donors according to the donor type classification explained on the 
inside cover of this folder. Separate sheets for each marker of infection are included : 
" a) HBsAg (yellow) 
b) anti-HCV (green) 
c) anti-HIV (pink) 
d) T. pallidum (old gold) 
If a sample is sent to the confirmatory laboratory, please also record the confirmatory conclusion when it is 
received. Please record the test kit and batch number used for the repeat testing on each sheet and use 
separate sheets for each batch of test used for repeat testing of donations collected within the month. Please 
add additional sheets to this folder as needed. 
Please do not routinely Include' the following samples which may be sent from your laboratory for 
confirmatory testing: i) samples taken to re-confirm an infection in a donor ie. 'diagnostic' samples' 
ii) donation samples referred for antibody quantitation for 
immunoglobulin preparation 
iii) non-BTS samples eg. ante-natal samples, organ/tissue bank samples' 
iv) donation samples referred due only to criteria for a special study 
v) autologous donations' 
' If you wish to include these samples on Section 3 sheets for your own records please do so and distinguish 
the entry by writing "CONE" or "SPECIAL" by the donation number column. 
2 These samples should also be excluded from Section I and Section 2. 
During the second week following the end of the calendar month please send the top (blue) copies of Section 
1, Section 2 and Section 3 a) yellow, b) green, c) pink & d) old gold to: 
The Medical Director (Infection Surveillance), 
National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, 
Watford, Herts. WD24 4QN 
Use the second (same colour) copies of Section 3 sheets to record results of confirmatory tests. Please return 
these second topics along with the next month's top copies, even if some confirmatory results are still 
outstanding. 
Please pass an Infected Donor Surveillance folder to the relevant medical officer for each donor with a 
newly confirmed infection. 
The back (white) copy of each report should be kept in this folder as a local record. 
cmmwd 521. 
Appendix 3 
NOTES ON"COMPLETING THE FORMS: 
Donor type classification 
Please apply the following criteria for classifying donations into donor type on Section 3 forms. 
NEW Donations from donors who have never been tested by a BTC for this 
blood home infection. ie. from donors who have never before donated to 
a UK BTC, and from donors who have not donated since the introduction 
of testing for the marker to which they are now found to be reactive. 
Please note that this latter type of NEW donor in-Section 3 would be 
classified as an OLD donor in Section 1. For these rare cases. please 
circle NEW and insert "ONT' (ie, old not tested) in the donor type box 
of Section 3. 
Previously reactive (PR) Donations from donors who are currently flagged donors/donors 
withdrawn from the panel due to at least one repeatedly reactive donation 
within the last six months, or at the last, or last-but-one donation. In 
practice this may include donors previously reactive to the current-test and 
donors previously reactive to another test for the same marker used to test 
previous donations. 
Not previously reactive (NPR) Donations from donors who have been tested by the screening test before, 
but have either never been repeatedly reactive to the test, or who have not 
been repeatedly reactive at the last, or last-but-one donation or during the 
last six months ie. are not, at this time, flagged/withdrawn due to 
reactivity to the test. 
Confirmatory laboratory conclusion 
Please use the following meanings for the confirmatory laboratories' conclusions on Section 3 forms. 
POS Confirmed to be positive. 
NEG Confirmed to be negative. 
UNDET Confirmatory tests do not conclude that this donation is either positive or 
negative. The marker/infection status of the donation is concluded as 
UNDETERMINED. 
ND The confirmatory laboratory did not perform any confirmatory tests on 
this donation (for example, if it was decided that testing of a donation 
would not contribute any information towards concluding a donor's 
infection status according to the algorithm in use, or if the sample was 
spoilt on arrival at the confirmatory laboratory). 
If you have any questions about the completion of these reports please call the CDSC/NBA Infection 
Surveillance Officer (Kate Soldan) on 020 8200 6868 x4602 
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DONATION TESTING SURVEILLANCE 
SECTION 1: Donation totals 
BTC : Month Year 
Please complete the table below as fully as possible. The totals for new and old/repeat donors (bold outlined boxes) 
are the minimum requirement. If age and sex breakdowns are also available please complete the entire table. 
Number of donations tested :- 
1 
<25 years 
1 
25-34 years 
1 
35-44 years 
1 
45+ years 
I 
TOTAL 
Males 
Females 
Total new 
X25 years 
1 
25-34 years 
1 
35-44 years 
1 
45+ years TOTAL 
Males 
Females 
Total old/repeat 
TOTAL 
DONATIONS 
TESTED 
Report completed by (please print name): Date // 
Please nen m the lop(bloc) copy of this font along with Saco. 2 and Section 3 of this nmont'o donation testing reporn to: - The 
Mcd Diretlor, (Infection 
Surveitlaacc) National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, Watford, Herts. WDI IQH. Thank you for Yo w help. 
lFomt ende DTS 101) 
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ý1ý ýý ý"aö 
. Jf 
Rv Month Year 
C 
ý'ý ýýý"' : DONATION TESTING SURVEILLANCE 
SECTION 2: Donations initially reactive to screening tests 
BTC " Month Year L. ý" 
Please complete the table below with the numbers of blood and plasma donations tested and the numbers 
found to be initially reactive (IR) (by manufacturers criteria) in screening tests for anti4HIV, HBsAg, anti- 
HCV and T. pallidum antibodies performed on donations obtained during this month. Please complete one 
line for each batch of kit used. 
Marker screen Batch numbers Initially reactive donations / 
& test of kits used Total donations tested 
(is. write mmufadru&Ied kit same and genaauon) 
Anti-HIV 
.1 kor 
.. ---------- ---I -"-" --- - 
----"-""-"-- ---ý 
- -- ---- -- -- ---: - 
HBsAg 
el kt 
------------ 
------------ ---! -------- 
Anti-HCV 
w wa 
------------ ---'--------- 
------------ ---'--------- 
T. pa! lidum 
r tic 
----------- ---'--------- 
------------ ------ -------- 
Malaria 
F k, 
----------- ---'--------- 
------------ 
i Report completed by (please print name): Date // 
Plaste rcwra the top (blue) copy of this form along with Sectwn I and Sccaoa) of Ibis month' I donsuun Iesung report to " The Medical Director 
(Infectious Surveillance), National Blood Authority. Oak House, Reeds Cremenf, Watford, WDI IQH.. Sea folder froh . over for full addresses, Thank you 
for yow help IFonm code; DTS 2 021 
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"d ö 
0 X11 ýýý z SE 
sF 
RVV Donor: 
NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 
INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
INFECTED DONOR SURVEILLANCE 
This folder is for recording and reporting information about a donor found to be infected with HBV, 
HCV (positive or indeterminate test results) , HIV or T. pallidum by the National Blood Service. 
A designated person at your blood centre should be responsible for completing these forms. 
Section 1 is for recording the donor, donation, and testing details known at the blood centre at the 
time when an infection is confirmed. Section 1 should be completed at the blood centre when 
complete confirmatory test results are received. When Section 1 has been completed please send the 
top (blue) copy to : 
The Medical Director, (Infection Surveillance), 
National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, Watford, 
Herts. WD1 1QH 
(If a subsequent sample from this donor (ie. a "confirmatory", or "diagnostic" sample) indicates an 
error in the results of tests on the initial sample please notify the Infection Surveillance Officer who 
will withdraw the initial report. ) 
Instruction for reporting HCVRNA (PCR) results (1/4/99 onwards): Please 
record the results of PCR tests done at the confirmatory laboratory on a singleton sample by "HCV 
PCR (Singleton)". Please record, if known, the results of PCR tests done by the NAT laboratory on 
a pooled sample by "NAT result (If known)". If the donation was not tested by pooled NAT testing, 
"ND" (not done) should be circled. If the donation was initially detected as HCV infected by NAT 
testing (i. e. non-reactive to antibody test) please tick the box provided to indicate this, and date the 
other test results if they relate to samples collected subsequent to the donation. 
Section 2 is for the recording of donor details known only by a clinician, or other carer, who 
subsequently communicates with the donor about the confirmed infection(s) or who knows the donor 
as a patient. If the blood centre is undertaking initial follow up of the donor's infection, Section 2 
should be completed at the blood centre and the top copy (blue) sent to The Medical Director, NBA 
(address as above). If the blood centre refers the donor to another carer, please complete the donation 
and report identity information at the top of Section 2 and then forward Section 2 to the other carer. 
The carer should then return the completed report to the NBA. 
There is no need to complete a separate laboratory report form for PHLS CDSC as information on 
these reports will be provided by the NBA to the relevant voluntary confidential national surveillance 
systems, and to local public health doctors. 
If you have any questions about the completion of these reports please call CDSC/NBA Infection 
Surveillance Officer (Kate Soldan), on 0181 200 6868 x4602 or email ksoldan@phls. nhs. uk. 
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NOTES ON COMPLETING THE FORMS: 
1. Test results 
The following abbreviations are used to describe test results and final confirmatory testing conclusions: 
POS A positive result to a test, or a positive conclusion regarding infection. 
NEG A negative result to a test, or a negative conclusion regarding infection. 
EQV An equivocal result to a test. 
ND A test was not done, or confirmatory testing was not done. 
INDET Confirmatory test results do not conclude that this donation is either positive or negative. 
The infection status of the donation is concluded as INDETERMINATE. (For HCV see the "Definition of an 
indeterminate donor for the HCV lookback". ) 
2. Soundex coding 
The soundex code of each donors surname is requested as an identifier. No soundex code is unique for a single 
surname. Mainly because soundex codes ignore vowels, all soundex codes can relate to several names, for example, H- 
300 is the code for Hutt, Heite, Hyde and Hoade among many possibilities. However, if the soundex code is used in 
combination with first initial, date of birth and sex, duplicate reports can be identified and reports for an individual can 
be updated. 
Instructions for the manual coding of surnames into soundex codes and a small programme for computer generation of 
soundex codes have been sent to your blood centre. If these are not accessible at the time of completing a form please 
contact Kate Soldan (0181 200 6868 x4602), or call the PHLS AIDS Division (0181 200 6868 x4420,4453,4406, 
4562,4559) and ask for the soundex code of a surname or list of surnames. If surnames are written in full onto these 
forms, they will be converted to soundex on receipt at the NBA. 
248 
Appendix 4 
'ý i: INFECTED DONOR SURVEILLANCE 
iSECTION 1: Donor & donation information 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Please complete this report for each donor with a newly confirmed HH; HBV, HCV or T. pallidum infection, or with an indeterminate 11CY 
infection. Please write into the spaces provided or tick the appropriate box. 
WM m ru (SPT cDýý Yly cane Dooatiom date atc) 
Soondex of donors one loitnl(ý) Sex Date of b nb Dow's postcode escb k end 
I. Results of confirmatory tests (please circle%omolete the correct results in detail and the final confirmater y conclusion. ND=not done) 
Infection Marker naafi by. test used (manufacturer and kit) rene! Conf. resr/t 
HIV I&2 anti-HIV : POS NEG EQV ND by HIV1- POS/ NEG 
HIV antibodies(WB) -------- 
by: 
Levels: 
-------- 
HIV2- POS / NEO 
HIV RNA(PCR) : POS NEG EQV ND ND 
HBV HBeAg : POS (RPHA NEG ND by: Neutralised? YES NO ND CARRIER / ACUTE 
anti-HBctgM : POS NEG EQV ND by 
anti-HBc total : POS NEG ND by. NEU / ND 
HB&Ag : POS KEG ND by 
anti-HBe : POS NEG NO by: 
anti-Has POS (kvcL_............... miulml) NEG ND by. 
HCV anti-HCV : POS NEG EQV ND by. POS / NEG 
by 
Levelslintensities: 
------- Please tick box (& date results) if infection 
INDET/ND 
HCV PCR (Singleton) : POS NEG EQV ND initially detected only by NAT testing 10 
f1 
NAT resuk (If known) : POS NEG ND 
T. pa! /idum POS / NEG / ND 
Notes: 
2. To which ethnic group does the donor consider himself/herselfto belong? 
White Qs Black-Caribbean Q, Black-African Q, Black-other Q11 " Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi Q12, 
^ Chinese Ek Other, Asian Q Other, specify: i Not known Q. 
i) Does this donor have any previous donations on record ? 
at this BC ............................... »....... »... yes 
Qt 
3. no 
Q14, 
not known 
Q15, 
to another BC in the UK....... » ............. yes 
Q16, 
no 
Qýl7, 
not known 
Q18, 
to a non-UK transfusion centre............ yes 
Q19, 
noI- 1]¢0, not known 1, 
ii) If "yes" (ie. donor has donated previously) lease give details of the most recent previous donation : 
BC of duea, ioa Doeanoe number of most rteent prcv, mo donation Daouion date 
-/-/- 
iii) What were the test results for this most recent previous donation taken by the blood transfusion service? 
Not tested for the infection(s)' now detected .................................... » .... »..... __.. »......... » 
1: 125. 
'I ft" or more infection. please note infection(s) in the margin beside each tick 
^ Non-reactive to the screening test(s) for the infection(s) detected2........... » ............................ 
026, 
2Pfease 
spe[I, test kn iued(sL e, ano/eNre andg een, nnn): 
Reactive to the screening test(s) & i) confirmed negative3.... » ...................... »................. 
Q27 
ii) result(s) undetermined' ............................... ... __ 
1: 1284 
3Pfmae 
, pacyfy conjirmaory tern and results. 
Confirmed positive ......... . _.. » ............... »............................................................. .... _.. ..... .l C9, 
Tested at another BC, result not known at this BC .......... ..................... »............................... 
[l0, 
Results not known/not traceable ............... »...................................... ........ j.. ý........................ _. 
ý^ 
1. 
iv) Is an archived specimen available from this previous donation? ............. yes 
ý2, 
no I _f13, not known 
[^134, 
............................... ^^ 
v) Has this donor ever been an apheresis donor? ....................................... »................................ yes 
[135 
, no 
[16, 
not known 
£137, 
Report completed by (please print): Date: // 
Please , en= the top(blsc) copy of this form to: The Medical Dkector. (lnfecuon Surve. Uanco). National Blood Authmrty. Oak House. Reeds Creeeeal. Watford, Hats. WDL IQtt. 
Thaek ye. tut yo, r kelp. - Vona code: IDS 1.021 
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ý 
CONFIDENTIAL 
ý''i INFECTED DONOR SURVEILLANCE 
SECTION 2: Donor exposure history for blood borne infections 
Please complete this report for each donor with a confirmed HIV. HBV HCV or T paiidum infection or an indeterminate IICV infection. 
oS was dete0ed Mnst= number Dmwtins dam 
Soo dcz of donor s somsor loýtial(s) Sca Date of butt 
1. Please tick the appropriate summary of the follow-up of the donor's exposures to infection 
a. Donor has no identifiable risk i. a no risk for infection identified despite satisfactory information provided ........... ». _........... 
nfQ. b. Risk for the donor not identified possibly because of incomplete follow-up/information ............. »..... »»........ ». ........ . ».. »». 
c, One or more probable risks for infection identified (please spedfy, all below) ». ... ». » .. ... »». ..... .. ..... ...... »»». 
Q, 
2. If c. to question 1, please specify probable risks for infection by ticking all that apply, deleting options and describing in free text as 
appropriate. If ticking "yes' to any exposure, please indicate the country of the exposure (UK or abroad), and the first and last year of the donor's 
exnnsure. For donors with multinle exposures nleme asterisk (9 the emnm-r which von think in the moat nmhahle mate of inf-r. nn 
Donor's probable exposure(s) to blood borne infections Yes B. Yes UK Abroad First year Last year 
Iniectine drus use VO 
Sex between men (i. e. homosexual intercourse) 
Sex between men and women (i. e. heterosexual intercourse) 
ease details of sexmal partner(s) risk s below 
Blood / tissue / organ recipient please delete as approprtal, 
Occupational exposure to blood 
Probable perinatal/horizontal exposure in childhood 
Other suspected exposure(e&eaebdd 
A. p deev, vwv. -di- umedel, baooiw. uymc4. e, e. aua body v'. & 
biwd-º. Please describe: 
Donor's heterosexual partner(s) Yes Comments: 
Has HN / HBV / HCV / T. naildum please delete as aaorooriate 
Is a man who has had sex with a man (i. e. a homosexual man) 
Is/was an injecting drug user 
Is/was paid for sex 
Has lived in/visited Africa 
Has received blood product treatment (eg. has haemophilia) 
Is a transplant / transfusion recipient please delete as appropriate 
Other known exposure, pleas describe: 
3. If c. to question 1. do you know why the donor did not disclose an existing risk factor (as detailed above) at the time of donating 
blood? 
No: no reason obtained 
QI 
Yes: Q2 please describe the reason 
4. To which ethnic group does the donor consider himselVherself to belong? 
White 
Qn Black-Caribbean D Black-African Q, Black-other 
Q" Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi Q, 
Chinese L_{ Other, Asian 
Q, Other, specify: . Not known U, 
S. In which country was this donor bom ? 
6. Does this donor say he/she has ever donated blood prior to the date above? ............................. yes 
Q 
no not known U, 
If "yes", please give details of the most recent previous donation: 
C~tFYIBC Omahas dw 
7. Has this donor had any clinical signs of this(/these) ^ 
infection(s)? .......................................... ..................................................................................... yes 
Q 
no 
EL 
not known 
Q 
If "yes". please describe with dates: 
Report completed by (pfeose prr 4 Date: // 
rkm emu. M roproem) copy orthi. 6.. e ro T3. Medical nbeuoc, llnaccuo, sýsvetu. ucm). N. umul Blood AWbonq.. Oak ºb, n., rued. crescmc 
Watfa. d . wn 1 IQºt 
Thank yap fm yar kelp 
(FýQda: IDS 2 021 
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RV ýý 1 PTI case code: 1 
NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 
INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
POST-TRANSFUSION INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
(NON-BA CTERIAL) 
Please use the enclosed forms to report all (non-bacterial) infections (including HAV, HBC, HCV, HIV, & parasitic infections) 
in transfusion recipients about which you are informed, and to report a summary of your investigations of implicated units. 
A designated person at your blood centre should be responsible for completing these forms. 
Section 1 (PTI case report) is for reporting each infection in a transfusion recipient which you are informed about 
which meets the following criteria*: 
A. i) the receipt of transfusion has been confirmed, and 
ii) the infection has been confirmed (by detection of antibody, antigen, RNA/DNA etc. ), and 
iii) there is no evidence that the recipient was infected prior to transfusion, 
or B. i) and iv) the recipient has acute clinical hepatitis of no known cause (ie. including no evidence of acute 
HAV, HBV, HCV, EBV or CMV infection in post-transfusion samples to date) 
(An infection satisfying these criteria will be referred to as a post-transfusion infection (PTI) case. ) 
* Except HCV infected recipients transfused prior to September 1991 with blood not tested for HCV antibodies. 
Some PTI cases will lead to an investigation of the donation(s) and donor(s) of the recipient's transfusion(s); some 
will not: please record this at the bottom of Section 1. Please complete a Section 1 form as soon as possible after you are 
informed of an infection in a transfusion recipient and send the top copy (yellow) to 
The Medical Director, National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, Watford, Herts. II 1QH 
Please keep the back (white) copy for your own records. 
Section 2 (PTI donor/donation investigation report) and Section 3 (PTI conclusion of investigation) are for reporting the 
outcome of any investigation of implicated units. If all the units implicated in the PTI case were produced 
by your blood 
centre, a Section 2&3 form should be attached to the PTI case file for completion, and posting (top copies only) to The 
Medical Director, NBA (at the address above) when the investigation is closed. 
If one or more unit(s) implicated in the case were produced by one or more other blood centre(s), copies of Section 2&3 
should be sent to each relevant blood centre(s) along with the details of their implicated unit(s). (A photocopy of the Section 1 
form may also be sent as a summary of the case details. ) After investigation of the implicated unit(s), the other blood centre(s) 
should complete Section 2 and Section 3 parts A&B and return the top copies to the blood centre who initiated the PTI case 
investigation. The date of completion of Section 3 will be taken as the date on which the investigation was closed. The case- 
initiating blood centre should complete a Section 2 and a Section 3, parts A, B, and C, and send the top copies, along with 
photocopies of the Section 2&3 reports from other blood centres relating to the case, to The Medical 
Director, NBA. 
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Please prefix your own unique number/code for the PTI case with the first three letters of your blood centre name 
when recording the'PTI case code' on each form. This will enable each case reported to be clearly identified, and will 
also allow linkage of Section 1 and Section 2&3 reports. It Is therefore particularly important to enter this case code 
on to each Section 2&3 form before sending to any other blood centre(s) who produced units implicated In the same 
case. 
continued overleaf... 
If a donor is found by a PTI investigation to have markers of infection with HBV, HCV, HIV or T. pallidum, please complete 
an Infected Donor Surveillance report (Sections 1&2). Please complete these forms for the donation which was implicated by 
the investigation ie. the donation which is believed to have transmitted an infection, even if this donation has no markers of 
infection, and write the PTI case code next to your blood centre name on Section 1 of the Infected Donor Surveillance report. 
(The Infected Donor Surveillance reports are not suitable for collecting information about donors found to have markers of 
other transfusion transmissible infections and information about such cases may be requested by other means as appropriate. ) 
(See back cover for reporting summary. ) 
If a look-back at other recipients of an infected donor discovers additional post-transfusion infection(s), please report each PTI 
on a separate set of forms: please record the blood centre as the source of the report4 and "look-back after (PTI case code)" as 
the reason for diagnosis on Section 1. 
Test results 
The following 2 
POS 
NEG 
EQV 
ND 
abbreviations are used to describe test results: 
A positive result to a test. 
A negative result to a test. 
An equivocal result to a test. 
A test was not done. 
Sounder coding 
The soundex code of each donors surname may be used instead of surname as an identifier. No soundex code is unique for a single surname. 
Mainly because soundex codes ignore vowels, all soundex codes can relate to several names, for example, H-300 is the code for Hutt, Heite, 
Hyde and Hoade among many possibilities. However, if the soundex code is used in combination with first initial, date of birth and sex, 
duplicate reports can be identified and reports for an individual can be updated. 
Instructions for the manual coding of surnames into soundex codes and a small programme for computer generation of soundex codes have 
been sent to your blood centre. If these are not accessible at the time of completing a form please contact Kate Soldan (0181 200 6868 
x4602), or call the PHLS AIDS Division on 0181 200 6868 x4420,4453,4406,4562,4559 and ask for the soundex code of a surname or 
list of surnames. If surnames are written in full on to these forms, they will be converted to soundex on receipt at the NBA. 
Example Section 2 question 2 
2. Infection status of the donor(s) 
Please record the results of re-testing the implicated donation(s)/donor(s) in the table below. Use one line to summarise all similar tests ie. 
the same test(s) and same result(s) on a similar specimen type. Please record re-tests on archived samples (and pack residues) from the 
implicated donation(s) and re-tests on subsequent samples (which may be either fresh or archived subsequent donations, or specially bled 
fresh samples) from the implicated donors separately. Record results by writing POS, NEG, EQV (equivocal) and%or the titre/level in each 
column. An empty cell will be taken as indication that the test was not performed. 
For a post-transfusion hBV case, with implicated donations from 13 donors, the summary testing results could look like this :- 
HAV HBV 
Number and type of samples anti-H" HBsAg i anti-HBc anti-HBc i HBeAg anti-HBe 
i anti-HBs 
(ARCHIVEISUB. SAMPLE) I gm (total) I gm 
x 
x 
x 
x 
E x I I I 
1 
ie. all archives were re-tested 8 donors provided a subsequent sample, one donor was anti-HBc positive. with no anti-HBs. 
The conclusions for this investigation (Section 3, part A) would therefore include - 
B. donor(s) was(were) found through re-testing of archive samples to have markers of transmissible infectioa ........... t9, 
Please specify the implicated unit type(s): 
If you have any questions about the completion of these reports please call Kate Soldan, NBA/CDSC Infecti262irveillance 
officer, on 0181200 6868 x4602 
Appendix 5 
Summary of surveillance reports for a PTI case 
A Blood centre is informed of 
an infection in a transfusion 
recipient (a PTI case) 
PTI Surveillance: Section 1 
A Post-Transfusion Infection report is 
completed and sent to the surveillance centre 
by a designated member of blood centre staff 
Investigation of No investigation 
implicated units conducted 
PTI Surveillance: Sections 2&3 
Summary reports of the Post-Transfusion 
Infection investigation(s) completed and sent, 
via the case-initiating blood centre to the 
surveillance centre by a designated member of 
blood centre staff 
Infected No infected 
donor donor 
identified' identified 
Infected Donor Surveillance: Section 1&2 
A report for each donor found to be infected 
with HBV, HCV, IIIV or Tpallidum is 
completed and sent to the surveillance centre 
by a designated member of blood centre staff 
I If other donations(s) from the infected donor(s) are investigated, ie. a look-back at other recipients is conducted, a Post-Transfusion 
Infection report (Sections 1,2 & 3) should be completed for each recipient who satisfies the criteria for a post-transfusion infection 
(see front of folder for criteria of a PTI). 
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Rv ýý 2 PT[ case code: 10 
NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 
INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
POST-TRANSFUSION INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
(BA CTERIAL) 
Please use the enclosed forms to report all bacterial infections in transfusion recipients, and post-transfusion reactions suspected to 
be due to bacteria, about which you are informed, and to report a summary of your investigations of implicated units. 
A designated person at your blood centre should be responsible for completing these forms. 
Section 1 (PT1 case report) is for reporting each infection/reaction in a transfusion recipient which you are informed about 
which meets the following criteria*: 
A. i) the receipt of transfusion has been confirmed, and 
ii) the infection has been confirmed, and 
iii) there is no evidence that the recipient was infected prior to transfusion, 
or B. i) and iv) the recipient has a post-transfusion reaction suspected (but not confirmed by laboratory tests) to be due 
to bacteria 
(Cases meeting these criteria will be referred to as post-transfusion infections (PTI) and post-transfusion reactions suspected to be 
due to bacteria (PTR). ) 
Some PTI/PTR cases will lead to an investigation of the donation(s) and donor(s) of the recipient's transfusion(s); some will not: 
please record this at the bottom of Section 1. Please complete a Section 1 form as soon as possible after you are informed of an 
infection/reaction in a transfusion recipient and send the top copy (yellow) to: - 
The Medical Director, National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, Watford, Herts. WDI IQH 
Please keep the back (white) copy for your own records. 
Section 2 (donor/donation investigation report) and Section 3 (conclusion of investigation) are for reporting the outcome of any 
investigation of implicated units. If all the units implicated in the PTI/PTR case were produced by your blood centre, a Section 2&3 
form should be attached to the PTI/PTR case file for completion, and posting (top copies only) to The Medical Director, NBA (at 
the address above) when the investigation is closed. 
If one or more unit(s) implicated in the case were produced by one or more other blood centre(s), copies of 
Section 2&3 should be 
sent to each relevant blood centre(s) along with the details of their implicated unit(s). (A photocopy of the 
Section 1 form may also 
be sent as a summary of the case details. ) After investigation of the implicated unit(s), the other blood centre(s) should complete 
Section 2 and Section 3 parts A&B and return the top copies to the blood centre who initiated the PTI/PTR case investigation. The 
date of completion of Section 3 will be taken as the date on which the investigation was closed. The case-initiating blood centre 
should complete a Section 2 and a Section 3, parts A, B, and C, and send the top copies, along with photocopies of the Section 2& 
3 reports from other blood centres relating to the case, to The Medical Director, NBA. 
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t%r'r 3: POST-TRANSFUSION INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
SECTION 1: Confirmed post-transfusion infection report 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Please complete one report for each transfusion recipient as soon as possible. 
Mood centre whwh oo was reponca PTI case code: (BC prefer) (BC case noJcode) Date of Ist report to BC: 
Source of report to blood centre(name and institution of 
notifier) 
J Recipien*s surname or soundez Initial(s) Sez Date of both 
A. PTI information 
i. Reason ioraiaen 
Hepatitis infection 
Clinical acute hepatitis .................... ......... . ................... .. 
Q 
20, 
Symptomatic chronic liver disease ............ 
ý7 
...................... 121: 
Hepatocel lul ar carcinoma .......................... ...................... 
E12 
3 
Abnormal liver function: routine testing ......................... 
[13 
4 
HAV/HBV/HCV markers: routine testing ...................... LJ24, Other, please specify: 
Other infection 
CMV infection .......................... .............................. ....... LJ281, 
Malaria .................................................................... ....... 
1: 129 
1: 
HTLV infection ....................................................... ....... 
1: 130 
u 
B19 infection .......................................................... ...... 
03 
1 
Bacteraemi a ................................................................... 
E12 
Specify species if known 
Post-transfusion reaction (PTR) .............................. ....... 
1: 133 
.. (suspected, but not confnned, to be due to bacteria) 
Other, please specify:,, 
HIV infection 
HIV related symptoms, not AIDS .............................................. 
1125, 
AIDS ......................................................................................... 
[16, 
HIV markers found on routine testing ....................................... 
[17, 
Other, please specify: to 
Notes & symptoms : 
3. Date of a) onset of symtoms: //- or, b) diagnosis of sub-clinical infection: 
4. Date of latest report of the recipient and status at that time ..................................................................... 
I I 
I I 
Dead, infection implicated .............. 
037 
, 
Dead, no known involvement Symptomatic ................................ 
119, 
of the infection .......................... 
1: 18 
, ý-7 Asymptomatic ........ ......................... LJ40. 
5. Had the recipient had any other known risk exposures for this infection? ............................................... yes 
041 
, no 
112: 
not known 
043, 
(eg. IDU, sexual/household contact with an infected person, surgery, organ/tissue transplant, fractionated blood product treatment, transfusion abroad) 
If "yes", please specify: 
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6. Infection status of the recipient 
Please enter the significant test results (ie. pre-transfusion, post-transfusion and follow up as available) for the recipient's samples in the table below. Please 
enter POS (positive), NEG (negative) EQV (equivocal) and/or the titre/level as appropriate in each box. An empty box will taken as indication that the test 
was not nerfonned. 
HAV HBV HCV HIV Other 
Lab where 
tests were 
perform Specimen date anti-HAV HBsAg I anti-HBc I' anti-IBC I-IBeAg anti-HBe a anti-HBs anti-HCV i" HCV RNA anti-HIV 
IBM 
'M 
' (total) IF EUSA(s) ' RIBA 
(nvt) i (%nJub/ ii (lien) ii 
/eve! ) tit 
tt tt 
3. 
B. Transfusion information 
1. Hospital of transfusion: 
2. Reason for transfusion: 
3. Datelperiod over which transfusion(s) was/were given: 
Ito 1 
4. Number and type of units transfused: If CMV infection is reported, 
red cells x 
D6 
cryoprecipitate x 11147 4b. How many units were 
platelets x 
D8 
other x 
D9 
i) labelled CMV antibody negative 
11L 
whole blood x Ll 1 not on x 1152 ii) leucocyte depleted L23 
FFP x Lc4 
Total number of units = L-155 
[ 
=L-t6 from this BC +L-6 from other BCs, specify: 
5. Based on the available information about the recipient and the implicated donation(s)/donor(s), ie. A&B above, was an investigation of 
the donation(sydonors(s initiated? 
Yes 
E8 
, please attach Section 2&3report forms to the case's file for completion once the investigation is closed 
No 
E1592 
Please state 
reason: 
Report completed by (please print name): Date / /, 
pleau return the top(yellow) copy of this form to. - The Medical Director, (Infection Surveillance) National Blood Authonty, Oak House, Reeds Crescent, Watford, Herts., WDI 
1QH. Thank you for your help. [Fons code. PTIS 1.02] 
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Section 3 (NON-BACTERIAL): Confirmed PTI investigation summary 
Conclusion of investigation 
Blood centre Frl case code: (BC prefix) (DC caase na/cale)ý 
A. Conclusion of this blood centre's investigation 
Please tick your conclusion(s) for the investigation of donation(s)/donor(s) at your blood centre. Please insert the correct number in the 
space to complete the conclusion where appropriate. 
The recipients infection was probably acquired by transfusion with a unit from this blood centre: 
A. Errors were found in compliance with SOP(s) in force at the time of testing/labellingrssuing of the implicated unit(s) ......... 
117, 
B. -78 donor(s) was(were) 
found through re-testing of archive samples to have markers of transmissible infection ............. 
079, 
Please specify the implicated unit type(s): 
C. -80 donor(s) was(were) 
found through testing of subsequent samples to have markers of transmissible infection ........... 
081, 
Please specify the implicated unit type(s): 
The recipient's infection may have been acquired by transfusion with a unit from this blood centre: 
D. For -82 
donor(s) no sample subsequent to the implicated donation was tested .................................................................. 
1: 183. 
E. For 4 donor(s) no archive sample of the implicated donation was tested ........................................................................ 
U85, 
F. For --86 
donor(s) neither an archive sample of the implicated donation, nor a subsequent sample was tested .................... 
[J87, 
The recipient's infection was probably not acquired from transfusion with a unit from this blood centre: 
G. Archived samples or subsequent samples were obtained from all donors; none were found to have markers indicative of possible 
infectivity at the time of donating the implicated unit(s) ...................................................................................... _....................... 
1: 188, 
H. Other e. g. the blood centre has been informed of another confirmed source of the recipient's infection .................................. 
[lag. 
Please specify: 
B. Actions of this blood centre as a results of this investigation 
Please insert the correct number in the box to indicate the outcome of this investigation for the donor(s) involved. 
A. -90 
donor(s) was(were) removed from the panel because confirmed markers of TTI were found in their blood. 
B. _91 
donor(s) was(were) removed from the panel because of repeated involvement in PTI case investigations. 
(Other PTI case code(s): 
C. -92 
donor(s) was(were) flagged/marked on the donor database as having been involved in a PTI case investigation. 
D. -93 other 
donation(s) from the infected donor(s) are being investigated ie. look-back at recipients is being conducted. 
Please describe any other actions following this investigation: 
C. Conclusion of case investigation 
The recipient's infection was probably acquired by transfusion with a unit from the blood service: 
it li d h i 
(''j E194 
un (s) mp cate e A. Errors were found in compliance with SOP(s) in force at the time of testing/labelling/issuing of t 
ibl i f i 
........ , E16 
ect on ... n e B. 5 donor(s) was(were) found through re-testing of archive samples to have markers of transmiss ........ 2 
C. X97 
donor(s) was(were) found through testing of subsequent samples to have markers of transmissible infection .. ........ 
098, 
if B or C is true: 
Please specify the implicated unit type(s): 
Please specify the implicated DONOR type: NEW , REPEAT - Date of previous 
donation: 
Please give the date the recipient was transfused with this unit: // 
The recipient's infection may have been acquired by transfusion with a unit from the blood service: Elm 
. D. For-99 donor(s) no sample subsequent to the implicated donation was tested ...................................... ..... ............. .... 0102 
, E. For -101 donor(s) no archive sample of the 
implicated donation was tested .............................................................. -. Q104 
d ......... F. For -103 donor(s) neither an archive sample of the 
implicated donation, nor a subsequent sample was teste ...... , 
The recipient's infection was probably not acquired from transfusion with a unit from the blood service: 
Archived samples or subsequent samples were obtained from all donors; none were found to have markers indicative G of possible . 
infectivity at the time of donating the implicated unit(s) ........................................ ..................................................................... 
Elm, 
11 
' s infection ...................... Other e. g. the blood service has been informed of another confirmed source of the recipient H ....... 106, . Please specify: 
FNB. Please also complete IDS forms for any IIIV/HBV/HCV infected donors detected by this investigation. I 
Report completed by (please print name): 
Date // 
Please return the top(ycuow) copy of this 
form to: - The Medical Director (CDSGNBA Infection Surveillance), National Blood Authority, Oak House, Reeds 
Crescent, Watford, Hefts. WDI 
IQH. Thank you for your help. 
(Foren code: PTIS 3.021 
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Appendix 5 
7: POST-TRANSFUSION INFECTION SURVEILLANCE 
Section 3 (BACTERIAL : PTI or PTR infection investigation summary 
Blood centre M cue codc: (B anlu) (BC case d) 
A. Conclusion (please complete for all cases) 
Please tick your conclusion(s) for the investigation of this case (A, BC or D), and as many of the statements I-V that are true. 
A. The recipient's transfusion reaction was probably caused by bacterialbacterial toxins from a transfusion of a blood component 
from the NBS 
B. The recipient's transfusion reaction may or may not have been caused by bacteria/bacterial toxins from a transfusion of a blood 
component from the NBS 
C. The recipient's transfusion reaction was not probably caused by bacteria/bacterial toxins from a transfusion of a blood 
component from the NBS. 
D. Other please spec 
L The recipient was found to have evidence of bacterial infection likely to have caused their transfusion reaction. ................... 
Ui 18, 
U. The implicated component was found to have evidence of bacterial infection ........................................................................ 
119, 
Ill. Other components from the implicated donation were found to have evidence of bacterial infection .................................. 
0120, 
Please specify the component(s): 
IV. An implicated donor was found to have evidence of bacterial infection likely to have been transmitted by transfusion ...... 
0121, 
V. The recipient's reaction was probably caused by bacteria from another source ...................................................................... 122, Please specify the suspected source: ................................. Venepuncture 
site? ...... No(unlikely).. L_L... Possible.. 
E1123.... 
Probable. 
tJ 
Other? 
Note 
B. Summary details of implicated agent and component (please complete unless transfusion has been shown 
not to be the cause of the recipients reaction) 1. Bacteria/toxin found, or suspected, to have caused the transfusion reaction: 
Bacterial load (if known): 
2. Component type found, or suspected, to have caused the transfusion reaction: 
If RED CELLS please give details: 
Buffy coat depleted?..... YES / NO Leucocyte depleted?..... YES / NO If yes, where? Blood centre 
Q124 
Bedside Q125 
If PLATELETS please give details: 
Recovered Q126 
Apheresis 13127 If apheresis, please specify collection apparatus: Cobe 
Q 
Haemonetics Q 
Other (specie) Q 
Not known Q 
Pooled? ......................... YES/NO Leucocyte depleted? ..... YES/NO 
If yes, where? Blood centre 
Q129 
Bedside 0129 
3. Age of the unit (days) at time of transfusion 4. Volume transfused: 
C. Actions of this blood centre as a results of this investigation 
Please insert the correct number in the box to indicate the outcome of this investigation for the donor(s) involved. 
A. _130 donor(s) was(were) removed from the panel because transfusion transmissible 
infection(s) may be present in their 
donations / because of repeated involvement in PTI case investigations (please delete as applicable). 
(Other PTI case code(s): I 
B. _131 donor(s) was(were) flagged/marked on the donor database as 
having been involved in a PTI case investigation. 
C. -132 other donation(s) are being investigated. Other actions following this investigation / notes: _ 
Report completed by (please print name): Date (Ic. date investigation was dosed by your BC) 
Please renn the Iop(ydlow) copy o(tAu foam to-- The Medical Director (CDSGNBA Infection S gvedlance), National Blood Audtonty. Oak House, Reeds C ctceol, W st*rd 
Hma. WDI IQH. Thank you fog yew help. [Fo m code PTIS(bac) 
3021 
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NATIONAL BLOOD SERVICE 7...;, , 
zs INFECTION SURVEILLANCE':.. 
MONTHLY DONATION TESTING REPORT 
For PhD: 
SEPTEMBER 1999 
i. e September's report Tables I a&1 b, 
October's report Tables 2a, lc&2b 
Manufacturers' details and centre details 
removed. 
If you have any queries relating to the data in Table 1a, 1b or 1c please contact Alan Slopecki (NBA 
Head of Quality Assurance: 01277 306000). If you have any queries relating to the data in Table 2a 
or Table 2b please contact Kate Soldan (NBA/PHLS-CDSC Infection Surveillance Officer: 020 8200 
6868 Extn. 4602). The data in Tables la-2b Scotland were collated by Dr Brian Dow, SNBTS 
Microbiology Reference Unit, 0141 357 7708. 
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CONTENTS 
Table Description Infection Page` 
la Test kit and test kit batch specific HBsAg 1-2 
testing results by centre for the last HCV 3-4 
calendar month. (Results of HIV 5-6 
confirmatory tests are incomplete. ) T. pallidum 7-8 
2a Donation type (from new, known HBsAg 9-10 
and monitored donors) specific HCV 11 -12 
infection rates by centre for the last HIV 13 -14 
but one calendar month. T. pallidum 15 -16 
1b Cumulative test kit and test kit HbsAg 17 - 18 
batch specific testing results to the HCV 19 - 20 
end of the last calendar month for HIV 21 - 22 
test kit batches in use during the T. pallidum 23 - 24 
last calendar month. (Results of 
confirmatory tests are incomplete. ) 
1c Donation type (from new, known HBsAg 25 - 26 
and monitored donors) specific HCV 27 - 28 
repeatedly reactive rates by test kit HIV 29 - 30 
from 12 months prior to the end of T. pallidum 31 - 32 
the last but one calendar month. 
2b Cumulative donation type (from HbsAg 33 - 34 
new, known and monitored donors) HCV 35 - 36 
specific infection rates to the end of HIV 37 - 38 
the last but one calendar month. T pallidum 39 - 40 
NOTES 
Tables Ia and 2a contain data for the most recent month available. 
Tables 1 b, Ic and 2b contain cumulative data up to the most recent month available. 
Tables I (a, b and c) present data for monitoring test kit and test kit batch 
performance. 
Tables 2 (a and b) present data for monitoring donor infection rates. 
Cumulative tables contain data about donation tested since Ist October 1995 by 
blood centres in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Channel Isles, the Isle of 
Man and the Republic of Ireland, and since Ist April 1996 by blood centres in 
Scotland. 
PR - previously reactive known donor. NPR - not previously reactive known donor. 
The data in the Scottish tables were collected and collated in Scotland and are 
presented in separate tables. 
* second page is for comparable data from Scotland - not included in PhD. 
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HEPATITIS B NBAIPHLS CDSC Donation testlng surveillance report September 1999 
Table I a: HBsAg testing of blood donation 
1: test kit and test kit batch specific results by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Blood Centre Test kit Batch Number 2 Number reactive (Y. ) Confirmatory test results 3 
Tested Initially Repeatedly Positive Negative Undet. Pending 
England 208682 1200 (0.58) 205 (0.10) 10 191 3 0 
16113 67 (0.42) 14 (0.09) 0 12 1 0 
7569 31 (0.41) 11 (0.15) 0 11 0 0 
7633 59 (0.77) 3 (0.04) 0 3 0 0 
15575 74 (0.48) 19 (0.12) 1 18 0 0 
12059 174 (1.44) 23 (0.19) 0 23 0 0 
13439 125 (0.93) 17 (0.13) 1 15 1 0 
14625 39 (0.27) 17 (0.12) ,2 14 1 0 
20897 5 (0.02) 3 (0.01) 1 2 0 0 
4920 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
2235 33 (1.48) 9 (0.40) 0 9 0 0 
10542 37 (0.35) 16 (0.15) 0 16 0 0 
14235 126 (0.88) 15 (0.11) 2 13 0 0 
7766 35 (0.45) 6 (0.10) 1 7 0 0 
1641 9 (0.55) 1 (0.06) 0 1 0 0 
26365 230 (0.87) 21 (0.08) 0 21 0 0 
4807 16 (0.33) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
7594 65 (0.86) 6 (0.08) 1 5 0 0 
9994 46 (0.46) 12 (0.12) 0 12 0 0 
10670 28 (0.26) 9 (0.08) 1 8 0 0 
Wales 10159 4 (0.04) 2 (0.02) 1 1 0 0 
10159 4 (0.04) 2 (0.02) 1 1 0 0 
Northern Ireland 6016 19 (0.32) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
3303 19 (0.58) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 0 
2713 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Channel Isles & tslp of Man 696 2 (0.29) 1 (0.14) 0 1 0 0 
185 1 (0.54) 1 (0.54) 0 1 0 0 
44 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
227 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
240 1 (0.42) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Republic of Ireland 11774 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
3240 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
8534 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Total 237327 1226 (0.52) 209 (0.09) 11 194 3 0 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Details 
of test results for these donors will be given In the appropriately dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables 1a and lb because they are on donations collected from donors 
being monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each Infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) in Tables lalb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
3. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of positive, negative. undetermined 
and pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening results In the 'grey 
zone. 
-page 1- 
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HEPATITIS C NBA/PHI. S CDSC Donation testing surveillance report September 1999 
Table 1 a: Anti-HCV testing of blood donations' : test kit and test kit batch specific results by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Blood centre Test kit Batch Number2 Number reactive (%) Confirmatory test results 
4 
Tested Initially Repeatedly 3 Positive Negative Undet. Pending 
England 208684 297 (0.14) 151 " (0.07) 17 101 32 .1 
23677 36 (0.15) 14 (0.06) 0 10 4 0 
23205 34 (0.15) 21 (0.09) 0 20 1 0 
25506 32 (0.13) 19' (0.07) 1 1 16 1 
1362 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
13268 5 (0.05) 5 (0.04) 1 3 1 0 
20867 19 (0.09) 14 (0.07) B 6 0 a 
4912 1 (0.02) 1 (0.02) 0 0 1 0 
8999 3 (0.03) 3 (0.03) 0 3 0 0 
3776 5 (0.13) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
21994 62 (0.28) 30 " (0.14) 4 21 5 0 
28040 62 (0.22) 20 (0.07) 2 18 0 0 
12402 22 (0.18) 13 (0.10) 0 11 2 0 
13479 9 (0.07) 5 (0.04) 0 4 1 0 
7197 6 (0.08) 4 (0.06) 1 2 1 0 
Wales 10145 10 (0.10) 9 (0.09) 0 7 2 0 
4223 8 (0.19) 7 (0.17) 0 5 2 0 
5922 2 (0.03) 2 (0.03) 0 2 0 0 
Northern Ireland 6015 8 (0.13) 4 (0.07) 0 3 1 0 
2708 2 (0.07) 1 (0.04) 0 1 0 0 
3307 6 (0.18) 3 (0.09) 0 2 1 0 
Channel Isles & We of Man 696 3 (0.43) 2 (0.29) 0 3 0 0 
229 1 (0.44) 0 (0.00) 0 1 0 0 
146 1 (0.68) 1 (0.68) 0 1 0 0 
81 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
240 1 (0.42) 1 (0.42) 0 1 0 0 
Republic of Ireland 11773 9 (0.08) B (0.07) 1 6 1 0 
3240 1 (0.03) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 0 
8533 8 (0.09) 7 (0.08) 1 5 1 0 
Total 237313 327 (0.14) 174 (0.07) 1B 120 36 1 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Details of 
test results for these donors will be given in the appropriately dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables 1a and 1b because they are on donations collected from donors being 
monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of donations 
tested (by test kit batch) In Tables 1 alb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) in Table 2a may arise for several 
centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
3. At some blood centres an alternative test kit is used for the repeat testing of donations from donors who have had at least two previous 
donations, which were at least six months apart, sent for confirmatory testing and found to have no confirmed markers of HCV infection. The 
repeat testing results, using the alternative test kit, are not shown. 
4. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of positive. negative, undetermined and 
pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening results In the 'grey zone. 
-page 3- 
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HN NBAIPhü. S CDSC Donation testing surveillance repast September 1999 
Table 1a: Mti-HIV testing of blood donations' : test kit and test Kit batch specific results by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Blood centre Test kit Batch Number2 Number reactive (X) Confirmatory test results 
3 
Tested Initially Repeatedly P ositive Negative Undet. Pending 
England 208720 244 (0.12) 132 (0.06) 0 132 0 0 
2206 1 (0.05) 1 (0.05) 0 1 0 0 
20485 15 (0.07) 12 (0.06) 0 12 0 0 
994 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
6695 4 (0.06) 1 (0.01) 0 1 0 0 
7300 7 (0.10) 1 (0.01) 0 1 0 0 
9215 10 (0.11) 9 (0.10) 0 9 0 0 
15455 13 (0.08) 7 (0.05) 0 7 0 0 
10054 10 (0.10) 10 (0.10) 0 10 0 0 
10710 16 (0.15) 2 (0.02) 0 2 0 0 
3920 7 (0.18) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
20878 17 (0.08) 5 (0.02) 0 5 0 0 
4909 5 (0.10) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
8395 15 (0.18) 12 (0.14) 0 12 0 0 
4370 2 (0.05) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
7521 21 (028) 20 (0.27) 0 20 0 0 
3807 5 (0.13) 3 (0.08) 0 3 0 0 
3909 1 (0.03) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 0 
6772 12 (0.18) 6 (0.09) 0 6 0 0 
11924 36 (0.30) 10 (0.08) 0 10 0 0 
16121 27 (0.17) 14 (0.09) 0 14 0 0 
8925 5 (0.06) 4 (0.04) 0 4 0 0 
1379 1 (0.07) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
20671 14 (0.07) 9 (0.04) 0 9 0 0 
Wales 10144 12 (0.12) 8 (0.08) 0 8 0 0 
10144 12 (0.12) 8 (0.08) 0 6 0 0 
Northern Ireland 6026 4 (0.07) 3 (0.05) 0 3 0 0 
6026 4 (0.07) 3 (0.05) 0 3 0 0 
Channel Islas & Isle of Man 696 3 (0.43) 2 (0.29) 0 2 0 1 
25 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
158 2 (1.27) 1 (0.63) 0 1 0 1 
46 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
227 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
240 1 (0.42) 1 (0.42) 0 1 0 0 
Republic of Ireland 11773 9 (0.08) 6 (0.05) 0 6 0 0 
3240 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
7211 9 (0.12) 6 (0.08) 0 6 0 0 
1322 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Total 237359 272 (0.11) 151 (0.06) 0 151 0 1 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Detat7s of 
test results for these donors will be given In the appropriately dated Table 2a (third column). 
2. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables la and 7b because they are on donations collected from donors being 
monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different or each Infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of donations 
tested (by test kit batch) in Tables 1 alb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may arise for several 
centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources 
3. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of positive, negative, undetermined and 
pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening results In the 'gray zone' 
-page S- 
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T. PALLIDUM NBANPHLS CDSC Donation testing surveillance report September 1999 
Table 1a: T. pallidum testing of blood donations : test kit and test kit batch specific results by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Blood centre Test kit Batch Number2 Number reactive (%) Confirmatory test resu lts 
3 
Tested Initially Repeatedly Positive Negative Undet. Pending 
England 208789 275 (0.13) 67 (0.03) 6 57 3 0 
1011 2 (0.20) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
10691 8 (0.07) 3 (0A3) 0 3 0 0 
7692 3 (0.04) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
4304 4 (0.09) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
13459 9 (0.07) 2 (0.01) 0 2 0 0 
9761 21 (0.22) 4 (0. (4) 0 4 0 0 
25511 32 (0.13) 8 (0.03) 1 4 2 0 
8646 44 (0.51) 11 (0.13) 0 11 0 0 
5982 8 (0.13) 5 (0.08) 0 5 0 0 
25810 30 (0.12) 8 (0.03) 1 6 1 0 
12780 6 (0.06) 4 (0.03) 0 4 0 0 
4293 27 (0.63) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
17715 45 (0.25) 4 (0.02) 1 3 0 0 
28043 21 (0.07) 9 (0.03) 0 9 0 0 
1379 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
8926 4 (0.04) 2 (0.02) 2 0 0 0 
2105 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
16418 5 (0.03) 4 (0.02) 1 3 0 0 
4263 4 (0.09) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Wales 10158 14 (0.14) 6 (0.08) 0 7 2 0 
8117 11 (0.14) 7 (0.09) 0 5 2 0 
2039 3 (0.15) 1 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
Northern Ireland 6024 10 (0.17) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
834 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
5190 10 (0.19) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 0 
Channel Isles & lain of Man 696 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
229 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
227 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
20 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
220 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Republic of Ireland 11774 16 (0.15) 3 (0.03) 1 2 0 0 
3240 4 (0.12) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 0 
5047 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
3487 13 (0.37) 2 (0.06) 1 1 0 0 
Total 237439 317 (0.13) 79 (0.03) 7 67 5 0 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. 
Details of lest results for these donors will be given in the appropriately dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables Ia and 1b because they are on donations collected from donors 
being monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) In Tables 1 alb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
3. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of positive, negative, undetermined 
and pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening results in the "grey 
zone. 
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HEPATITIS B NBA/PHLS CDSC Donation testing surveilance report October 1999 
Table 2a: HBV infection in blood donor : donor type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Donations (c1. table Ia September 1999 report) Donors being monitored I 
Blood centre from New Donors 3 from Known Donors 
Number Number Number2 Number Number Number' Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
England 
20041 38 (0.19) 9 188671 167 (0.09) 1 201 70 (34.83) 0 
2622 2 (0.08) 0 21060 23 (0.11) 0 20 7 (35.00) 0 
2295 4 (0.17) 1 20943 18 (0.09) 0 24 9 (37.50) 0 
3158 8 (0.25) 1 22340 32 (0.14) 0 30 13 (43.33) 0 
981 7 (0.71) 1 13644 10 (0.07) 1 11 6 (54.55) 0 
2258 1 (0.04) 1 23559 2 (0.01) 0 4 1 (25.00) 0 
1279 2 (0.16) 0 11498 23 (0.20) 0 3 3 (100.00) 0 
2141 6 (0.28) 3 19863 17 (0.09) 0 18 4 (22.22) 0 
2450 1 (0.04) 0 25556 21 (0.08) 0 58 11 (18.97) 0 
1260 3 (0.24) 1 11141 4 (0.04) 0 13 4 (30.77) 0 
1597 4 (0.25) 1 19067 17 (0.09) 0 20 12 (60.00) 0 
Wales 
1457 1 (0.07) 1 8702 1 (0.01) 0 2 0 (0.00) 0 
1457 1 (0.07) 1 8702 1 (0.01) 0 2 0 (0.00) 0 
Northern Ireland 
605 0 (0.00) 0 5411 0 (0.00) 0 12 4 (33.33) 0 
605 0 (0.00) 0 5411 0 (0.00) 0 12 4 (33.33) 0 
Channel Isles & Isle of Man 
49 0 (0.00) 0 659 1 (0.15) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
17 0 (0.00) 0 212 1 (0.47) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
20 0 (0.00) 0 207 0 (0.00) 0 
.0 
0 (- ) 0 
12 0 (0.00) 0 240 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
Republic of Ireland 
1406 0 (0.00) 0 10368 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
308 0 (0.00) 0 2932 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
1098 0 (0.00) 0 7436 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
Total 23558 39 (0.17) 10 213811 169 (0.08) 1 215 74 (34.42) 0 
Frequency of confirmed positive I in 2356 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
"2 More information about confirmed positive infections In blood donors will be reported in a quarterly surveillance report. 
3. Guerney and Jersey blood centres coiled samples for testing, but do not collect donations, from 'new donors'. 
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HEPATITIS C NBA/PHLS CDSC Donation testing surveillance report October 1999 
Table 2a: HCV infection in blood donor : donor type specific Infection rates by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Donations (of. table Ia September 1999 report) Donors being monitored I 
Blood centre from New Donors3 from Known Donors 
Number Number Number2 Number Number Number2 Number Number Number 2 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
England 
20041 56 (0.28) 15 188673 95 (0.05) 2 199 116 (58.29) 1 
2622 6 (0.23) 0 21055 8 (0.04) 0 25 9 (36.00) 0 
2295 2 (0.09) 0 20940 19 (0.09) 0 27 15 (55.56) 0 
3158 6 (0.25) 1 22348 11 (0.05) 0 22 13 (59.09) 0 
981 4 (0.41) 1 13649 1 (0.01) 0 6 3 (50.00) 0 
2258 8 (0.35) 6 23521 7 (0.03) 2 42 26 (61.90) 1 
1279 3 (0.23) 0 11496 2 (0.02) 0 5 S( 100.00) 0 
2141 10 (0.47) 4 19653 20 (0.10) 0 28 22 (78.57) 0 
2450 8 (0.33) 2 25590 12 (0.05) 0 24 14 (58.33) 0 
1260 3 (0.24) 0 11142 10 (0.09) 0 12 8 (66.67) 0 
1597 4 (025) 1 19079 5 (0.03) 0 6 1 (12.50) 0 
wales 
1457 4 (0.27) 0 8688 5 (0.06) 0 16 3 (18.75) 0 
1457 4 (027) 0 8688 5 (0.06) 0 16 3 (18.75) 0 
Northern "and 
605 2 (0.33) 0 5410 2 (0.04) 0 13 5 (38.46) 0 
605 2 (0.33) 0 5410 2 (0.04) 0 13 5 (38.46) 0 
Channel Wes & isi of Man 
49 1 (2.04) 0 559 1 (0.15) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
17 0 (0.00) 0 212 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
20 1 (5.00) 0 207 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
12 0 (0.00) 0 240 1 (0.42) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
Republic of Ireland 
1406 3 (0.21) 1 10367 5 (0.05) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
308 0 (0.00) 0 2932 1 (0.03) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
1098 3 (0.27) 1 7435 4 (0.05) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
Total 23558 66 (0.28) 16 213797 108 (0.05) 2 229 124 (54.15) 1 
Frequency of confirmed positive I In 1472 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed poaldve, donations. 
2. More information about confirmed positive infections in blood donors will be reported In a quarterly surveillance report. 
3. Guemey and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not collect donations, from new donors'. 
S. One additional HCV infection was detected by NAT testing. Thfs donation was anti-HCV negative and does not appear In tables Ia. b+c. 
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Table 2a: HIV infection in blood donor : donor type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Donations (cf. table 1a September 1999 report) Donors being monitored I 
Blood centre from New Donors3 from Known Donors 
Number Number Number Number Number Number " Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (X) positive reactive (5) positive reactive (%) Positive 
England 
20041 29 (0.14) 0 188695 109 (0.06) 0 177 Be (49.72) 0 
2622 6 (0.23) 0 21063 7 (0.03) 0 17 7 (41.18) 0 
2295 2 (0.09) 0 20940 9 (0.04) 0 27 4 (14.81) 0 
3158 4 (0.13) 0 22351 13 (0.06) 0 19 10 (52.63) O 
981 1 (0.10) 0 13649 3 (0.02) '0 6 1 (18.67) 0 
2258 2 (0.09) 0 23529 4 (0.02) 0 34 24 (70.59) 0 
1279 2 (0.16) 0 11486 12 (0.10) 0 15 15 (100.00) 0 
2141 2 (0.09) 0 19868 25 (0.14) 0 13 2 (15.38) 0 
2450 6 (0.24) 0 25586 24 (0.09) 0 28 10 (35.71) 0 
1260 0 (0.00) 0 11149 4 (0.04) 0 5 4 (80.00) 0 
1597 4 (0.25) 0 19074 5 (0.03) 0 13 11 (84.62) 0 
Wales 
1457 0 (0.00) 0 8687 8 (0.09) 0 17 8 (47.06) 0 
1457 0 (0.00) 0 8687 8 (0.09) 0 17 8 (47.06) 0 
Northern Ireland 
605 2 (0.33) 0 5421 1 (0.02) 0 2 1 (50.00) 0 
605 2 (0.33) 0 5421 1 (0.02) 0 2 1 (50.00) 0 
Channef Islas & isl or Man 
49 0 (0.00) 0 659 2 (0.30) 0 "0 0 ( ") 0 
17 0 (0.00) 0 212 1 (0.47) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
20 0 (0.00) 0 207 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
12 0 (0.00) 0 240 1 (0.42) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
Republic of Iman 
1406 3 (0.21) 0 10367 2 (0.02) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
308 0 (0.00) 0 2932 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
1098 3 (0.27) 0 7435 2 (0.03) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
Total 23558 34 (0.14) 0 213829 122 (0.06) 0 197 97 (49.24) 0 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
2. More Information about confirmed positive infections will be reported in a quarterly surveillance report 
3. Guemey and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not collect donations, from new donors'. 
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Table 2a: T. pallidum infection in blood donor : donor type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected in September 1999 
Donations (cf. table Ia September 1999 report) Donors being monitored 1 
Blood entre from New Donors3 from Known Donors 2 2 
Number Number Number Number . Number Number Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
England 
20041 12 (0.06) 4 188778 55 (0.03) 2 94 16 (17.02) 0 
2622 0 (0.00) 0 21076 5 (0.02) 0 4 1 (25.00) 0 
2295 1 (0.04) 0 20955 5 (0.02) 0 12 1 (8.33) 0 
3158 3 (0.09) 1 22353 5 (0.02) 0 17 0 (0.00) 0 
901 2 (0.20) 0 13647 14 (0.10) 0 8 3 (37.50) 0 
2258 0 (0.00) 0 23552 8 (0.03) 1 11 4 (36.36) 0 
1279 0 (0.00) 0 11501 4 (0.03) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
2141 1 (0.05) 1 19867 4 (0.02) 0 14 1 (7.14) 0 
2450 2 (0.08) 0 25593 7 (0.03) 0 21 3 (14.29) 0 
1260 2 (0.16) 2 11150 0 (0.00) 0 4 1 (25.00) 0 
1597 1 (0.06) 0 19084 3 (0.02) 1 3 2 (66.67) 0 
Wales 
1457 5 (0.34) 0 8699 3 (0.03) 0 5 0 (0.00) 0 
1457 5 (0.34) 0 8699 3 (0.03) 0 5 0 (0.00) 0 
Northam Ireland 
605 1 (0.17) 0 5419 0 (0.00) 0 4 3 (75.00) 0 
605 1 (0.17) 0 5419 0 (0.00) 0 4 3 (75.00) 0 
Charnel Isles 3b of Man 
49 0 (0.00) 0 659 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
17 0 (0.00) 0 212 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
20 0 (0.00) 0 207 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
12 0 (0.00) 0 240 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
Republic of betan 
1406 0 (0.00) 0 10368 3 (0.03) 1 0 0 (- 0 
308 0 (0.00) 0 2932 1 (0.03) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
1098 0 (0.00) 0 7435 2 (0.03) 1 0 0 (-) 0 
Total 23558 18 (0.08) 4 213923 61 (0.03) 3 103 19 (18.45) 0 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
2 More information about confirmed positive Infections will be reported in a quarterly surveillance report. 
3. Guemey and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not collect donations, from new donors' 
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Table Ib: HBsAg testing of blood donation 1: cumulative test kit and test kit batch specific results 
Donations (collected between 1110195 and 30109/99) tested by test kit 
batches In use at one or more blood centre during September 1999 
Test kit Batch Blood Centre 2 Number 3 Number reactive (%) Confirmatory test results 4 
Tested Initially Repeatedly Positive Negative Undet. Pending 
601 1 (0.16) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
607 1 (0.16) 0 (0.00),. 0 0 0 0 
27759 141 (0.51) 10 (0.06) 0 17 1 0 
25046 141 (0.56) 18 (0.07) 0 17 1 0 
2713 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
262443 74 (0.03) 30 (0.01) 10 20 0 0 
48051 14 (0.03) 12 (0.02) 3 9 0 0 
3102 4 (0.13) 1 (0.03) 1 0 0 0 
35852 7 (0.02) 5 (0.01) 2 3 0 0 
82244 29 (0.04) 7 (0.01) 3 4 0 0 
3497 1 (0.03) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
21830 3 (0.01) 1 (0.00) 0 1 0 0' 
27894 '7 (0.03) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
6830 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
28223 7 (0.02) 4 (0.01) 1 3 0 0 
4920 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
518382 2482 (0.48) 439 (0.08) 15 429 4 0 
19115 13 (0.07) 7 (0.04) 0 7 0 0 
43916 208 (0.47) 36 (0.08) 0 36 0 0 
48664 171 (0.35) 26 (0.05) 1 26 1 0 
62861 239 (0.38) 59 (0.09) 0 59 0 0 
20524 53 (0.26) 9 (0.04) 2 9 0 0 
11127 37 (0.33) 10 (0.09) 0 10 0 0 
59925 285 (0.48) 59 (0.10) 4 55 0 0 
22705 86 (0.38) 17 (0.07) 0 21 0 0 
59604 196 (0.33) 38 (0.06) 3 33 1 0 
44109 148 (0.34) 23 (0.05) 0 23 0 0 
47524 486 (1.02) 73 (0.15) 1 73 1 0 
26365 230 (0.87) 21 (0.08) 0 21 0 0 
7594 65 (0.86) 6 (0.08) 1 5 0 0 
7766 35 (0.45) 8 (0.10) 1 7 0 0 
15575 74 (0.48) 19 (0.12) 1 18 0 0 
13439 125 (0.93) 17 (0.13) 1 15 1 0 
7569 31 (0.41) 11 (0.15) 0 11 0 0 
352 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
352 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
130996 595 (0.45) 204 (0.16) 3 200 1 0 
28068 93 (0.33) 32 (0.11) 2 29 1 0 
60720 21S (0.35) 66 (0.11) 0 66 0 0 
20996 222 (1.06) 81 (0.39) 0 81 0 0 
10542 37 (0.35) 16 (0.15) 0 16 0 0 
10670 28 (0.26) 9 (0.08) 1 8 0 0- 
500 1 (0.20) 1 (0.20) 0 1 0 0 
185 1 (0.54) 1 (0.54) 0 1 0 0 
315 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
Total 941039 3294 (0.35) 692 (0.07) 28 667 6 0 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Details of 
test results for these donors will be given In the appropriatly dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Blood centre(s) at which the test kit batch was In use during the last month are marked with a plus sign (y. 
3. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables Ia and lb because they are on donations collected from donors 
being monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each Infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) In Tables 1 alb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
4. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of the positive, negative, 
undetermined and pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening 
results In the 'grey zone. 
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Table 1b: Anti-HCV testing of blood donations' : cumulative test kit and test kit batch specific results 
Donations (collected between 1110195 and 30109199) tested by test kit 
batches in use at one or more blood centre during September 1999 
Test kit Batch Blood Centro 
2 
Number3 Number reactive (%) Confirmatory test results4 
Tested Initially Repeatedly Positive Negative Undet. Pending 
22389 24 (0.11) 17 (0.08) 0 11 7 0 
2708 2 (0.07) 1 (0.04) 0 1 0 0 
588 1 (0.17) 0 (0.00) 0 1 0 0 
19093 21 (0.11) 16 (0.08) 0 9 7 0 
66602 49 (0.07) 39 (0.06) 12 21 6 0 
1411 1 (0.07) 1 (0.07) 0 0 1 0 
15123 10 (0.07) 8 (0.05) 1 6 1 0 
28181 24 (0.09) 17 (0.06) 10 7 0 0 
3590 2 (0.06) 2 (0.06) 1 0 1 0 
4912 1 (0.02) 1 (0.02) 0 0 1 0 
3240 1 (0.03) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 0 
4223 6 (0.19) 7 (0.17) 0 5 2 0 
5922 2 (0.03) 2 (0.03) 0 2 0 0 
240 1 (0.42) 1 (0.42) 0 1 0 0 
240 1 (0.42) 1 (0.42) 0 1 0 0 
151846 Be (0.05) 55 (0.04) 4 48 3 0 
22500 9 (0.04) 7 (0.03) 0 7 0 0 
5603 1 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
683 1 (0.15) 1 (0.15) 0 1 0 0 
13268 6 (0.05) 5 (0.04) 1 3 1 0 
23406 18 (0.08) 12 (0.05) 0 12 0 0 
7695 3 (0.04) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
81 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 0 
23386 7 (0.03) 6 (0.03) 1 5 0 0 
21105 10 (0.05) 8 (0.04) 0 8 0 0 
3776 5 (0.13) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 0 
23146 14 (0.06) 10 (0.04) 1 8 1 0 
7197 6 (0.08) 4 (0.06) 1 2 1 0 
259006 549 (0.21) 235 (0.09) 15 167 52 1 
52466 191 (0.36) 60 (0.11) 2 54 4 0 
29260 84 (0.29) 46 (0.16) 5 36 5 0 
41003 87 (0.21) 31 (0.08) 4 26 1 0 
57949 93 (0.16) 34 (0.06) 3 23 8 0 
44858 52 (0.12) 37 (0.08) 1 4 31 1 
33470 42 (0.13) 27 (0.08) 0 24 3 0 
Total 500083 703 (0.14) 347 (0.07) 31 248 68 1 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive. donations. Details 
of test results for these donors will be given In the appropriaty dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Blood centre(s) at which the test kit batch was in use during the last month are marker with a plus sign (i ) 
3. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables to and 1b because they are on donations collected from donors 
being monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each Infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) In Tables 1 alb and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
4. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of the positive, negative, 
undetermined and pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening 
results in the "grey zone. 
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Table 1b: Anti-HIV testing of blood donations1 : cumulative tost kit and test kit batch specific results 
Donations (collected between 1/10195 and 30109199) tested by test kit 
batches in use at one or more blood centre during September 1999 
Teat kit Batch Blood Centre 
2 
Number3 
Tested 
7681 
7681 
439 
439 
144762 
28200 
38695 
3643 
33290 
27873 
6830 
4909 
1322 
19445 
7521 
11924 
232375 
8086 
18080 
54426 
40043 
61082 
7300 
4737 
22238 
396 
9215 
6772 
58723 
48785 
22054 
10801 
19811 
20485 
28115 
30222 
21427 
8925 
41691 
12413 
4370 
994 
10054 
3920 
2105 
444 
240 
158 
46 
Number reactive (Y. ) 
Initially Repeatedly 
4 (0.05) 3 (0.04) 
4 (0.05) 3 (0.04) 
1 (0.23) 1 (0.23) 
1 (0.23) 1 (023) 
169 (0.12) 68 (0.05) 
27 (0.10) 9 (0.03) 
48 (0.12) 28 (0.07) 
6 (0.16) 2 (0.05) 
41 (0.12) 14 (0.04) 
40 (0.14) 13 (0.05) 
2 (0.03) 1 (0.01) 
5 (0.10) 1 (0.02) 
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
57 (0.29) 30 (0.15) 
21 (0.28) 20 (027) 
36 (0.30) 10 (0.08) 
300 (0.13) 173 (0.07) 
6 (0.07) 3 (0.04) 
42 (0.23) 13 (0.07) 
59 (0.11) 37 (0.07) 
52 (0.13) 38 (0.09) 
77 (0.13) 44 (0.07) 
7 (0.10) 1 (0.01) 
2 (0.04) 2 (0.04) 
32 (0.14) 19 (0.09) 
1 (0.25) 1 (0.25) 
10 (0.11) 9 (0.10) 
12 (0.18) 6 (0.09) 
284 (0.08) 168 (0.05) 
42 (0.07) 19 (0.03) 
20 (0.04) 9 (0.02) 
42 (0.19) 20 (0.09) 
6 (0.06) 4 (0.04) 
11 (0.06) 7 (0.04) 
15 (0.07) 12 (0.06) 
18 (0.06) 12 (0.04) 
35 (0.12) 10 (0.03) 
29 (0.14) 26 (0.12) 
5 (0.06) 4 (0.04) 
33 (0.08) 25 (0.06) 
9 (0.07) 6 (0.05) 
2 (0.05) 2 (0.05) 
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
10 (0.10) 10 (0.10) 
7 (0.18) 2 (0.05) 
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
2 (0.45) 1 (0.23) 
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
2 (1.27) 1 (0.63) 
0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 
Confirmatory test results 4 
Positive Negative UndeL Pendi 
0 30 
0 30 
0 10 
0 10 
1 61 6 
0 90 
0- 22 6 
0 20 
0 14 0 
1 12 0 
0 10 
0 10 
0 00 
30 0 
0 20 0 
0 10 0 
0 
1 
1 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
s 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ö 
0 
0 
0 
3 
12 
34 
37 
43 
1 
2 
19 
1 
9 
6 
165 
17 
6 
20 
4 
6 
12 
12 
10 
26 
4 
25 
7 
2 
0 
10 
2 
0 
0 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ö 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
T 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
a 
I 
0 
Total 1 750041 817 (0.11) 444 (0.06) 17 428 101 
1. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Details 
of test results for these donors will be given in the appropriatly dated Table 2a (third column). 
2. Blood centre(s) at which the test kit batch was In use during the last month are marked with a plus sign (+). 
3. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables la and lb because they are on donations collected from donors 
being monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests Is different for each infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) in Tables 1a/b and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) in Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
4. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of the positive, negative, 
undetermined and pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening 
results in the "grey zone". 
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Table 1b: T. pallidum testing of blood donation 
1: 
cumulative test kit and test kit batch specific result 
Donations (collected between 1/10/95 and 30/09/99) tested by test M 
batches in use at one or more blood centre during September 19 
Test kit Batch Blood centre 
2 
Number3 Number reactive (74) Confirmatory test results 4 
Tested Initially Repeatedly Positive Negative U ndet. Penc 
492 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
492 0 (0.00) A (0.00) 0 0 0 
28683 225 (0.78) 50 (0.17) 0 50 0 
28683 225 (0.7B) 50 (0.17) 0 50 0 
1233 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
1233 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
547887 650 (0.12) 155 (0.03) 17 127 10 
1011 2 (0.20) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
959 4 (0.42) 3 (0.31) 0 3 0 
30317 17 (0.06) 4 (0.01) 0 3 1 
21741 18 (0.08) 3 (0.01) 0 3 0 
24987 21 (0.08) 10 (0.04) 1 8 1 
3497 5 (0.14) 4 (0.11) 0 3 1 
22113 33 (0.15) 4 (0.02) 1 3 0 
19171 49 (0.26) 7 (0.04) 1 6 0 
23536 28 (0.12) 9 (0.04) 2 7 0 
22741 3 (0.01) 1 (0.00) 1 0 0 
20047 21 (0.10) 10 (0.05) 4 6 0 
16171 16 (0.10) 5 (0.03) 0 4 1 
8926 4 (0.04) 2 (0.02) 2 0 0 
24076 20 (0.08) 7 (0.03) 0 6 0 
220 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
10691 8 (0.07) 3 (0.03) 0 3 0 
18829 11 (0.06) 1 (0.01) 0 1 0 
3590 4 (0.11) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 
19363 57 (0.29) 7 (0.04) 0 B 0 
44901 34 (0.08) 12 (0.03) 0 11 1 
16418 5 (0.03) 4 (0.02) 1 3 0 
20250 18 (0.09) 3 (0.01) 0 3 0 
27182 25 (0.09) 6 (0.02) 0 6 0 
3240 4 (0.12) 1 (0.03) 0 1 0 
5982 B (0.13) 5 (0.08) 0 5 0 
4293 27 (0.63) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 
23162 11 (0.05) 3 (0.01) 1 1 1 
27436 36 (0.13) 7 (0.03) 0 7 0 
25511 32 (0.13) 8 (0.03) 1 4 2 
3487 13 (0.37) 2 (0.06) 1 1 0 
26609 97 (0.36) 15 (0.06) 1 14 0 
21021 15 (0.07) 5 (0.02) 0 3 2 
4304 4 (0.09) 2 (0.05) 0 2 0 
2105 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 
52521 43 (0.08) 15 (0.03) 1 13 1 
52521 43 (0.08) 15 (0.03) 1 13 1 
68502 79 (0.12) 33 (0.05) 1 30 3 
24823 58 (0.23) 25 (0.10) 1 21 3 
41640 18 (0.04) 7 (0.02) 0 7 0 
2039 3 (0.15) 1 (0.05) 0 2 0 
13298 24 (0.18) 3 (0.02) 0 3 0 
8108 14 (0.17) 2 (0.02) 0 2 0 
5190 10 (0.19) 1 (0.02) 0 1 0 
Total 712616 1021 (0.14) 256 (0.04) 19 223 14 
I. Excluding donations from donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed to be positive, donations. Details r 
test results for these donors will be given In the appropriately dated table 2a (third column). 
2. Blood centre(s) at which the test kit batch was in use during the last month are marked With a plus sign (+). 
3. Note that the number of test results that are excluded from tables 1a and lb because they are on donations collected from donors bean 
monitored for previous reactivity to the screening tests is different for each Infection. Minor discrepancies between the number of 
donations tested (by test kit batch) In Tables la/b and the number of donations tested (by new and known donor type) In Table 2a may 
arise for several centres which obtain the denominator counts for these tables from different sources. 
4. Discrepancy between the number of donations found to be repeatedly reactive and the sum of the positive, negative, undetermined are 
pending confirmatory results may arise due to referral for confirmatory testing of donations with screening results in the *grey zone". 
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Table 1c: HBsAg positivity in blood donor : donation type specific repeatedly reactive rates by test kit 
Donations collected during the 12 months prior to 30/09/99 (excluding donations tested by 
blood centres during a month in which more than one test kit was used by the blood centre) 
Donations Donors being monitored 1 
Blood centre from New Donors from Known Donors 
Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirms, 
reactive Positive reactive p ositive reactive p ositive 
33 0 (0.00) 0 780 0 (0.00) 0 5 1 (20.00) 0 
33 0 (0.00) 0 780 0 (0.00) 0 5 1 (20.00) 0 
179 0 (0.00) 0 2506 0 (0.00) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
179 0 (0.00) 0 2506 0 (0.00) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
25499 12 (0.05) 1 110664 76 (0.07) 0 62 23 (37.10) 0 
18710 10 (0.05) 1 55164 68 (0.12) 0 45 14 (31.11) 0 
6789 2 (0.03) 0 55520 8 (0.01) 0 17 9 (52.94) 0 
54674 26 (0.05) 17 413564 46 (0.01) 2 Be 15 (16.85) 0 
5352 0 (0.00) 0 36566 4 (0.01) 1 1 1 (100.00) 0 
13181 5 (0.04) 4 99199 6 (0.01) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
36141 21 (0.06) 13 277799 36 (0.01) 1 86 14 (15.91) 0 
60 0 (0.00) 0 1063 1 (0.09) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
60 0 (0.00) 0 1063 1 (0.09) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
177254 304 (0.17) 62 1365692 1522 (0.11) 8 2061 361 (17.52) 2 
33721 30 (0.09) 8 239456 154 (0.06) 4 264 35 (13.26) 0 
28972 34 (0.12) 7 255395 303 (0.12) 0 351 97 (27.64) 0 
37178 71 (0.19) 9 254853 266 (0.10) 0 357 50 (14.01) 2 
24575 53 (0.22) 18 217803 190 (0.09) 2 304 75 (24.67) 0 
34667 83 (0.24) 14 271290 502 (0.19) 1 664 88 (13.25) 0 
18141 33 (0.18) 6 126895 107 (0.08) 1 121 16 (13.22) 0 
123 0 (0.00) 0 2917 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
123 0 (0.00) 0 2917 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
50868 104 (0.20) 8 462335 541 (0.12) 2 540 243 (45.00) 0 
16112 36 (0.22) 4 146674 120 (0.08) 0 140 68 (48.57) 0 
11043 16 (0.14) 0 90748 154 (0.17) 2 14 14 (100.00) 0 
23713 52 (0.22) 4 224913 267 (0.12) 0 386 101 (41.71) 0 
30 0 (0.00) 0 643 1 (0.12) 0 0 0 (- ) 0 
30 0 (0.00) 0 843 1 (0.12) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
Total 308720 446 (0.14) 88 2360384 2107 (0.09) 12 2759 643 (23.31) 2 
1. Donors being monitored because of prevbusly reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
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Table 1c: Anti-HCV positivity In blood donor : donation type specific repeatedly reactive rates by test kit 
Donations collected during the 12 months prior to 30109199 (excluding donations tested by blood 
centres during a month in which more than one test kit was used by the blood centre) 
Donations Donors being monitored 
Blood centre from New Donors 
from Known Donors . 
Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
roactivo (%) p ositive reactive (%) positive react ive (%) p ositive 
25589 46 (0.18) 1 112139 132 (0.12) 2 513 220 (42.88) 2 
18710 32 (0.17) 1 54851 49 (0.09) 0 358 163 (45.53) 0 
90 0 (0.00) 0 1904 1 (0.05) 0 2 1 (50.00) 0 
6789 14 (0.21) 0 55384 82 (0.15) 2 153 56 (36.60) 2 
70307 182 (0.26) 28 510328 388 (0.08) 16 1673 655 (39.15) 8 
15633 46 (0.29) 11 98106 121 (0.12) 3 242 80 (33.06) 0 
5352 12 (0.22) 1 " 36567 28 (0.06) 1 0 0 (-) 0 
13181 27 (0.20) 2 99188 59 (0.06) 1 11 0 (0.00) 0 
36141 97 (0.27) 14 276467 180 (0.07) 11 1420 575 (40.49) 8 
202 1 (0.50) 0 - 3014 6 (0.20) 0 8 6 (75.00) 0 
202 1 (0.50) 0 3014 6 (0.20) 0 8 6 (75.00) 0 
50991 03 (0.16) 23 465195 114 (0.02) 1 597 145 (24.29) 1 
123 2 (1.63) 1 2913 0 (0.00) 0 4 3 (75.00) 0 
16112 26 (0.16) 11 146736 30 (0.02) 0 78 25 (32.05) 0 
11043 16 (0.14) 1 90734 42 (0.05) 1 28 11 (39.29) 0 
23713 39 (0.16) 10 224812 42 (0.02) 0 487 106 (21.77) 1 
117254 363 (0.20) 89 1365512 901 (0.07) 14 2241 779 (34.76) 1 
33721 61 (0.18) 11 239405 178 (0.07) 1 315 91 (28.89) 0 
28972 56 (0.19) 14 255446 173 (0.07) 4 300 114 (36.00) 0 
37176 59 (0.16) 14 254936 115 (0.05) 2 274 67 (24.45) 1 
24575 94 (0.38) 20 217605 191 (0.09) 4 502 234 (4(L61) 0 
34667 67 (0.19) 20 271283 135 (0.05) 3 671 245 (36.51) 0 
18141 26 (0.14) 10 126837 109 (0.09) 0 179 20 (15.64) 0 
Total 324343 675 (0.21) 141 2456188 1541 (0.06) 33 5032 1805 (35.871 12 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confkmed positive, donations. 
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Table 1c: Anti-HIV positivity In blood donor : donation type specific repeatedly reactive rates by test kit 
Donations collected during the 12 months prior to 30/09/99 (excluding donations tested by blood 
centres during a month in which more than one test kit was used by the blood central 
Donations Donors being monitored 
Blood centre 
fro m New Donors from Know n Dono rs 
Number Number Number Number Number Number. Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive reactive /. positive reactive p ositive 
5762 0 (0.00) 0 666 1 (0.15) 0 12 4 (33.33) 0 
5762 0 (0.00) 0 668 1 (0.15) 0 12 4 (33.33) 0 
19737 22 (0.11) 0 109926 34 (0.03) 0 140 54 (38.57) 0 
12948 17 (0.13) 0 54417 11 (0.02) 0 112 43 (38.39) 0 
6789 5 (0.07) 0 55509 23 (0.04) 0 28 11 (39.29) 0 
202 0 (0.00) 0 3022 1 (0.03) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
202 0 (0.00) 0 3022 1 (0.03) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
70307 91 (0.13) 2 511227 237 (0.05) 4 774 318 (41.09) 0 
15633 25 (0.16) 0 98192 66 (0.07) 0 156 49 (31.41) 0 
5352 4 (0.07) 0 36566 15 (0.04) 1 1 1 (100.00) 0 
13181 20 (0.15) 1 99198 42 (0.04) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
36141 42 (0.12) 1 277271 114 (0.04) 3 616 268 (43.51) 0 
71 1 (1.41) 0 1195 2 (0.17) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
71 1 (1.41) 0 1195 2 (0.17) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
88337 129 (0.15) 7 74724 624 (0.08). 7. 1400 486 (34.86) 0. 
28972 35 (0.12) 1 255295 209 (0.08) 3 451 157 (34.81) 0 
123 0 (0.00) 0 2917 4 (0.14) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
24575 41 (0.17) 3 217627 174 (0.08) 2 280 72 (25.71) 0 
34667 53 (0.15) 3 271285 237 (0.09) 2 669 259 (38.71) 0 
2114 0 (0.00) 1 17056 0 (0.00) 0 7 0 (0.00) 0 
2114 0 (0.00) 1 17056 0 (0.00) 0 7 0 (0.00) 0 
139908 155 (0.11) 3 1083745 555 (0.05) 3 1076 318 (29.55) 0 
33721 36 (0.11) 2 239483 83 (0.03) 2 237 70 (29.54) 0 
37178 32 (0.09) 1 254996 97 (0.04) 0 214 57 (26.64) 0 
16112 25 (0.16) 0 146588 66 (0.06) 1 226 49 (21.68) 0 
11043 12 (0.11) 0 90735 103 (0.11) 0 27 16 (59.26) 0 
18141 18 (0.10) 0 126864 70 (0.06) 0 152 32 (21.05) 0 
23713 32 (0.13) 0 225079 114 (0.05) 0 220 94 (42.73) 0 
19 2 (10.53) 0 705 1 (0.14) 0 6 3 (50.00) 0 
19 2 (10.53) 0 705 1 (0.14) 0 6 3 (50.00) 0 
Total 326457 400 (0.12) 13 2474868 1455 (0.06) 14 3415 1185 (34.70) 0 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donatlons. 
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Table 1c: T. pallidumantibody positivity in donors donation typd specific repeatedly reactive rates by test kit 
Donations collected during the 12 months prior to 30109199 (excluding donations tested by blood 
centres during a month in which more than one test kit was used by the blood centre) 
Donations Donors being monitored 
Blood centre from New Donors from Known Donors 
Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly coy finned tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
BECTON DICKINSON RPR 467 1 (0.21) 0 5322 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
377 0 (0.00) 0 3416 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
90 1 (1.11) 0 1906 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 ( -) 0 
CENTOCOR 16112 12 (0.07) 0 146571 88 (0.06) 0 243 42 (1728) 0 
16112 12 (0.07) 0 146571 86 (0.06) 0 243 42 (17.28) 0 
IMMUTREP RPR 2457 1 (0.04) 0 14821 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-). 0 
2457 1 (0.04) 0 14821 0 (0.00) 0 0 0 (-) 0 
MUREXTPHAVD35 214721 171 (0.08) 35 1692514 072 (0.05) 31 1719 269 (15.65) 3 
33721 12 (0.04) 3 239636 32 (0.01) 4 84 15 (17.86) 0 
26972 26 (0.09) 2 255393 132 (0.05) 3 353 50 (14.16) 0 
37178 18 (0.05) 4 255114 106 (0.04) 1 96 14 (14.58) 0 
2518 2 (0.08) 0 18330 17 (0.09) 2 0 0 (-) 0 
11236 9 (0.08) 3 82851 51 (0. (6) 10 0 0 ( -) 0 
24575 38 (0.15) 10 217659 199 (0.09) 1 448 46 (10.27) 0 
34667 47 (0.14) 7 271405 245 (0.09) 5 549 79 (14.39) 0 
18141 5 (0.03) 3 126974 5 (0.00) 0 42 7 (16.67) 1 
23713 14 (0.06) 3 225152 85 (0.04) 5 147 58 (39.46) 2 
MUREX VDRL 4451 2 (0.04) 0 32024 6 (0.02) 1 0 0 (- ) 0 
4451 2 (0.04) 0 32024 6 (0.02) 1 0 0 (-) 0 
NEWMARKET LAB 36141 14 (0.04) 4 277659 75 (0.03) 2 226 64 (28.07) 5 
36141 14 (0.04) 4 277659 75 (0.03) 2 228 64 (28.07) 6 
OLYMPUS PK 15824 10 (0.06) 1 135052 42 (0.03) 1 21 19 (90.48) 0 
15824 10 (0.06) 1 135052 42 (0.03) 1 21 19 (90.48) 0 
RANDOX TPHA 18710 2 (0.01) 0 55145 17 (0.03) 0 64 7 (10.94) 1 
18710 2 (0.01) 0 55145 17 (0.03) 0 64 7 (10.94) 1 
Total 308883 213 (0.07) 40 23591081098 (0.05) 35 2275 401 (17.63) 10 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
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Table 2b: HBV Infection in blood donor : cumulative donation type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected between 1110/95 and 30109199 
Donations Donors being monitore d1 Blood centre from New Donors 3 from Known Donors 
Number Number Number2 Number Number Number2 Number Number Number2 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly eonfhnei 
reactive (8'c) positive (%) reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
England 1109390 1482 (0.13) 378 (0.03) 8868582 5018 (0.06) 57 5941 1697 (28.56) 9 
4878 4 (0.08) 1 1487 2 (0.13) 2 0 0 (-) 0 
99724 141 (0.14) 27 940579 538 (0.06) 7 873 206 (23.60) 0 
138235 217 (0.16) 40 905062 666 (0.07) 1 911 248 (27.22) 1 
117663 179 (0.15) 26 916943 602 (0.07) 0 671 100 (14.90) 2 
13941 12 (0.09) 4 111473 22 (0.02) 0 41 11 (26.83) 0 
4432 2 (0.05) 2 26985 7 (0.03) 0 2 1 (50.00) 0 
72083 124 (0.17) . 19 608178 363 (0.06) 2 372 147 (39.52) 1 
114873 50 (0.04) 32 908783 115 (0.01) 8 161 35 (21.74) 1 
22367 12 (0.05) 10 236100 23 (0.01) 7 26 8 (30.77) 1 
53325 50 (0.09) 8 642507 280 (0.04) 5 59 59 (100.00) 1 
127917 238 (0.19) 107 856008 416 (0.05) 9 675 143 (21.19) 0 
25850 35 (0.14) 7 170013 107 (0.06) 2 156 46 (29.49) 0 
140599 210 (0.15) 46 1204387 1138 (0.09) 8 1292 361 (27.94) 1 
78336 70 (0.09) 22 450596 168 (0.04) 2 160 37 (23.13) 1 
95167 138 (0.15) 27 889481 571 (0.06) 4 542 295 (54.43) 0 
Wales 69635 29 (0.04) 16 (0.02) 396592 80 (0.02) 6 75 11 (14.67) 1 
69635 29 (0.04) 16 396592 80 (0.02) 6 75 11 (14.67) 1 
Northern Ireland 51449 18 (0.03) 2 (0.00) 256152 103 (0.04) 0 99 48 (46.46) 0 
51449 18 (0.03) 2 256152 103 (0.04) 0 99 46 (46.46) 0 
Channel Islas & Isle of M 2021 2 (0.10) 0 (0.00) 31075 24 (0.08) 0 20 6 (30.00) 0 
515 2 (0.39) 0 7642 19 (0.25) 0 4 0 (0.00) 0 
531 0 (0.00) 0 10324 1 (0.01) 0 2 2 (100.00) 0 
972 0 (0.00) 0 13109 4 (0.03) 0 14 4 (28.57) 0 
Republic of Wand 72422 36 (0.05) 16 (0.02) 579212 82 (0.01) 4 41 14 (34.15) 1 
20695 6 (0.03) 2 149738 19 (0.01) 1 9 9 (100.00) 1 
51727 30 (0.06) 14 429474 63 (0.01) 3 32 5 (15.63) 0 
Total 1304917 1567 (0.12) 412 (0.03) 10131613 5307 (0.05) 67 6176 1774 (28.72) 11 
Frequency of confirmed positive I In 3,167 1 In 151,218 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
2. More Information about confirmed positive Infections in blood donors will be reported in a quarterly surveillance report. 
3. Guerney and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not collect donations, from 'new donors'. 
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Table 2b: HCV Infection in blood donor : cumulative donation type specific Infection rates by centre 
Donations collected between 1/10195 and 30109199 
Donations Donors being monitored 
Blood centre from Now Donors3 from Known Donors 
umber Number Number2 Number Number Number? Number Number Number 
2 
fed repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive (X) reactive (%) positive reactive (1) positive 
England 
1109390 2775 (0.25) 616(0-06) 8860959 7548 (0.09) 176 13564 6260 (46.15) 52 
4878 2 (0.04) 0 1486 1 (0.07) 0 1 0 (0.00) 0 
99724 190 (0.19) 44 940380 513 (0.05) 17 1071 379 (35.35) 6 
138235 297 (0.21) 58 904456 861 (0.10) 12 1517 551 (36.32) 2 
117663 245 (0.21) 68 916759 516 (0.06) 8 855 266 (31.11) 4 
13941 48 (0.34) 9 111364 106 (0.10) 1 150 73 (48.67) 1 
4432 7 (0.16) 1 26921 25 (0.09) 7 66 53 (80.30) 2 
72083 166 (0.23) 45 606255 154 (0.03) 2 295 135 (45.76) 0 
114873 292 (0.25) 65 906740 952 (0.10) 38 2204 1426 (64.70) 15 
22367 49 (0.22) 17 235637 122 (0.05) 23 489 283 (57.87) 5 
53325 175 (0.33) 16 642197 783 (0.12) 10 369 369 (100.00) 2 
127917 538 (0.42) 110 854699 1168 (0.14) 18 1984 972 (48.99) 4 
25850 41 (0.16) 9 169931 175 (0.10) 6 238 62 (26.05) 1 
140599 294 (0.21) 108 1203341 958 (0.08) 28 2338 906 (38.75) 8 
78336 210 (0.27) 25 450272 568 (0.13) 3 484 252 (52.07) 0 
95167 221 (0.23) 41 088521 646 (0.07) 3 1502 533 (35.49) 2 
Wales 
69635 127 (0.18) 46(0.07) 396215 384 (0.10) 13 452 217 (48.01) 7 
69635 127 (0.18) 46 396215 384 (0.10) 13 452 217 (48.01) 7 
Northern Ireland 
51449 144 (0.28) 9 (0.02) 255133 289 (0.11) 3 1118 677 (60.55) 0 
51449 144 (0.28) 9 255133 289 (0.11) 3 1118 677 (60.55) 0 
Channel Isles & Isle A Man 
2021 5 (0.25) 1 (0.05) 31070 28 (0.09) 2 25 20 (80.00) 0 
518 0 (0.00) 0 7644 9 (0.12) 0 2 1 (50.00) 0 
531 3 (0.56) 1 10316 4 (0.04) 1 10 9 (90.00) 0 
972 2 (0.21) 0 13110 15 (0.11) 1 13 10 (76.92) 0 
Republic of Ireland 
72422 262 (0.36) 23 (0.03) 578402 715 (0.12) 15 851 201 (23.62) 0 
20695 70 (0.34) 6 149657 145 (0.10) 2 90 90 (100.00) 0 
51727 192 (0.37) 17 428745 570 (0.13) 13 761 111 (14.59) 0 
Total 1304917 3313 (0.25) 695 (0.00) 10121779 8964 (0.09) 209 16010 7375 (46.06) 59 
Frequency of confirmed positive I In 1,878 1 in 48,430 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
2. More information about confined positive infections in blood donors Wit be reported In a quarterly surveillance report 
3. Guemey and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not collect donations. from "now donors". 
X. An additional HCV infection was detected by NAT testing. This donation was anti-HCV negative and does not appear in tables 1a, b+c. 
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Table 2b: HIV Infection In blood donor : cumulative donation type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected between 1110195 and 30109199 
Donations Donors being mon itored' 
Blood centre from New Donors3 from Known Donors 
Number Number Number2 Number Number Number 
2 
Number Number Number2 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive (%) reactive (Y. ) positive reactive (X) positive 
England 
1109390 1 157 (0.10) 55 (0.00) 8868237 4267 (0.05) 38 6286 3027 (48.15) 0 
4878 0 (0.00) 0 1486 1 (0.07) 0 1 1 (100.00) 0 
99724 103 (0.10) 5 940944 388 (0.04) 4 508 231 (45.47) 0 
138235 123 (0.09) 4 905230 468 (0.05) 3 743 300 (40.38) 0 
117663 141 (0.12) 5 917043 438 (0.05) 1 571 183 (32.05) 0 
13941 20 (0.14) 0 111380 64 (0.06) 0 134 85 (63.43) 0 
4432 1 (0.02) 0 26958 
. 
15 (0.06) 0 29 18 (62.07) 0 
72083 84 (0.12) 2 608112 415 (0.07) 3 4313 123 (28.08) 0 
114873 143 (0.12) 3 907757 549 (0.06) 3 1187 690 (58.13) 0 
22367 19 (0.08) 1 235965 109 (0.05) 2 161 56 (34.78) 0 
53325 79 (0.15) 1 642408 313 (0.05) 3 158 158 (100.00) 0 
127917 119 (0.09) 15 856177 307 (0.04) 7 508 179 (35.38) 0 
25850 15 (0.06) 0 170040 74 (0.04) 0 129 31 (24.03) 0 
140599 138 (0.10) 16 1204643 567 (0.05) 9 1036 556 (53.67) 0 
78336 83 (0.11) 2 450444 241 (0.05) 0 312 181 (58.01) 0 
95167 89 (0.09) 1 889650 318 (0.04) 3 373 235 (63.00) 0 
Wales 
69635 63 (0.09) 1(0.00) 396369 288 (0.07) 0 298 109 (36.58) 0 
69635 65 (0.09) 1 396369 288 (0.07) 0 298 109 (36.58) 0 
Northern Ireland 
51449 92 (0.18) 0(0.00) 255810 86 (0.03) 0 441 246 (55.78) 0 
51449 92 (0.18) 0 255810 86 (0.03) 0 441 246 (55.76) 0 
Channel Isles i tsl of Man 
2021 6 (0.30) 0 (0.00) 31077 34 (0.11) 1 15 15 (83.33) 0 
518 4 (0.77) 0 7639 23 (0.30) 0 7 7 (100.00) 0 
531 0 (0.00) 0 10325 8 (0.08) 0 1 1 (100.00) 0 
972 2 (0.21) 0 13113 3 (0.02) 1 10 7 (70.00) 0 
Republic of "ant 
72422 123 (0.17) 3 (0.00) 678909 336 (0.06) 2 344 50 (14.53) 0 
20695 20 (0.14) 0 149723 74 (0.05) 2 24 24 (100.00) 0 
51727 95 (0.18) 3 429166 262 (0.06) 0 320 26 (8.13) 0 
Total 1304917 1443 (0.11) 59 (0.00) 10130402 5011 (0.05) 41 7387 3447 (46.66) 0 
Frequency of confirmed positive I in 22117 1 In 247.083 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confirmed positive, donations. 
2. More information about confirmed positive infections will be reported in a quarterly surveillance report. 
3. Guemey and Jersey blood centres collect samples for testing, but do not tolled donations, from 'new donors'. 
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Table 2b: T. pallidum infection in blood donor : cumulative donation type specific infection rates by centre 
Donations collected between 1110195 and 30109/99 
Donations Donors being monitored 
1 
Blood centre from New Donors from Known Donors 
Number Number Number2 Number Number Number 
2 
Number Number Number2 
tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed tested repeatedly confirmed 
reactive (%) positive (%) reactive (%) positive reactive (%) positive 
England 
1109390 891 (0.08) 176(0.02) 8870055 3484 (0.04) 123 4468 1245 (27.86) 61 
4878 0 (0.00) 0 1484 2 (0.13) 0 3 1 (33.33) 0 
99724 39 (0.04) 7 941170 164 (0.02) 6 282 38 (13.48) 3 
138235. 182 (0.13) 26 905033 558 (0.06) 15 940 258 (27.23) 5 
117663 80 (0.07) 19 917218 238 (0.03) 4 396 54 (13.64) 1 
13941 8 (0.06) 1 111475 8 (0.01) 0 39 28 (71.79) 0 
4432 4(0.09) 2 26963 8 (0.03) 1 24 2 (8.33) 2 
72083 118 (0.16) 4 608074 529 (0.09) 2 476 161 (33.82) 2 
114873 89 (0.08) 14 908262 458 (0.05) 24 682 228 (33.43) 23 
22367 14 (0.06) 7 236100 24 (0.01) 5 26 6 (23.08) 4 
53325 20 (0.04) 5 642528 151 (0.02) 16 38 38 (100.00) 0 
127917 144 (0.11) 50 856246 444 (0.05) 10 437 711, (17.85) 5 
25850 5 (0.02) 1 170125 29 (0.02) 3 44 8 (18.18) 0 
140599 121 (0.09) 24 1204881 557 (0.05) 20 798 218 (27.32) 10 
78336 32 (0.04) 10 450637 91 (0.02) 7 119 38 (31.93) 4 
95167 35 (0.04) 6 889859 223 (0.03) 10 164 91 (55.49) 2 
Wales 
69635 39 (0.06) 5(0.01) 396693 181 (0.05) 9 74 11 (14.66) 0 
69635 39 (0.06) 5 396593 181 (0.05) 9 74 11 (14.86) 0 
Northern Ireland 
51449 20 (0.04) 2(0.00) 256140 83 (0.03) 1 111 68 (61.26) 2 
51449 20 (0.04) 2 256140 83 (0.03) 1 111 68 (61.26) 2 
Channel Isles & Isla of M 
2021 8 (0.40) 3 (0.15) 31076 25 (0.08) 1 19 13 (68.42) 2 
518 3 (0.58) 2 7641 8 (0.10) 1 5 5 (100.00) 2 
531 3 (0.56) 1 10318 13 (0.13) 0 6 6 (75.00) 0 
972 2 (0.21) 0 13117 4 (0.03) 0 6 2 (33.33) 0 
Republic of Ireland 
72422 28 (0.04) 4(0.01) 579187 166 (0.03) 16 66 57 (86.36) 0 
20695 6 (0.03) 0 149737 26 (0.02) 2 10 10 (100.00) 0 
51727 22 (0.04) 4 429450 140 (0.03) 14 56 47 (83.93) 0 
Total 1304917 986 (0.08) 190(0.01) 10133051 3939 (0.04) 150 4738 1394 (29.42) 65 
Frequency of confirmed positive I in 6,868 1 In 67,554 
1. Donors being monitored because of previously reactive, but not confined positive, donations. 
2. More Information about confirmed positive Infections will be reported In a quarterly surveillance report. 
-pays 39- 
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If you have any questions about the data in this report please contact Kate Soldan (NBA/PHLS-CDSC 
Infection Surveillance Officer) on 0181 200 6868 Extn. 4602 
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NBAIPHLS CDSC Infection Surveillance Six Monthly report data to end of June 1999 
NOTES 
This report is a tabular (and graphical) summary of the data submitted to the NBA/PHLS CDSC 
infection surveillance system by the end of December 1999 about infections detected from October 
1995 to June 1999. Effort has been made to avoid errors or inaccuracies both within and between 
surveillance reports. However, the data sets are constantly being changed and updated as more 
Information is reported and so minor inconsistencies between surveillance reports may arise. 
Table 1 and Table 2 (denominators) contain data from the NBA/PHLS CDSC Donation Testing 
Surveillance data set. The information about cases that is summarised in Tables 2,3.4 and 5 is from 
the NBAIPHLS CDSC Infected Donor Surveillance data set at 31 December 1999 this data set 
consists of a sub-set of the Infected donors identified by the Donation Testing Surveillance as not all 
infections had been reported in detail by the end of December 1999 (see Table 1). Table 6a contains 
both data specifically requested from blood centres at the end of 1995 about the total numbers of HCV 
positive new and repeat donors detected by the end of September 1995, and data from the 
NBA/PHLS CDSC Donation Testing Surveillance data set for October 1995 to June 1999. Table 6b 
contains data provided by the Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service Microbiology Reference 
Unit (SNBTS MRU) about the total numbers of HCV positive new and repeat donors detected in 
Scotland by the end of June 1999. Table 7 contains data from the NBA HIV Testing Surveillance 
database up to September 1995 (up to December 1995 for Scottish blood centres) and from the 
SNBTS MRU and the NBAIPHLS CDSC Donation Testing Surveillance data set from October 1995 to 
June 1999. Table 8 contains data about HBsAg testing of blood donations from the SNBTS MRU and 
the NBANPHLS CDSC Donation Testing Surveillance data set from October 1995 to June 1999. 
Tables 9 and 10 contain Information from the NBAIPHLS CDSC Post-Transfusion Infection 
Surveillance data set. 
The Donation Testing Surveillance data classifies donors as new or repeat donors according to 
definitions used at blood centres. Information about the testing of previous donations is reported to 
the surveillance centre on the Infected Donor report this allows classification of positive donors as 
newly-tested or previously-tested donors. Previously-tested donors may have been found to be 
positive. or indeterminate. on previous donations: they are not all donors who have seroconverted for 
the marker since their previous donation. The following definitions therefore apply to the terms used 
in this report. 
New A new donor by blood centre classification 
Newly-tested A donor who has not been previously tested for the marker 
under consideration by the blood transfusion services included 
in this surveillance. 
Repeat A repeat donor by blood centre classification 
Previously-tested A donor who has been previously tested for the marker under 
consideration by blood transfusion services included in this 
surveillance. 
For citation of the data included In this report the following is suggested; "NBA/PHLS CDSC 
Unpublished Quarterly Infection Surveillance Report No. 10. June 1999' 
All tables contain data from the blood centres of England. Wales, Northern Ireland, The Republic of 
Ireland, the Channel Isles and the Isle of Man unless otherwise stated. 
The next infection surveillance report will present data about donation collected up to 
31 December 1999. and will include information about infection that Is reported to the surveillance 
centre by 30 June 2000_ 
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NBA/PHLS CDSC Infection Surveillance Six Monthly report data to end of June 1999 
CONTENTS 
Table/Figure Description Page 
Table I Infections detected in blood donors and the completeriess of reporting. 1 
(Figure 1) Table 1 shows the number of Infections detected by the testing of blood 
donations collected between 01/10/1995 and 30 June1999 and the 
number of these infections for which a detailed infection report (Infected 
Donor report - Section 1) and an exposure history report (Infected Donor 
report - Section 2) had been received by the end of December 1999. Table 1 shows data for the most recent six months, data for the previous 
six months, and cumulative data since the start of the surveillance system 
in October 1995. 
Table 2a&b Age and sex of infected blood donors. 2_5 
(Figures 2a Tables 2a and b show the age and sex breakdown of newly tested and 
&, b) previously tested infected donors respectively. Infections detected 
between 01110/1995 and 30 June 1999 and reported by the end of 
December 1999 are included. The number of donations tested is also 
shown: age and sex breakdown was available for four blood centres and 
this information Is presented separately. This was used to estimate the 
total number of donations tested In each age and sex group. The rates per 100,000 donations shown In Tables 2a&b and in Figures 2a&b have been 
adjusted for underreporting (i. e. no Infected Donor report) of Infected 
blood donors by assuming that the unreported Infected donors have the 
same age and sex distribution as the reported infected donors. 
Table 3 Ethnic group of infected blood donors. 6 
(Figure 3) Table 3 shows the ethnic group of infected donors detected between 
01110/1995 and 30 June 1999. (Denominators of donations tested from 
these ethnic groups are not currently available. ) 
Table 4 Mean ages of newly tested blood donors found to be infected with HBV. 7 
(Figure 4) HCV. HIV or to have Treponemal antibodies between 01/10/1995 and 
30 June 1999 by sex. 
Table 5a, b&c Exposure histories of infected donors. a. 8 (Figure 5a&b) Tables 5a, b&c show the probable route of Infection for newly tested and b. 9 
for previously tested blood donors found between 01/10/1995 and 30 c. 10 
June 1999 to be infected with HBV. HCV or HIV respectively. For donors 
with more than one possible route of acquisition of Infection, the probable 
route was allocated according to a hierarchy of probabilities as to how 
infection was most likely to have been acquired. This hierarchy was 
based on current understanding of infection risks. Fuller exposure history 
is held in the data set and Is available for alternative tabulation. For HIV 
infected donors, information received at PHLS CDSC from sources other 
than blood centres Is included to give the best available assessment of 
how infection was probably acquired. 
Table 5d&e Reasons why probable routes of infection were not recognised prior to 11 
donation. Reported (by users of report form IDS 2.02) up to 30 June 1999. 
Table 6a&b HCV Infected blood donations: a. England & Wales, b. Scotland a. 12 
(Figure 6a&b) Table 6 shows the rate of HCV infected blood donations from new and b. 13 
repeat blood donors between the beginning of testing in October 1991 
and the end of June 1999. 
Table 7' HIV Infected blood donations: UK 14 
(Figure 7) Table 7 shows the number and rate of HIV infected blood donations from 
new and repeat donors between the beginning of testing in September 
1985 and the end of June 1999. 
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NBA/P4-ILS COSC Infection Surveillance Six Monthly report data to end of June 1999 
CONTENTS continued... 
Table/Figure Description Page 
Table 8 HBsAg positive blood donations: UK 15 
(Figure 8) Table 8 shows the number and rate of HBsAg positive blood donations 
from new and repeat donors between October 1995 and the end of June 
1999. 
Table 9a Current status of previously reported 'pending" post-transfusion infection 16 
investigations, and newly reported post-transfusion infections (01107/1999 
- 31/12/1999). 
Table 9b Post-transfusion infection reports 17 
(Figure 9b) Table 9 shows post-transfusion infection reports to the NBA/PHLS COSC 
between 1 October 1995 and 30 December 1999 by infection and by 
outcome of investigation. 
Table 10 Cumulative total transfusion transmitted infections. 18 
Table 10 shows the number of incidents of transfusion transmitted 
infections (and number of infected recipients Identified) reported between 
01/10/1995 and 31 December 1999. 
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Table 6a. HCV Infected blood donations: England & Wales 
Donations collected from 0110911991 to 3010611999 
New donors 
HCV Donations 
infected tested 
Rate per 
100,000 
Repeat donors' 
HCV Donations Rate per 
Infected tested 100,000 
HCV 
infected 
Total 
Donations 
tested 
Rate per 
100,000 
1991 Sep-Dec 94 105,204 89.35 438 703,194 62.29 532 808.398 65.81 
1992 289 303,597 95.19 518 2,190,696 23.65 807 2,494,293 32.35 
1993 252 292,862 86.05 204 2,233,679 9.13 456 2,526.541 18.05 
1994 254 313,363 81.06 125 2,209,965 5.66 379 2.523,328 15.02 
1995 249 305,782 81.43 105 2,198,658 4.78 354 2,504.440 14.13 
1996 191 296,156 64.49 72 2,243,229 3.21 263 2,539,385 10.36 
1997 172 281,096 61.19 64 2,389,190 2.68 236 2,670,286 8.84 
1998 117 266,540 43.90 67 2,235,443 3.00 184 2.501,983 7.35 
1999 Jan-Jun 82 152,914 53.62 17 1,135,825 1.50 99 1,288,739 7.68 
Total 1,700 2,317,514 73.35 1.610 17,539,879 9.18 3,310 19,857,393 16.67 
1 Including repeat donors newly tested for HCV infection. 
Figure 6a. HCV infected blood donations: England & Wales 
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Table 6b. HCV infected blood donations: Scotland 
Donations collected from 0110911991 to 3010611999 
New donors Repeat donors' Total 
HCV Donations Rate per HCV Donations Rate per HCV Donations Rate per 
infected tested 100.000 infected tested 100,000 Infected tested 100,000 
1991 Sep-Doc 33 12,935 255.12 66 96,646 68.29 99 109,581 90.34 
1992 55 34,879 157.69 102 297,946 34.23 157 332.825 47.17 
1993 30 31,149 96.31 60 281,053 21.35 90 312,202 28.83 
1994 25 29,396 85.05 39 283,313 13.77 64 312.709 20.47 
1995 49 29,778 164.55 20 274,952 7.27 69 304,730 22.64 
1996 34 29.905 113.69 19 270,782 7.02 53 300.687 17.63 
1997 40 29,968 133.48 20 263,700 7.58 60 293.668 20.43 
1998 31 28,667 108.14 13 256,438 5.07 44 285,105 15.43 
1999 Jan-Jun 15 16,605 90.33 6 124,482 4.82 - 21 141,087 14.88 
Total 312 243,282 128.25 345 2,149,312 16.05 657 2,392,594 27.46 
1 Including repeat donors newly tested for HCV infection. 
Figure 6b. HCV Infected blood donations: Scotland 
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Table 7. HIV infected blood donations: UK (i. e. England, Wales, Northern Ireland & Scotland) 
Donations collected from 0111011985 to 3010611999 
HIV 
infected 
New donors 
Donations Rate per 
tested 100,000 
Repeat donors' 
HIV Donations Rate per 
infected tested 100,000 
HIV 
Infected 
Total 
Donations 
tested 
Rate per 
100.000 
1985 Oct-Dee 5 - - 8 - - 13 610,918 2.13 
1986 20 322,490 6.20 33 2.312,765 1.43 53 2,635.255 2.01 
1987 12 340,770 3.52 11 2,246,471 0.49 23 2,587,241 0.89 
1988 8 353,834 2.26 15 2.278,553 0.66 23 2.632,387 0.87 
1989 17 372,748 4.56 20 2,368,391 0.84 37 2.741,139 1.35 
1990 18 353,456 5.09 14 2,463,339 0.57 32" 2.816,795 1.14 
1991 16 442,692 3.61 15 2,506,550 0.60 31 2,949,242 1.05 
1992 12 349,204 3.44 14 2,551,885 0.55 26 2,901,089 0.90 
1993 11 333,574 3.30 9 2,581,492 0.35 20 2,915,066 0.69 
1994 10 351.603 2.84 6 2,558,643 0.23 16 2,910.246 0.55 
1995 17 352,229 4.83 13 2,548,813 0.51 30 2,901,042 1.03 
1996 10 335,714 2.98 12 2,579,182 0.47 22 2,914,896 0.75 
1997 22 319,609 6.88 10 2,720,413 0.37 32 3,040,022 1.05 
1998 10 309,460 3.23 13 2,555,023 0.51 23 2,864,483 0.80 
1999 Jan-Jun 6 178,746 3.36 5 1,288,482 0.39 11 1,467,228 0.75 
Total 194 4,716.129 4.01 198 33,560,002 0.57 392 38.887,049 1.01 
Including repeat donors newly tested for HIV infection. 
Figure 7. 
HIV Infected blood donations: UK 
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Table B. HBsAg positive blood donations: UK (i. e. England, Wales, Northern Ireland & 
Scotland): 01/1011995 to 3010611999 
HBsAg 
positive 
New donors 
Donations Rate per 
tested 100.000 
Repeat donors' 
HBsAg Donations Rate per 
positive tested 100,000 
HBsAg 
positive 
Total 
Donations 
tested 
Rate per 
100,000 
1995 Oct 35 89,840 38.96 10 601,032 1.66 45 690,872 6.51 
1996 120 335,714 35.74 18 2,579,182 0.70 138 2.914,896 4.73 
1997 99 319,609 30.98 35 2,720,413 1.29 134 3,049,022 4.41 
1998 102 309,460 32.96 19 2,555,023 0.74 121 2,864,483 4.22 
1999 Jan-Jun 47 178,746 26.29 11 1,288,482 0.85 58 1.467,228 3.95 
Total 403 1,233,369 32.67 93 9,744,132 0.95 496 10,977,501 4.52 
1 Induding repeat donors newly tested for HBsAg. 
Figure S. HBsAg positive blood donations: UK 
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brillate) have been challenged. ' Trained doctors can do all 
those things. Doctors also have an advantage in that they are 
allowed to give thrombolytic treatment, which improves the 
outcome of patients who have had heart attacks. °The relative 
advantages of different staff is unclear in the case of trauma, ' 
and two American studies have shown that patients with 
penetrating injuries attended by either the police' or the 
public ° had as good or a better outcome than those attended 
by trained ambulance crews. Patients with severe head injuries 
often need to be paralysed and ventilated, which usually can be 
undertaken only by doctors. ` 
The research is inconclusive, but well trained doctors 
undoubtedly have a role in prehospital emergency care. Yet 
undergraduate medical training is poor preparation, and that is 
why the Royal College of Surgeons has established a specialist 
examination in prehospital care. BASICS also offers training 
and has proposed a system of accreditation so that ambulance 
services can be sure that doctors are adequately trained. The 
new faculty is open to doctors, ambulance staff, nurses, first 
aiders, and others interested in prehospital care, and undoubt- 
edly this difficult work needs teamwork. The roles of first 
aider, ambulance person, and doctor are complimentary. 
Research is lacking not only on who should deliver care but 
also on the best care to offer. Guidelines cannot be automati- 
cally transposed from hospital practice to emergency 
prehospital care. An important element of all prchospital work 
is the decision of when to transport the patient. Will an 
intravenous infusion help an exsanguinating patient or simply 
delay definitive treatment by a surgeon? Giving fluid to 
patients with blunt chest trauma before transport to hospital 
increases mortality, " as does delaying the transfer to hospital 
of patients with penetrating trauma in order to wait for the 
arrival of paramedics. " Some types of care can be given safely 
only in hospital. 
Further research is also needed on the best equipment for pre- 
hospital emergency care. Some forms of equipment-for 
instance, extrication devices-are unique to prehospital care, and 
they have not been adequately assessed. Some equipment may 
worsen the patient's predicament: pneumatic antishock garments 
may increase mortality, probably because they compromise respi- 
ratory function"; and semirigid collars used for immobilising the 
neck may raise intracranial pressure (G Davies, personal commu- 
nication). New forms of telemetric equipment are also being pro- 
posed that will allow doctors to assist from a remote location. 
Their use will need evaluation and audit. 
The research and audit that are necessary to underpin pre- 
hospital emergency care will appear in the new journal. A new 
body has been proposed to regulate paramedics, and the new 
faculty is collaborating with BASICS on training and accredi- 
tation. All the professional groups need to work together, and 
the journal will be for them all. These initiatives should ensure 
better outcomes for patients who need emergency care. 
MATTHEW COOKE 
Editor 
TIM HODGIrTTS 
Chairman, editorial board 
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A SHOT in the arm for safer blood transfusion 
A new surveillance system for trumfusion hazards 
How safe is blood transfusion in 1996? Despite recent public- 
ity surrounding contaminated blood bags and hepatitis C 
virus, it is probably safer than it has ever been. More rigorous 
donor selection, improved viral screening tests, tighter quality 
control, and accreditation of hospital laboratories have all 
played a part. But there is no room for complacency. As was 
highlighted by an editorial in the BMA two years ago, prevent- 
able deaths after transfusion still occur. ' 
The commonest cause of transfusion related death in the 
United States, where reporting to the Food and Drugs 
Administration is mandatory, is the transfusion of ABO 
incompatible blood. ' A British survey revealed that episodes 
where wrong blood is given to a patient as a result of poor 
patient identification may complicate as many as 1 in 30 000 
transfusions. ' Mortality is minimised, firstly, because the 
distribution of blood groups in the British population means 
that two thirds of "wrong" transfusions are by chance ABO 
compatible and, secondly, by the fact that only I in 10 ABO 
incompatible transfusions is fatal, ' Nevertheless, such 
episodes, and other near miss events, reveal serious 
deficiencies in the transfusion process. Rarer immunological 
complications such as transfusion associated graft versus host 
disease' and transfusion related lung injury' also continue to 
cause fatalities. 
What is the situation with transfusion transmitted infection? 
Recent American figures suggest that the risk from a donor 
who is infectious but not yet scropositive is about I in 500 000 
for HIV, I in 100 000 for hepatitis C virus, and 1 in 60 000 for 
hepatitis B virus. * 
Recent calculations for England suggest even greater safety 
than in the United States, with estimated current risks of HIV 
and hepatitis C infectious donations entering the blood supply 
for any reason of I in more than 2 million and 1 in more than 
200 000 respectively (K Soldan, JAJ Barbara, unpublished 
BMJ Vol uni 313 16 NovEMB * 1906 1221 
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data). Estimates of risk for hepatitis B infection are 
complicated by the fact that transmission may arise from 
donors with chronic hepatitis B infection and undetectable 
hepatitis B surface antigen. In Britain, there has been only one 
reported case of HIV transmission from the 26 million units of 
blood tested since 1985. ' Rare cases of fatal bacterial contami- 
nation of blood also occur, ' and there has been at least one 
probable transmission of human T cell lcukaemia/lymphoma 
virus type I by transfusion in Britain. ` 
Unlike the United States, Britain has had no system for 
comprehensive monitoring of transfusion hazards. Because 
blood is not a licensed product, the Committee on the Safety 
of Medicines' yellow card system covering serious reactions to 
drugs and plasma fractions such as factor VIII has never 
included whole blood or its components (red cell concen- 
trates, platelets, fresh frozen plasma, and cryoprecipitate). This 
gap in reporting is now being filled, with the recent launch of 
the serious hazards of transfusion (SHOT) initiative. Covering 
the whole of Britain and the Republic of Ireland, the initiative 
is a voluntary and confidential reporting system for transfusion 
related deaths and other serious complications. It covers all 
infectious and major immunological complications of transfu- 
sion, as well as all episodes where wrong blood is given, 
whether or not the patient is harmed. Complications of 
autologous donation will also need to be reported, since both 
bacterial contamination"' and errors in administration" have 
been described. 
SHOT aims to improve transfusion safety further by analys- 
ing reported information on transfusion hazards and translat- 
ing the findings into transfusion service policy, clinical 
guidelines, and training. Similar systems already exist for con- 
fidential reporting of maternal, infant, and perioperative 
deaths, and their value is widely appreciated. 
The success of the scheme will depend on the participation 
of all staff administering blood, so its activities are being 
directed by a steering group with wide representation from 
royal colleges and professional bodies. The system will be co. n- 
fidential, with no possibility of identifying patients or hospitals 
from the final data set. The need for anonymity is paramount 
to encourage reporting without prejudice to the individuals or 
institution concerned. 
Hospital haematologists responsible for transfusion will 
have a key role in reporting both infectious and non-infectious 
hazards. Blood transfusion centres should he rapidly informed 
about possible viral or bacterial transmissions so that 
withdrawal of other components and appropriate investiga- 
tions can begin. Vigilance of reporting of infections to national 
surveillance centres also continues. Full details of the SHOT 
scheme, along with the clinical features of the serious compli- 
cations of transfusion, are described in the recently revised 
Handbook of Transfusion Medicine, provided free to all 
hospitals. " 
One example is given to indicate the potential value of the 
scheme. In 1994, a report was published of three eases of 
transfusion associated graft versus host disease linked to a new 
purine antagonist, fludarabine, under trial for chronic 
lymphotyric leukaemia. " During the preparatory period for 
the launch of SHOT, one of us (IMW) was made aware of 
1222 
three further cases from different parts of the country. ' As a 
result, national guidelines now recommend the use of gamma 
irradiated components to prevent transfusion associated graft 
versus host disease in patients who receive fludarabine. 
Transfusionists face many challenges in today's health serv- 
ice. There arc many additional but costly testing and process- 
ing manoeuvres to which donated blood could be subjected, 
but which of these would best improve transfusion safety? 
Should we be testing for additional viral markers such as anti- 
bodies to hepatitis B core antigen and human T cell 
leukaemia/lymphoma virus, moving to virally inactivated fresh 
frozen plasma, or undertaking leucocyte depletion of all blood 
collected? Or would the public he better served by extensive 
investment in quality assurance and audit of transfusion 
practice, " accreditation of "transfusion prescribers, "" basic 
research into blood and plasma substitutes, or widespread 
provision of facilities for autologous transfusion? 
'nie SHOT initiative has the potential tu provide the data 
necessary to inform these kinds of decision. Its success will 
depend on good case ascertainment, which will require 
vigilance and support from all staff who care for transfusion 
recipients. We thank Dr John Barbara for invaluable advice 
and discussions on infection risk. 
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plasma (Table 1). Our PCR results for IICV RNA were con- 
firmed independently for all 14 negative lot samples and for 
12 (85.7%) of 14 PCR-positive lot samples (John Saldanha, 
PhD, National Institute for Biological Standards and Control, 
Potters Bar, UK). The viral load for 30 HCV RNA-positive lot 
samples was compared to that of the National Institute for 
Biological Standards and Control reference preparation 
number 95/590, which had been validated by international 
collaborative studies to contain approximately 4000 copies 
of HCV RNA per mL. This reference preparation is expected 
to test positive after a single PCR amplification. Twenty-eight 
of the 30 lots tested negative after the first amplification; 
therefore, they contained less than 4000 copies of HCV RNA 
per mL. 
On the basis of these findings, we believe that screen- 
ing for anti-IICV has reduced the viral load to concentra- 
tions so low that the manufacturing process itself makes 
HCV RNA undetectable in the finished product. Neverthe- 
less, as an additional measure to ensure the viral safety of 
these products, we strongly recommend accelerating the in- 
troduction of a virus-inactivation and/or -removal step in 
the preparation of all IMIG products. 
Giulio Pisani, PhD 
Karen Cristiano, PhD 
Maria Wirz, PhD 
Carlo Pini, PhD 
Giuliano Gentil], PhD 
Laboramry o/tmmunology 
istituto Superiore di Sanit4 
VialeRegina Elena, 299 
00161 Nome, Italy 
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Unexplained hepatitis C virus antibody 
seroconversion in established blood donors 
In two articles published in the Journal of Medical Virology' 
and TRANSFUSION= Atrah et al. report hepatitis C virus 
(11(: V) seroconversion in 10 blood donors whose blood was 
collected by the Birmingham (UK) Blood Centre from 1992 
through 1995. We believe that the reports byAtrah et al. over. 
estimate the incidence ofttCV seroconversion in a represen- 
tative English blood donor population, because their find- 
ings are inconsistent with a significantly larger and 
contemporaneous national survey, and because their cor- 
roborating evidence of HCV infection is inconclusive. 
A retrospective national survey of blood donors who 
had seroconverted for f1CV between January 1993 and De- 
cember 1995 has been conducted in England (Soidan K, et 
at HCV seroconversions in blood donors: England, 1993 to 
1995. Manuscript submitted for publication). The case defi- 
nition used for this survey required the demonstration of a 
change from negative results to positive results on compa- 
rable enzyme immunoassay and recombinant immunoblot 
assay. From 1993 through 1995,14 cases of HCVseroconver- 
sion in blood donors were recorded by the English survey 
(including Donor 2 from Atrah et al. '). Six of the cases de- 
scribed by Atrah et at. (Donors 1 and 3 from the first article 
and Donors 1 to 4 from the second article) did not satisfy the 
case definition (based on serologic test results) used for this 
survey. These six donors also had characteristics that make 
us doubt the authenticity of seroconversion for HCV in 
them: they differ from the accepted cases with respect to age, 
relevant risk factors, and polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
results. 
The mean age of the English survey donors was 30 years 
(22- 43) compared to 52 years (38-64) for the donors pre- 
sented by Atrah et al. (p<0.001). Fifty percent (6/12) of the 
national survey donors for whom exposure history informa- 
tion was available had had a probable exposure to HCV 
during the relevant period (2 had injected drugs, 2 had HCV- 
infected sexual partners, 1 had a sexual partner who had 
injected drugs, and 1 had blood contact during a fight). None 
of the donors presented by Atrah et al. had a known prob- 
able exposure to HCV infection. For 3 of the 4 donors in the 
Atrah study for whom a PCR test result was available for the 
first seropositive donation, no HCV RNA was detected: all 3 
donations were taken less than 1 year after the last sero- 
negative donation. Only 1 of 10 English survey donors with 
a PCR test performed at the time of the first seropositive 
donation was PCR negative: this donation was taken 2 years 
after the last scronegative donation. Similarly, only 1 of the 
6 HCV seroconversions recorded in Scotland during this 
period was in a donor who was PCR negative at the first 
seropositive donation. 
We also note here the lack of transmission of HCV by a 
donor (Donor 2 from Atrah et al-2) who is reported as being 
PCit positive on a donation dated September 1993, the re- 
cipient of which was identified, counseled, and found to be 
uninfected. This donor was found to be PCR negative 9 
months later. This pattern of viremia and infectivity is un- 
expected and should be carefully confirmed, perhaps by 
retesting key samples in an independent laboratory, before 
its implications may be accepted. 
Volume 37, September 1997- TRANSFUSION 987 
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Atrah et al. report an HCV seroconversion incidence of 
0.34 per 10,000 previously seronegative donors (1 /30,000) in 
1994. The denominator available for the national survey was 
donations from repeat donors, rather than the number of 
seronegative donors tested. which was used by Atrah et al. 
Use of this denominator produces a lower estimate of the 
seroconversion rate in repeat donors but still allows com- 
parison between centers and periods. The extent of this 
underestimation in 1994 depends on how much less than 1 
year the average interval between donations is. unless 
interdonation intervals vary considerably between blood 
centers, the comparison of rates using this denominator is 
valid. If we accept thevalidityof the cases presented byAtrah 
et at., the rate of postseroconversion donations in all dona- 
tions from repeat donors in Birmingham during 1994, 
calculated by our method (0.17/ 10,000), Is tenfold the analo- 
gous rate in the rest of England (0.016/10,000). If Binning. 
ham and the rest of England have a common HCV sero- 
conversion rate among repeat donors, the probability that 
such a high rate would be observed in the Birmingham sur- 
vey is extremely low (p = 0.004). The observed annual rates 
of post-HCV seroconversion donations in England for the 
years 1993,1994, and 1995 were 0.029,0.014, and 0.028 per 
10,000, respectively. The rate of HCV seroconversion in re- 
peat blood donors in Scotland during this period was 0.06 
per 10,000. 
The differences in the results from the two surveys im- 
ply that different criteria were used for the ascertainment of 
cases of seroconversion. Other blood centers' under- 
reporting of HCV seroconversions to the English survey or 
local factors affecting HCV transmission or donor selection 
in the Birmingham area could account for some of the dif- 
ferences. However, in the light of the analysis of the charac- 
teristics of these cases and bearing in mind our concerns 
about the confirmation ofHCV antibody detection, 3 we con- 
sider the differences in the estimated seroconversion rates 
to be attributable to error in the ascertainment of sero- 
conversion in the Birmingham survey. 
Patricia E. Hewitt, MD, FRCP, FRCPath 
John-). Barbara, MA, MSc, PhD, PIBIol, FRCPath 
National Blood Service 
London and South East Zone 
Kate Soldan, BA. MPhi! 
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Public Health laborotorySensicel 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre 
61 ColindalsAvenue 
London, UK 
Jean-Pierre Aliain, MD, PhD 
Division of Transfusion Medicine 
University of Cambridge 
Cambridge, UK 
Brian C. Dow, PhD 
Scottish National Blood Transfusion Service 
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The above letter was sent to Atrah et al.; Dr. Atrah offered the 
following reply. 
Hewitt et al. misrepresent our two articles. " We reported 
seroconversion in 7 blood donors, not 10. We reported sero- 
conversion in 3 donors in the first article' and in 4 donors 
in the second. ' Three additional donors were reported in the 
second article as an example of a change in serologic status 
that we did not consider sufficient to categorize as a docu- 
mented seroconversion. This difference invalidates the sub- 
sequent calculations, comparisons, and conclusions of 
Hewitt et al. 
The word seroconversion may legitimately convey a 
different meaning in different studies. Hewitt et al. may ar- 
gue the merit of their definition as compared to ours, but 
they should not doubt our figures, which were derived by 
more accurate means and based on different criteria. Our 
studies relied on an active systematic search for donors who 
were found positive by defined criteria in two successive 
years after being tested negative by the same manufacturer's 
assay and generation of kit on previous donations in one 
regional transfusion center. Their means of case detection 
relied on notification of seroconversion by 14 regional trans- 
fusion centers using kits from different manufacturers and 
different confirmation algorithms. Furthermore, their crite- 
ria. for seroconversion were not explained to those filling out 
the forms; this could have affected the consistency of the 
information supplied. 
Hewitt et al, make the assumption that seroconversion 
is synonymous with infection. We did not make such a claim, 
as we recognize that test systems have limitations that make 
such an assumption untenable. We reported scroconversion 
as we defined it and attempted to discuss its causes and im- 
plication in the light of available knowledge. 
Finally, if Hewitt et al. consider our findings for HCV 
seroconversion in Birmingham excessive and unacceptable, 
they should also explain their own published data. I refer the 
reader to the report presented at the annual meeting of the 
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Incidence of seroconversion to positivity for hepatitis C 
antibody in repeat blood donors in England, 1993-5 
K Soldanj Aj Barbara, Fieptonstall 
Abstract 
Objective: To estimate the rate of seroconversion to 
positivity for hepatitis C antibody in repeat blood 
donors in England and to describe the probable 
routes of infection in these donors. 
Design: Retrospective survey of blood donors 
becoming Iotsitive for hepatitis C. antibody and of the 
results of donation, testing. 
Setting. The 14 blood centres in England. 
Subjects: All repeat donors giving blood between 
January 1993 and December 1995. 
Main outcome measures: Number of donors 
developing hepatitis C between donations doting the 
three years of testing for hepatitis C antibody at 
English blood centres and the rate of scnuon ersion 
among repeat blood donors. Probable routes of 
infe ctifnL 
Results: 14 donors during 1993-5 fidfilled the case 
definition for scmconvcrsion to positivity for hepatitis 
C antibody. The estimated ser(conve sion rate for 
infection with hepatitis C in repeat donors was 0.26 
per 100 000 person )tars (95'ßo confidence internal 
0.15 to 0.43). Counselling after diagnosis found that 
four of these donors had risk factors specified in the 
criteria excluding people fmm giving blood but these 
factors had not come to light betirre donation. 
Another of the donors who scrocomertcd had a risk 
factor that has since been included in the exclusion 
criteria I feterosexual intercourse was considered to 
be the most likely mute of infection for five of the 14 
donors 
Conclusions: The rate of scroconversion for positivity 
to hepatitis C antibody in repeat blood donors in 
England was extremely low. During 1993-5 fewer than 
I in 450 000 donations were estimated to have come 
from repent donors who had become positive for 
hepatitis C antibody since the previous donation. 
Litroduction 
In Septctnb i' 1991 blt. wd transI uion services in the 
Unital Kingdom began routinely testing all blood 
donations for antibody to hepatitis C virus. Since then 
around 2 million healthy adidts harr been test<rl fier 
the antibody each year by the English national blood 
service. National collation of test results and of charac" 
teristics of donors positive for hepatitis C antibody 
provides valuable information about donors and about 
a selected sample of the adult population of England. 
Must acute infections With hepatitis C are asymptu- 
tnatic, and most probably pass undetected. Recent 
infection is implied when a donation that is positive for 
hepatitis C antibody was preceded by a donation that 
was negative fier the antilxxlv. 'llte testing of donations 
from repeat donors therefore provides a rare 
opportunity to identify incident infections with hepati- 
tis C virus. Information about incident infections is of 
interest to blood transfusion services and to public 
health workers as it relates to current rather than past 
transmission of the virus. The selection process for 
blood donors aims to cxdudc donors who have recog- 
nised risks of contracting blootlborne infections. 
Incident infection in blood donors usually indicates 
one of three things: a failure in the definition or appli- 
cation of selection criteria; an unrecognised exposure 
to blcwdtwmc infcvAt in; or info tion through an exfxr- 
sure that is not included in the selection criteria 
because it is common in blood donors and thought to 
be associated with a comparatively small risk of 
infection. 'llierc remains a small risk of u-ansmission of 
hepatitis C virus by transfusion from the infectious 
donations of donors who arc negative for hepatitis C 
antibody and from failures in the testing and exclusion 
of donations that are positive for the antibody. 17hc 
number of donors who seroconvert between donations 
is needed to estimate the risk of collecting a donation 
from a recently infected donor who has not yet dcvcl- 
oped detectable hepatitis C antibodies and hence the 
risk of truuntiuing hepatitis C by transfusion. 
During 1994-5 we surveyed scroconversions to 
hepatitis C antibody detected by English blood centres 
from September 1991 to December 1995. We used 
these results with data from the infection surveillance 
system of the National Blood Authority and Public 
Health Laboratory Service Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre to estimate the rate of seroconver- 
sion to positivity for hepatitis C antibody in repeat 
donors in England during 1993-5. 
Subjects, and methods 
Sample 
BI(x)(i donations in England are obtained f om volun- 
tary unpaid Bonurs. "Ilse selection procedure excludes 
people who are outside the age range 18-65 years, 
those who have been at known high risk of contracting 
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blocxlbornc infections, and those who save any mecli- 
ntl condition which con ainclicates either the loss of 
450 nil of'hlond or the gibing of'their blood to patients 
'1 he number of repeat donors in ION constituted 
around, l i cif fire population aged 18-65 in England in 
the middle of 1994. 
During the study all donations were tested tiyr 
hepatitis C antibody using enzyme linked inununo- 
sombant assays (EI.. ISAs). Initially reactive donations 
were retested by E LISA. Donations that wert reactive 
on reheat testing were not used, and supplementary 
tests (additional EI. ISAs and recombinant 4111111.11101blOt 
assay and, in some cases, the pa dytnerasc chain reaction 
for hepatitis C DNA) were peifürmed on them to 
clarity the infcc tion status of donors. 
Donors with evidence of infection with hepatitis C 
virus were contacted by the blood centres and offered 
additional testing and counselling by the blood centre, 
with rcfenal to a relevant medical specialist, or they 
were referred to their general practitioner kur further 
tnanagentent. ' Risk factors fir hepatitis C. were 
discussed with donors during their follow tip and any 
acknowledged by the donor were tecortksl. 
Case definition 
A standardised algorithm for confirmatory testing of 
blood donations had not been used, and we had to 
accommodate variation in the tests used. We used a 
comprehensive case definition that was designed to 
include all true biological scroconNe lions and exclude 
false positive results and any spurious results caused by 
changes in uzt format and performance over time. 
"17tc three case definitions were: 
" Negative results in third generation recombinant 
immunosorbent assay in pre-serocon ersion donation 
and positive results in third generation recombinant 
immunosorbent assay in post-scroconvetsion dona- 
tion, without negative results in poly nterase chain reac- 
tion for hepatitis C DNA fir the post"serocortmersion 
do Cation if given < 12 months after the pre- 
seroconversion donation 
" Negative results in EI. ISA and second generation 
recombinant imrnunosorbent assay in pre- 
seroconcersion donation and positive results in El. ISA 
(of same manufacmn-cr and generation as pre- 
seroconversion test) and second generation recom- 
binant imnnmosorirent assay in pout-scroeonversion 
dot> ttion, without negative results in polvmerase chain 
reaction for hepatitis C 1)NA for the post- 
scrocom"crsion donation il' given < 12 months aller 
the pre setnconversion donation 
" \egatis'c results in third generation EI.. IS. A in 
pre-seroconversrcm donation and positive results in 
third generation ELISA and recombinant iumiuno- 
sotbcnt assay in post-seericons ersion donation, uidtout 
negative results in pollanetase chain reaction for hepa- 
titis C DNA for the Imst-serucommsion donation if 
given < 12 months : flier the pre-sel ocou ersion dona- 
tiOn. 
Methods 
In Jtily 1994 all English blood centres teere asked to 
return inii)rmation about the tests performed at 
results obtained on the first donation positive for 
hepatitis C antibody (ixt-sen ccniversion donation) 
and the last donation negative lot hepatitis C antibody 
(pre-scroconversion donation) for cat-it donor who was 
considered to have seroconverted between donations 
wince testing began in 1991. Serocunversious identified 
after July 1994 were also reported and included in the 
snr ey. Information was also requested ahnet possible 
exposures to hepatitis C virus. In October 1995 the 
national svstcrn Ihr the surccill, tuce of donation testing 
was revised and scrttconversions were then identified 
li-otn routine survt illance reports. 
That results were examined to see whrlher they met 
the case definition. If they did not the reporting blood 
centre was crnuactetl and asked Corr any additional test 
results or to perform additional tests on archived sam- 
ple-, Most (-ntuntottly they were asked to perform par- 
allel recontbinant immunoblot assays on samples of 
pre-seroconvcrsion and post-seroconversion dona- 
tions. Follow up of missing returns and requests for 
additional information continued during 1995. 
During 1991 (September-Decctnher) and 1992 
most repeat donors tested for hepatitis C, antilrudy 
were being tested by the National Blood Service for the 
first time. As a previous negative result on testing for 
hepatitis C antibody lest is a prerequisite ft)r 
scroconversion to positivity for hepatitis C antibody, 
rates for 1991 and 1992 were not cakulatesL 
The rate of post-wroconversion donations in all 
donations ! hurt repeat donors was calculated by divid- 
ing the number of seroconversions by the number of 
donations from repeat donors. The number of 
donations from repeat donors tested for hepatitis C 
antibody during 1993,199-I, arid 1993 was obtained 
fum the national system for the surveillance of dona- 
tion testing. 17te incidence of seroconvetsion was 
calculated by dividing the number of seroconversitn s 
by the number of person years at risk. 'I-he number of 
person years was estimated by dividing the number of 
donations firnt repeat donors by the average annual 
number of donations per repeat donor. The average 
number of donations per repeat donor at one blood 
centre (which tests S'Mn of the repeat donor donations 
in England) was 1.71 over one )rar and 3.49 over three 
pears (1993-5). The average annual number of 
donations during the three years from 1993 to 1995 
was therefore taken as 1.16 (3.49/3). This is equivalent 
to an average interval between donations of 0.811) eater 
Results 
We received 23 reports of putative seroconvcrsion in 
repeat donors tested between September 1991 and the 
end of 1995. The test results available for seven of t bent 
did not satisfy the case definition. We asked centres to 
repot on only the donors for whom fill testing inf tr- 
mation aas available, so these seven reports do not 
represent alt the possible additional cases of recent 
inkction with hepatitis C virus in repeat donors in 
whore the data are iusullieient to satisfy our case deli- 
nition. 'Aro of the donors who tirillled the case defini- 
tion received their diagnosis during 1991 or 11992, and 
14 of the cases werir diaguosecl during the study )cars, 
199 S-ý (table 1). 'l lie di crence in the rates for 1993, 
1991, acid 1995 was not significant (P = 0.59). Results 
from the polyrnrrase chain teat non were available for 
10 of ihre 14 donors: nine donors had positive results 
and one donor, whose first scropositive donation was 
HMJ 316 9 MAY l'$H . -Innj. mm 
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Table 1 Seroconversion to positivity for hepatitis C antibody among repeat donors In England, 1993-5 
1993 1991 1996 1193.6 
No of danidons from domrs who had 536 14 
woco 1ow1od sirKa previous donation 
no or donations non, reoea donors feud toi 2 140 '712 2116 tla 2105 038 8 381828 
antibody W hepatitis C vnuo 
frepoaxY M donations trap donors woo red 1 in 428 142 1U 705 393 1 in 350 840 1 in 494 423 
anocom ded ilea Mit donation 
....... _..... _... __. _... __. _.... _........ _. __.... _. _.......... _.. _... _. _. __.... _.. _. __...... ___. __....... _.. _....... _ Rate of wotanversron per 100 000 person 0.40 (0.17 to D. 98) 0.24 (0,0810 0.75) 
years (95% Cl) 
Table 2 Acknowledged probable exposure to hepatitis C virus in 14 repeat donors who became positive for hepatitis C antibody 
0 Wrus 
1149 (0 22 to 1.08) 0.26 (0.15 to 0.43) 
Total (x-141 Mm (us) Women 
Inpcurg dog use Yes 2 2 0 
Neleosexual inkM5Urse 
. ... _. 
5 1 4 
_ _. _ .. . _. __. _. _. _. __. -. _., ý__. r. _ Partner , In hBpaUt¢ C' 
... 
. _. --Yea __.. ' . _..... 1 ... __.... _.. O_. _. 
Pxlna who Injected drugsl Yea 2 0 2 
P>/mer Wih tanoos 
.. 
No I 0 1 
P Imes Irom coumry with high PrewIence of hepaldis c .... ý _. __. Na _ .. . ..... ___ .. ý _ _. _.. _. ... ý.. _.. ,, _ 1 
Blood em4a with person with risk laaors No ij 1 0 
Noneiden56ed No 4 2 2 
No inlombon 2 2 0 
'N tome of donation this uMCtion crittrion moo not in use. 2 
fin one N. partner was found positiv for antibody to Mpatdis C after donor was given diagnosis: in other, msbody status of partner was not known 
3Meo rponad on m Atrab of al' 
taken two years after the last scronegative donation, 
had negative results. 
Five blood centres reported no seroconvaaions. 
'11tree mitres reported more than one seroconversion; 
one centre in one of the Thames regions reported four 
cases and had the highest raue of semconversion, and 
two centres, outside the Thames regions, reported wo 
cases each, There was no significant heterogeneity 
between the rates by centre (deviance=159, df=13, 
P 0.25). 
'1he average interval between the pie- 
senxonversion and post"scroconvetsion donation for 
the 14 donors was 1.29 years (n iediau 1.38 years, range 
0.42-2.33 years). 7his interval was 1.5 times longer than 
the average interval in 1993-5 for all repeat donors. 
Table 2 shows the reported probable exposures to 
infection of those who sewconvertetl (information 
about ethnic group was not gathered). The average age 
of all repeat donors was around 40. The mean age 
of the 14 donors who scroconverted was 30 years 
6 months (9514ß confidence interval 26 years 7 mouths 
to 34 ), cars 5 months); die meat age of the men was 
31 years 5 months (26 years 1 month to 36 years 
8 months) and of the women 29 years -1 mouths 
(21 years 1 month to 37 years 6 months). 
Discussion 
Estimating seroconversion rates 
A total of 412 repeat donors who were positive for 
hepatitis C aotitwdy were identified by English blood 
centres during 1993-5. Only 19 of thorn were prnvcd to 
be incident infections witlt hchatitis C virus. This 
surrey eMmiates the minimum rate of sc: roconve lion 
it) Positivity for hepatitis C antibody in repeat donors 
io England during 1993-5. Our case definition 
excluded spurious scroconvcrsion due to chmtges io 
test format and pchft)rmance. the sensitivity and 
specificity of ELISAs and recombinant itnmunoblot 
HMJ VOLUME 3 16 9 MAY 1498 www, bmj cnm 
Criterion for exclusion of 
No of oöocomrtlep down 
assays used to test for hepatitis C antibody changed 
between 1991 and 1995, and third generation tests 
were introduced during 1993. By the time of this 
survey many of the archived samples from the 
pre-scroconvcrsion donations under investigation had 
been used for repeat and supplementary tests or had 
been discarded, depending on each blood centre's prn- 
tocol. Therefore, repeat and supplementary testing of' 
pre-seroconversion donations was limited. Because we 
required evidence of comparably confirmed negativity 
for the last seronclntivc donation, we may have 
excluded some cases of true seroconversion. Previous 
reports of seroconversion to positivity for hepatitis C 
antibody with less strictly applied case. definitions' have 
been justifiably challenged: and we chose to identify 
clear cut rather than probable cases. Also, our survey 
was retrospective and relied on retrieval of blood 
centres' records of tests performed up to four years 
previously. For these reasons, this study rrtay underesti- 
ntate the number of donors who seroconvert and 
therefore the rate of seroconversion among repeat 
donors in. England. Donations from repeat donors who 
were being tested for hepatitis C antibody by the 
national blood service for the first time during 1993-5 
could not be excluded flout the denominators that we 
used.. study conducted on donations (hiring 1993 by 
one blood cenue found 1.8% ofdonations from repeat 
donors to be from donors riot previously tested for 
hepatitis C antibody by the blood centre. "This inaccu- 
racy in our denominator is likely to result in a further, 
although slight, depression of the seroconversion rates 
as estimated frost these data. 
One blocxl venue has published reports about 
three cases dia}ntosed during 1993' and a further tour 
cases tli: igtuued during 1994 and 1995" in which set, (. )- 
conversion was thought to have occurred. T'hc 
blood 
centre obtained denominators of previously negative 
donors tested for Hepatitis C antibody dining 1993 and 
estimated the srnkouversion rate during 1993 to be 
14 15 
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?. 78 per 100 000 (1 in 351937) previously ncgative, 
repeat donors': more than 10 times the estimaw from 
our national study. Ilotivever, the case definition used 
by this centre: may have been flawed' '; only one of the 
cases described satisfied the case definition that we 
used. We consider the estimate of the rate of 
scroconcersiun in repeat blood donors derived by this 
single centre to he erroneously high. 
Blood donor sample 
Selection criteria for donors airs at selecting a sample 
of the population that does not report a recognised 
risk for bloodborne infections before donation. ' Since 
the early 19SI)s potential donors have been given 
expl: utatory literature, and since 1989 all new donors 
and donors who have not attended tor two years or 
more have been directly questioned altout risk factors. 
One centre has additionally asked donors to complete 
-a questionnaire. The procedure tor clicitiug infor- 
mation about exposures to risk of infection with hepa- 
titis C sines from infected donors has varied 
throughout the United Kingdom. A standard question- 
naire for interviewing donors is soon tu be innctdut ed. 
Information obtained after donation lion infected 
donors may be affected by Was related to the 
interviewer and the donor. Most blood donors infected 
with hepatitis C virus hale reported a Iristory of inject- 
ing drug use, " " typically many )ears before donating 
blood. Almost one third of those who seroconvcrtcd in 
this study had no risk i: rctors for infection with hepati- 
tis C virus identified by the blood. service. Testing the 
sexual partners of donors who seroconcerted may help 
to establish the utie extent of hetcroscxual haosmis- 
sinn in the donor population. Uncntnmon routes of 
transmission and possible exposures that are not 
thought to be associated witlt risk of infection with 
hepatitis C should also be investigated. 
Seroconversion for hepatitis C virus among repeat 
blood donors in England is tare. 'lids implies that the 
incidence of hepatitis C in the population represented 
by repeat blood donors is now low or that selection cri- 
teria für donation of blood effectively exclude most 
repeat donors with current esposurc to hepatitis C 
tints During 1993-5,14 donations (less than I in 
"150 000 donations) were obtained from donors who 
had seroconvciteil for hepatitis C virus since a 
previous donation was negative boor antibody. During 
tue same period 15 donations were obtained hont 
donors who had developed dctec(able HIV : uuilxtdy 
sitter their piesicnts donation. The number of repeat 
donors who become infected sc idi hepatitis C virus or 
other bloodbornc infections but do not return to 
donate alter their seroconrcrsion cannot be ascer- 
tained by donation testing. In the f turc, tests for 
nuc'lcic acids may enable detection of infectious dona- 
tions that test negative for antibody. 
Recipients and new donors 
We did not determine infection with hepatitis C virus 
in those who irceived the scroncgative pre- 
serocomersion donations. 'Tiacing rr ipicuts of poten- 
tially iulcctious donations is conducted by blood 
cenu"es, and one of the 14 pre-scroconversion 
donations has bechi shown to have truismitied 
infection with hepatitis C virus' 
14Iä 
" The rate of seroconvcrsiou for positivity to 
hepatitis C antibody in English blood donors is 
lote-026 per 100 000 person ytars during 
1993-5 (95% confidence interval 0.15 to 0.13) 
" The probable mute of infection uw unknown 
is a third of the blood donot: s who 
serocon'erted during 1993-5 euid who provided 
information ort risk factors 
" The exclusion of blood donors with a history of 
probable exposure to hepatitis C. retrains an 
important strategy to help keep the blood 
supply free of infection 
Donations from new donors contributed 12% of 
the total number of donations collected in England 
during 199: 1-5. Seroconversiun rates in new donors 
cannot be directly measured, and there are reasons to 
expect that recent inFections in new donors may be 
more ficgitent than in repeat donors; repeat donors 
hate been tested for negativity for markers of infection 
with hepatitis C virus, hepatitis B %ints, JIM and 
Trr/wwina fxrllithnn, and new donors may be more 
likely to donate blood to obtain testing after having 
been exposed to infection. 
Opportunities for further work 
Sotveillance of donation testing anti of dot toes who 
sciocon ert litt hepatitis C virus between donations 
continues to be an important component of nioniurr- 
ing the safety of the blood supply, Study of possible 
exposures to infection that are associated with 
seroconversion for hepatitis C. vino and of the course 
of i cction in scroconverting blood donors who have 
a known date of infection should further contribute to 
our understanding of the cpidemiolopy and clinical 
course of hepatitis C. 
We thank %fr Mike Briuain and Trent blood Centre for data on 
the ititert'al between bksx1 donatitms, IN Paddy Farriugtou lit' 
stati. +ticil help, and all the stall of the bfood centres and public 
Ixalth lalx, rawries in England wit provided law and 
responded to requests kirr supplemcnt: it information alxrut 
testing for hepatitis C eins 
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(Receiv f 20 Juty 1998; In final form 26 August 1998) 
Despite the success of efforts made to prevent the 
transmission of infections by blood transfusion, the 
risk of infectious donations entering the blood 
supply and transmitting infection to the recipients 
of blood components and blood products remains a 
concern. following the implementation of donor 
selection and donation testing strategies to exclude 
HBV, HIV, and HCV infectious donations from the 
blood supply, direct observation of transmission of 
these viruses by blood transfusion has become rare 
and indirect estimation of the probable frequency 
of infectious donations entering the blood supply 
has become more common. Published estimates for 
different blood services and different periods of 
time have varied in their methods and scope. The 
limitations of the estimation process should be 
considered when using estimates of the risk of 
infectious donations entering the blood supply to 
address questions about blood safety. 
Ktyw r1s: Aloe transfusion, I 11V, I ICV, I113V, Mmismission, 
estimated risk 
INTRODUCTION 
Transfusion of bloxxf collected from one indivi- 
dual into another carries with it the possibility of 
transmitting diseases caused by blood-borne 
infectious agents. This is particularly important 
as patients receiving blood transfusion are often 
immunosuppressed or otherwise relatively vul- 
nerable to infection. Transmission of syphilis 
(Treponema pallidluin) was recognised in the early 
days of transfusion when blood was transferred 
directly from donor to recipient. Testing dona- 
tions for treponeinal antibodies and storage of 
blood between collection and transfusion has 
overcome this problem. Since then, three viral 
infections-HBV, IICV, and IHIV-have been the 
predominant transfusion-transmitted agents to 
cause disease and to prompt changes in transfu- 
sion practice. The use of factors associated with 
these blood-borne infections to exclude indivi- 
duals from donating blood, and the testing of 
blood donations for markers of these infections 
have greatly reduced the risk of infectious 
donations entering the blood supply. Never- 
theless, some risk will always remain because 
donor selection and serological testing of dona- 
'Corresponding author. 
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Lions can not identify and exclude every in- 
fectious donation. A the risks of transmitting 
these infections by transfusion have decreased it 
has become increasing difficult to directly 
measure, or quantify, these risks and more 
attention has turned to theoretical estimation of 
the risks of infections being transmitted by 
transfusion. 
RISK ESTIMATION 
Table 1 shows some key items of information 
required to calculate theoretical estimates of the 
risk of a donation infectious for a given organ- 
ism entering the blood supply. The range of 
values in which each of the variables in Table I 
might lie depends on the sample used to 
estimate the variable, the biological variability 
involved, and the assumptions made in obtaining 
the working value. Table 11 summarises some 
published studies that have provided theoretical 
estimates of the risk of transfusion-transmitted 
infections. All of these studies have attempted to 
estimate the risk of window period donations 
(i. e., i. in Tab. 1) associated with donations from 
repeat donors. Some studies have included 
estimation of the risk of false negative results 
and errors (i. e., ii. in Tab. D. In all, the risk of 
persistent (or fluctuating) seronegativity during 
K. SOLDAN AND 1. BARBARA 
established infections (i. e., iii. in Tab. 1) in blood 
donors has not been included or has been 
assumed to be zero. 
In the USA the fall in the estimated risk of 
accepting I11V infectious donations between 
1987 and the early 1990s was largely due to a 
reduction in the length of the window period 
used in the risk calculations (from 56 days to 22 
days). The markedly higher estimated risk of 
111V infectious donations in the Thai study is 
largely the result of the higher incidence of 111V 
infection in Thailand than in Europe and North 
America, although the longer window period 
used in this study also contributed to this higher 
estimated risk. The published studies have 
varied in whether they have estimated the risk 
from all donations, or just from donations from 
repeat donors. New (i. e., first time) donors differ 
from repeat donors in ways that affect the risk of 
an infectious donation entering the blood sup- 
ply. Probably most important is that new donors 
have not been previously tested by the blood 
service for markers of infections used to exclude 
individuals from the donor panel. So, donations 
from new donors have a higher prevalence of 
infectious markers. Incidence of infection can be 
derived from donation testing in two ways; by 
testing donations for markers indicative of an 
early infection (e. g., IgM class of antibody to 
TABLE. I Key information for estimating the risk of donations infectious for known pathogens entering the blood supply 
despite donation testing 
Component of risk Infornuition nitideJ and source of that information 
Derived from donation testing Other sources 
L risk of scronegative infectiouti 
donatiom being collected during 
early infection 
ii. risk of serupositive donation 
entering the bkxd supply through 
test failure or process error 
. Incidence of in£ixction in 
donors 
" Prevalence of marker used 
to indicate infectivity in 
donations 
" Length of the infectious 
serontg; ative window }ericxi 
following infection 
" Scmsltinity of tests fur the marker 
" Rate of errors that could lead to 
failure tu identify or withdraw a 
positive donation 
iii. risk of seeronegative infectious " Frequency of seronegative, 
donation being collected from infectious individuals (other than 
donors with established (not those in the window period 
early) infection fo16n, in}, infection) amongst 
blood donors 
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TABLE 11 I'ublishLd risk estimation studies 
Country Estimated risk Window Length of False Test wu itivity Estimates 
(Year of infectious donations per period infcctkuus negative(FN) (5) and error rate for new 
data/ million donations (WI') risk window period and Amor risk (%R) used donor 
estimates) (range) estimated? used in day, estimated? donations 
(range) included. ' 
USA 181 HIV 26 Yes 56(28-98) Yew S: 99% Partially 
(1986-87) No - WP-No 
FN = Yes 
USAI9J HIV 6.5(3.33-11.33) Yes 56 No - Yes 
(1987) Yes ER: 0,1% 
USA 1101 111 V 4.64 Yes 56 No Yes 
(1987) No - 
UK (211 HIV: 1986 3.2 Yes 56 Yes S: 98% Partially 
(1986-87) 1IIV: 19871.1 No - WP=NO 
FN = Yes 
Australia 112] HIV 1.08 Yes 28-42 Yes S: 99. W., ( Yes 
(1985-90) No - 
USA1131 IIIV 2.03 (0.36 . 4.95) Yes 22(6-38) No -- No 
(1991-93) HTLV 1.56(0.50-3.90)) 51 (36 72) No - 
HC\' 9.70(347-36.11) 82(54-192) 
1 B, AK 6.65(2.87-13.43) 59(37-87) 
HBV 15.83(6.82-3197) 
USA1141 H1V 1.52-2.22 Yes average of 25 No - Yes 
(1992-93) Yes ER: 0.5% 
France (15] 111V 1.75(0,3-4.6) Yes 22(6.38) No No 
(1992-94) HTLV0.17(0.0-1.6) 56(24-128) No - 
IlCV 4.48(1.? 10.0) 66(38-94) 
113sAg 3.13 (0.9 -11.2) 51(36-72) 
1113V 8.45(2.8-23.2) 
AList ralia1161 HIV 0.79(0.22-1.37) Yes 22(6-38) No No 
(1994-95) 1ICV 4.27(2,82-10.01) 8264-192) No 
HHsAg 2.710-70-4.00) 59(37.87) 
H13V 6.45(4.0-5-9.52) 
Thailand [171 IIIVA 990380(210--65O) Yes 45 Nn - No 
(1940-93) HIV: 1991190(100-540) No - 
HiVA992200(1)0 341)) 
HIV: 1993 190 (50-670) 
' Variou> methods- 
hepatitis B core antigen, p24 HIV antigen, 
nucleic acids, or testing for low titre anti-HIV 
with recently proposed dc-tuned antibody as- 
says), or by using seroconversions in repeat 
donors that mark infections that have arisen 
since. a previous donation. The former approach 
was not used in any of the studies listed in 
Table 11. All except one used the latter approach. 
Brookmeyer et ut., did not use donation testing 
data at all but utilised back-calculated estimates 
of the infection curve in the United States. 
Unfortunately seroconversions can only be ob- 
served in repeat donors: additional information 
and assumptions have to he used to obtain an 
estimate of incidence in new donors. Cumming 
et al., used the prevalence observed in donations 
and assumptions about the time donors had 
been at risk of I1IV infection to estimate 
incidence rates in donors tested for the first 
time. Lackritz et tit., used the prevalence ob- 
served in donations from new and from repeat 
donors during the first year of testing and 
assumptions about how the difference between 
these prevalences represented differences in 
incidence. Dax et al., used the prevalence 
observed in donations and assumptions about 
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the time course of HIV infection and about the 
probability of donating throughout that time. 
Studies frequently state that the risk of a 
donation being collected during the window 
period is the largest remaining risk of infection 
transmission (for infections that donations are 
tested for). This is often an assumption rather 
than a proven fact. The relative importance of 
the different components of the risk of accepting 
infectious donations varies between blood ser- 
vices depending on the specifications of dona- 
tion testing, the proportion of donations 
collected from new donors and the rates of 
incidence and prevalence in the donating popu- 
lation. For example, the greater the proportion of 
donations collected from new donors the larger 
the contribution to the overall risk is that 
associated with donations from new donors 
(the'1'hai study reports that 76% of all donations 
were collected from new donors); and the 
greater the prevalence of infection the more 
important the risk of false negative tests and 
errors in the exclusion of seropostive donations. 
According to an analysis of data for England 
(Soldan. K, Barbara. J. et al., Unpublished work), 
1993-1995, less than 10% of the total estimated 
risk of an HCV infectious donation entering the 
blood supply in England would be due to 
window period donations from repeat donors 
(window period for anti-F ICV of 66 days (54- 
192), lest sensitivity for anti-HCV of 98%, error 
rate of 0.5%). Studies that omit some compo- 
nents of risk or only consider donations from 
repeat donors would usually underestimate the 
risk of an infected donation entering the blood 
supply. 
LIMITATIONS OF RISK 
ESTIMATION - METHODS 
In most risk estimation studies estimates of 
incidence based on senxonversions have been a 
key element. The use of seroconversions to 
estimate incidence involves an assumption that 
donors are not more likely to self-defer, either 
temporarily or permanently, after they have 
seroconverted and that the probability of an 
individual donating blood does not vary over 
the course of antibody development after infec- 
tion. There are some observations such as longer 
than average interdonation intervals in donors 
who have seroconverted for antibodies to HCV 
ill, and fewer than expected HIV p24 antigen 
positive, I IIV antibody negative donations in the 
USA j21, that suggest that donors are more likely 
to self-defer during the window phase. This may 
be due to a perception of recent risk or due to 
symptomatic primary infection. 
HBsAg negativity during established HBV 
infection can occur in healthy adults at the tail- 
end of HBV carriage. Transmission from such 
donors has been observed [3) and this risk 
should he included in estimates of total risk 
where blood service,, use HBsAg alone as a 
marker of HBV infective donations. 
The sensitivity of assays is typically estimated 
using a panel of samples considered representa- 
tive of the population positive for the marker 
concerned. The potential of newly recognised 
subtypes and variants of viral infections to 
escape detection by assays is not addressed by 
most risk estimation studies. Since HIV antibody 
testing began, there has been an emphasis on 
improving the sensitivity of tests with regard to 
early seroconversion concentrating on the HIV 
sub-type that has been most common in Europe 
and the USA, sub-type B. Other subtypes of 
IHIV-1 infection have become more globally 
distributed, and the importance of ensuring 
assays have high sensitivity to a comprehensive 
range of HIV sub-types, should not be over- 
looked (4). Mutant HBV infections, not detected 
by HBsAg tests, have also been shown to pose a 
risk 151. 
Data that could verify of refute the results of 
risk estimation studies are rare. The introduction 
of nucleic acid testing of donations should detect 
infectious donations missed by current serologi- 
cal tests and therefore provide some data to 
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compare with the estimates. However, if the 
estimates from Europe and the USA are close to, 
or higher than, the true risk, several years of 
data collection from nucleic acid testing will be 
needed to test the accuracy of the estimates. 
LIMITATIONS OF RISK 
ESTIMATION - USEFULNESS 
The comparability of these estimates to other 
risks of morbidity is not straightforward. In- 
fectious donations entering the blood supply do 
not directly translate to infected recipients. The 
actual risk of disease also depends upon the 
transmission rate, susceptibility of the recipient 
and the natural history of transfusion-trans- 
mitted infections in recipients. Information 
about natural history is often only available 
from case reports or from studies in other 
patient groups. The size of the infective dose, 
and the relatively poor health status of recipi- 
ents, may make transmission (and rapid disease 
progression) more likely. On the other hand, 
some infectious agents may loose viability 
during their storage between collection and 
transfusion. 
The communication and use of risk estimates 
is often difficult 161. Misunderstanding of these 
risk estimates, or ignorance of their limitations 
can lead to a false sense of confidence, or a false 
sense of alarm, in the safety of transfusion. 
Only those components of risk that we know 
about are estimated and the accuracy of the 
estimates is only as good as the accuracy of the 
information used to derive them. While these 
estimates of the risk of infectious donations 
being accepted and entering the blood supply 
can be of value, they can give the misleading 
impression that the true and total infectious risk 
of transfusion is known. They should not be 
allowed to detract attention and resources away 
from unestimated risks. The true infectious risks 
of blood transfusion involve both infections 
already and demonstrably blood-borne (such 
'117 
as HBV, 1 HV and I ICV), and those that have not 
yet been identified. The litter category may have 
considerable impact on blood services 17] and 
represents a potential hazard of transfusion that 
has been repeatedly realised as blood-borne 
infections have been recognised. These as yet 
unidentified risks justify the use of generic 
measures to limit the exposure of recipients 
such as restricting donation p(x)ling, the use of 
viral inactivation and the avoidance of unneces- 
sary transfusion therapy. 
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Acute hepatitis B infection associated with blood transfusion 
in England and Wales, 1991-7: review of database 
K Soldaa, M Ramsay, M Collins 
Blood donations in England and Wales are collected 
from healthy donors who do not acknowledge factors 
associated with an increased risk of bloodborne infec- 
tions All donations issued for transfusion since the 
early 1970s have been tested für hepatitis B surface 
antigen as a marker of transmissible hepatitis B virus. 
These measures have resulted in low rates of transmis- 
sion by transfusion but have not eliminated all 
infectious donations from the blood supply. 
Hepatitis B infections in transfusion recipients are 
investigated by the national blood services to identify if 
they were transmitted by transfusion. A donation is con- 
cluded as having been probably infectious if the donor 
was surface antigen negative but had evidence of acute 
infection or of earring the virus (antib(. Ay to hepatitis B 
core antigen with no or low titres of antibody to surface 
antigen') or if the donor was surface antigen positive (ou 
review of test results or retesting archived setwn) and 
blood was erroneously released. Mutant strains of hepa- 
titis B rims not detected by routine surface antigen tests 
also pose a risk of infectious donations being 
tr nsfused. ` 
Acute hepatitis B infections, and the probable route 
of infe tion, are reported voluntarily by laboratories in 
England and Wales to the Communicable Disease 
Surveillance Centre. \'Ve examined these reports to 
describe the frequency and nature of acute hepatitis B 
infection transmitted by transfusion. 
hepatitis 13 infection and most cases are due to carriage 
of infection rather than acute infections in donors, A 
similar observation was made by the North London 
Blood Centre during 1985-93 {John Barbara. personal 
communication). 
Donor selection criteria aim to exclude people with 
recent risk factors for acquiring bloodhcmne infection. 
Persistent hepatitis B infections often follow perinatal 
or childhood infection and therefore are less likely to 
be excluded by donor selection. Testing for antibodies 
to hepatitis A core antigen. as is routine in some other 
countries, would have detected most of the infectious 
donations identifiid, Since testing for antibodies to 
core antigen would also detect non-infectious dona- 
tions from donors with naturally acquired inuuunity to 
hepatitis B further tests would be needed to avoid 
unnecessary loss of donations. 
Further consideration of the costs and benefits of 
testing donations for antibodies to core antigen is 
warranted. Policies to vaccinate people who receive 
multiple transfusions' remain . 
justified. The serious 
hazards of transfusion scheme' and collaborative work 
between the national blood services and Public Health 
Laboratory Service will continue to monitor post- 
transfusion infections. 
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reports and follow up information necessary for this study. 
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Methods and results 
We reviewed cases of acute hepatitis B infection 
reported to the surveillance centre during 1991-7 and 
sought information from the national blood se. Mces 
for cases associated with transfusion (table). Twenty 
four of 4185 (0.6%) cases were associated with transtü- 
sion in England and Wales. For 10 reports investigation 
by the national blood services was not possible (for 
example, donation identifiers not available) or incon- 
elusive (for example, one or more donor not traced for 
retesting). or information was not available retruapec- 
tively. Of the 14 probably infectious donations that 
were identified, three were from surface antigen nega- 
d-. r donors during anise hepatitis B infection and I1 
were collected front negative donors during late 
carriage of the virus. No reports of erroneous release 
of surface antigen positive blood were identified. 
Comment 
Over 2.5 million donations are is ued annually in Eng- 
land and Wales. hiie cares presented here unde csti- 
mate the number of hepatitis B infections transmitted 
by tt-ansfusion as infection is often asymptomatic and 
not all acute infections are. diagnosed and reported. 
Nes'erthekss, these data show that transmission of 
hepatitis B by transfusion does occur but is tare in 
England and Wales. Transfusion accounts fier only a 
small part of the total burden of acute symptomatic 
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Reports of acute hepatitis B infection associated with transfusion. England and Wales, 
1991-7' 
TrassisiaU UK 
Donor tuAaa sldw "wive IiwsaU allen of daa 
Tot ratl probINa roull w wxtww w 
Yew rpuh of W. da IW e da Carla imaIcIial 
1981 572 5 023 
1992 531 3 111 
1993 629 -5 14 
1994 631 3 02t 
1995 613 5 014 
2 1. _ 10 
1997 628 1 001 
1%1-7 d165t 24. _ ._ 2t (0.57%) 11 10 3 
'D&U &131 March 98, tFor 21 reports the most prof bIe route of mkdion was Inmfusion abroad 
(not 
known IL have bann confirmed by vmstiptian of the Inpheated donehars). and Ia throe Itio tx no 
mlutrnafion about the place of tnnstuewn was Provided. 
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reprovrnon programmes in BriluiM provided thu opmaoiu expreunt du not n«rxsarily re5rd the policy Cl the 
these we w il planned and well rexaurcecL Deb armýnt of He d h. 
Cotaclualon 
Our findings dispel some of the common concerns 
and myths associated with "care in the cotmnunity" 
patients and provide robust evidence that community 
rate has worked well for the furnier patients of psychi- 
atric hospitals, most of whom are currently living in the 
community and posing minimal risk to themselves and 
the public. In light of this, a change towards 
matiwtional cam is not a rational policy. 
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Serious hazards of transfusion (SHOT) initiative: 
analysis of the first two annual reports 
LM Williamson, S Lowe, EM Love, H Cohen, K So)dan, DBL McClelland, P Skacel, JAj Barbare 
Abstract 
Objective To receive and collate reports of death or 
major complications of transfusion of blood or 
components 
Design Haematologists were invited confidentially to 
report deaths and major complications after blood 
transfusion during October l q96 to September 1998. 
Setting Hospitals in United Kingdom and Ireland. 
Subjects patients who died or experienced serious 
complications, as defined below associated with 
tranafusias of red cells, platelets, fresh frozen plasma, 
or csyoprecipitue. 
Main outcome measures Death. 'wmng" blood 
transfused to patient, acute and delayed transfusion 
tractions, transfusion related acute lung injury, 
tramhuion associated graft versus host disease, 
post-transfusion purpuny and infection transmitted 
by tansfusion. Circumstances relating to these cases 
and relative frequency of complkations. 
Results Over 24 months, 366 cases were reported, of 
which 191 (52%) were "wrung blood to patient" 
episodes. Analysis of these revealed multiple errors of 
identification, often beginning when blood was 
collected from the blood bank. There were 22 deaths 
from all causes, including three from ABO 
incompatibility. There were 12 infections: tour 
bacterial (one fatal. seven viral, and one fatal case of 
nmalaria. During the second 12 months, 164/424 
hospitals (39%) submitted a "nil to report return. 
Conclusions TrAnsfusion is now extremely safe but 
vigilance is needed to ensure correct identification of 
blood aml pr u. Staff education should include 
awareness of ABO incompatibility and bacterial 
contamination as causes of life threatening reactions 
to blood. 
Introduction 
M. current incidence of major compticationa 
due to 
blood transfusion is unknown. Until 196 blood trans- 
fusicm vra, not «weted by either a confidential 
inquiry 
or the yellow card system of the Committee of Safety of 
Medicines. Perception of transfusion safety focuses on 
the diminishing risk of viral truiumissiont, while the risk 
of ABO incompatible transfusion due to errors 
in 
blood or patient identification remains a threat" 
'Ib 
analyse the residual risks of tranafiukttt, a cun&lentW 
voluntary reporting system for major transfusion 
events-serious hazards of tranduMoo (S}107)- 
INQ VOLUME l19 3 JULY 19G9 -br% 
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Methods for case asaartainmrnt 
In NOVOmbtr 1996 hrmaodog a in the united King- 
doin and Ireland were invited on a voluntary con6aen- 
dal bsW In inform SHOT of deaths and major adverse 
evem in . even otego.; ea (see results) a. 
wöaied 
with 
the aandwion or red cells. platelets. 5sah koren 
plate or cryopredpitwe. The SHOT Wunch was 
poblkiud at profeswonal canfnences and by an edko 
ri. d in the AW' Suspected cmes or pc i-t wuhmion 
infection were reported In local blond centres, and 
awes can6rmed after dent unrsögat on as M &W to 
tranaSrion were collated by the National Blood 
Audwrity/Public Heald laboratory Service Commu- 
nicable Diaau Surveillance Cebe. 
Incidents other than infections reported to the 
SHOT oboe wee analysed with a qucuionna e then 
entered on a aecwe database witlput idaw5crs. 
During the wound yew hospitals could submit a "nil to 
repeat' in card We have analysed data relating to 
ioödena ü ixcvrnd between I Omber 19913 and 
30 September I99$. 
Result 
Of 424 eligible bospWs. 94 uubmiued 169 reports 
boing the bit rear, with 112 hospitals submitting 197 
r'spOsl duru3g the seaxmd 1e, an i xr aw of 163%. 
'N9 to report crdI, introduced in the . ecaod year, 
woe wsbis iurd by 164 hospitals (39%), bringing over- 
a2 psrtidpaaon to 6S% Reports included 191 
ioddenr+ of iocar*ea blood transfused and 12 
hifectiaor Iranwined by traro[iuion (figºre6 Of 341 
analysed cases. there were 22 deaths and 81 osea of 
major morbidity . with at leap atze death in every 
amev y (taME). 
ba "id at osaqowmt aw[.. ad 
Of the 191 reported episodes in whkh a patient was 
uwtu. ed with a wrap blood componem 82 were 
AN) kwo igle traniusiau, leading to dime 
dnthr, 25 sacs requiring iilenMve rat, and viz caw 
of pa i rheara D aaui sadoo in young (morale 
padrz*a The errors in 177 analysed cum of incorrect 
handorion generally consWed of a sequence of one to 
seven faiYues to defect incorrect identity of blond or 
pod em leading to traoduaion to the wmong pooenc 
(out crew-103 ones; two emus-40 ores; three 
stows-26 Cum far mors-2 wes; mix more-5 
MG VOLLOK Sit ljtAX IVW wwwbutcm 
Uvemew of Sot uses to wt, di Inas report forms wn nuMO 
osea: semi errors-I case). First errors occurred at all 
stages of the process: during the tequest for blood or 
aampütg of the patient, or both (33), including two 
ioddents (one fatal) of tramposition of blood grouping 
samples at the patient's bedside, and in the tranduuion 
labmtory (S9). Collection of the wrong blood from 
the blood bank ref igenuor was the u or aesIs of 
primary error (61), with bkxx1 Sec y taken without 
a formal identity check again- the paden's cow 
renxti 7the bedside check faded to deeect discrepancy 
in blood or patient identity in a total of 80 cusm 
despite being carried out by two people (one always a 
qualified nurse or doctor). In 20 inddsnta, dw patient 
had no identity wrist band. 
Ismanofopwl interatho s between donor and 
Psti-d 
linmuinologicaI interaction were tepoi red in Are 
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t andusion purpurn, t aniusion usocurcd graft 
venw hat disease. and transfusion clued acute hang 
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tic a tixxlies were mined become of nass- 
compliance with current guideänea' Oct M, 
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Five reports were received of a hypoten- 
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dwough a bedside lets- 
cocyle ÖVP' Of eight cams at ULüh11bon aauodaed 
graft went. host diwast one was 
, 
a, 
ýp ae, 
nýzat, w, 
ý, 
e neonate 
with an unusual form of UMtu. wý eßde"t7 and 
tour 
patients had B cd lymphoid auügnannt not currently 
an indication for prcvarion of utnsfiuion aaodsfed 
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The two annual reports have provided the first 
detailed analysis of transfusion errors in the United 
Kingdom. an approach already recommended in the 
United States. " Following defined procedures for 
blood handling" and regular staff training are crucial; 
bedside ABO grouping has a high error rate" and is 
not recommended by SHOT, although it is mandated 
in France. Medical and nursing staff must be aware of 
the possibility of ABO incompatibility or bacterial 
infection in a shocked recipient of transfusion, white 
errors in identification will be nunsmised by procedural 
training for porters and phlebotomists and by 
forthcoming guidelines for blood handling and 
administration from the British Committee for Stand- 
ards in Haematology. Infections transmitted by 
transfusion were relatively rare, a finding consistent 
with the calculated law residual viral risk, 3 now 
overtaken by the frequency of bacterial contamination 
of platelet concenaateL' SHOT data provide mixed 
messages: the risk: eneft ratio of appropriate transfu- 
sion is high compared with other risks in life, " but 
safety can still be improved. The United Kingdom lacks 
a unified body to take an overview of all aspects of 
blood safety, sometimes making it difficult to practise 
`aligning effort with risks w' Technological advances 
such as viral genomic detection and inactivation may 
be mandated by regulatory authorities, but prevention 
of transfusion error requires local managerial commit- 
ment. "process reengineering. 7" and an active hospital 
transfusion committee. Hopefully the concept of clini- 
cal governance will focus resources in this important 
area 
Connöutas: LMW. EML PS, and JAJU took part in the 
esst blidunaw of the SHOT scheme, design of the questiamnire, 
analysis of data, and compilation of the report St, HC, and KS 
bole part in design of the queatiorwire, analysis of data, and 
compilation of the report DBLMcC took part in the 
edba hma, c of the SHOT sdicnie, analysis of data, and 
amp Lwcsl of the report. LMW. HC, and EML are the paran. 
wra 
Funding: UK Tr ndut{nn Services, Republic of Inland 
TmnatuMon Service, British Society fa Hwuawlogy. British 
Transfusion Society. 
Competing interan: None declared. 
1 Sumo K Aeporu of 335 u eieo-rmdred derir: 197a dne* 
1985. Kai9biw 199I 3&Sa1.9a 
2 McCl0and DBL, rn3bp. P. Faun in blood mm U" 1o Bitair, iuiwy 
d ho. pkal ymnWdcgy deprnnena 9M) 19"; 3M 12084 
3 W01ian i LU, Hopiormll J, Soldas KA SHOT' In the um 
Ow Mier 
blood "nSaioe MV 1996313: 1121.2 
4 BCSH Blood T-" uw 7Sek Fort'a Gvddkia fur pn-ew» +ion 
mmpauwky pox . loin kt blood troxarinn labnnkxis Ihm4taan 
mm~ l90; ß: 273-83. 
3 9tOt. Mit. 'mdob ton KdM Nt")J .rX. &uMl K, NJI T. 
AaNodoo a (&e c. "« tyvan by akntkm dpWdel cazmwn+ abb 
a ewrü dy dmgd wWw vA-. al dkeroid mswmnn*dvaww 
blood bnAkkün lend in paömb win imdwd the Blared pWtleaa 
1 inS uanw I997$7: 45762. 
6 WWwmnn LU, iwe;, love FM, Cobai H. Sddrl K McOellmd DHL. 
ei aI. SNOT &w"  ei 1996.1997. MradWo 28401' Giq 
Maixhaar BlindCnwa 1983. 
7 WiOianm LM. Laie 5, W+c EMGohen H. Sddri 110 McOdood DBI. 
ei al. SNOT awud v«# 1997.1993. Mrrlvslcr: SHOT «See, 
MandieMer Blood Cantu 1999. 
a NH3 Pxoa$e. Bour b" rsufndoi. ludur. NHS L, ecuüc. 1999. 
(GiRVly HSC 1998 vcJ 
9 Cenna NaUwnal dNtnaM 9aýoo L'Atýouitirw e mawiw a /owa: is 
cd. «v . rdb199. r.. i rr YApvA atasat 3. w son as aM6W&wn«r it 
Nwi»W dl4th ul7ilmv. A" 1995 ad Man 1996. Air: Apwe 
rtaninite i -%mg, 1999 
la K. mHý, BrdeJLVandoesduaf7W 9MGE. Memo$ Mao ' 
cawon and dt-A Winn d the aum d avn» in uma lýiun o dichn 
Aentfrýw 1946; 30: 1071. e1. 
11 C+rntlueJA, BuydJ. Nd PM. Mhemce w*wia 
policy daas. s du kddana of emnaar blood =roupkK at bb»d 
bid spot mwi )aalmau 1997,37: 116472. 
12 bi ri d P. SurcnPk*n+ N. Haruy U. Sid LA. Rd y at 
pmuww mon bedok r oanpalalky tdt: aroaw" we "n*" 
pncUCe and uaki>t. TAW44. oa 199ß; 48: 10.1P6. 
13 Sdnebee GB, ß" MP. KI im- sn Kordaa j). The rin at 
»en»ke+. prwnkurd del kdidlwn N U# j MW 1998334: 168390. 
14 B 
aRkhoal 
e ML BerwrW v omxmlkn «cd- 
k" bkmd 
a3 ('Moat KG Ganter sac ca td +neNy WW dw am drat, 
EM] 1996313.799.802. 
1a AuBudttn JP, KM" M& T wMküon iefasy v"IP*f euxb wth 
riki 7. W. 48Ww 1997; 37: 1211'. 
17 M Odirid DBI. 'DeslMg a ski eocsa A rw 19aa'. 789VP 1103. 
U. w 19Apil 1999) 
Cost minimisation analysis of provision of oxygen at 
home: are the Drug Tariff guidelines cost effective? 
Liam G Heaney, Denise McAllister, Joseph MacMahon 
Abstract 
Obj. cth ss Tb determine the level of oxygen cylinder 
use at which it becomes more cwt effective to provide 
oxygen by concentrator at home in Northern Ireland, 
and to examine potential cost savings if cylinder use 
above this level had been replaced by concentrator in 
1996. 
Design Cost minimisation analysis, 
Saum= Area health boards in Northern Ireland 
Main outcome meewres Cost effective cut off point 
for switch to provision of oxygen horn cylinder to 
concentrator. Potential maximum and minimum 
savings in Northern Ireland (sensitivity analysis) 
owing to switch to more cost effective strategy on the 
bean of provision of cylinders in 1996. 
Results In Northern Ireland it is currently cost 
effective to provide oxygen by concentrator when the 
patient is using three or more cylinders per month 
independent of the duration of the prescription. More 
widespread use of concentrators at this level of 
provision is likely to lead to a cost saving. 
Conclusions The Drug 'pTesc ibin6 guidelines, 
advocating that provision of oxygen by concentrator 
becomes cheaper when 21 cylinders arg being used 
per month-are currently inaccurate in Northern 
Irrland Regional health authorities should review 
their summt arrangements for provision of oxygen at 
home and perform a cost analysis to determine at 
what level it becomes more cost effective to provide 
oxygen by concentrator. 
Introduction 
In the United Kingdom. the provision of oxygen at 
home can be pied eider in cylinders (capacity of 
amt of 
ýr,. c 7,48 
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The risks of infection transmission by blood 
transfusion in England 
Kate Soldan, John Barbara 
Strategies implemented to prevent transmis- 
sion of infections by blood transfusion have 
been very successful. Despite this, the risk of 
infectious donations entering the blood supply 
and transmitting infection to the recipients of 
blood components and blood products is con- 
tinually under scrutiny. 
In order to assess the risks and consequences 
of transfusion transmitted infections the char- 
acteristics of blood borne infections, of dona- 
tions, and of blood recipients need to be 
considered. Over the years, knowledge about 
new agents and about potential failures in the 
strategies to exclude known agents has in- 
creased. Consequently the range of possible 
strategies to exclude infections from the blood 
supply has also increased, and debate about the 
risks of infection transmission by blood trans- 
fusion has become more complex. 
Transfusion transmissible infections 
At certain stages in their natural history many 
viral, bacterial, and protozoal infections can be 
blood borne and may be transmitted by trans- 
fusion. Fortunately for transfusion medicine, 
many blood borne organisms cause symptoms 
that render their victims too unwell, or 
obviously unfit, to donate blood. Other agents 
are only present in the blood transiently and 
some agents do not survive the conditions of 
blood storage outside the human body. 
Variations in the length of time over which 
agents are present in the blood, and are viable 
in stored blood, determine to a large extent the 
variations in the risk that infectious donations 
will be collected. Infections of most concern 
are those that have long periods of infectivity in 
the absence of any clinical signs or symptoms 
of infection and are stable in stored blood (for 
example, hepatitis B virus (HBV), HIV, and 
hepatitis C virus (IICV)). The length of time 
between infection and the development of 
detectable serological markers (the window 
period) also varies between agents (for exam- 
ple, 22 days for anti-I11V and 66 days for 
anti-HCV' using current assays). The shorter 
the window period, relative to the total asymp- 
tomatic scropositive infective period, the better 
is the detection of infectious donations by 
serological testing (all other things being 
equal). 
For infections with transient blood borne 
infectivity (for example, hepatitis A virus 
(HAV) and parvovirus B19), the risk of 
infectious donations being collected depends 
upon the incidence of the infection in the 
donor population and the length of the 
infectious period. 
Strategies to reduce risk 
There are three main strategies for preventing 
infectious donations from entering the blood 
supply issued to hospitals. The first concerns 
the recruitment and selection of blood donors 
who do not have a known increased risk of 
infection. The second is the testing of dona- 
tions for serological markers of infections. The 
third covers the control of cleanliness during 
component production. 
Donor recruitment and selection aims to 
select a group of individuals with a low risk of 
infection: the prevalence of infection and the 
incidence of infection should both be loc. In 
practice incidence is often difficult to measure. 
The selection of a "low risk" group therefore 
often depends on identifying groups with low 
seroprevalence and without the characteristics 
or exposures associated with an increased risk 
of infection. There are some general guidelines 
for donor selection (which are well founded in 
experience). Voluntary donors are considered 
safer than paid donors, and repeat donors safer 
than new donors. However, selection of these 
individuals is not guaranteed to be effective- 
particularly for new infections or for infections 
with changing epidemiology. 
New knowledge about exposures of in- 
creased risk for blood borne infections is regu- 
larly considered so that guidelines for predona- 
tion donor selection in the United Kingdom 
can be revised as necessary. Inapparent infec- 
tions and non-recognition or denial of risk fac- 
tors in donors prevents the exclusion of all 
infected donations by predonation selection 
criteria. 
Over the years there has been a steady intro- 
duction of available measures to reduce risks 
that have been recognised. läble I shows the 
tests for markers of transfusion transmissible 
infection that are currently performed on all 
blood donations in the United Kingdom. The 
introduction of each of these tests has led to a 
reduction in the number of transfusion trans- 
mitted infections (table 1). During the first full 
year of anti-IHIV (1986) and anti-FICV (19-)2) 
testing in England and Wales, 38 and 807 
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positive donors were identified, respectively- 
thus preventing the donations from these 
donors entering the blood supply. As time 
passes following the introduction of a marker 
test, and the population of repeat blood donors 
passes through the testing process, the overall 
rate of infectious donations identified de- 
creases. The number of positive donations 
excluded from the blood supply in England 
and Wales by donation testing during 1997 is 
shown in table 1. Many, if not all, donations 
positive for HI3sAg, anti-HIV, or anti-HCV are 
expected to lead to infection in at least one 
blood recipient if they are not excluded from 
the blood supply. 
Maximising the effectiveness of donation 
testing includes assuring good test perform- 
ance. This can be obtained by the evaluation of 
test kits, and test kit batches, for suitability and 
reliability in the blood centre setting, before 
their use by transfusion services. Monitoring 
performance once a test is in use is also 
important. 
Testing blood donations improves the safety 
of the blood supply in two direct Ways: 
" Infectious donations found to be positive for 
markers of infection at the time of donation 
are removed. 
" Infected donors are excluded from the 
donor population, and infected donations 
are therefore prevented from entering blood 
centres in the future. 
These factors can be quantified to assess the 
benefits of donation testing. 
Testing also improves the safety of the blood 
supply in two indirect ways: 
" Donors who are at increased risk of blood 
borne infections are excluded from the 
donor population. As blood borne infections 
often have common routes of transmission, 
donors with evidence of one infection may 
be at increased risk of having other blood 
borne infections that are not detected by 
donation testing. Also, some individuals who 
have been in contact with infected donors 
(fier example, sexual contacts) may be at 
increased risk of infection, and infected 
donations may be prevented from entering 
blood centres if these individuals are in- 
structed not to donate blood. 
" The diagnosis of infection in a donor, and 
the surveillance of infections and risk factors 
in donors, can improve methods of donor 
selection--for example, the detection of 
HCV antibodies in blood donors revealed a 
large group of donors who had been exposed 
to blood borne infections by injecting 
drugs. ' 
The probability of transmitting an infection 
by blood transfusion can be reduced by certain 
manufacturing processes and conditions. Strict 
control of cleanliness during component pro- 
duction limits the opportunities for bacterial 
contamination. Storage of whole blood and red 
cells at 4±2°C limits the growth of any bacteria 
that are present. 
Developments to testing systems, and con- 
trols on those systems, that ensure the release 
only of negative components have been crucial 
in the improved safety gained by donation test- 
ing. Automation of testing, along with inclu- 
sion of controlled steps in commercial rests, has 
enabled strict standardisation and close moni- 
toring of the testing process. One example of an 
important addition to the testing processes is 
sample addition monitors that change colour 
(measurable on a spectrophotometer) when 
serum or plasma is added. Another is process 
control automation. Use of appropriate quality 
control samples, as well as the manufacturer's 
controls and "go-no-go" samples, adds a 
further check on test performance. The 
computerisation of test results and of compo- 
nent release has helped to increase safety in the 
face of increasing numbers of donations and 
the increasing volume of data generated during 
the testing of each donation. 
Practices beyond the transfusion centre also 
contribute to the prevention of transfusion 
transmitted disease. Strategies to avoid transfu- 
sion as a treatment unless absolutely necessary, 
and to inactivate viruses by heat or solvent 
detergent treatments of products, prevent 
exposures. Strategies to provide prophylactic 
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treatment to recipients can also play a useful 
role. For example, HBV immunisation is 
currently recommended for haemophiliacs, 
those receiving regular blood transfusions or 
blood products, or those carers responsible for 
the administration of such products. " 
Manufacturing processes that involve pool- 
ing donations or components, for example for 
treatment with solvent detergents, require 
careful consideration. Pooling (unless the 
infection is neutralised by antibodies also 
present in the pool) can lead to a single 
infectious donation entering multiple prod- 
ucts, and is therefore avoided. Pooling is 
particularly dangerous with regard to agents 
that are not excluded by testing, including 
agents that are as yet unknown. 
Additional serological tests are performed in 
some countries. Some detect infections missed 
by current testing-for example, HIV p24 
antigen and anti-HBc. Others detect transfu- 
sion transmissible infections that are currently 
not tested for in the United Kingdom-for 
example, anti-HTLV. Others detect surrogate 
markers of infection--for example, alaninc 
transaminase for hepatitis viruses, low pH hae- 
magglutination for parvovirus ß 19, and alpha- 
neopterin for detecting inflammation. The ti-c- 
quency of infections, and therefore the risk of 
transmissible infection, in donations in Eng- 
land and Wales has tended to be lower than in 
countries where additional tests have been 
adopted. However, this in not always the case. 
Factors such as the expected risk of disease 
occurring in recipients, the amount of public 
concern about blood safety and the infection in 
question, and the availability of resources have 
also played a part in determining the differ- 
ences in blood testing strategies in difrerent 
countries. The availability of tests for nucleic 
acids provides an opportunity to detect infec- 
tions that cannot be detected by serological 
tests. Donations collected during the window 
period of early infection are the main candi- 
dates. Nucleic acid testing (NAT) should 
detect infectious donations from seronegative 
donors and from any serupositive donors that 
routine serological testing fails to detect. 
Nucleic acid tests are soon to be used for HCV 
RNA in mini-pools of plasma samples destined 
for pooled product manufacture. ' The poten- 
tial additional benefit for a blood service of 
such procedures for specific agents will depend 
on the epidemiology of the agent in their popu- 
lation. 
Assessing the value of additional donation 
testing strategies must consider some or all of 
the following costs: 
" the cost of test kits and reagents and related 
laboratory costs including staff tine; 
" the costs of confirmatory testing on reactive 
donations; 
" the costs of notifying, counselling, and 
referring donors who are positive to new 
tests, or who have persistent false reactivity 
to the new tests used; 
" the costs of replacing donors excluded 
because of positivity (or false persistent 
reactivity) to the tests used; 
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" the costs of any delay in the release of blood 
components while testing is performed; 
" the costs of added data management and 
added complexity to the blood release 
procedure; 
" the costs of look-hacks-that is, of tracing 
and testing recipients who may have been 
exposed to infection by other donations 
from donors found tu be positive. 
Quantification of risks 
Quantifying the risk of transfusion trans- 
mission of infection can be attempted by 
several methods, each with different limitations 
(table 2). 
Surveillance systems monitor diagnosed 
transfusion transmitted infections. Several fac- 
tors common to transfusion transmitted infec- 
tions, and to transfusion recipients, are likely to 
contribute to a lack of clinically apparent 
symptoms and therefore to underdiagnosis of 
infections. Other treatments may negate or 
modify symptoms-many transfusion recipi- 
ents are receiving antibiotic drugs and are 
therefore less likely to suffer observable conse- 
quences from bacterial infections. Transfusion 
recipients are sick or injured, and often elderly, 
and have high mortality from other causes. The 
recipients who receive relatively large numbers 
of transfusions, and are therefore at the highest 
risk of transfusion transmitted infections, have 
the highest mortality rates. Long presympto- 
matic periods are common for persistent blood 
borne viruses. Whether infection with a larger 
viral dose, at an older age, and in already ill or 
immunocompromised individuals alters this 
period is not always known. Transfusion in the 
past may be overlooked as a possible route of 
infection when diagnosis is delayed for such 
long periods. Naturally acquired immunity to 
infection may be quite high for some infections, 
and asymptomatic infection is common in the 
young age groups with low levels of naturally 
acquired immunity (for example, HAV and 
B19). Recognised cases of transfusion trans- 
mitted infections are likely to be those with the 
more apparent, and more severe, clinical 
consequences. 
These ascertainment biases and limitations 
can be overcome by actively following up 
transfused recipients and testing them for 
evidence of transfusion transmitted infections. 
In the United Kingdom, transfusion transmis- 
sion of infection with observed clinical conse- 
quences is rure--. -both in absolute terms and 
relative to incidents of infection transmission 
by other routes. The number of recipients that 
need to be followed up in order to obtain a 
precise estimate of transmission rates is there- 
fore very large, and such studies have become 
prohibitively expensive. A recent study of 
21 800 units found no transfusion transmitted 
111V, HBV, HCV, or HTLV (human T cell leu- 
kaemia virus) 1 and It infections. " 
Another approach is tu estimate the number 
of infectious donations that current donation 
testing is not expected to detect. To attempt 
stich estimation, information is needed about 
infection rates in the population donating 
blood, about the development and persistence 
313 
Appendix 8 
408 S, M, w, Barbara 
Tthl.. ti nn acfq tamit, rtily . Jdnr auJ cstinr, ctcs m rlr: Uillf al l irrsc/crnr ah, vts /arte ur: rqr sntx(h+trcm rnnrnirin. cl 
utJ. rtiens . k, rm (ur are reported) is, nrrr'rar (.: gssual. +rt rcr Per 2. S ruill>; rrt ciarnrtiorrs) 
lixeyr. ", "ti: : >ttrdr+juvn; lru4vr b'ntutur:.! nr/. ". uiýrrx . Lururn"rr; +: l., rxnl iur. r 
. Vurlydlurr;: 'I arp. u: rri r. xa< wo/vow,. /Bartur: Ju li) '12.1 8(m) the N+r'. l Dopple /S: rn orrr, Fli, lx.! >nnh" 
8/101, r, l+rvt3 jinrdti. vtr 1996'/ (93°r, w)±tiJ: +s. " rt±iut 191' '"95 do-, irr/r, u, "v lato r 
I»ht'tnar nt: itvd O, t'%-, \. p'YS"/ iwn-r. rls) 17+r'Lnr. l1 (YC". "<a»n. l: u:: i+u: rc"rli; 
IL\V 1' NA NA 
HIV 1 (3 rccipicnts infected)" 0 (0 to 42 )) 0.8 (0 3 
HC\' 1 0 (0 to 4' 3) 11 (9, I to 18.3) 
1113V 1 0 (0 qt, -123S NA HTLV'1 and 11 0 oton, 4231 NA 
Qa,: ttria 3 NA N. A 
NA, im araital le. 
'$ounc: S; riour Jrua. n, b rrJ rra v, Iirriar Annual Rcmrrt 1996 1997. 
hepacics AMC) irus: HIV, human immunudrlicrcucy virus; HTL4, human T m11 lrukermia virus. 
of the markers that are tested for, and about the 
tests and the testing system used. The prob- 
ability of a donation being collected during the 
window period when the tests used cannot 
detect evidence of infection depends upon the 
incidence of the infection and the length of the 
window period. The probability of symptoms 
that may prevent donation occurring during 
this period may also need to be considered. 
Incidence is usually calculated using observa- 
tions of acute infections in donors or observa- 
tions of seroconversions in repeat donors. The 
probability of a false negative test result 
depends upon the prevalence of the marker and 
the sensitivity of the test. The probability of a 
marker positive donation being released into 
the blood supply owing to a failure, or error, in 
the testing system also depends upon the 
prevalence of the marker and upon the 
probability of a failure or error. 
Infectious donations do not necessarily 
mean morbidity in recipients, and estimating 
the effect of infectious donations requires 
knowledge about transmission and the natural 
history of infections. 
Transfusion transmitted infections also bear a 
risk of onward transmission. The major risk fac- 
tors for transmission of the persistent viral 
infections-that is, injecting drug use and sexual 
contact--may be relatively rare among transfu- 
sion recipients. However, this is not always the 
case and other types of contact-especially those 
common in health care settings-pose a risk of 
secondary transmission, 
Our limited knowledge 
When considering the infectivity of blood from 
donors, and the natural history of infections 
transmitted by transfusion, knowledge obtained 
from observing infections transmitted by other 
routes may not be reliable. In particular, the 
progression of disease caused by some viral 
infections may be affected by the viral load at 
the time of infection. An infected blood compo- 
nent typically exposes a recipient to a far higher 
viral dose than other routes of transmission. 
Whether prion disease can be transmitted by 
transfusion is currently uncertain. " Unknown 
infections and infections with increasing poten- 
tial to cause harm to recipients owing to the 
changing epidemiology of the infection, or 
changing vulnerability of blood recipients to 
disease, may pose the greatest risks of infection 
to recipients. Avoidance of unnecessary trans- 
fusion and vigilance of blood borne infectious 
diseases in the general population and in blood 
recipients are therefore important general 
components of transfusion medicine. 
We thank Man Ramsay for comments nn thw manuscript. 
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Bacterial Contamination of 
Blood Components 
C. P. Engelfriet 
H. W. Reesink 
From the literature and from the first re- 
sults of haemovigilance in some countries in 
which a haemovigdance system has been in 
force for Mane time, it is evident that hacteri- 
al contamination of cell concentrates, plasma 
and even of nutologous blood is still a serious 
hazard of transfusion. For example. in 
France. where a legal obligation to report 
all untoward effects of blood transtusum 
was implemented in 1994, bacterial conta- 
mination was the most frequent cause of 
transfusion-related death Ill and bacterial 
contamination was responsible htr lO'il of 
transfusion-acaxiated fatalities in the period 
1986-1988 in the USA 12J. 
There are several sources of bacterial 
contamination. such as bacteraemiu in the 
donor's hloxl. insufficient disinfection of the 
donor's skin. inadequate sterilization of the 
blood-collecting equipment during manufuc- 
lure, or inadequate handling of the donated 
blood or the blood products derived from it. 
Several measures have been proposed to try 
to reduce the frequency of transtusion-asso- 
ciated septic reactions. most of which am be- 
ing aeti%ely investigated 1±J. 
It scemed of interest to gather infcrma- 
tion on this subject in an Intonational Forum, 
in particular on the frequency of septic trans- 
fusion reactions and on measures taken to re- 
duce the risk of contamination. 
In order to obtain such information, the 
questions listed below were sent tu 16 trans- 
fusion centres. Answers were obtained from 
9 of them. 
Q «'; siOils 
(1) Have you any data on the frequency of 
transfusion-associated septic reactions in 
your country/centre and il MI. could you indi- 
cute the Ixrrenlage of tataItues a> s ell n, the 
blood product involved' 
12) Have you any data on the frequency of 
bacterial contamination of red cell and/or 
platelet concentrates as determined in r itro? 
(3) Have any of the measures, to reduce 
the risk of bacterial contamination listed be- 
low been adopted or investigated in your 
country/Centre? 
- Improvement of donor skin preparation 
and/or di. inlectiott: 
- removal of the f itst 2 ml of blood collect- 
ed: 
- limitation of storage time of cell rnmsen- 
(nttes: 
- preuunsfusion detection of bacteria: visu- 
al inspection. endotnsia assays, microbio- 
logical staining. ribowrnal assays for bac- 
teria, polymerase chain reaction, culture 
techniques: 
modifications of blood processing: lcuco- 
cyte depletion, disinfection of watertxtth, 
modification of the period of storage prior 
to component preparation, and 
others, 
Comments 
Question I. fhe frequency of TA septic re 
actions varies from none in the last several 
years (Finland and Vicnnat to 4-6 (I fatal 
case) per year in Canada (, cc Blajehman). 7 (2 
fatalities) in 3 years in the British Isles (ex- 
cluding Scotland) (see Soldan) and 3 serious 
cases in 1997 in the Flemish-speuking part of 
Belgium (xc Nluy)Ie). In Cleveland, where a 
prospective microbiological surveillance pro- 
grmnrne has been in place for more than 7 
years (platelet unit. only). all 4 tu 5-day-old 
units or concentrates were tested. it was con- 
cluded front the results that a septic reaction 
would have occurred after the transfusion of 
1/500 platelet pools. In spite of surveillance. I 
fatal septic reaction occurred. In this case, 3- 
dav-old platelets were used, which therefore 
had not bcen tried i. ce Yonuu. iun In the 
I ISA. a.. a whoic.. eplic reactions are rclxmrd 
in 1/10.00O to 1/20. X10 unit, transfuscd and 
fatal reactions in 1/0 million units (see Klein). 
TA septic reactions are considered to be gross- 
ly undcrrclxmed. An interesting case mlxtrt il- 
lustratcs this imlwnam issue ((acs Blajchmant. 
Que. rrion 2. Data concerning bacterial 
contamination mainly concern platelets. The 
rate of contamination found varies consider- 
ably. A survey of the main data is given in 
table I. lbere is clear evidence that the rate 
of contamination incTea%ev with storage (see 
Blajchman and Yomtovian). 
In Finland, in a series of 28,912 units in- 
vestigated during 1978--1988. Moth red cell 
and platelet concentrates, were rested. Seri- 
ous contamination was found in I red cell 
concentrate and in 5 platelet units. 
In the multicentr study which has been 
initiated in the USA. both red cell and 
platelet concentrates will be tested. 
Question 3. Measures to rcducc the risk 
of bacterial contamination that have been 
adopted are as follows: irnpro%ed treatment 
of the skin before donation (c. g. the two-step 
method first using isoprop) I alcohol und then 
tincture of iodine in Canada). presiorage lcu- 
cocyle depletion-reduction of both platelet 
and red cell concentrate. limitation of the 
storage time, particularly of platelets (3.5 
days). visual inspection of the concentrate 
before use and, in some countries, routine 
testing of platelet concentrates for bacterial 
conrvmin: airm )grant stain in Cleveland. Bact 
Alert 240 in Oslo and Belgium). Other meth- 
ods of bacterial testing are being investigat- 
cd. In Spain. no data are available at present, 
but bacterial screening procedures will s&xm 
be introduced. 
In conclusion. it is clew that there is 
much awareness of the danger of bacterial 
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Table 1. Rntc of h; ktcriil contamination of platcki cuth"rntralez 
Country/centre Platelet. Rute of 
cunuuninatiun 
per IOQ, t)00 
pay of 
(cnting 
Canada random unit% 25 day I 
70 day 3 
Finland random PRP uaits 110 (1979 1994) 
pooled BC-derived units 110 11991-1996) outdated 
140 (1997-1998) 
Oslo pooled RC-derived units 44- 167 day I 
apheresis units 0 day I 
Clcvcl, nd random units 49.7 
apherenis units 41,5 
Belgium ramk+m single units 160 
pcolcd., mcemrates S71) 
lihtüh Isles single random unu% 0 
Korth London pnnled rataltnn units 7(X) 
apharsis unite 4(X) 
Vicnna number of unit, tc%lcd too small 
day 4-5 
day 4-5 
day I 
day I 
(of 249) day 5--7 
contamination. particularly of platclct con- 
centrates. Mcasures to reduce the danger 
have been taken. There is evidence that par- 
ticularly routine testing for bacterial contam- 
ination of platelet concentrates reduces the 
risk of transfusion-related septic reactions. 
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Question I 
There is no formal huemovigilance sys- 
tem currently in place in Canada: however. it 
is a requirement of Health Canadu (the Bu- 
real' of Biologicals and Radiopharmaccuti- 
cals) tu report all serious adverse effects as- 
suxiatCd wilh the transfusion of blood 
products, including those due to septic trans- 
fusion reactions. Based on these reports we 
have had approximately I death annually 
over the past 10 years due to transfusion-as- 
cociated sepsis. Thcxc deaths were associated 
with the transfusion of both platelets and red 
cells. In addition. there were 3.5 non-fatal 
septic transfusion reactions annually. In my 
upiniou, however. it is likely that serious 
transfusion-associated septic episodes occur 
more frequently than the number reported. 
Septic transfusion reactions (fatal and non- 
fatal) arc grossly underreported, as many se- 
rious reactions are not being recognized as 
being due to contaminated blood products. 
An example of how such underreporting 
might occur is exemplified by a recent Cana- 
dian case. 
The blood product recipient, a 76-year- 
old man with severe thr rnbocytopenia due 
to myekxlysplasia, received a pool of 5 units 
of prc-storage-filtered leucarctiuced random 
donor platelet, as an outpatient. He was not 
pre-medicated and did not have any symp- 
toms during or following the transfusion of 
the platelet pcw1. Three days later, he came 
into hospital having been called in by his 
physician, who found him to he febrile 
(39. (C). Accordingly. the patient wa. ad- 
tnitted to hospital and started on antibiotics. 
He went into %hock approximately 8 It after 
admission and died Iromt the consequences of 
the septic shock 3 days hater. blood cultures 
from this patient were positive for Suiphyio- 
cocruS aurt'us. 
The donor of the platelet unit which very 
likely caused the above transfusion-associat- 
ed septic reaction was a 36-year-old male 
who had donated blood on many previous oc- 
casions. Ile gave a whole blood donation 4 
days prior to the recipient receiving the pool 
of platelets which included this donor's 
platelet unit. Three days after the donation. 
the blood donor begun feeling unwell, with 
diizines . vomiting and diarrhoea. Accord- 
ingly. he went to the emergency room of a lo- 
cal hospital, in the evening, after work. No 
specific diagnosis was made when he was 
wen in the emergency room. but he was kept 
overnight for observation. The next day. he 
went into septic shock and the cultures of 
blood taken from him in the emergency room 
were positive for S. aneu. u. He subsequently 
developed disseminated intravascular coagu- 
lation and had a stormy hospital course, but 
survived. Soon after admission to hospital, a 
family member of the donor told the attend- 
ing physician that he had donated bood 4 
days previously. This inlormation was trans- 
mitted to the blood manufacturer (Canadian 
Blood Servicen), who alerted the physician 
attending the platelet pool recipient. The S. 
aurcus isolates from both the donor and the 
recipient were found tu be identical on an- 
tibiotic sensitivity and by gene mapping. in- 
dicating that they were likely from the same 
source. 
The important issue arising from this par- 
ticular case. is the tuet that had the blood 
donor not presented with a septic episode 
subsequently to his whole-blood donation. it 
is likely that this fatal transfusion-associated 
septic reaction would not have been attribut- 
ed to the platelet transfusion. 
Question 2 
We have done three prospective studies at 
our Centre, evaluating the frequency of bac- 
terial contamination of allogeneic platelet 
concentrates. in loth random donor and 
aphere, is platelets. In the first study, 16 of 
31,61(1 random donor platelet concentrates 
were found to he contaminated with bacteria 
II ]. The organisms i%olated were mostly skin 
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contarnrnants. N nethelc; s, the tnic comarni" 
naht rate was estimated at 51 per l00. (x)0 
units. In this study and the next, a true posi- 
tive was defined as a platelet unit ui which 
one or more of the associated blood compo- 
ncnts again provided evidence for the pres- 
ence of the carne organism as that isolated 
from the initial sample (+egrnrnt). The bactc- 
rial culturing technique involved the use of 
two different automated detection devices 
(each for a 6-month period) which tested 
aliquots of the platelets taken within 24 Ii of 
the time of preparation. 
Because of the possibility that some or- 
ganisms might not be detected on day I. a 
second prospective study was done to ascer- 
tain whether day I and day 3 cultures were 
equal in sensitivity 121. A second aspect of 
this latter study was tu determine the number 
of organisms present in the contaminated 
platelet units evaluated. Over an 18-month 
period, over 16,291) units of random donor 
platelets were cultumcl on day I. Of these, 
I0,065 were also available for culture on day 
3. Thus. 61. $0 of routinely prepared random 
donor platelet unit,, were cultured on both 
days I and 3. Over the whole study period. 
only II of 26,335 units tested were found to 
contain true-positive contaminant, Four of 
the true-po%itive units were from day I ctd- 
tures and 7 were from day 3 cultures. All 
true-positive cultures firm day I were also 
positive on day 3. Thus, the day I true-posi- 
tive prevalence was 15 per I(1(1,00 units, 
whereas the day 3 true-positive prevalence 
was 70 per 101,1MN1 units. This study thus in- 
dicated that the prevalence of true positives on 
day 3 was approximately 3-fold higher than 
on day I. This implies that approximately two 
thirds (11- platelet units that contain bacteria 
would not have been detected by bacterial cul- 
tures done on day I. The enumeration of the 
quantity of bacteria present in the positive cul- 
tures observed indicated that the number of 
organisms present in contaminated platelet 
units ranged from 10-'to 10' CPU/ml 121. 
We also conducted a smaller prospective 
study in our Centre evaluating the bacterial 
contamination rate of apheresis platelet units. 
Of 6,055 units tested, 14 were bond to be 
positive for a rate of 230 per 100,1NX) units 
13J. The contaminated units were not evaluat- 
ed further to establish whether they represent. 
cd true or false positives. Based rin the data 
from the above two studies, it is likely that at 
least 5054: would have been false positives. 
Quvctinn 
.f 
In Canada. two decision, have been taken 
recently to reduce the possible risk for rccip- 
I3actcnal Contamination of Blood 
Components 
iettts of bacterial contamination of cellular 
blood products. The first measure. taken in 
early I998. was to institute an improved 
method for the preparation of phlcholomN 
sites of blood donors. The method instituted 
was based on the studies by Goldman et al. 
141 which indicated that an isopropyl alcohol 
scrub followed by iodine tincture was more 
ctlicacious in reducing the level of skin con- 
taminants than the previously used ppss idine- 
iodine. The second measure, which was tak- 
en also in early 1998, was to institute 
universal pre-storage leucocyte reduction of 
all platelet unity (bah random donor and 
apheresis7 distributed in Canada. The latter 
intervention was instituted not specifically to 
reduce the risk of bacterial sepsis but to im- 
prove the overall safety associated with 
platelet transfusions. Moreover, universal 
pre-storage leucocyte reduction of all red 
blood cell units distributed in Canada was 
fully implemented as of July 1999. 
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Question 1 
In Belgium. transfusion-assn iuled reac- 
tions are reported on a voluntary basis and re- 
porting is usually limited to serious reactions. 
In 1997.3 scrioun, not fatal. septic rottc- 
tions due to the translusioo of hactcrially 
contaminated blood components were noted 
in Flanders. the nuithern part of our country 
(h million inhabitants). 
Qnestien 2 
Since la+l year, microbiological cultures 
are systematically carried out on samples of 
all platelet concentrates (PLC) immediately 
after preparation. Over a period of 6 months, 
the initial culture was Rwnd positive in 63 
(1.95%) of 3,20 single-duner PLC and in 
148 (1.73%) of li. 537 pooled random-donor 
PLC. Following the finding of a positive re- 
sult. 96 PLC wert: retested and in 3 of 35 sin- 
gle-donor PLC and in 29 of 61 pooled ran- 
dom-donor PLC. found initially positive, the 
first restalt was confirmed on a second sam- 
plc. 
Extrapolation of thew, results to the total 
number of prepared PLC indicates that 
0.1617, of single-donor PLC and 0,53% of 
pooled random-donor PLC arc bacterially 
contaminated. 
Question .1 For seseral years. special attention has 
been given to donor skirt preparation and dis- 
infection (Iwo-step method). 
In 1996, microbiological testing of all 
single-donor PLC and all perlet random 
donor PLC using an automated culture sys- 
tem (ßacT/Alert 240. Organen Teknika) was 
started. Using a sterile technique. 20-ml sam- 
ples are taken from a sampling hag immedi- 
ately after preparation of the PLC; the sam- 
pling hag is an integrated part of the BC 
pooling and filtration system (Autosrop BC, 
Pall Corp. ) or is connected tu the system us- 
ing a sterile connecting device (T-SCD, Teru- 
mo). The samples are divided equally over a 
40-rd anaerobic and an aerobic culture Mile 
for the BacT/Alen system. 
The cultures are monitored continuously 
for 5 days. A negative microbiological cul- 
ture result is required at the time of the re- 
lease of a PLC. All PLC with a positive ini- 
tial culture result are removed ! root the 
inventory. If the culture becomes positive 
after release of a PLC a call-hack procedure 
is started. In the case that the PLC has al- 
ready been transfused, the treating physician 
ýü. S. v 2000: 18: 94-, 7 61 
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25 platelet concentrates 
7 platelet concenrratae 
[8 
platelet concantrates 
produced by apheresis produced 
from pools 
of 4 buffy coats 
I 
For 4 units, bacterial growth was I Fort unit. bacterial growth was For 6 units, bacterial growth was For 3 cobs, bacterial growth was confirmed in the platelet only confirmed in the confirmed neither in the confirmed neither in the platelet concentrate and for 2 of these. 
BacT/Alert culture bottle, but platelet concentrate nor in the concentrate nor in the units of contamination was also 
not in the platelet concentrate BacT/alert culture bottle erythrocyte concentrates confirmed in 1 of the units of 
erythrocyte concentrates 
For 11 units, bacterial growth in 
the platelet concentrate was not 
tested, but no growth was found in 
any of the erythrocyte concentrates 
Fig. 1. Platelet cowentrates giving Moitive msulta in IS T/Alcrt tas all samples are ndtured ihnrough out the storage pcri d ýtf the 
platelet V neentrutec, s Ix), itive culture troy appear xfter Ihr. unit has been Iramit$edl. Data from apprncimutcly 9, (1(X) platelet con- 
centratas over the period April I. 1998 to Octohct 1,1999. 
of the patient i. informed. None of thew 
PLC was assccitucd with a . optic transfu- 
. iun reartion. 
Dr. L MuyIle 
R(xk Krum. Vlaandcrcn 
Uicmt an fiel Blood 
Edmond Picard'. trial 16 
n-10c0 Hrus' ), IB. I iumt 
Jens Kjeldsen-Kragh 
Question I 
Tbc trv ucncy of transfusion-a suciatcd 
. rptic reactions is known ncither in Norway 
nur in the clinical dcpurtmcnts we krve. 
Question 2 
Since April I. 1519 we have tested all our 
platelet concentrates for bacterial contamina- 
tion I day after donation using an automated 
blood culture system (BacT/Alctt. (anon 
Teknika). Over a period of I'/. year, the per- 
centage of contaminated concentrates rangcd 
between 0% for apheresis units and 
0.044-(1.1(67% for HC-derived units (fig. I). 
No serious adverse reactions related to bacte- 
rial contamination of platelet products were 
reported after we have stinted testing all 
platelet concentrate . Red cell units, huwe- 
er, arc not tested mutincly. 
Question 3 
(Nute means listal. we used BacT/Alert 
(culture bottles for aerobic bacteria) to test all 
platelet concentrates for bacterial contanina- 
liun and. in addition, we deplete all cellular 
blood products of lcucocytes. Finally, all 
blood products are tn%pcct<4t visually. 
Jca> Kieldscn-Kragh. Nif nil) 
1711e. a: J lloivcrcity HcMpital 
lhpattmcnt of Innnun l(oy and 
Tran, (u iun Mcdiciac 
Ki6evelen 166,14-4W)7 (Mo (Norway) 
R. Kekomäki 
The Finnish Red Cross Blood Ttwtsfu- 
sion Service collects annually approximately 
35O, WQ units of blaxJ from voluntary, un- 
paid donors, morn than 40% being collected 
in mobile sessions countrywide. the other 
collections Iring done in fixed premises. 
ContponcnLs are prepared in 5 ccnt1m using 
the same standard operational procedures 
62 w. s. nb xm. 'x 5' -n7 
and quality system. Whole blixxl is rapidly 
c x, led to 20-22°C and stored at this temper- 
ature overnight (16-18 h) Prior to processing. 
Key figures: in 1998, approximately 307.000 
units of red cells (SAGM, bully coat re- 
moved, of which I2'E were lcueocyie-depter- 
cd prior to further storage), approximately 
122.0X) units of huffy-coat-derived platelet 
concentrates the majority of them pools of 4 
or 3: more than 80% leucocyte-depleted prior 
to further zusage) and appmeimatcly 35.000 
units of FFP were distributed to the hospitals 
sere ing a population 1)( 5 million. 
No centralised haemovigilance system is 
in pkue as yet. Our institute has. however. 
maintained a policy of recommending dial all 
severe untoward effects possibly related to 
transfusion should be reported back to the 
producer of blood and its components on a 
voluntary basis. 
Question 
Septic reactions usst iuted with transfu- 
sion of any blood component have been 
rarely reported IIi. She annual number of ad- 
vcrse events resembling a septic reaction rc- 
porled to our centre varies from I to 4. 
To he able to prove the a , ameiation with a 
transfusion, a recommendation has been giv- 
en to close the transfusion set immediately 
and disconnect it from the patient. store the 
International Forum 
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Table 1. Ht ct nal u'tI lkuion of plmrld ct ccotmtc% in Finland 
Plntcla. Period positiv. tsnitbuk; diur Ccmwo"inatcJ 
cultures, n preparations. n tii 
tiinglc units derived from PRP 1979-1994 50 47.085 0.1 I 
Bullyawt-dirivcd, pooled l (r)I - Itft 12 9,7,5$ 0.11 
luffycwt-tkri, ul. txn, l. 'i 1))7-. I9I8 39 26.464 0.1$ 
PRP = Pl+ telct-nch plasm- 
-1 Da% of tcstitW =o n(kI (t. 
bag with the closed transfusion set in rcfrig- 
erator and submit it to microbial studies at 
the BTS. 
The procedure to follow is decided upon 
jointly by the physicians in-charge at the hos- 
pital and at the transfusion service. Culture% 
of the patient's blood are done at the hospital 
and the results from hloxi component tests 
are confirmed by a third-party labunuurv. 
Culturing both the suspected blood ctompo- 
nents and blood samples from the patient 
aims at proving or disclosing a shared origin 
of a bacterial contaminant. No single case 
ha, been identified during the 1 {)s. 
Question 2 
Any data on the rate of bacterial contum- 
ination of blood components are affected by 
the quality of the component itself (Icucu- 
cyte-depleted or not). initial contamination 
level of the product. sample solumc taken for 
the culture. sampling time ac compared to 
hltial donation and pr ccssing of the compo- 
nent, culture medium and detection system. 
Data on the frequency of bacterial contami- 
nation of platelet concentrates produced at 
our institute cover more than 20 years. The 
approach to use outdated components for 
bacterial cultures is such as to detect rnaxi- 
mal contamination rate following an extend- 
ed 'incubation' period. From 1978 to 1988 al- 
togedter 48 of 28.912 unit, (0.17%: whole 
blood, red cells and platelets) were lxOcitire. 
In most of them, bacteria were present in low 
concentration, i. e. I -1. (XXliml. One unit of 
red cell concentrate in = 11.600) and 5 units 
of platelets were comarninated with more 
than 101/ml. 86% of bacterial strains detected 
were considered to be skin contaminants I0. 
Myllyli. unpubl. results]. 
The overall results of bacterial contami- 
nation of platelet concentrdcs hetween 1978 
and 199H are presented in table I. In 1998 an 
inoculum of 4 ml was used in PediBact bot- 
ties and analysed in the BacT/Alert system 
(Organen 'IcknikaI. Staphrloeoteus epider- 
mittis was identified in 12 of the 15 positive 
Bacterial C'ontaminalion of Blood 
Component, 
cultures. and 3 other coagulase-negative 
Str+phytnroerws strains were ohst rued. lit one 
case also the red cell concentrate and the 
plasma unit were culture-positive. Further- 
more, in another case, one plasma unit. de- 
rived (mm the same donation as the platelet 
product was. culture-rmitiVC, whereas the red 
cell concentrate remained negative. 
Question 3 
'Ihe preventive measures taken to reduce 
the bacterial contamination rate of blood 
components have been the conventional 
ones: paving attention to the appearance of 
skin surrounding the venepuncture site: se- 
lecting only healthy skin for puncture, care- 
fully disinfeL ing the puncture site. e. g.. let- 
ting the disinfectant dry prior to the puncture. 
and emphasising an aseptic puncture tech- 
nique as such. No initial blood sample has 
been removed to decrease the ntunher of 'un- 
avoidable' skin contaminant. entering the 
blood bag. Storage time of platelet concen- 
trates has been limited to 5 days although 
current platelet preparations as such may stay 
haemostatically active for a more extended 
period of time. 
Red cell units and platelets are distributed 
only after careful visual inspection of the 
preparation. No endotoxin assays, microbial 
staining, rihoumtal assays for bacteria, poly- 
Trierase chain reaction or routine bacterial 
cultures are performed prior to distribution. 
A small prospective trial was conducted 
in 1491 to prolong the storage time to 7 days 
during a holiday season. Blood samples from 
pooled huffy-coal-derived leucocyte-deplet- 
cd platelet products were inoculated to Pedi- 
Bact bottles and cultured (BacT/Alert) ac- 
cording to manufacturer's guidelines (at least 
for 48 h) to screen for platelet preparations 
with a positive bacterial culture. Samples 
were drawn only from platelet concentrates 
with nontwl appearance and swirling. One of 
the 264 preparations, representing 1.056 
units of hlcxxl. was positive. The growth (5. 
epidennidi. ) was evident after 11 h of cul- 
14, x Cune 2W0; 7Rý59-. 67 
Lure. The product was removed from the 
stock. Pm-transfusion screening caused a 
heavy workload and complicated the logis- 
tic . 
including the extended quarantine peri- 
xi of platelets. 
Blood processing after overnight storage 
at own) temperature, as performed at our insti- 
tutc, has been suggested to be favourable for 
phagovytusis of contawinating bacteria 121. 
Since it is known that a certain proportion 
of components is contaminated with com- 
mon epidermal bacteria. improved methods 
to avoid contamination during venepuncture 
should be developed. 
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Quesrioll I 
Data on the frequency of transfusion-as- 
scs is ted septic reactions in our facility strict- 
ly relates to platelet units. We have not ob- 
served a confirmed transfusion-associated 
septic reaction after transfusion of other 
blood components. For platelets. we have 
had in place a prospective microbiologic 
surveillance program for more than 7 years 
which has gradually evolved over this time 
period (see below). [)ureng this time interval, 
from July 1991 to June 1998. apprusimately 
5,61X) 1, ooled random donor units (primarily 
5 units per pool) containing I or more 4- or 5- 
day-old unit. and 7.224 4- and 5-day-old sin- 
gle donor platelet units were prepared for 
transfusion and subsequently analyied (l J. In 
the pooled random donor category, 6 pools 
were intercepted prior to transfusion because 
of pretransfusion gram stain positivity. con- 
finued as heavily contaminated on follow-up 
culture. Almost without a doubt. these in- 
stances, had they not been intercepted, would 
have been associated with a transfusion-asso- 
63 
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ciated septic reaction. An additional 8 ran- 
dom donor pawls and 3 apheresis units were 
transfused with a negative pretranstusion 
gram stain. but with follow-up culture ex- 
hibiting confirmed positivity. In the 3 in- 
stanaw with the apheresis platelets, there 
were no clinical signs or symptoms ehurac- 
teristic of transfusion-associated sepsis. 
Iaowcvcr, in the )t instances of transfused 
grant-stuin-negative, culture-positive ran- 
dom donor platelet pools, 5 recipients exhib- 
ited signs and/or symptoms characteristic of 
trop, fusion-associated sepsis, including one 
or more of the following: fever. hypotension, 
positive posttransfusion blood culture. There 
were no deaths. Titus, for pooled random 
donor platelet pools undergoing surveillance. 
the anticipated rate of transfusion-associated 
septic reactions at our facility is I] i6 + 5i 
transfused pools out of 5,49) or approxi- 
mately one in every S(N) pooled random 
donor platelet transfusions. 
While no deaths were observed in the 
surveillance group described above, there 
have been 3 deaths since 19.9 in our facility 
associated with platelet bacterial contamina- 
tion. In 2 insances (Enlemiwr)er aeraeenes 
and Pseudonoms aerugütoau). we had not 
yet initiated the surveillance program; in the 
3rd instance (Pseudontenur. s aerr, einosa), the 
platelet pool was composed of platelets less 
than 4 days of age and thus did not qualify for 
the prermnsfusion surveillance program. 
Over the 10-year period from 1989 to the 
present. we have transfused approximately 
2$, (MX) random donor platelet pxMds cumain- 
ing approximately 144, (XX) units. Hence, for 
all pooled random donor platelets issued at 
our facility over 10 years, the approximate 
rate of identified fatalities associated with 
transfusion of bacterially contaminated 
platelet,, is I in 1), 333 platelet transfusions or 
I in 48, (XX) random platelet units. 
Que. xtum 2 
Our inter st in studying bacteria] contam- 
ination of blood components, ; pccitically 
platelets, began in 1991 when, during a I- 
month period, 4 confined positive oases of 
platelet bacterial contamination were identi- 
lied in our institution us follows: Psru- 
donwnas aeruginosa (1). Bacillus curie (2) 
and Staphrloeoe ar epidmnidis (I). A thor- 
ough investigation by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Food and Drug Administration 
revealed no inciting or predisposing Ia, tors 
[2,31. Nonetheless, because the P. aerugi- 
no a platelet contamination likely contribut- 
ed tu the death of a ferneng anti. I of the 2 B. 
onus platelet contaminations contrihutcd to 
64 Vox S7aß 2pMk7$: S9 h7 
patient morbidity in the form of lobar pneu- 
mania requiring admission to the intensive 
care unit, we elected to institute, at that time. 
a Prospective n'ticrabiologir surveillance pro- 
grain. The goals of this program were to: 
I) better define the actual incidence 
of platelet bacterial contamination, including 
unrecogmiaed cases not associated with signs 
and symptoms of infection or transfusion 
reaction: 
(2) assess the influence of the in vitro 
platelet storage inter al on the frequency and 
magnitude of bacterial contamination, and 
(3) assess the potential utility of a pre- 
transfusiun gram stain to prevent transfusion 
of bacterially contaminated platelets, 
Initially. in the first 12 months, we per- 
formed pretrnsfusion grain stains and cul- 
tured all platelet pools and single donor 
apheresis units regardless of the storage age 
of the unit. In all, 3,141 consecutive random 
donor platelet pools (14,481 units) and 2,476 
single donor apheresis units were studied. All 
single-donor apheresis units were sterile but 
6 of the random donor pools (0.19`x) were 
found to be bacterially contaminated, with I 
unit of 5 in the pool being the source in each 
case. Contaminants were S. epidt'rmWit (4), 
B. cen"as (1) and S. au, eua (1) at count-, of 
0.5> 102-1011 colony-limning units (CPUV 
ml in platelet pools and ItP-10" CFU/ml in 
source units. 'The contamination rate for units 
transfused at c4 days (1.8 per 1031(X)) was 
significantly lower than at 5 days (1 19 per 
10.000: p<0.05), as was the magnitude of 
contamination (p<0. OS) 141. Since the older 
platelets were shown to be at greatest risk for 
measurable bacterial contamination, we con- 
tinued our prospective surveillance only in 
pools containing one or more 4- or 5-day old 
Units and with 4- and 5-day-old single donor 
apheresis units. 'these platelets are concid, 
ereil 'at risk'. 
In our most recent surveillance project. 
noted above, a compilation of the rate of con- 
lamination in 44- to and 5-day-old random and 
single donor platelets over a 7-year period. 
July 1991 to June. 1998. it total of 28,152 
random-donor units and 7,224 single-donor 
platelet units were studied. Fourteen random- 
donor units were confirmed positive for bac- 
terial contamination (4.97/1(10)0) and 3 sin- 
gle donor units were confirmed positive for 
bacterial contamination (4.15/10,1110)). There 
was no statistical difference in the unit-for- 
unit rite of bacterial contamination between 
random- and single-donor units (p = 1A). 
However, since random-donor units are 
pooled, the risk of contamination with ran- 
dom-donor platelet units increases by syt- 
proximately the factor of the number of units 
in the lxxol. For example. a pool of 5 random- 
donor units would have 5 times the risk of 
bacteria) contamination compared to a sin- 
gle-donor unit. In addition, our data demon- 
strate, for bacterial contamination of ran- 
dom-donor platelet units. statistically 
sittnificam variability over time in the inci- 
dence of platelet bacterial contamination 15j. 
'I'ltis suggests that as yet unknown inciting 
factor(s) may contribute to the occurrence of 
bacterial contamination of platelets. Finally, 
an additional study [6) shows no statistically 
significant difference in the risk of bacterial 
contamination in leukorcducal platelet- 
pheresis products prepared by continuous fil- 
tration during collection compared to non- 
lcukoreduced platclctphcresis products. This 
suggests, that early leukocyte removal does 
not enhance the subsequent risk of bacterial 
growth in single-donor apheresis units. 
Question 3 
In our facility, we have utili, ed, as noted 
above, the gram stain as a measure to identi- 
fy bacterial contamination of platelet units 
and interdict them prior to transfusion. The 
gram stain is limited in its utility in that it has 
been effective only in preventing transfusion 
of heavily contaminated platelet units - the 
units having greater than approximately It» 
organisms/mi. The gram stain has missed 
many contaminated units with lower num- 
bers of organism. It is also more likely to 
miss gram-negative contamination compared 
with gram-positive contamination because 
the dark blue contrast against the light pink 
platelet background, present with gram-posi- 
tive organisms, is lacking with grant-nega- 
tive organisms. The consequence of perform- 
ing a prctrana'usion gram stain from an 
aliquot of a pool containing at least one 4- or 
5-das-old platelet unit is ati follows [1l: 
Outconx: forconlinned cultum-positive 
platelet Units 
Total 
RDP potrls not tnmslused due to a 
IxitiVc gram stain. it 0/14 
RI)Y pools tranUuwd with a 
ncgatisc grim stain, n 8/14 
No sytnptotns or scquelac 3/8 
No symptoms with soquelae 2/8 
Symptoms and ccluclac 3/9 
SOP polt not transfused due to a 
positive grain stain. n (1/3 
Sr)PI, ools transfused with a 
negative gram stain. n : il3 
RDP = Random-donor platelet unit. 
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Most rc cntly, since we harr not inter- 
dicled a bacterially contaminated platelet 
unit prior to transfusion with a gram stain in 
3 years, during which time there hure bccn 
10 instances of confirmed culture positivity, 
we have elected tu suspend the pretransfu- 
sion gram stain beginning on February I. 
1999. We will continue to gather culture 
surveillance on all of our transfusions con- 
taining 4- and 5-day-old units and reinstate 
the gram stain if quantitative culture surveil- 
lance reveals increased quantities of bacterial 
organisms. In the meantime, we await im- 
proved more sensitive and rapid methods for 
interdicting bacterially contaminated platelet 
units prior to transfusion. 
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Rau-tcrial Contamination of Blood 
Components 
Paul Höcker 
Gabriele Stieg/er 
Questiari 
No cases of transfusion-associated septic 
reactions in our hospital were reported in the 
Isst few saus. 
Question 2 
According to the policy of our Institute. 
the storage period of apheresis platelet con- 
centrates is limited to 72 h (3 days'). Bacteri- 
al contamination was determined at the end 
of storage time in approximately IO' . of 
platelet concentrates. Of 75 platelet concen- 
trates tested 5 were contaminated. 
More recently we have evaluated bactcri- 
al contamination of platelet concentrates 
stored for 5 days. Nineteen concentrates were 
tested so far and none were bacterially con- 
taminated. 
Question 3 
Our Institution follows standard operat- 
ing proccdurc. s for donor skin disinfection. 
We remove at Icast 2 ml of blood when 
diSContinucws cell separmors are used. 
The surrage time of cell concentrates is 
limited to 42 days for erythrcxytc ccrncen- 
trates, 3 day: for apheresis platelet concen- 
trates and 6h for lymphocyte or granulocyte 
concentrates. For all blood cell products 
leaving the Institute. transfusion is recom- 
mended within 6 h. 
Before detisery all blood products arc %i- 
sually inspected, All platelet- and red blood 
cell concentrates are leukocyte-depleted. 
Ao. Unrv. Prof. Dr. Paul Häcker 
Ciabriclc SGctIcr. 41U 
Klin. Abteilung für TrancfusionsmrJiiin 
Univ. Klinik für Ulutgntppenvrrologie und 
Trun, (umunýmeditin 
Allgemeines Krankenlwun der Stadt Wien 
W'5lrringcr (üirtcl 18 2U 
A-) ») Wien (Austria) 
Harvey G. Klein 
We have no ccntcr-specific data for the 
CI ink tI C'enter regan1ing frequency of trans- 
fusion-a, socjated bacterial sepsis. We rely 
currently on estimates supplied by the Amer- 
ican National Red Cross (ARC) [I I conccrn- 
ing culture-Ixmitive units and unpublished re- 
ports from the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC). These reports esti- 
ulate culture-prnitive red blood cells in the 
range of 0-0.2% and platelets between 0 and 
10r%. Febrile reactions associated with bartc- 
riul amtantination arc rclxmed at 1/10,000to 
1/20, (X, 10 per unit nanstiiscd and fatalities at a 
rate of I death in I to 6 million units trans- 
fused. There has been no organised system of 
nationwide surveillance for bacterial eonwm- 
ination of blood components or for trancfu- 
sion-associated bacterial sepsis. The Food 
and Trug Administration LIDA) require, re- 
porting of fatalities, but most nonlethal 
events are likely unreported. 
In December of 1997, a multicenter study 
f'or the systematic collection of data concern- 
ing bacterial contamination of blcxxt compo- 
nents (BaCon Study i was initiated under the 
joint guidance of the American Association 
of Blood Banks (AABB), te ARC, the CDC, 
and the Department of Defense. llte goals of 
the study include determination of the rates 
of bacterial contamination associated with 
recipient transfusion reactions, identification 
of the responsible microorganisms, identifi- 
cation of risk factors for bacterial contamina- 
tion and for recipient morbidity und mortality. 
To the best of my knowledge, no large co- 
ordinated intervention trial has been directed 
toward the problem of bacterial contamina- 
tion. There are numerous small studies. how- 
ever, most supTiorted by hospital transfusion 
sersices, blood centers, and conimercial en- 
terprises. Some of these were reviewed in it 
conference at NIH in 1997 12]. Current stod- 
ies include investigation of ribosomal assays 
and nucleic acid amplification technique. 
Visual inspection of blood prior to issue has 
long been a requirement and a standard of the 
AABB. Some centers use color charts to dc- 
rect changes in color of red cell units that 
may indicate bacterial growth. Except lot- 
anecdotal reports. no data concerning the ef- 
ficacy of this approach are available 131. One 
center has made extensive use of gram stain- 
ing of platelet concentrates and reports that 
this method is effective, if insensitive. prtcii- 
eel, and inexpensive 14). Others have not 
been able to implement this system as suc- 
cessfully. and it is not in widespread use. 
Limits on duration of acceptable storage 
fier licensed blood components are defined by 
the FDA and ordinarily are based on evi- 
dence of component safety and efficacy. Red 
cell storage. depending on the anticoagulant- 
preservative solution, has been limited by the 
bounds of red cell viability and function. 
Platelet storage at 22°C has been limited 
both by concerns for cell viability and func- 
Vox Swig ? lkK1; 1S: 90 65 
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lion and for bacterial growth. I know of no 
collection entity that is further limiting stur- 
age time to reduce the risk of bacterial 
growth. Although shorter storage might in. 
deed reduce morbidity related to bacterial 
sepsis. the trade-off in terms of blood avail- 
ability is too great to shift the risk-benefit cal- 
culus. 
About 2014 of platelets and a smaller per- 
centage of red cells are leukoreduced in the 
United States. Most leukoreduction is still 
done by filtration at the bedside. Universal 
leukoresluction of cellular blood components 
is almost certain to occur within the next sev 
eral months and will most likely shift to 
prestoragc processing by the blood collection 
center. While this change in processing will 
not be introduced to alter the frequency of 
bacterial contamination, it will be important 
to try to estimate what effect it will have on 
blood safety. 
The issue of bacterial contamination re- 
tnains one of the primary concerns of blood 
collectors and transfusion service scientists 
and clinicians. However the priority given to 
prior diseases, HIV. hepatitis, and emerging 
infection, has in fact overshadowed bacterial 
contamination where research funding is 
concerned. 
Kate Soldan, John Barbara, 
Alan Slopecki, Angela Robinson 
Question I 
In the British Iles (excluding Scotland) 
surveillance of lxrt-transfusion infections 
(including bacterial infections) rcpotlcd In 
blood centres began in Oktober 1495. A cer- 
tainment of cases via an additional hospital 
reporting xfieme (including Scotland) was 
added in (kaober 1996. Between ist Oktober 
1995 and 31 st December 1998,22 completed 
investigations into post-transfusion reactions 
suspected to be due to bacteria were reported 
to the surveillance system. Seven of these 
have been concluded to be due to the transfu- 
sion (table 1), including 2 (29%) where the 
infection was implicated in the death of the 
patient. For it further 15, the investigations 
lacked conclusive evidence of infuaiun/con- 
tamination in the implicated unit(s) (table 2), 
including 1 (7°k) where the infection/reac- 
tion was implicated in the death of the pa- 
tient. Bacterial contamination of blood com- 
ponents remains suspected, although not 
proven (not isolated), as the cause of the re- 
action in some o1 these: patients. 
Ret' irnce. % 
Wagear Si, Fiietln wn I. 1, Dodd RY: 'I'ransfu- 
sion-a. s ociated bacterial %epiis. C'lin Micmhi- 
ol Rev I9(14: 7: 2'Nl-3O2. 
2 Klein JIG. DwIti RY, Nass PM. Fratantoni JA, 
Nrmu GJ: Current status of microbial can tain- 
inaliQn of hlaxl e mpoucnts: Sumnr: uy of a 
contcrcnce. '1'ransfusion 1997: 37: 95-101. 
3 Kim D. M. Brecher SMli, 131xm1 I. A, Este', Tl, 
Carmen RA. Nelwn F1 Visual identification 
or bacterially contaminated red cells. Transfu- 
sion 1992 2: 22I-225. 
4 Yomro%ian R, Lii,, anis HM. Goalnough IT, 
Hirschlcr NV. Morriscev AM, Jacobs MR: A 
pn»pxtise , nicnrhiologic surveillance per 
grant to cktect uni present the transfusion of 
(ctrrially contantinatsti platelets. Transfusion 
1993,33'9O2-909. 
Fiar%cv G. Klein. MMD 
Chief. ! k'parunent of Trunslusinn Medicine 
Warren G. Mngnuum Clinical Center 
National In, titutes of Health 
Bethesda. Mt) 21/892 (USA) 
Table 1. Tr nslusiofl ax idtzd septic It actions cvncltukri (after invcstigation) to be due to an in(ccwd/ 
c mtaminutrd Mtadl trat lusa O1la Oct her 1995 to 31st Ueceitt x'r I998) 
nrgunism tilrwxl 
ci agxmem 
Symptoms Fatal? 
Bacillus anno pL, nelo tran, fu+ un reaction no (1) 
icnt died 
of Icukarmiu) 
Bacillus euer. Platelets ct)14+ cd during Iranfusion, outcome and 
ti' overcd, unwell again later loOOwn 
E. chcrichia coli platelets hactcrecmia ntr 
fsc herirhin (. 111i platelet. severe febrile reaction yes 
Serttrria liguijociens red cells endoloxin shock no 
Sruph, ý/,. rrnrus aurcus platelets bacteracmia yes 
group k streptocucuccue. platelet, Septic chock no 
Total 7 2 (29%1 
Table 2. 'Cmnxfusiurr: cs xiutai septic rcaclinm for Nilich imastigation could not positively identify an in- 
I'ecte VirHUaminatcd hl xd comptmcntt (Ist (-tuber 1995 1i 31st Dccen* r 1998) 
Organism Blood 
cnrnpuncnl 
Symptom, Fatal? 
`lixcd rcd cells +evcrc reaction no 
(7n. suidia sp. red cell. febrile Sangrenc no 
S: apkylormuu' aurruY phnrlCls +e plicaemia 110 
None identified rod cells Iahrllc, hvpertrnsiorl nu 
None Identifue I and cells py'reAnl, 
breathlessness. Yes 
hypertension 
None tdcntdictl red cells no 
None identified rai cells cardiovas mlaI collapse, no 
respiratory arrest 
None identified red cell, febrile, back pain no 
Now identified nx) celIs severe hypertension no 
None identified red cells itru ediate febrile reaction nu 
None identified platelets inmtediate reaction, no 
hypertension. trachycirdia 
hone identified red evil immediate breathlessnccs. no (patient 
died. 
hypertension, followed by but no evidence 
cardiac anaa. mul i-organ of contamination 
failure as cause of death) 
None identified platelets transhlsion reaction 
no 
Total I5S 1 (7%) 
' Other causes are also suspected. 
66 Nbý Sang 'XXN}1i-b7 International Forum 
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Tible 3. Rctro q)L tive study on nnoitrxing timt expired lit) platelet ttrncentrater I'm haclerial contami- 
nation Ia Fihruarv 1995 to 31st O Iobcr 1997 
Type T(Nal Initially reactive Contir ned puxitivc 
TL pooled platelets 1.547 27 (1.8ä. I in 571 1147%, 1 in 141) 
TE wnglc platclca 249 
Apheresik plklelctc I. IN13 
.............. rotnl 2.80 
4(1.6,0.1 in 62) 
13 (I .? 
GF, I in 77) 
44 (1.6'x., 1 in (4) 
Table 4. Pnvcnunc 1 tcasnrrc adopteAI ur under imcstigation in our country 
410.4%. 1 in 1-511 
15 i11. SK. 1 in 187) 
Pi ventivc tncasurc Pr3aicc in England Comments 
Improve donor skin p. epnration yes %tudv nearing compkiinn 
3W/(W disintCctiou national policy will follow 
Romoval of the fiat 2 ml of blood being cn itlercvl 
Limit uorage time of all conmmnu" not comridctui 
Pre-tr". tncfu in detection of beetaia problems with the logiuicr of 
sonic of ihcxc tnctliods 
Visual inspection enc turugtd 
L: ndotoxin awwyx no 
Micn>holo ical staining no 
Rihtzuxtud acsayx for bacteria pemling research project in progress (Bristol) 
Polymcrasc chain reunion no 
Culture techniques no' 
(lange blood processing 
Leucocyte depletion yes! implernentution of 
mii vers. al leucndcplction 
under way 
- 
Disinketion of waterbath not applicable rclesunt for hospital units 
no waterbuthx used at blood centres 
- Alter period of Storage prior some conflict with l ucocyte 
to component preparation depletion 
Others 
AlthrwEh not tonnalls timer crns i(mtion automated culture of platelets after I day incubation, with 2 day extension to shelf-life of negatives las in Sweden) is roconmkiakd by John Barbara. 
Question 2 
The data in table 3 have been provided by 
Carl McDonald from a study conducted at 
North London blood centre. 
Que rinn 3 
Sec tahlc 4. 
Katc Solan. John Barharn, 
Angola kobtn on. Alan Skpuki 
Kun(mul Blood Audiority 
Ouk I luu n. Rrnl. Cresmut 
Watford WDI1Q11(UK) 
Bacterial Contamination of Blood Vsox Sang 2Oa9sa47 
Components 
Halina Seyfried 
Qtresdon 
A tested of 783.954 units of blood were 
collected in 1998. One (t). (XX)I`. r) septic fa- 
iality and 19 t0.0021, -K 1 transfusion-associated 
septic reactions were reported to the blood 
transfusion service. Only red cell cotwen- 
trates were involved. In 14 patients the con- 
tamination was due to bacteria often present 
in the skin of donors (micnwocci. Sraphdo- 
c(occus epidernridia). In 19 patients the reac- 
tions were mild and severe in 1. The analysis 
of the fatal caw revealed that it was due to a 
mistake of the clinician respmsihle for blood 
transfusion, Transfusion had been stopped 
because of the symptoms of a non-hacmolyt- 
ic reaction (fever up to 38.5'C, chills). The 
bag remained for 5h connected with the pa- 
ticnt and when the symptoms disappeared. 
the transfusion was continued and led to sep- 
tic shock and death 10 h later. Blood collect- 
ed 6h after death showed Klebsiella pneunro- 
niue. buiembacrer cloucae and Serrctlin 
liquefm'it ns. Microbiological staining and 
culture techniques on the fresh frozen plasma 
separated from the unit of whole blood did 
not show bacterial amtatninatiun. 
Question 2 
I have no data on the ireiuency of bacte- 
rial contamination of rcd ccll and/or platelet 
concentrates as determined in vitro. 
Question 3 
The preventive measures adopted in our 
country arc as follows: 
improvement of donor skin preparation 
and disinfection; 
limitation of storage time of red cell con- 
centrates; 
- pretransfusion detection of bacteria; 
- visual inspection. 
- changes in hllxxl processing, and 
Ieuctxepletion in about 30% of red blood 
cell and platelet coIICe111rates (either 
bully coat removal or filtration). 
Prof. Hnlina Scyfricd. MD 
Institmc of Ffaem: nolopv and HIood Trincfocxm 
Chocimska S 
I'L -00.957 W+uszawn (Polandl 
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State-of-the-Art Paper 
Vox Sanguinis 
Vox Sang 20U; 78 (suppl 2): 291--295 
The Serious Hazards of Transfusion (SHOT) 
Initiative: The UK Approach to Haemovigilance 
Loma Williamson Hannah Cohen Elizabeth Love Hilary Jones Audrey Todd Kate Soldan* 
SHOT Office, Mandl Mood Centre, Manchester, UK 
'CvM Pubic Hedth Laboratory Cominrycab. Disease Suurved ence Centre, Coindele Avenue, London UK 
Introdredou 
Blood transfusion is a widely used therapy in hospital 
practice, with over 3 million components issued annually in 
the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland. In the early 1990's, 
there was a growing awareness among UK transfusion 
specialists, haematologists and other clinicians that there was 
little information on the safety of the whole transfusion 
process from blood component production in a Transfusion 
Centre to administration at the bedside. Major policy 
decisions had to be reached, and clinical guidelines produced, 
without a sound basis of epidemiological and statistical 
information. As suppliers of therapeutic products, 
UK Transfusion Services recognised their obligation to 
understand the magnitude of patient risk caused by their 
products. At the same time, reports from the UK and 
elsewhere [1,21 suggested that hospital errors in patient 
identification were a major source of transfusion-related 
morbidity and mortality. To analyse residual risks of 
transfusion, a voluntary reporting system for major 
transfusion complications - the Serious Hazards of 
Transfusion (SHOT) scheme - was launched in November 
1996 [3]. 
SHOT: Aims, organization and reporting system 
Aims 
SHOT works as a confidential reporting system which 
aims to collect data on serious adverse events of transfusion 
of blood components, and to make recommendations to 
improve transfusion safety. Through the participating 
Royal Colleges and professional bodies, SHOT findings can 
be used to (1) inform policy within transfusion services and at 
Department of Health level, (2) improve standards of hospital 
transfusion practice, (3) aid production of clinical guidelines 
for the use of blood components, (4) educate users on 
transfusion hazards and their prevention, and (5) provide a 
'rapid alert' of clusters of existing or new hazards which may 
emerge. This year, SHOT has joined the Internet, and you can 
find us at httplwww. shot. demon. co. uk. 
Organisation 
The strategic direction of SHOT comes from a Steering 
Group with wide representation from Royal Colleges and 
professional bodies representing medical, nursing and 
laboratory staff. SHOT was affiliated to the Royal College of 
Pathologists in November 1997- The operational aspects of 
the scheme are the responsibility of a Standing Working 
Group, which is accountable to the Steering Group. SHOT is 
therefore entirely professionally driven and organised, with 
no direct formal links either to government or regulatory 
agencies. However, the Health Service Circular 1998/224 
KARGER O 2000 S. Kafgar AO, Bu cl Lorna Williamson, MJ) 
Fix -41 61 306 12 34 
E"Miul large@k&W. ch 
University ofCmnbridge Division of Transfusion Medicine 
www. kaw. com 
Fast Anglia Blood Centre 
Long Road, Cambridge CB2 2PT (UK) 
Tel. +44 1223 548009, Fix. +44 1223 548136, E-Mail 
loma. williamson t nbs. nhs. uk 
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'Better Blood Transfusion' sent from the National Health 
Service Executive to all hospitals, requires a clear 
commitment to SHOT reporting and to changes in practice 
resulting from SHOT observations and recommendations. 
Reporting System 
SHOT invites reports of major adverse events surrounding 
the transfusion of single or small pool blood components 
(red cells, fresh frozen plasma (PFP), methylene blue FFP and 
cryoprecipitate). It does not cover complications of 
fractionated plasma products, as licensed medicinal products, 
these are already covered by the 'Yellow Card' system of the 
Medicines Control Agency. However, for purposes of 
comparison SHOT also invites reports on complications of 
solvent-detergent FFP, a pooled licensed product. Hospitals 
report events under the following categories: 
(1) incorrect blood component transfused, whether or not 
any harm results. This includes blood intended for 
another patient, or a component which does not meet 
the requirements of the patient 
(2) acute transfusion reaction (up to 24 hours) 
(3) delayed transfusion reaction (beyond 24 hours) 
(4) transfusion-related acute twig injury (TRAU) 
(5) post-transfusion purpura (PTP) 
(6) transfusion-associated graft-versus-host-disease 
(TA-GVHD) 
(7) bacterial contamination 
(8) post transfusion viral infection 
(9) other post-transfusion infection e. g. malaria 
(10) incidents associated with either autologous pre- 
donation or return of any type of autologous blood. 
At hospital level, hazards are reported to the local 
haematologist responsible for transfusion. Suspected cases of 
transfusion transmitted infection are then reported to the 
supplying blood centre; this is essential to ensure rapid 
withdrawal of other implicated components and appropriate 
donor follow-up. These cases are then reported by blood 
centres to the Public Health Laboratory Service 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (PHIS CDSC) 
post-transfusion infection surveillance system. Non-infectious 
hazards are notified directly from hospitals to the 
SHOT office on an 'initial report' form. On receipt of a 
report, the assistant national co-ordinator allocates a number 
to the case, then issues a detailed follow-up questionnaire 
specifically designed for each hazard. Once complete, the 
information in the questionnaire is entered in an anonymised 
way onto the SHOT database, and the paper record shredded. 
Thus there can be no trace back to individual cases. 
An Annual Report and separate Summary of Findings 
and Recommendations combine the data from the infectious 
and non-infectious arms of the reporting system. Both are sent 
to all hospitals, the aim being for the Summary to be widely 
distributed to all types of hospital staff involved in handling 
blood. Most hospitals in the UK now have a Transfusion 
Committee, which has a useful co-ordinating role in 
implementing SHOT findings. 
292 Vox Sang 2000; 78 (suppl. 2): 291-295 
Key findings 1996-1999 
The third Annual SHOT Report[5) was launched on 
7 April 2000 to coincide with the World Health 
Organisation's World Health Day, which had as its theme 
'Blood Safety'. Rcsults'from the first three annual reports [5- 
81 are summarised below. 
Overview 
Of 424 eligible hospitals, 94 submitted 169 reports during 
the first year, and 112 submitted 197 reports during the 
second year, an increase of 16.5%. "Nil to report" cards, 
introduced in the second year, were submitted by 
164 hospitals, bringing overall participation to 65%. In the 
third year, of 432 eligible hospitals, 132 submitted 
252 reports, an increase in reports of 27.9% compared with 
the previous year. Including 204 hospitals which sent "nil to 
report" returns, overall participation in the third year was 
77.8%. SHOT reporting now covers >90% of all red cell 
usage in the UK. 
The breakdown of reports by type is shown in the Figure. 
In particular, we have drawn attention to the problem of 
'wrong blood transfused' incidents which in each of the 3 
years have comprised over half the cases reported: 
335/618 (54.2%) in total. Transfusion transmitted infections 
account for a very small proportion of reported post- 
transfusion complications - 3% - (n=19). Of 584 cases 
analysed over 3 years, there were 28 deaths and 114 cases of 
major morbidity, defined as intensive care admission or 
possible long term scquelac (Table 1). 
Incorrect blood or component transfused 
Of the 335 reported episodes in which a patient was 
transfused with the wrong blood component, 97 were 
ABO incompatible, leading to 4 deaths and 29 cases of 
immediate major morbidity. There were 13 cases of potential 
RhO sensitisation in young female patients. Notably, the 
errors in each of 313 analysed cases of incorrect transfusion 
consisted of a sequence of one to 7 procedural failures to 
detect incorrect identity of blood or patient, leading to 
transfusion to the wrong patient. Errors occurred at all stages 
of the transfusion process but a key source of error was 
collection of the wrong blood from the blood bank 
refrigerator. Blood was frequently taken without a formal 
identity check against the patient's case record. In addition, 
administration of a blood component to the wrong patient 
usually involved failure of the bedside checking process to 
detect discrepancy in blood and patient identity (n=140). In 
35 cases, the patient had no identity wristband. Prescription, 
request or blood sampling errors (n=61) included four 
incidents of transposition of blood grouping samples at the 
patient's bedside. Two of these. one fatal, involved the use of 
pre-labelled sample tubes, contrary to existing British 
Committee for Standards in Haematology (BCSH) 
guidelines [9]. Laboratory errors (n"95) included failure to 
consult/heed historical records, as well as incorrect grouping, 
cross matching and labelling. 
Williamson/Cohen/LoveJJones/Codd/ 
Soldan 
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Immune complications of transfusion 
These were reported in five categories (acute and delayed 
reactions, TRALI, PTP and TA-GVHD). These cases were 
unpredictable and generally did not reflect poor practice. 
However, with the exception of haemolytic events, reactions 
were investigated inconsistently, and it was not always 
possible to determine the cause of the reaction. Seven reports 
were received of a hypotensive reaction to components passed 
through a bedside leucocyte filter (10]. Over 3 years, there 
have been 39 cases of TRALI following transfusion of red 
cells and platelets, as well as FFP. PTP is almost certainly 
underreported, but cases were investigated and managed 
appropriately. Of 10 cases of TA-GVHD, all fatal, 4 had 
B cell lymphoproliferative disorders not covered by current 
UK guidelines for irradiated components. 
Transfusion transmitted injection 
Of 94 suspected cases, only 19 (20%) were confirmed to 
be related to the transfusion. Eleven cases 
(one hepatitis A infection, one malaria, nine bacteraemias) 
were due to infections for which no testing of donations is 
performed, while six cases (four hepatitis B, one hepatitis C, 
one HIV) were due to donations taken during the marker 
negative "window period" after recent infection. There were 2 
further cases of hepatitis C infection; one a newly reported 
case of hepatitis C was in a patient who received a blood 
transfusion before the introduction of donor screening in 
1991, and another due to laboratory error in hepatitis 
C testing - corrective and preventative action was 
subsequently put in place. Of the nine bacterial cases, two 
involved red cells, contaminated with Serratia liyuefaciens 
and a fatal Yersinia enlerocolitica transmission. The 
remaining six involved platelet transfusions, comprising a 
fatal case of Staphylococcus aureus, isolated from the donor's 
skin and nose, two cases of I: scherichia coil (one fatal), two 
cases of Slaphylococcus epldermidis and one of 
Bacillus cereus. The other fatality caused by infection was 
due to cerebral malaria after transmission of 
Plasmodium falciparum from a donor who lived in a 
malarious area as a child and who had visited (a different) 
malarious area within the previous four years. This rapidly led 
to amendments to selection criteria for donors. 
Table 1. Morbidity and mortality related to transfusions in fully analysed cases 1996 - 1999 (n7-584) 
Detail Total Incorrect Major acute Major detayrd post. TA-Craft Tranat Uion Tranahulon Urdasitkd 
component transtwou trawtwlon trarotuaion versus host related acute transmitted 
trans teed reaction reaction purpurn disease lunz injury infection 
Death 
attributcd to 28 4141 10 440 
kuafusion 
"n, L 
ably due 
to 
vanssf num 
y 2 2 0 1 0 4 0 
. 
Msior 114 44 3 17 S 0 31 14 
morbidity 
Minor/no 425 259 75 59 26 0 0 1 
morbidity 
Outcome 8 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 
unstated 
TOW 594 312 84 80 33 10 39 19 
I The ctegorv "Ikath Possibly due to transfusion" was introduced for the 1999 / 99 reporting year. 
SHOT - The UK Approach to Hacmovigilancc vo: $ 2" 74 puppe. 4 291, -295 293 
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Figure 1. Overview of 618 cases for which initial reports forms were received 1996 - 1999 
Tran sfusion-role tod 
acute lung injury 43 Transfusion-associated 
Post-translusion (7%) graft versus host 
purpurn 32 (5.2%) disease 11 (1.8%) 
0. reyed rranst, son 
»acdon 82 (13.3%) 
Transfusion 
transhnitt, d infection 
19(3%) 
Unclassified 7 (1,1%) 
Acute transfusion 
reacnan 89 (14.4%) 
Incorrect blood/ 
component translUsed 
335(64,2%) 
Key recommendations and associated new initiatives in 
blood safety 
Incorrect blood or component transfused 
Getting "the right blood to the right patient in the right 
place at the right time" is a complex chain from patient blood 
sampling through laboratory testing to bedside administration. 
The three SHOT reports have emphasised that multiple errors 
may occur at all stages of the process. Following the first 
SHOT report, the BCSH developed a very useful guideline on 
blood administration (I). A number of recommendations in 
. this guideline are in line with those in the SHOT reports, 
including the need for strict procedures to avoid confusion 
between patients at the time of sampling, minimum formal 
identification requirements when blood is collected from the 
hospital blood bank, the importance of bedside checking 
procedures, the provision of identity wristbands, ensuring that 
special requirements of patients are met (e. g. for irradiated or 
294 Vox Sang 2000; 78 (suppl. 2): 291-295 
CMV negative blood), consultation of the historical record in 
the hospital blood bank and formal recording of telephone 
requests. It is essential that this guideline is disseminated 
widely within hospitals. If used as the basis for a 
comprehensive staff training (and retraining) programme, this 
guideline offers sound practical advice on how transfusion 
errors can be reduced. However, to reduce 'wrong blood' 
episodes to the vanishingly low level of viral transmission 
now seen, innovative computing developments to ensure 
correct blood/patient identity would be required. These 
systems would have other major advantages, e. g. in reducing 
errors in drug administration. The NIlS IT strategy should 
take a lead in assessing this area of new technology. 
Immune complications Of transfusion: 
Clinicians should continue to report all types of serious 
adverse event following transfusion, as this may act as an 
early warning of adverse effects of novel techniques and 
processes (c. g. leucocytc depiction, virus inactivation, 
drug/product interactions), Any possible impact of universal 
leucocyte depletion of the blood supply (achieved in 
November 1999) on TA-GVHD incidence will take several 
years of further monitoring to emerge, so it is critical that full 
Will is msot/Cohen2ovelloncsTTodd/ 
Soldan 
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details of all cases are returned to SHOT. A standard protocol 
for the investigation of suspected TA-GVHD cases should be 
developed, and extension of the indications for irradiated 
components to eliminate TA-GVHD considered. A national 
card, designed by the BCSH, is available to be issued to 
patients at risk of TA-GVHD who are receiving shared care 
between a transplant/oncology centre and their referring 
hospital, to indicate their need for irradiated components. 
Prevention of TRALI requires that UK Transfusion Services 
consider different possible strategies for donor 
selection/screening, taking into account logistics, effect on the 
blood supply and cost-effectiveness. 
British Committee for Standards in Hac natology, Blood Transfusion 
Task Force, Guidelines For pre-transfusion compatibility procedures in 
blood transfusion laboratories, Transfusion Medicine 1996; 6: 273.2$3. 
Shiba MK, Tadokoron K. Sawanoboti M, ' Nakajima 1, Suzuki K, Juji T. 
Activation of the contact system by filtration of platelet concenrataa 
with a negatively charged white cell erzoval filter and measurerneM of 
venous blood bradykinin levels in patients who received the filtered 
platelets. Transfusion 1997; 37: 457462. 
British Committee for Standard: in Haematology. Blood Teamfusion 
Task Force, The administration of blood and blood components and the 
management of transfused patieals. Transfusion Medicine 1999; 9: 227- 
23g. 
Transfusion transmitted infections: 
National collation of data arising from these cases needs 
to continue over several years before a picture of the extent 
and nature of the infectious complications of transfusion can 
emerge. The quality of investigation of transfusion reactions 
suspected to be due to bacteria is variable. National guidelines 
on the investigation of these cases are currently being revised 
following comments from users. 
Priority selling in blood safety: 
The 3 SHOT reports together offer a comprehensive 
picture of transfusion complications in the UK. This provides 
powerful data against which future priorities for transfusion 
safety enhancements can be considered. However, this is 
possible only if combined with a strategy for considering 
transfusion risks together, and setting priorities for allocation 
of resources. There remains a need for an overarching 
approach to decision making in relation to blood safety. A 
national unified body is needed, with appropriate relevant 
expertise and representation from professional bodies which 
can prioritise new initiatives in blood safety. This should be 
complemented by a parallel initiative on appropriate 
prescription of blood. 
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The Prevalence of Hepatitis B Infection in Adults 
with no Recognized Increased Risk of Infection 
Sir. 
In the U. K.. it is under debate whether immunization for hepati- 
tis R (HBV) infection should be targeted at individuals with a rec- 
ognized increased risk of infection (as currently recommended') 
or given universally (as recommended by the WHO). 2" t The addi- 
tional benefit of universal immunization above a well imple- 
mented selective programme is that it provides direct protection 
tu individuals with no recognized increased risk of infection. 
Estimates of the prevalence of infection in these individuals are 
therefore helpful when considering universal immunization. as 
they provide a measure of the maximum benefit of extending 
immunization to these groups. 1111V testing of large numbers of 
low risk individuals is. however, rarely performed. 
Blood donations are collected from individuals with no recog- 
niutii lifestyle risk for blood-borne infections and are tested for 
4` 31Nx1 The Unlish Infirturn Society 
hepatitis It surface antigen (itltiAg) in order to exclude joke- 
tious donations fron the blood supply. The prevalence of I lI sAg 
is low: 0.1)3%of new donors were found to be) IRsAg positive iii 
{nglund and Wales during 1998.4 Testing for hepatitis It core 
antibody (anti-lilie) additionally identifies individuals who have 
had 1113V infection and are now IIIfsAg-negative. During 1995. 
the National Blood Service in the tamndon and South-cast region 
of England conducted a project that involved testing more ih m 
IlK)000 blood donors for anti-lilac. ' Information about the 
donors tested during this project has been collated and used to 
estimate the prevalence of HHV infection in adults with no rec- 
ognized increased risk of infection who are therefore unlikely to 
receive selectively offered I16V immunization in the ILK. 
Data were collected from two blood centres (A: East Anglia, 
13: South Thames) about the age. sex and country of birth IWWen- 
tre I3 only) of each donor tested (luring the period of the anti-lulle 
project. and about anti-HB; c test results from the project's 
records. Samples reactive to initial testing by Abbott Coriyme 
(Abbott Laboratories. North Chicago, U. S. A. ) were further tested 
by Abbott IMXeore and Abbott IMX hepatitis lt surface antibody 
(anti-HBs) test, and, if anti-this negative (or below 0.1 IU/ml). by 
Ortho anti-Htic f; L. ISA (Ortho Diagnostics, Raritan NJ. U. S. A. ) to 
exclude false positives. ' Anti-1113e positive results were linked to 
the appropriate donor data by matching of unique record nuwn- 
bers. As not all (9(r#, ) donations collected during the period of 
the project were tested for anti-Hßc, the donor dataset was 
scaled, maintaining the age and sex distribution, to the number 
of anti-1111c tests performed for the calculation of prevalence 
estimates as appropriate. 
The overall prevalence of anti-HOc was 0.57%. Adjustment 
for the depletion of infected Individuals from our anti-lilac tested 
cohort due to previous HlsAg testing (891Y. of donations are col- 
lected from individuals who have donated blood previously) 
slightly increased the overall prevalence estimate to 0.59% (by 
addition of 0.03%4 x 89% x 104 287 = 28 infections). The 
prevalence increased with age (P <0.00001) and was higher in 
donors to centre 13 (P<0.005). Males had a higher prevalence 
(0.66%) than females (0.46%) (P<0.0001) (Fig. 1). "i'he preva- 
Ience amongst centre B donors born in the I;, K. (343/70.203. 
0.49%) was lower than that in donors born outside the U. K. 
(97/3197.3. ()3')6) (P<0,00001) and increased with age 
c, 
1.40 r-. -- --- 
'-1.20 
/. 
/r. .. 
ý 11,001 
x 0.80 /ý 
ý:... 
Ä 0.0 j 
c 0.440 
0.20 
0.00/ :.... _ 1_.. 
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Figurc 1. Anti-H11c prrralcurr in blood Juraurs. (, I Pcnrdtw I; k burn 
donors (rcnlrt Bonly) 139/ 12 SA9.11.41'%. (aI Mules: Ilk-borndono-. 
(rrnlrc It only) _(11/ 
37 114. (). SS%. (,: ` II rntalcs: all donors Ircnh'c, 
A mid I)) 2 341 iO 372.0,1 7%. 1 a-1 M: 4cr: all ckmtKS li rnlres A : und Il 
IiJ/i 191 S. 0.66'%.. 
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Letters to the Editor 
11' <IIIH lIl) (Itg. 1 J. fhe prcvalences observed amonga 
donors horn in regions with more Ih: rn 21)1) donors tested were. 
Western Europe 2.59% 141 /1581), Australasia, 2.14% (5/2 3.1). 
India/l'okistan/Itangludesh and other Asian 3.71'%. ( 17/458). 
sub-S ih3irin Africa 4.91'%. (2(14(17). 
The prevalence of hepatitis It infection in this population was 
low and the number of infections that could be prevented only 
by universal vaccination of IlK-tern individuals appearx tu he 
extremely small %o ne of these infections might be prevented by 
ukctivc immunisation of occupational groups who are not 
excluded from donating, and some through reduction in scc- 
undary transmission from other selectively immunized groups. 
Infections in non-UK-burn individuals may have been 
acquired prior tu arrival in the U. K.. or reflect higher risk of 
inketton amongst sub-groups of the U. K. population with a 
higher prevalence of carriage. 
1I1WV infection was more frequent in donors tu the London-basal 
centre - even after excluding those donors born outside the U. K. 
Inermsing prevalence with age may be due partly to accumulating 
exposures to infection and partly to IIKV infection having been 
more ccxrunon in the past. The prevalence in younger adults is 
more likely to reflect recent exposure levels lover 8(M of reported 
acute Infections. 1991-1997. were aged under 45 years). 
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Appendix 8 
Surveillance of viral infections in donated blood 
Testing donated blood for markers of infections that can be transmitted tu 
recipients is important in maintaining the safety of transfused blood. The 
National Blood Authority (NBA), the Welsh Blood Service, and the PH15 
Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC), began collaborating to 
provide national surveillance of infections detected in donated blood in Oktober 
1995. They also collaborate in the voluntary confidential system known as 
'Serious Hazards of Transfusion' for reporting all major complications of blood 
transfusions in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, which was 
launched in November 19961. Data on markers of hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C 
virus (HCV), and HIV infections in donated blood collected in England and 
Wales during 19% are published in this issue (see page 258). 
The overall rates of infected donations in England and Wales in 1996 were low 
and rates were much lower in donations from repeat donors than in new donors. 
Most donations of blood (88%) came from repeat donors. Rates were similar to 
those in other countries in western Europe. HIV antibodies were detected in 0.79 
per 100000 donations tested in England and Wales in 19%, compared with 2.41 
in France (1945), 1.49 in Germany (1993), 1.03 in Denmark (1995), and 0.28 in 
Finland (1995)2. HCV antibodies were detected in 0.06% of donations from new 
donors in England and Wales in 1996, compared with 0.28% in France (1994), 
0.16'S in Germany (1995), 0.05% in Finland (1945), and (1.04% in Denmark (1995)'. 
Differences in the prevalence and incidence of infections in the general population 
and differences in the recruitment and selection of donors affect the rates of 
infection in donations of blood. The tests that are used also affect rates: in the 
United Kingdom, blood donations are tested for hepatitis B virus surface antigen 
(HBsAg) whereas in Denmark and France, blood donations are tested for HBsAg 
and antibody to hepatitis B core antigen. 
On rare occasions infected donations may enter the blood supply because the 
infected donations do not have the serological marker used to test for infection' 
or the test fails to detect the marker. The appropriate blood centre should be 
informed immediately if such an event is suspected. Components can then be 
withdrawn and investigation of the source of infection can prevent further 
transmission of infection. 
I. CDSC. Surveillance of the complications of blood transfusion. Commit" Dts Rep 
CDR Wkly 19%; 6: 409. 
2. European centre for the epidemiological monitoring of AIDS, WHO-EC 
collaborating centre on AIDS. HIVJAIDS surrxtllance in Europe. Quarterly Report 
no 50. Saint Maurice: 1996. 
3. Nalpas B, Delaroques-Astagneau E, Desenclos )C. European survey on hepatitis C. 
Report to the European Commission, DG V. Paris: 1996. 
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Surveillance of viral infections in donated blood: England and Wales, 1996 
Donated blood is collected from volunteer adult donors Table Markers of infection detected in blood doeatiom 
who do not acknowledge any medical conditions, travel England and Wales, 19% 
history, or behaviours, that are known to be associated 
with an increased risk of bloodborne infections. Donated 
blood is tested currently for hepatitis B virus surface 
antigen (HBsAg), hepatitis C virus antibodies (anti-HCV ), 
HIV antibodies (anh-HIV), and treponemal antibodies. 
Donations are released to the blood supply only if none of 
these markers of infection are detected. Donors who have 
any of these markers are informed of their infection, are 
told to stop donating blood, and arereferred to appropria to 
services for further care. Repeat blood donors have 
attended to donate blood previously but their previous 
donations may not have been tested for some of these 
markers. 
A total of 406 donations (15.99 per 100 000 donations) 
collected by the English and Welsh Blood services during 
19% had markers of viral infections (table). Of these 406 
infected donations, 262 (65%) had anti-HCV, 124 (31%) 
had HBsAg, and 20 (5%) had anti-HIV. New donors 
contributed 12% of all blood donations, but 76% of infected 
donations. 
Blood donations have been tested for anti-HIV since 
1985 and for anti-HCV since 1991. The annual rates of 
Figure 1 Blood donatiom with and-HIV: England and Walen, 
I January 1986 to 31 December 1996 
10 
8 
t Ns eonoer 
Yew a donation 
hure 2 51ood donations with anti-HCV: England and Wales, 
I September 1991 to 31 December 19% 
Bonas 120 -t me. 
- PAP" donors 
100- 96% owftmm -ar"I 
go- 
so- 
40- 
0 -T- 1001 a 93 a 96 ae 
H8SAg 
rob- 
MCV 
anti- 
KV 
AN three 
rn dwrs 
AM donstwro 124 282 20 406 
per 100000 donalons EN1 4.89 10.32 0.79 15.99 
1 in x donations 20 479 9692 126969 6255 
Donations trom n. w donors 100 190 9 30E 
per 100000 donra8Ons tNNd 35.80 84.16 3.04 104.00 
1 in x donation 2717 1569 32906 962 
Donations from repeat donors' 15 72 11 9e 
per 100000 donations tselsd 0.67 321 0.49 4.37 
1 in x don atone 149549 31 156 203930 22890 
May ., suds donetions from repeat donors newly a. a br m. A. rs of 
ffibcbon 
these two markers in donations of blood from new and 
repeat blood donors are shown in figures 1 and 2. The rate 
of infected donations from repeat donors falls after new or 
improved tests are introduced, because repeat donors 
with the marker are detected and stop donating blood. 
HBcAg and anti-HCV were 2.8 and 1.9 times respectively 
more common in newly tested male donors than newly 
tested female donors in 19% (chi squared test p<0.001 for 
both markers). The mean age of newly tested donors who 
had HBsAg was 36.7 years (95% confidence interval (CI) 
35.6 to 37.8), for anti-HCV it was 33.2 years (95% Cl 30.9 
to 35.5), and for anti-HIV it was 28.3 years (95% Cl 22.8 to 
13.7). 
Figure 3 Age group and sam of infected blood donoro 
newly tested donors, 19%' 
75 1 
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Surveillance of viral infections in donated blood: England and Wales, 1997 
Blood for transfusion in England and Wales is collected 
from adult volunteer donors who do not acknowledge any 
medical conditions, travel history, or behaviours known to 
be linked to an increased risk of bloodborne infections. 
Donated blood is tested currently for hepatitis B virus 
surface antigen (HBsAg), hepatitis C virus antibodies (anti- 
HCV), HIV antibodies (anti-HIV), and treponemal 
antibodies. Donations are released to the blood supply 
only if none of the markers is detected. Donors who have 
any of these markers are informed of their infection, told to 
stop donating blood, and referred to appropriate services 
for further care. Earlier donations from repeat blood may 
not have been tested for some of the markers listed: testing 
for anti-HIV began in 1985 and for anti-HCV in 1991. 
A total of 389 donations (14.57 per 100 000 donations) 
collected by the English and Welsh blood services in 1997 
had markers of viral infections (table). Sixty-one per cent 
(236/389) of the infected donations had anti-HCV (figure 1), 
31% (124) HBsAg, and 7%, (29) anti-HIV (figure 2). New 
donors contributed 117E of all blood donations, but 74% of 
infected donations. The rate of anti-HIV prevalence in 
donors in 1997 was higher than in with previous years. 
Figure 1 Blood donations with anti-HCV: England and 
Wales, 1 September 1991 to 31 December 1997 
120 
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I 95% cordidenoe interval 
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Figure 2 Blood donations with anti-HIV: England and 
Wales, 1 January 1986 to 31 December 1997 
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Table Markers of infection detected in blood donations: 
England and Wales, 1997 
Any of 
anö- ant- these three 
HBSAg HCV HIV markers 
All donations 124 236 29 389 
per 100000 donations tested 4.64 8.84 1.09 14.57 
1 in x donations 21535 11315 92079 
6864 
Donations from new donors 93 172 21 286 
per 100000 donations tested 33.08 61.19 7.47 101.74 
1 in x donations 3023 1634 13386 983 
Donations from repeat donors' 31 64 8 103 
per 100000 donations tested 1.30 2.68 0.33 4.31 
1 in x donations 77071 37331 298 849 
23198 
" May include donations from repeat donors newly lasted for makers 
of infection 
This is being investigated, although the rate is based on a 
small number of anti-HIV positive donations. 
HBsAg and anti-HCV were detected more often in newly 
tested male donors than in newly tested female donors in 
1997 (2.5 and 2.3 time,.,. respectively, chi squared test p<0.001 
for both markers) (figure 3). Newly tested donors with anti- 
HCV had a mean age of 38.4 years (95% confidence interval 
(Cl) 37.1 to 39.7), which was older than newly tested donors 
with HbsAg (34.6 years; 95% Cl 32.3 to 36.9) and newly tested 
donors with anti-HIV (29.6 years; 95% Cl 25.9 to 33.4). 
Figure 3 Age group and sex of infected blood donors: newly 
tested donors, 1997' 
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Surveillance of viral infections in donated blood: England and Wales, 1998 
Donated blood is collected from volunteer adult donors Table Markers of infection detected in blood donations: 
who do not acknowledge any medical conditions, travel 
history, or behaviours that are known to be associated 
with an increased risk of bloodborne infections. During 
1998 all donated blood was tested for hepatitis B virus 
surface antigen (HBsAg), hepatitis C virus antibodies (anti- 
HCV), HIV antibodies (anti-HIV), and treponemal 
antibodies. Donations are released to the blood supply 
only if no markers of infection are detected. Donors in 
whose blood any detected markers of infection are found 
are informed of their infection, told to stop donating blood, 
and referred to appropria te services for further care. Repeat 
blood donors have attended to donate blood previously 
but their previous donations may not have been tested for 
some of these markers. 
A total of 313 donations (12.51 per 10(1000 donations) 
collected by the English and Welsh blood services during 
1998 had markers of viral infections (table). Fifty-nine per 
cent of these infected donations (184/313) had anti-HCV, 
35% (109) had HBsAg, and 6% (20) had anti-HIV. New 
donors contributed 11 % of all blood donations, but 71 % of 
infected donations. Blood donations have been tested for 
anti-MV since 1985 and for anti-HCV since 1991. The 
annual rates of these two markers in donations of blood 
Figure 1 Blood donations with anti-HIV: England and 
Wales, I January 1986 to 31 December 1998 
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Figure 2 Blood donations with anti"HCV: England and 
Wales, I September 1991 to 31 December 19% 
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lasted 1« imkere of 
from new and repeat blood donors are shown in figures 1 
and 2. The higher rate of anti-HIV prevalence observed in 
new donors in 1997 relative to previous years was not 
repeated in 1998. HBsAg and anti-HCV were 1.9 and 2.2 
times commoner, respectively, in newly tested male donors 
than newly tested female donors in 1998 (chi squared test 
p<0.01 for both markers). Newly tested donors with anti- 
HCV (mean age 37.9 years; 95% confidence interval (Cl) 
36.7 to 39.2) were slightly older than newly tested donors 
with HBsAg (mean age 36.5 years; 95% Cl 34.3 to 38.7) and 
newly tested donors with anti-HIV (mean age 31.5 years; 
95% Cl 27.3 to 35.7). 
Figure 3 Age group and sex of infected blood donor: newly 
tested donors, 1998' 
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Surveillance of viral infections in donated blood: England and Wales, 1999 
Donated blood is collected from volunteer ad ult donors who do 
not acknowledge any medical conditions, travel history, or 
behaviou s, that are known to be associated with an increased 
risk of bk odbcmie infections. During 1999 all blood donations 
were individually tested for hepatitis B vines surface antigen 
(HBaAg), hepatitisC virus antibodies (ant -HCV), li1V antibodies 
(anti-HIV), and treponemal antibodies. Donations are released 
to the bkmd supply only if noneof these markers of infection are 
detected. Testing of donated blood for HCV by nucleic acid 
testing (NAT) began during 1999'. Initial tenting is performed 
on pools of donations - positive pools are further tested to 
identify individual positive donations. Since September 1999, 
fresh-frozen plasma has only been released if found negative for 
HCV RNA by N AT. Donors who have any markers of infection 
detected are informed of their infection, aretold tostopdonating 
blood, and are referred to appropriate services for further care. 
Previous donations from repeat blood donors may not have 
been tested for some of these markers, 
Three hundred and six of 2559614 donations (11.95 per 
1000(10) collected by the English and Welsh blood services 
during 1999 had markers of viral infections (table). Of these 
306 infected donations, 202 (669c. ) had HCV, 87 (28%) had 
HBV (including one with dual HCV and HBV infection), and 
18 (6%) had anti-HIV. New donors contributed 11% of all 
blood donations, but 78% of infected donations. Blood 
donations have been tested for anti-HIV since 1985 and for 
Figure I Blood donations with anti-HIV: England and 
Wales, 1 January 1986 to 31 December 1999 
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Figure 2 Blood donations with HCV: England and Wales, I 
September 1991 to 31 December 1999 
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Table Markers of infection detected in blood donations: 
England and Wales, 1999 
Any of 
am- and- these cues 
HBSAQ HCV' HIV mafkersr 
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subsequentlyseroconvertedforanti-HCV. The implementation 
of NAT testing of blind donations for HCV RNA is continuing, 
with the aim of releasing all blood components in England 
and Wales knowing that they are negative for HCV RNA. 
1. Flanagan P, Barbara JAJ. PCR testing of plasma pools: from 
concept to reality. Transfus Mid Rev 1999; 13 (3): 164-76. 
Figure 3 Age group and sex of infected blood donors: newly 
tested donors, 1999" 
a) HBsAg 
60 1 
Hri 
ZS34 3644 45 
250 b) H(: V Mw 
3200 
. 
Ago group (years) 
Rslw. sdkKu+dwropor&wMn i fie (foorrr001 - f)rerh 
sp mM s, apQ by /w propor*on al al dsIehd I 
imcft for w$ fi I Ow aft on 
pe wW ma her been Nom 
Dole are for EB9SSW and Wales only. unless o"mwvAse stated. We** numbers are provisional and Should not 139 used 10 
irdic. e trends. 
296 Registered as a newspaper 
335 
Appendix 8 
SI1OT Annual Report 1998 / 1999 
Published 7th April, 2000 
by The Serious Hazards of Transfusion Steering Group 
National co-ordinators: Dr Elizabeth M Love 
Ms Kate Soldan (PHLSCDSC) 
Assistant national co-ordinator: Mrs Hilary Jones (SHOT office) 
Writing Group 
EM Love, LM Williamson, H Cohen, H Jones, 
A Todd, K Soldan, J Revill, DR Norfolk, 
J Barbara, C Atterbury, D Ash er 
on behalf of the SHOT Steering Group 
Requests for further information should be addressed to: 
SHOT Office 
Manchester Blood Centre 
Plymouth Grove 
Manchester 
M13 9LL 
Tel: 01612514208 
Fax: 01612514319 
Email: hilary. jones@nbs. nhs. uk 
elizabeth. love@nbs. nhs. uk 
Website: http//www. shot. demon. co. uk 
ISBN 0 9532 789 21 
336 
Appendix 8 
SHOT Annual Report 1998 / 1999 
13. TRANSFUSION-TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS 
Introduction 
Infectious complications following transfusion differ from non-infectious complications in several ways 
that may affect the ascertainment and investigation of incidents. The onset of symptoms related to a 
hansfusion-transmitted viral infection may occur fron several weeks to y; ars after the date of the 
transfusion. Reports of infections transmitted by transfusion in a particular year can therefore accrue 
over the subsequent year(s). The number of cases ascertained by the end of any' period is therefore 
expected to be an incomplete picture of the infections transmitted during that period- Acute infections, 
such as bacteraemias, that tend to be clinically apparent and diagnosed within days after receipt of the 
infectious transfusion, may be relatively complete but chronic viral infections will be underrepresented. 
In addition, the occurrence of disease, or the observation of serological markers of infection, in 
individuals who have donated blood can lead to the ascertainment of transfusion-transmitted infections 
by tracing and testing of recipients exposed to components collected from donors during potentially 
infectious periods. Recipients may be asymptomatic at this time and only identified by this 
investigation. 
Post-transfusion infections (PTI) may be due to an infected (or contaminated) transfusion or infection 
may have been acquired from another source. Investigation of markers of infection in an implicated 
donation. or in subsequent samples from the donors of implicated donations, can confirm transfusion as 
the probable cause of infection, or identify the need to investigate other possible sources. The blood 
service must therefore be informed about implicated transfusions so that investigations can be 
conducted to confirm or refute the suspicion that the implicated transfusion(s) may have been 
infectious. This is essential to prevent further transmission(s) by other components and/or by 
chronically infected donors, and to reveal any systematic errors or deficiencies in the blood service 
testing. Such investigations may involve microbiological testing of many donors and may take several 
months to complete. 
A surveillance system to collect standardised information about infections suspected to have been 
transmitted by transfusion was introduced in the British Isles (excluding Scotland) and the Republic of 
Ireland by the National Blood Authority and the Public Health Laboratory Service Communicable 
Disease Surveillance Centre (PHLS CDSC) in October 1995. 
Retrospective data were collated in Scotland for cases occurring in Scotland during this year. 
Methods 
Participating blood centres (see above) reported all post-transfusion infections of which they had been 
informed to the NBA/PHLS CDSC infection surveillance system. The criteria for identifying infections 
eligible for reporting as post-transfusion infections were either: 
a) the receipt of the transfusion had been confirmed and the infection in the recipient had been 
confirmed (by detection of antibody, antigen. RNAIDNA or culture) and there was no evidence that the 
recipient was infected prior to transfusion, (see exception below) or. 
b) the receipt of the transfusion had been confirmed and the recipient had acute clinical 
hepatitis of no known cause (including no evidence of acute HAV. HBV. HCV. EBV or CMV infection 
in post-transfusion samples to date). 
One category of post-transfusion infections is not included in these data. In January 1999, a meeting of 
reporters agreed that HCV and HIV infections diagnosed in recipients who had received transfusions in 
the UK that were not tested for anti-HCV (i. e. pre September 1991) or anti-HIV (i. e. pre October 1985) 
respectively should be excluded from reporting. The blood service is rarely able to conduct follow-up 
investigation of donors implicated in these cases and these cases do not contribute to knowledge of the 
current infection transmission risks of blood transfusions. Numbers and details of such infections are 
therefore not included in this report. 
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If other possible sources of infection were known for a post-transfusion infection. an initial report was 
still requested. . 
Information about the recipient, the recipient's infection and the tran'sfusion(s) implicated as the 
possible source of infection formed the basis of the initial report. Subsequently, after appropriate 
investigations had been completed, details about the findings of the investigation, were reported. (PTI 
report forms are in Appendix 5) 
A post-transfusion infection was classified as a transfusion-transmitted infection if the following criteria 
were met at the end of the investigation: - 
the recipient had evidence of infection post-transfusion. and there was no evidence of infection 
prior to transfusion 
and, either 
" at least one component received by the infected recipient was donated by a donor who had 
evidence of the same transmissible infection. 
or 
" at least one component received by the infected recipient was shown to have been contaminated 
with the agent of infection 
Twice this year, all participating blood centres were reminded of the requirement to report, and asked to 
report any cases that had not yet been notified. 
Data received by 31112199 about incidents of transfusion-transmitted infections initially reported by 
blood centres between 1110/98 and 30/9/99 were included in this report. Data received about incidents 
reported during the previous three years of the surveillance system are included in a cumulative table. 
Unless the investigation was closed due to the identification of a probable source of infection other than 
transfusion. investigations that were closed without being able to conclusively investigate the source of 
the post-transfusion infections were classified as post-transfusion infections of undetermined source. 
Results 
34 initial reports of post-transfusion infections were made by blood centres during the report year. An 
additional 11 reports were received about post-transfusion reactions that were suspected- to be due to 
bacteria but for which no evidence of bacterial infection (or endotoxin) that could have caused the 
reaction was sought and found in the recipient or implicated component (i. e. the incidents did not 
satisfy the criteria for a post-transfusion infection as stated above, but may have been reactions of 
bacterial origin). Reports were received from 12 of the 21 blood centres participating in the 
surveillance system. These 12 centres collect approximately 86% of the donations tested by blood 
centres participating in the surveillance system. 
Figure 13 shows the classification of reports during the report year. 
Of the 34 post-transfusion infections initially reported by blood centres to the surveillance system 
between 1/10/98 and 30/9/99,7 (21%) were classified. after appropriate investigation, as transfusion- 
transmitted infections. Table 22 shows the transfusion-transmitted infections reported to the 
surveillance system between 1/10/98 and 30/9199 by year of transfusion: Four were transfused during 
the report year, and 3 were transfused prior to the report year. 
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Figure 13 
Classification of post-transfusion infections (and post-transfusion reactions) initially reported 
between 1/10198 and 3019/99. 
Year of transfusion 1997 1998 1999 Total 
I (to end Sept) 
Infection 
HBV - 1(1) - 1(1) 
HCV 1(1) -- 
1(1) 
Bacteria - 2(2) ' 3(3)' 
5(5)-2 
Total 1(1) 3(3)' 3(3)' 7(7) 
Notes: ' Infection was implicated in the death of a recipient. 
` Additionally. one probable transfusion transmitted bacteraemia (not fatal), transfused during 
1998. was reported in Scotland. 
A retrospective collation of cases investigated by blood centres in Scotland found three post-transfusion 
infection investigations during the report year. One recipient (72 year old male) developed pryexia and 
tachycardia after transfusion with red cells (23 days old, not leucodepleted). The recipient responded to 
antibiotic therapy and recovered. Coagulase negative Sraphyloccocus was cultured from the red cell 
pack. For two post-transfusion HCV infection reports (one transfused in 1996, one in 1999) 
investigation was completed and no evidence was found to implicate transfusion as the source of 
infection. A probable source of infection other than transfusion was known for one of these cases. 
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TrsosLLsioo-transmitted iotecüons reported between U1O/98-3019/99 by year of transfusion. The 
number of incidents are shown, with the total number of identified infected recipients shown in 
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Details of transfusion-transmitted infections 
A. Infections for which donation testing is mandatory 
Hepatitis B virus 
One transfusion-transmitted HBV infection was reported. 
One recipient (73 year old female) was found to have markers of acute HBV infection four months after 
transfusion of a red cell unit (one of three units received during a month) collected from a donor who 
developed acute HBV infection between one and two months after donating blood. The recipient was 
traced after the donor's General Practitioner informed the blood service of the donor's infection status. 
The archive of the implicated donation was confirmed to be HBsAg negative on re-testing but was 
found to be HBV DNA positive by nested PCR. (DNA was not detectable by PCR on a1 in 96 
dilution). The recipient died three months after her HBV diagnosis from the underlying reason for 
transfusion: HBV infection was not implicated in the recipient's death. 
The probable source of the recipient's BBV infection was concluded to be an HBV infectious, though 
I BsAg negative. donation collected from a repeat donor during early acute infection. The blood donor 
did not report any risk factor for 118V infection that is currently included in the criteria for the 
exclusion of individuals from donating blood. 
Hepatitis C virus 
One transfusion-transmitted HCV infection was reported. A repeat donor was found to be anti-HCV 
positive and HCV RNA positive. The archived sample of the previous (first) donation from this donor 
was re-tested and was also anti-HCV and HCV RNA positive. The recipient (a 64 year old male) of 
this red cell unit was traced and tested fourteen months after transfusion and was found to be anti-HCV 
positive and HCV RNA positive. Investigation by the blood service found an error had occurred during 
the re-testing of the donation that was initially reactive to the anti-HCV test. The duplicate repeat tests 
were read as negative because the samples were unintentionally dispensed into blank wells that are used 
to fill out part plates so they can be handled by automated machinery. It had been common practice to 
blank these out with a black marker pen to ensure that in the event they were accidentally used for 
samples they would return a fail safe positive reaction. However new machinery had been introduced 
which read these as negative. Once the problem was identified corrective and preventative action was 
put in place to ensure that a different mechanism is used to ensure that blank wells will if accidentally 
used return a positive result and "fail safe". 
The probable source of the recipient's HCV infection was concluded to be an HCV infectious. anti- 
HCV positive. donation from a new donor. The donation was not excluded from the blood supply 
because of a laboratory error during the testing process. The blood donor did not report any risk factor 
for HCV infection that is currently included in the criteria for the exclusion of individuals from 
donating blood. 
MV 
No transfusion transmitted }UV infections were reported during this year. 
B. Infections for which donation testing is not mandatory 
Bacteria 
Five transfusion-transmitted bacteraemias were reported. 
One recipient (27 year old male) developed bacteraemia after transfusion with two leucodepleted, 4 day 
old apheresis platelet units from the same donor. The recipient recovered and was asymptomatic one 
week after the transfusion. Staphylococcus epidermidis was isolated from the platelet packs and from 
the recipient (and these two isolates had identical banding patterns). Staph. epidermidis (with a 
different DNA fingerprint) was subsequently cultured from swabs of the donor's arms. Staph. 
epidermidis was not grown from swabs taken after standard skin preparation. No failure in the donor 
arm cleansing procedure at the time of donating the implicated donation had been noted. 
The probable source of the recipient's bacteracmia was concluded to be transfusion with platelets 
contaminated with skin flora from the donor's arm. 
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One recipient (52 year old male) suffered a severe febrile reaction during transfusion of a 
leucodepleted, 3 day old apheresis platelet unit. and died later the same afternoon. On inspection the 
next day the remainder of the platelet pack had some signs of bacterial contamination (unusual orange 
colouration and small specks visible when held up to the light). Escherichia coli was cultured from the 
recipient's blood and from the platelet pack (and these two isolates had identical biochemical profiles). 
No leaks or defects were identified in the platelet pack. An interview with the donor confirmed absence 
of symptoms of infection at and around the time of donation and swabs of the donor's arm skin were 
negative on culture. 
The probable source of the recipient's reaction, and cause of death. was concluded to be transfusion 
with platelets contaminated with Ecoli. No source of the contamination was identified. 
One recipient (78 year old female) suffered symptoms including feeling ho4 sweaty and dyspnoeic 
during transfusion of a pooled, leucodepleted, 4 day old platelet unit. The recipient subsequently 
recovered and was completely asymptomatic two weeks after the transfusion. Blood cultures were not 
taken from the recipient. Staphylococcus epidermidis was cultured from the platelet pack and from the 
red cell unit made from the same donation. 
An interview with the donor confirmed absence of symptoms of infection at and around the time of 
donation and swabs from the skin of the donor's arm were negative on culture. 
The probable source of the recipient's transient reaction was concluded to be transfusion with platelets 
contaminated with Staph. epidermidis. No source of the contamination was identified. 
One recipient (63 year old female) developed urticaria. rigors and pyrexia during transfusion of a 
pooled. leucodepleted, 4 day old platelet unit. The recipient was pyrexial for three days after 
transfusion and was treated with broad spectrum antibiotics. Bacillus cereus was cultured from the 
recipient's blood and from the platelet pack (and these two isolates were both of type 29). B cerets 
(type 29) was also cultured from swabs from the skin of the donor's arm (both pre- and post- arm 
cleansing). 
The probable source of the recipient's reaction was concluded to be transfusion with platelets 
contaminated with B. cereus from the donor's arm. 
N. B. The above four cases were associated with leucocyte depleted platelets: all platelets issued in the 
UK since January 1999 have been leucocyte depleted. The numbers of cases are too small to detect any 
effect of leucodepletion on bacterial contamination of components. 
One recipient (58 year old female) suffered a respiratory and cardiac arrest during transfusion of a 
second unit of red cells (33 day old. not leucodepleted) and died the same day. Yersinia entercolitica 
(serotype 09. biotype 3) was isolated from the patient's blood, the implicated red cell pack. the archive 
of the implicated donation and a fresh sample of blood taken from the donor 5 months after the 
donation. On follow-up the donor reported a history of diarrhoea a few weeks prior to the donation. 
The probable source of the recipient's reaction, and cause of death. was concluded to be transfusion 
with red cells contaminated with Yersinia entercolitica from the donor's blood. 
Details of post-transfusion infections not found to be transfusion-transmitted 
infections 
Three (9%) post-transfusion infections (all bacteraemias) were classified as post-transfusion infections 
of undetermined source due to inconclusive investigation of the transfusion(s) implicated as the source 
of infection. For seventeen (50%) post-transfusion infection reports (1 HAV infection. 5 HBV 
infections. 7 HCV infections. 2 HIV infections, t syphilis infection and 1 bacteraemia). investigation 
was completed and no tvidence was found to implicate transfusion as the source of infection. A 
possible source of infection other than transfusion was known for 5 of these infections (HBVx1: 
invasive medical procedure abroad. HCVxl: renal dialysis & transplant. HCVxI: tattoo, HIVx2: sexual 
risk factors). 
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Reporting delay 
For the 5 transfusion-transmitted bacterial infections, disease occurred on the same day as the 
transfusion. Both of the transfusion-transmitted viral infections (1 HBV and I HCV) were diagnosed 
with sub-clinical infections (130 days and 440 days after transfusion respectively) during the follow up 
of suspected infectious donations. Blood centres were informed of the bacteraemias suspected to be 
associated with transfusion on the same day (3 cases), the next day, and 7 days after transfusion. The 
intervals between the blood centre being informed and the completion of the initial surveillance report 
form (i. e. reporting delay) were 124 days, 98 days, 32 days, 22 days and 12 days for the 5 clinically 
detected (bacterial) infections. The average interval between transfusion and the initial report (i. e. 
including all time intervals and reporting delays) was 135 days (n=7). 
Under-reporting 
The cases ascertained by this surveillance system were diagnosed, suspected to be attributable to 
transfusion, communicated to the blood service, and reported by a blood centre to the surveillance 
centre. At any one of these steps, other post transfusion infections may have been missed and the extent 
of under-reporting of post-transfusion infections is therefore unknown. The proportion of post- 
transfusion infections that are reported each year may vary as other factors such as testing performed on 
transfusion recipients. awareness of transfusion as a possible source of infection, reporting of 
information to blood centres and reporting of information from blood centres to the surveillance centre 
vary. 
Previous year 
During the previous reporting year (i. e. 1/10/97 to 30/9/98) 4 transfusion-transmitted infections were 
reported (see SHOT Annual Report 1997-98 for details of these cases). One of these was an HCV 
infection transmitted by transfusion prior to anti-HCV testing of blood donations: this case has now 
been excluded from the cumulative figures. None of the post-transfusion infections reported during the 
1997-98 year that were pending full investigation at the time of the last (i. e. 1997-98) SHOT annual 
report have been subsequently concluded to have been transfusion-transmitted infections. 
The investigations of seven post-transfusion infections that were classified as pending full investigation 
in the 1997-98 SHOT report have subsequently been concluded to be not due to transfusion (4 cases) or 
inconclusive (3 cases). One of the inconclusive cases concerned an HIV infection in a patient who had 
received multiple transfusions during the early 1990s and had no other risk factors for HIV infection. 
Investigation of the transfusions given to this patient did not identify a source of infection, however, as 
not all transfusions were investigated, transfusion with HIV infectious. anti-HIV tested. blood was 
concluded to be the probable, although unproven, source of infection. 
Table 23 shows the cumulative number of transfusion-transmitted infections reported by the end of 
September 1999. 
Figure 14 shows the number of reports received by year of transfusion since October 1995. 
79 342 
Appendix 8 
SHOT Annual Report 1998 / 1999 
Table 23 
Cumulative total transfusion-transmitted infections: reported between 1/10/95-30/9/99 by date of 
transfusion. The number of Incidents is shown with the total number of identified infected 
recipients in brackets. 
Year 
transfusion 
of pre- 
1995 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(to end 
Sept)- 
Total Deaths 
Infection 
HAV - 1(1) - - - 1(1) 
HBV 1(I)b 1(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(1)- 5(5) 
HCV - 1(1) 1(1) - 2(2) 
1ßV` - - 1(3) - - - 1(3) 
Bacteria 1(1) 1(1) 3(3) 3(3)» 3(3)' 11(11) 3 
Malaria - - l (l). - - 10) 1 
Tota16 1(1)1 2(2) 5(7) 6(6)' 4(4)"z 3(3)' 21(23) 4 
Notes: Infection was implicated in the death of a recipient. 
One household member who was caring for the recipient has been diagnosed with acute 
HBV. 
` One additional investigation, initially reported during 97-98 and concluded during 98-99, 
failed to confirm or refute transfusion transmission of HIV infection during the early 1990s. As the 
patient had received multiple transfusions. and had no other risk factors for infection, transfusion with 
1-IIV infectious blood was concluded to be the probable, although unproven, source of infection. 
Additionally, one probable transfusion transmitted bacteraemia (not fatal), transfused during 
1998, was reported in Scotland. 
Figure 14 
PTI reports by report year 
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COMMENTARY 
". Reported transfusion-transmitted infections are rare: only 7 confirmed cases were recognised 
during this 12-month period of reporting. Investigations of a further 29 cases of post-transfusion 
infection were reported. 50% of the PTI reports during this year have been shown not to be caused 
by transfusion. For 9% of the reports the investigation was inconclusive and for the remainder 
investigation continues. Similarly. in Scotland during this year. one probAble case was recognised 
and two reports were shown not to be caused by transfusion. 
" Eleven cases of post-transfusion reactions suspected (but not confirmed) to be due to bacteria were 
also reported. Conclusive investigation of a suspected bacteraemia in a transfusion recipient relies 
heavily on the collection and handling of relevant samples at the hospital where the transfusion was 
performed. This means that absence of evidence of an infection. or toxin. in donations given to 
recipients who had post-transfusion reactions that were suspected, on clinical presentation, to be 
due to bacteria does not equate with evidence of absence of a transfusion-transmitted infection or 
toxin. 
" The intervals between transfusion and diagnosis of transfusion-transmitted infections were long - 
many weeks, months or years. Infections transmitted by transfusion between 1/10/98 and 30/9/99 
will continue to be ascertained by the surveillance system as diagnoses are made in the future. 
" Two transfusion-transmitted viral infections (1 HBV and 1 HCV) were detected by follow-up of 
recipients after the detection of infections in blood donors. In one case (HCV) the donor's 
infection was diagnosed by the blood service by the testing of a subsequent donation, and in the 
other case (HBV) the donor's GP informed the blood service of the donor's infection. Neither of 
these transfusion-transmitted infections had caused symptomatic, diagnosed disease in the 
recipients. One of these transfusion-transmitted infections (HBV) was due to a donation collected 
from a donor during the marker negative "window period" early in a recent infection. One (HCV) 
was due to a laboratory error resulting in a false negative test result. Neither of these donors 
reported risk factors. 
" Five transfusion-transmitted bacterial infections arose from donations from donors with infections 
for which no routine microbiology testing is performed. 
" One reported transfusion-transmitted infection resulted from errors in the microbiological testing, 
or release, of blood donations. 
" Two transfusion-transmitted infections, both bacterial, reported during this year resulted in the 
death of the recipient. 
" Several reports have been received of components that were observed to have visual signs of 
bacterial contamination before use, were not transfused, were sent for bacteriological investigation 
and were found to contain bacteria expected to cause disease in a recipient if transfused. 
Inspection of components, especially platelets, detected contamination and prevented morbidity in 
these incidents. Such inspection should continue to be encouraged. These reports indicate "near- 
miss" bacterial transmissions. The investigation of the source of the contamination in these cases 
can be as informative as the investigation of transmissions, and the possibility of requesting and 
collating some information about these cases in the future is being considered. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
" Careful inspection of blood components can, in some cases, detect bacterial contamination and 
prevent potential transmission. Components showing any unusual colour, turbidity or clumping 
should not be transfused, but should be returned to the Hospital Blood Bank for culture. 
" Clinicians should report all post-transfusion infections diagnosed in their-patients to their regional 
blood service for appropriate investigation. Blood centres should, in tunr, complete an initial 
report form as soon as possible. 
" The quality of investigation of transfusion reactions suspected to be due to bacteria is variable. 
Hospitals should consult guidelines and the blood service about the investigation of such cases, 
including the sampling and storage of implicated units. National guidelines (from the NBS) on the 
investigation of these cases are currently being revised following comments from users. 
" Donors' clinicians (and donors themselves) can aid the detection of transfusion-transmitted 
infections, and hence their appropriate care. by communicating with the blood service about any 
relevant history of blood donation on patients diagnosed with blood borne infections. 
" National collation of data arising from these cases needs to continue over several years before a 
picture of the extent and nature of the infectious complications of transfusion can emerge. 
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